

2022-23 Middle School Core Files

Middle School Resolution

Resolved: The United States federal government should substantially increase its security cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in one or more of the following areas: artificial intelligence, biotechnology, cybersecurity.



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Cyber Warfare Aff

Cyber Warfare AFF Description

The “Cyberwarfare AFF” (previously the “Disinformation AFF”) argues that the internet is going to be just as important as the battlefield in coming conflicts. Hacking groups have launched a number of attacks over the years, especially Ransomware attacks like the one targeting the Colonial Pipeline that shut down gasoline distribution for weeks in parts of the United States.

Advantage One argues that Russia will continue to use the internet as a way to attack the United States and other countries. Therefore, the US and NATO need to strengthen their defenses in order to counter this threat. Currently, there is not a well-coordinated effort to combine defenses to counter it.

Advantage Two argues that an extension of this needs to be countering Russian disinformation to counter Russia’s political goals. Misinformation polarizes constituencies and can hurt democracy.

Terms to Know:

AI: Answers to

Colonial Pipeline: In May of 2021, the hacking group DarkSide hacked the computer systems of the Colonial Pipeline, a line that carries gasoline from Texas all the way to New York, supplying about 45% of the gasoline in those areas. The group locked the billing system and demanded a payment in Bitcoins. The pipeline was shut down as a precaution because the hackers may have accessed that system as well. The system was shut down for 6 days.

Solvency Advocate: A expert or reputable report that proves a given course of action can work

Thumper: A situation that disproves a given impact

Cyber Warfare AFF Case

1AC Cyber Inherency

NATO and its allies depend heavily on a strong cyber defense.

NATO 2022 ("Cyber defence," North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), March 23, 2022, [NATO - Cyber defence](#), NAUDL)

Cyber threats to the security of the Alliance are complex, destructive and coercive, and are becoming ever more frequent. NATO will continue to adapt to the evolving cyber threat landscape. **NATO and its Allies rely on strong and resilient cyber defences to fulfil the Alliance's core tasks of collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security**. The Alliance needs to be prepared to defend its networks and operations against the growing sophistication of the cyber threats it faces. Cyber defence is part of NATO's core task of collective defence. NATO Allies have affirmed that international law applies in cyberspace. NATO's main focus in cyber defence is to protect its own networks, operate in cyberspace (including through the Alliance's operations and missions), help Allies to enhance their national resilience and provide a platform for political consultation and collective action. In July 2016, Allies reaffirmed NATO's defensive mandate and recognised cyberspace as a domain of operations in which NATO must defend itself as effectively as it does in the air, on land and at sea. **Allies also made a Cyber Defence Pledge in July 2016 to enhance their cyber defences, and have continued to bolster their national resilience as a matter of priority**. NATO reinforces its cyber capabilities, including through education, training and exercises. **Allies are committed to enhancing information-sharing and mutual assistance in preventing, mitigating and recovering from cyber attacks**. NATO Cyber Rapid Reaction teams are on standby 24 hours a day to assist Allies, if requested and approved. At the 2018 NATO Summit in Brussels, Allies agreed to set up a Cyberspace Operations Centre as part of NATO's strengthened Command Structure. They also agreed that NATO can draw on national cyber capabilities for operations and missions. In February 2019, Allies endorsed a NATO guide that sets out a number of tools to further strengthen NATO's ability to respond to significant malicious cumulative cyber activities. NATO and the European Union (EU) are cooperating through a Technical Arrangement on Cyber Defence, which was signed in February 2016. In light of common challenges, NATO and the EU are strengthening their cooperation on cyber defence, notably in the areas of information exchange, training, research and exercises. **NATO is intensifying its cooperation with industry through the NATO Industry Cyber Partnership**. At the 2021 NATO Summit in Brussels, Allies endorsed a new Comprehensive Cyber Defence Policy, which supports NATO's core tasks and overall deterrence and defence posture to enhance further the Alliance's resilience. Allies are using NATO as a platform for political consultation, sharing concerns about malicious cyber activities and exchanging national approaches and responses, as well as considering possible collective responses. Allies are promoting a free,

open, peaceful and secure cyberspace, and pursuing efforts to enhance stability and reduce the risk of conflict by supporting international law and voluntary norms of responsible state behaviour in cyberspace.

The United States needs to increase cyber efforts with NATO to improve NATO's and their own cyber security.

Ilves et al. 2016 ("European Union and NATO Global Cybersecurity Challenges," Luukas Ilves, Counselor for Digital Affairs at the Permanent Representation of Estonia to the EU. Timothy Evans is Senior Advisor, Cyber Strategy and Policy, at Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory in Arlington, Virginia. Frank Cilluffo is the Director of the George Washington University's Center for Cyber and Homeland Security. Alec Nadeau is a Presidential Administrative Fellow at the George Washington University's Center for Cyber and Homeland Security. July 28, 2016, https://cco.ndu.edu/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=HVj82hUX7_s%3d&portalid=96, NAUDL)

Developments in the cybersecurity operations of both NATO and the EU have paralleled the growth of cybersecurity as a major policy concern to the United States and other national governments. The digital revolution has also changed the basic environment in which governments operate, necessitating increasing levels of cross-border interdependence and connectivity. **European countries have responded to the need to increase coordination and cooperation through new initiatives at the national level and under the auspices of NATO and the EU.** Nevertheless, the relationship between national capabilities and sovereignty, and the authority of these two international organizations, remains unsettled. **The efforts of NATO and the EU to mainstream cybersecurity into existing activities have thus far proven insufficient to fully address the growing cyber threat landscape.** NATO's Development of Cross-border Cyber Defense Policy and Coordination NATO forecasted today's cyber threat environment in 2010: "**Cyber attacks are becoming more frequent, more organized and more costly [...]: they can reach a threshold that threatens national and Euro-Atlantic prosperity, security and stability.**"⁶ NATO faces a cyber threat landscape that abounds with hackers, hacktivists, nation-states, and criminals. **NATO itself has been targeted directly by Russian hackers seeking information on its defensive posture against Russia.**⁷ Furthermore, the recent attack by Russia on the Ukrainian power grid underscores the fact that **Russian cyber attack capabilities are very real.**⁸ **NATO also faces the same types of cyber breaches that affect businesses in America on a daily basis, ranging from random criminal acts to infiltrate NATO's systems to those of a more sophisticated, targeted nature.** Despite preventive measures, cyber criminals around the world continue to gain access to these networks, including those that are classified.⁹ In all, the current threat environment embodies much more significant risks than those first exemplified by the Russian cyber attacks on Estonia in 2007, which initially prompted NATO to address the dangers of cyber warfare.

Cyber security attacks are becoming more and more dangerous.

Maigre 2022 ("NATO's Role in Global Cyber Security," Merle Maigre is the senior cybersecurity expert at e-Governance Academy in Estonia. She is a member of the Executive Board of the Cyber Peace Institute in Geneva and the International Advisory Board of NATO CCDCOE, April 6, 2022, [NATO's Role in Global Cyber Security | Strengthening Transatlantic Cooperation](#), NAUDL)

Malicious cyber activity has increased substantially over the past years, ranging from ransomware and espionage to politically motivated cyberattacks and sophisticated malware used in the war in Ukraine. NATO allies must remain on high alert. The changed nature of military conflict changes the defensive mission of NATO, which faces capable opponents in cyberspace and raises the question of how to create accountability when a hostile state fails to observe globally agreed norms. The set of action for NATO for the next five years evolves around how to impose costs and how to deny benefits against malicious actors in cyberspace. **What the war in Ukraine says about cyber power is yet not entirely cleared from the fog of war. Many aspects remain uncertain, but given the unpredictability of the Putin regime, the risk of an escalation in hostile cyber exchanges between Russia and NATO states remains high. What is clear is that, as of February 24, 2022, we live in a different world in which the European and global security orders have been shattered.** This brief first explores the challenge that cyber threats pose to NATO allies and how the rapidly evolving cyber-threat landscape can alter the international security environment. Secondly, it looks at developments in cyber defense policy within NATO. Finally, the brief analyzes how NATO needs to adapt to address cyber challenges, studying how allies align their sovereign interests, capabilities, and cyber doctrines with NATO operational requirements and strategic ambitions. **NATO is set to issue strategic documents in 2022 that will guide the next decade of its military planning. This will certainly require more transatlantic consultation on political-military matters with an emphasis on cyber security and cyber defense.** Cyber Challenge to World and NATO Allies: **Malicious cyber activity has increased substantially over the past years while the world has kept turning amid the omnipresent pandemic** and now war in Ukraine. States, non-state actors, **and criminal groups compete and are increasingly weaponizing sensitive information and infiltrating other countries' networks to steal data, seed misinformation, or disrupt critical infrastructure.**

Thus the Plan: The United States federal government should substantially increase its security cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in cyber security.

1AC Cyber Advantage 1: Russia

The past attacks on US cyber space will continue to happen without strong cyber security.

Purdy 2021 (“The US Needs A Stronger Commitment To Cybersecurity,” Andy Purdy, July 30, 2021, Andy is CSO for Huawei Technologies USA, overseeing Huawei’s US cyber assurance program.

<https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2021/07/30/the-us-needs-a-stronger-commitment-to-cybersecurity/?sh=7a5b9db05daf>, NAUDL)

The Colonial Pipeline ransomware attack illustrated the vulnerability of America’s critical infrastructure to a security breach. Fuel shortages and rising prices got people’s attention. Data breaches have more than doubled over the past decade. Recent cyberattacks have exploited the “trusted supplier” status of SolarWinds and Microsoft Exchange, among other companies, and raised concerns at the highest levels of government and the private sector. The stakes are only getting higher as the internet of things makes everything more connected and we all become more dependent on 5G-enabled technologies. What’s being done to prevent cyberattacks – and is it enough? Last month, President Joe Biden issued an executive order to begin developing mandatory baseline security requirements for government agencies and the companies that do business with them. The order states that the federal government must collaborate with the private sector and with the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to develop and implement a zero-trust model that “eliminates implicit trust in any one element, node, or service and instead requires continuous verification” from multiple sources.

U.S. cyber- security is currently weak against attacks.

Marks and Schaffer on June 6, 2022 (“The U.S. isn’t getting ahead of the cyber threat, experts say,” Joseph Marks and Aaron Schaffer, June 6, 2022, Joseph Marks, writes The Cybersecurity 202 newsletter focused on the policy and politics of cybersecurity. Before joining The Washington Post, Marks covered cybersecurity for Politico and Nextgov, a news site focused on government technology and security. He also covered patent and copyright trends for Bloomberg BNA and federal litigation for Law360. Aaron Schaffer is a researcher for Technology 202 and Cybersecurity 202, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/06/06/us-isnt-getting-ahead-cyber-threat-experts-say/>, NAUDL)

Our network of cyber experts have a less-than-rosy take on the United States' ability to fend off cyber attacks. Most of them said the U.S. is either just as vulnerable to cyberattacks or even more vulnerable today than it was five years ago. That assessment, from a group of experts polled by The Cybersecurity 202, reflects **a half-decade during which government and industry have supercharged their efforts to defend against devastating hacks from foreign governments and criminals — but the bad guys have upped their game even more.** most experts say. “[We’re] less vulnerable against the threats of five years ago. But **I see no evidence that the threat has stood still, and in fact, it is likely that it has grown at a faster rate than our defenses,**” said Herb Lin, senior research scholar for cyber policy and security at Stanford University. “We become evermore vulnerable with each passing day,” warned Lauren Zabierek, executive director of the Cyber Project at the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center. “I don’t know where the bottom is.” The breakdown, **About 43 percent of respondents** to our Network experts poll **said the United States is more vulnerable to cyberattacks now.** About 38 percent said we’re just as vulnerable as we were five years ago. Just 19 percent of experts said the United States is less vulnerable in cyberspace than five years ago. **The sobering results come as cyber executives and analysts are convening in San Francisco for the RSA Conference, the largest annual industry-focused cybersecurity gathering,** which is being held in person for the first time since the start of the coronavirus pandemic. The cyber industry has fared extremely well during the past half-decade — nearly doubling in value, according to some estimates — but it has also struggled to keep up with the dizzying pace of attacks. More targets: One key problem, according to experts who said the United States is more vulnerable now: The nation has become more reliant on technology during the past five years — significantly increasing the targets that hackers can aim at. And that technology is often being built without security foremost in mind. **“Cybersecurity is improving constantly, but the complexity of our digital society may be outpacing our efforts to keep up,” Mandiant Threat Intelligence chief John Hultquist said.** Cyber and tech investor Niloofar Razi Howe: “We are more vulnerable because of the dizzying pace we are adopting technology, engaging in tech transformation, and adding devices without prioritizing security.” **One particularly rich target has been a vast new array of Internet-connected devices, such as refrigerators, thermostats and cameras. These devices,** commonly called the “Internet of things” or “IoT” **are notorious for relying on weak or default passwords and being difficult to update with software patches — making them easy pickings for hackers.** “Many of these technologies have shortchanged their cybersecurity expenditures, creating ever-increasing liabilities for everyone,” said Sascha Meinrath, founding director of X-Lab, a think tank at Penn State focusing on the intersection of technologies and public policy. “As the cyber-strategist Biggie Smalls would have said, ‘More IoT, More Problems,’ ” quipped Peter Singer, a fellow at the New America think tank. (Singer said the United States is equally vulnerable compared to five years ago). **Many experts blamed the United States’ ongoing vulnerability to hacking on the increased brazenness of U.S. adversaries, especially Russia. Norma Krayem, a cyber policy expert at Van Scoyoc Associates: “Russia’s use of cyber tools against Ukraine has clearly demonstrated to the world that it can fully disrupt key aspects of critical infrastructure.**

Simple U.S. deterrence does not work.

Pham 2022 ("IN CYBERSPACE, NO ONE CAN HEAR YOU BLUFF," By Captain Tuan N. Pham, U.S. Navy, Center for International Maritime Security May 11, 2022 <https://cimsec.org/in-cyberspace-no-one-can-hear-you-bluff/>, NAUDL)

General Paul Nakasone – Commander, U.S. Cyber Command (USCC) and Director, National Security Agency (NSA) – asserts that “traditional military deterrence is binary in regard to conflict and a deterrence model...does not comport to cyberspace where much of the nefarious cyber activity plays out non-stop in an ambiguous strategic gray zone.” While this article is in agreement with the “futility of totally deterring adversaries from operating in cyberspace and instead actively disrupting those activities before they can inflict damage,” it takes the position of respectfully disagreeing that traditional deterrence is binary and the rules of traditional deterrence do not hold in cyberspace. **Deterrence centered around domain denial is neither desirable nor sustainable. Hindering access to cyberspace is not consistent with the enduring American values of individual liberty, free expression, and free markets. This encumbered access also runs counter to the U.S. national interest of protecting and promoting internet freedom to support the free flow of information that enhances international trade and commerce, fosters innovation, and strengthens both national and international security; and the universal right (global norm) of unfettered free access to and peaceful use of cyberspace for all.** Restricting access to cyberspace is also not practical considering the cost to operate in cyberspace is modest, the barriers to entry low, and the ease of operating negligible. Deterrence, the “prevention of action by either the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction and/or belief that the costs of action outweigh the perceived benefits,” is more complicated and nuanced than a simple binary response of yes or no. **Deterrence can create a delay or pause for transitory maneuvering space to mitigate the effects of the threat action, or better yet, take preemptive or preventive measures to disrupt (neutralize) the threat action.** Deterrence, like warfighting (war), involves universal and immutable “human nature” that does not change over time or across nationality, demographic, culture, geography, and domain. Rational actors choose to act or not to act based on fundamental “fear, honor, and interest (Thucydides)” and are deterred to act or not to act by real or perceived “capability, intent, and credibility (deterrent triad).” Additionally, as Henry Kissinger once noted, “deterrence is a product of capability, intent, and credibility and not a sum...if any one of them is zero, deterrence fails.” **Washington accordingly must do more and do better to ensure each factor succeeds as an aggregate deterrent triad for increased integrated deterrence, decreased strategic risk, greater strategic alignment, and lesser likelihood of conflict across all the interconnected and contested domains.** Deterrence works best when it is clear, coherent, uniform, and complementary across the fluid competition continuum (steady state to crisis to conflict); expansive instruments of national power (diplomatic, information, military, economic, financial, intelligence, and law enforcement – DIMEFIL); and interconnected and contested domains (physical and nonphysical) for strategic consistency, operational agility, and tactical flexibility. Last year in an article titled “In Space, No One Can Hear You Bluff,” this author made the policy case for a more active space deterrence to better manage the growing threats to the vulnerable U.S. high-value space assets. This article makes the same policy case now for a more active cyber deterrence to better address the exigent factors of time, space, and force in cyberspace. **An attack in cyberspace can come from anyone, occur anywhere, and happen anytime with no warning to react and no opportunity to respond – an increasing real risk as the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine persists and President Putin becomes more impatient and desperate for victory while becoming at risk of dangerously perceiving a shift in U.S. policy from conflict containment (vertical and horizontal) to conflict escalation, or worse, regime change.**

A strong cyber security front helps secure the U.S. from further Russian attacks.

Maigre 2022 (“NATO’s Role in Global Cyber Security,” Merle Maigre is the senior cybersecurity expert at e-Governance Academy in Estonia. She is a member of the Executive Board of the Cyber Peace Institute in Geneva and the International Advisory Board of NATO CCDCOE, April 6, 2022, <https://www.gmfus.org/news/natos-role-global-cyber-security>, NAUDL)

Another set of threats comes in the form of belligerent state actors that seek to steal sensitive data for espionage. **In December 2020, Russian intelligence services infiltrated the digital systems run by US tech firm SolarWinds and inserted malware into its code. During the company’s next software update, the virus was inadvertently spread to about 18,000 clients, including large corporations, the Pentagon, the State Department, Homeland Security, the Treasury, and other US government agencies. The hack went undetected for months before the victims discovered vast amounts of their data had been stolen.**⁵ There are also politically motivated cyberattacks mandated by states that interfere in democratic processes and political discourse. **In September 2020, the internal email system of Norway’s parliament was hacked.**⁶ Ine Eriksen Søreide, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Norway, underlined the significance of the attack by calling it an important cyber incident that affected the “most important democratic institution” of the country.⁷ **Norwegian authorities later identified Russia as the actor responsible for the attack**, marking the first time that Norwegian authorities had made a political attribution to such an attack. Since the beginning of this year, Ukraine’s government has been hit by a series of cyberattacks that defaced government websites and wiped out the data on some government computers. In mid-January, hackers defaced about 70 Ukrainian websites, including the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defense, Energy, Education, and Science, as well as the State Emergency Service and the Ministry of Digital Transformation, whose e-governance portal gives the Ukrainian public digital access to dozens of government services. The hackers replaced the home pages of about a dozen sites with a threatening message: “be afraid and expect worse.” After a couple of days, however, most of the sites were restored.⁸ The international hacktivist collective Anonymous has declared “cyberwar” against Russia’s government, claiming credit for several cyber incidents including distributed denial of service attacks that took down Russian government websites and Russia Today, the state-backed news service.⁹ Around the globe, aging critical infrastructure has long been vulnerable to attack. The most worrying type of cyberattack is sophisticated malware designed by states or state-backed actors that act as “time bombs” in the critical cyber networks of target countries, such as the energy, telecom, and transportation sectors. Around the globe, aging critical infrastructure has long been vulnerable to attack. In 2020, the UK’s National Cyber Security Centre issued a warning of Russian attacks on millions of routers, firewalls, and devices used by infrastructure operators and government agencies.¹⁰ **On the day of the Russian invasion, ViaSat, a provider of high-speed satellite broadband services, was hacked along with one of its satellites Ka-Sat, whose users included Ukraine’s armed forces, police, and intelligence service. Destructive wiper malware attacks by Russia against Ukraine included WhisperGate, discovered in January by Microsoft, in Ukraine’s networks that “provide critical executive branch or emergency response functions”;**

Russian Attacks could go nuclear.

Ellyat 2022 (“Could there be war between Russia and the West? Strategists predict what could happen next,” Holly Ellyat, a correspondent with CNBC’s international team in London – she cites multiple experts in this reporting, CNBC, April 29, 2022 Holly Ellyat is: <https://www.cnbc.com/2022/04/29/russia-ukraine-war-should-the-west-prepare-for-war-with-putin.html> , NAUDL)

Nonetheless, Ramani noted the threat posed by Russia could become more acute if it felt humiliated on the battlefield. In particular, military setbacks in Ukraine around May 9 could pose some danger. That’s Russia’s “Victory Day” – the anniversary of Nazi Germany’s defeat by the Soviet Union in World War II. **“Putin has had a history of escalating unpredictability if he feels that Russia is being humiliated in some way ... and if there are major setbacks,** especially on around the 9th [of May] **then there’s a risk of unbreakable action,”** he said. “But also there’s a logic of mutually assured destruction that hopefully will rein everybody in.” **Threatening nuclear attacks is part of Putin’s “playbook,” said William Alberque, director of strategy, technology and arms control at the International Institute for Strategic Studies think tank. “Putin enjoys using risks and he thinks he has a much more appetite for risk than the West does,” he told CNBC on Thursday. “He’s trying to use the old playbook of ‘if I terrify you enough, you’ll back down,’” he said. “Ultimately, if he uses nuclear weapons, even a demonstration strike, this would turn Russia into a global pariah.”** Alberque said. He advised Western leaders, “We just need to be able to manage our risk and keep our nerve and not panic when he does something that we might not expect.”

***Nuclear Powers could respond to cyber attacks could escalate to nuclear war**

Acton 2020 Acton, James. "Cyber Warfare and Inadvertent Escalation." March 25th, 2020. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Dr. James Acton has a PhD in Theoretical Physics from Cambridge and is the Codirector of nuclear Policy at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. <https://www.amacad.org/publication/cyber-warfare-inadvertent-escalation>

The United States' experience is the norm. All nuclear-armed states have felt, and continue to feel, similar concerns. Indeed, **the last few decades have seen the emergence of new potential vulnerabilities—this time in cyberspace—as nuclear weapons and C3I systems have come to rely increasingly on digital technology. To be sure, the networks involved in nuclear operations are almost certainly among the most secure anywhere. Yet there is broad agreement among technical experts that perfect network security is “impossible.”**As a result, the possibility of cyber interference with nuclear forces and C3I systems is real.

The vulnerability of nuclear forces and C3I systems creates the risk of inadvertent escalation: that is, escalation resulting from military operations or threats that are not intended to be escalatory. So-called crisis instability, for example, could arise if a state were afraid of being disarmed more or less completely in a preemptive strike by an adversary, whether or not such fears were well founded.In the most extreme case, **“use-’em-or-lose-’em” pressures could lead the state to employ nuclear weapons, conceivably in its own preemptive attempt to disarm its adversary, but more likely in a limited way to try to terrify the opponent into backing down. In less extreme scenarios, a state afraid of being disarmed might take steps—issuing nuclear threats, for example, or dispersing mobile nuclear forces—that raised the likelihood of nuclear use later.**

This danger is likely to be exacerbated by any cyber vulnerabilities affecting nuclear forces and C3I systems. Most directly, the existence of such vulnerabilities could intensify existing fears of being disarmed—fears that are already acute in China and Russia (as well as in Pakistan and, most likely, North Korea). However, because of their unique characteristics and effects, **cyber threats could create at least three qualitatively new mechanisms by which a nuclear-armed state might come to the incorrect conclusion that its nuclear deterrent was under threat. First, the purpose of cyber interference could be misinterpreted. In particular, espionage could be mistaken for an attack. Second, a cyberattack could have a more significant effect than intended. Malware implanted into information technology (IT) systems associated with non-nuclear weapons could accidentally spread into more sensitive nuclear-related systems, for instance. Third, the initiator of a cyber operation could be misidentified.** An operation carried out by a third party, for example, could be misattributed by one state in a bilateral confrontation to its opponent. **What makes these pathways so pernicious is that the catalyst for escalation could appear to its initiator to be a relatively benign action.**

To make matters worse, such pathways could lead to inadvertent escalation even if the target of the cyber interference were not afraid of being completely disarmed. Today at least, this description fits the United States. **If, in a conflict against Russia, say, the United States wrongly concluded that its strategic early-warning system was under cyberattack, it might reason that Moscow was seeking to undermine U.S. missile defenses, which use early-warning data, prior to launching a nuclear attack.** Given that U.S. declaratory policy explicitly highlights **the option of a nuclear response to non-nuclear attacks on nuclear C3I assets, such a “misinterpreted warning” might lead Washington to use nuclear weapons.** But even if it did not, its response, which might include nuclear threats, could still be escalatory.

1AC Cyber Advantage 2: Social Media Misinformation

Russia's cyber attacks have planted false information in the media.

Ling 2022 ("NATO Should Elevate Its Cyber Game, and Quickly," Justin Ling, Centre for International Governance Innovation, May 13, 2022, <https://www.cigionline.org/articles/nato-should-elevate-its-cyber-game-and-quickly/>, NAUDL)

Russia's propaganda and disinformation apparatus is extraordinarily complex. Some outlets are fully state-run, some are merely state-funded, and others are operated at arm's length by Putin-linked oligarchs. The system churns out conspiracy theories and whataboutism to aid Moscow's objectives. From the start of the all-out invasion on February 24, **Russian disinformation has thumped on a series of narratives: that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) posed a security risk to the Russian Federation; that Ukraine was run by neo-Nazis; that Ukraine is responsible for slaughtering civilians on its own territory.** Those narratives have, unfortunately, been somewhat effective in discouraging a unified response from NATO. They've influenced millions of Westerners and found purchase with far-right and Russophilic politicians the world over. **The most visible Western response to date has been the collective taking offline of Russia Today, or RT, the state-run television network.** Yet trying to ban Russian media is a mug's game. Any outlets forbidden by law or suspended by the social media giants would simply jump to the Russian-founded social media platform Telegram, which abhors regulation. Rather than playing whack-a-mole outlet by outlet, Ukraine's allies would be better off exposing how these disinformation networks work. **Many of these social media pages, self-styled think tanks, blogs and media outlets are designed to look fully independent and authentic. Efforts by Twitter, Alphabet and Meta to expose them as disinformation have been inconsistent.** Berlin-based, Moscow-run video aggregator Ruptly is "state-affiliated media," according to Twitter, but "state-controlled media" per Facebook; its "transparency" feature notes that the outlet's page administrators are in three EU countries, but doesn't name them. **Some smaller but perhaps more effective outlets** — such as the French-language Donbass Insider, which **has used manipulative practices to spread Kremlin disinformation on its Facebook page — carry no disclaimer at all.**

Hackers have broken into real news sites and planted stories.

Greenburg 2020 ("Hackers Broke Into Real News Sites to Plant Fake Stories," Andy Greenberg, senior writer for WIRED, covering security, privacy, and information freedom. He's the author of the forthcoming book *Tracers in the Dark: The Global Hunt for the Crime Lords of Cryptocurrency*. July 29, 2020, <https://www.wired.com/story/hackers-broke-into-real-news-sites-to-plant-fake-stories-anti-nato/>, NAUDL)

OVER THE PAST few years, online disinformation has taken evolutionary leaps forward, with the Internet Research Agency pumping out artificial outrage on social media and hackers leaking documents—both real and fabricated—to suit their narrative. More recently, **Eastern Europe has faced a broad campaign that takes fake news ops to yet another level: hacking legitimate news sites to plant fake stories, then hurriedly amplifying them on social media before they're taken down.** On Wednesday, **security firm FireEye released a report on a disinformation-focused group it's calling Ghostwriter. The propagandists have created and disseminated disinformation since at least March 2017, with a focus on undermining NATO and the US troops in Poland and the Baltics; they've posted fake content on everything from social media to pro-Russian news websites.** In some cases, FireEye says, Ghostwriter has deployed a bolder tactic: **hacking the content management systems of news websites to post their own stories. They then disseminate their literal fake news** with spoofed emails, social media, and even op-eds the propagandists write on other sites that accept user-generated content. **That hacking campaign,** targeting media sites from Poland to Lithuania, **has spread false stories about US military aggression, NATO soldiers spreading coronavirus, NATO planning a full-on invasion of Belarus, and more.** "They're spreading these stories that NATO is a danger, that they resent the locals, that they're infected, that they're car thieves," says John Hultquist, director of intelligence at FireEye. "And they're pushing these stories out with a variety of means, the most interesting of which is hacking local media websites and planting them. These fictional stories are suddenly bona fide by the sites that they're on, and then they go in and spread the link to the story." FireEye itself did not conduct incident response analyses on these incidents and concedes that it doesn't know exactly how the hackers are stealing credentials that give them access to the content management systems that allow posting and altering news stories. Nor does it know who is behind the string of website compromises, or for that matter the larger disinformation campaign that the fake stories are a part of.

Fake news is driving a false wedge between countries

Greenburg 2020 ("Hackers Broke Into Real News Sites to Plant Fake Stories," Andy Greenberg, senior writer for WIRED, covering security, privacy, and information freedom. He's the author of the forthcoming book *Tracers in the Dark: The Global Hunt for the Crime Lords of Cryptocurrency*. July 29, 2020, <https://www.wired.com/story/hackers-broke-into-real-news-sites-to-plant-fake-stories-anti-nato/>, NAUDL)

But the company's analysts have found that the news site compromises and the online accounts used to spread links to those fabricated stories, as well as the more traditional creation of fake news on social media, blogs, and websites with an anti-US and anti-NATO bent, all tie back to a distinct set of personas, indicating one unified disinformation effort. **FireEye's Hultquist points out that the campaign doesn't seem financially motivated, indicating a political or state backer, and notes that the focus on driving a wedge between NATO and citizens of Eastern Europe hints at possible Russian involvement. Nor would it be the first time that Russian hackers planted fake news stories; in 2017, US intelligence agencies concluded that Russian hackers breached Qatar's state news agency and planted a fake news story designed to embarrass the country's leader and cause a rift with the US,** though US intelligence never confirmed the Kremlin's involvement. "We can't concretely tie it to Russia at this time, but it's certainly in line with their interests," Hultquist says of the Ghostwriter campaign. "It wouldn't be a surprise to me if this is where the evidence leads us." Much of the disinformation has focused on Lithuania, as DefenseOne reported late last year. In June 2018, for instance, the English-language, Baltic-focused news site the Baltic Course published a story claiming that a US Stryker armored vehicle had collided with a Lithuanian child on a bicycle, killing the child "on the spot." The same day, the Baltic Course posted a notice to the site that "hackers posted this news about the deceased child, which is FAKE!!! We thank our vigilant Lithuanian readers who reported on our Facebook page about fake new on site. We strengthened security measures." A few months later, the Lithuanian news site Kas Vyksta Kaune published a story stating that "NATO plans to invade Belarus," showing a map of how NATO forces in Polish and Baltic countries would enter the neighboring country. Kas Vyksta Kaune later acknowledged that the story was fake, and planted by hackers. Someone had used a former employee's credentials to gain access to the CMS. Then in September of last year, **another fake story was posted to the site about German NATO soldiers desecrating a Jewish cemetery, including what FireEye describes as a photoshopped image of a military vehicle with a German flag visible behind the cemetery.** More recently, the fake stories have attempted to exploit fears of Covid-19. One story posted to both Kas Vyksta Kaune and the English-language Baltic Times in January claimed that the first Covid-19 case in Lithuania was a US soldier who was hospitalized in critical condition, but only after he "visited public places and participated in city events with child and youth participation," according to the Baltic Times version of the story. In April and May of this year, the focus turned toward Poland: A fake story was posted across several Polish news sites in which a US official disparaged local Polish forces as disorganized and incompetent. This time the campaign went even beyond news sites. A fake letter from a Polish military official was posted to the Polish Military Academy website, calling on the Polish military to cease military exercises with the US, decrying the US "occupation" of Poland, and calling the exercises an "obvious provocation" of Russia. The Polish government quickly called out the letter as fake. FireEye's finding that all of those operations to plant **fake news were carried out by a single group comes on the heels of a report from The New York Times that Russia's military intelligence agency, the GRU, has been coordinating the publication of disinformation on sites** like InfoRos, OneWorld.press, and GlobalResearch.ca. **US intelligence officials speaking to the Times said that disinformation campaign, which included false reports that Covid-19 originated in the US, was specifically the work of the GRU's "psychological warfare unit,"** known as Unit 54777. **Given the GRU's**

role in meddling in the 2016 presidential election, including its hack-and-leak operations against the Democratic National Committee and the Clinton Campaign, any GRU role in more recent disinformation raises fears that it may be targeting the 2020 election as well. While FireEye has made no such claims that the Ghostwriter news site compromises were the work of the GRU, **Hultquist argues that the incidents in Poland and the Baltics should nonetheless serve as a warning. Even if false stories are spotted quickly and taken down, they could have a significant temporary effect on public opinion, he warns.**

More Americans are turning to social media for their news.

Vorhaus 2020 ("People Increasingly Turn To Social Media For News," Mike Vorhaus, the CEO of Vorhaus Advisors. Forbes, June 24, 2020, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/mikevorhaus/2020/06/24/people-increasingly-turn-to-social-media-for-news/?sh=37284ed13bcc>, NAUDL)

In these days of pandemic, protests, economic recession and angst among the world's population a recently issued report shows that consumers continue to shift away from traditional media sources for their news and are moving more towards social media and messaging services to find the news. Long gone are the days of people getting most of their news from a local TV station, their local newspaper or the national newscast from one of the networks. Over 15 years ago, we already saw the substantial decay of Americans using traditional news sources and instead the Internet becoming a major source of news, particularly for the 18 to 34 year old demographic. This data comes from a study done for Carnegie Corporation in 2005. A research group I led at the time was responsible for the study. Carnegie Corporation is a major U.S. charitable foundation with a significant interest in journalism and news. **As newspapers have fallen dramatically in usage, and the national newscasts have dropped in ratings, the swing to new sources of information has accelerated considerably. Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism at Oxford University has recently issued a report on the state of digital news around the world.** One of the very notable facts coming out from the study is the heavy use of Instagram for news which could soon possibly overtake Twitter. Instagram news consumers were 11% of the social media population. Twitter was statistically tied at 12%. **Just as we found in 2005 for Carnegie Corporation, the shift away from traditional news media sources is being led by the younger generation, in this case people under 25 years old.** Two-thirds of that age cohort said they use Instagram for gathering news information. The same age group reported that they were two times more likely to look at news on social media apps. Facebook leads with 36% of social media consumers using the social media giant for consuming news. YouTube had 21% of social media users looking at news on the popular video site. WhatsApp had 16% of consumers in that group and 12% used Twitter. Facebook owns both Instagram and WhatsApp. **In this time of political and social upheavals, it is interesting to note that the Reuters study (conducted by YouGov, a research agency) only found 14% of people in the US trusted news on social media** compared to 22% in regard to news gathered from search engines. Also, as further evidence of the power of social media in driving news to consumers, social media as a news source, saw ongoing growth with news consumers, unlike platforms such as all online sources combined, TV, and print. When thinking about what we know about the news and where we get our news, I reflect back on Will Rogers' famous quote: "All I know is just what I read in the papers, and that's an alibi for my ignorance."

The impact is American fascism, war and economic collapse.

Homer-Dixon 2022 (“The American Polity is Cracked and Might Collapse, Canada Must Prepare,” Thomas Homer-Dixon is the Executive Director of the Cascade Institute at Royal Roads University. He has a Ph.D in International Relations from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and is an expert on threats to global security in the 21st Century, <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-the-american-polity-is-cracked-and-might-collapse-canada-must-prepare/>, NAUDL)

But **there’s another political regime**, a historical one, **that may portend an even more dire future for the U.S.: the Weimar Republic**. The situation in Germany in the 1920s and early 1930s was of course sui generis; in particular, the country had experienced staggering traumas – defeat in war, internal revolution and hyperinflation – while the country’s commitment to liberal democracy was weakly rooted in its culture. But as I read a history of the doomed republic this past summer, **I tallied no fewer than five unnerving parallels with the current U.S. situation. First, in both cases, a charismatic leader was able to unify right-wing extremists around a political program to seize the state. Second, a bald falsehood about how enemies inside the polity had betrayed the country – for the Nazis, the “stab in the back,” and for Trumpists, the Big Lie – was a vital psychological tool for radicalizing and mobilizing followers. Third, conventional conservatives believed they could control and channel the charismatic leader and rising extremism but were ultimately routed by the forces they helped unleash. Fourth, ideological opponents of this rising extremism squabbled among themselves; they didn’t take the threat seriously enough**, even though it was growing in plain sight; and they focused on marginal issues that were too often red meat for the extremists. (Today, think toppling statues.) To my mind, though, **the fifth parallel is the most disconcerting: the propagation of a “hardline security doctrine.”** Here I’ve been influenced by the research of Jonathan Leader Maynard, a young English scholar who is emerging as one of the world’s most brilliant thinkers on the links between ideology, extremism and violence. In a forthcoming book, *Ideology and Mass Killing*, Dr. Leader Maynard argues that **extremist right-wing ideologies generally don’t arise from explicit efforts to forge an authoritarian society, but from the radicalization of a society’s existing understandings of how it can stay safe and secure in the face of alleged threats. Hardline conceptions of security are “radicalized versions of familiar claims about threat, self-defence, punishment, war, and duty.”** he writes. **They are the foundation on which regimes organize campaigns of violent persecution and terror.** People he calls “hardliners” believe the world contains many “dangerous enemies that frequently operate in and through purported ‘civilian’ groups.” Hardliners increasingly dominate Trumpist circles now. Dr. Leader Maynard then makes a complementary argument: Once a hardline doctrine is widely accepted within a political movement, it becomes an “infrastructure” of ideas and incentives that can pressure even those who don’t really accept the doctrine into following its dictates. **Fear of “true believers” shifts the behaviour of the movement’s moderates toward extremism. Sure enough, the experts I recently consulted all spoke about how fear of crossing Mr. Trump’s base – including fear for their families’ physical safety – was forcing otherwise sensible Republicans to fall into line.** The rapid propagation of hardline security doctrines through a society, Dr. Leader Maynard says, typically occurs in times of political and economic crisis. Even in the Weimar Republic, the vote for the National Socialists was closely correlated with the unemployment rate. The Nazis were in trouble (with their share of the vote falling and the party beset by internal disputes) as late as 1927, before the German economy started to contract. Then, of course, the Depression hit. **The United States today is in the midst of crisis – caused by the pandemic, obviously – but it could experience far worse before long: perhaps a war with Russia, Iran or China, or a financial crisis when economic bubbles caused by excessive liquidity burst.**

1AC Cyber Solvency

The United States should join forces with NATO to increase their own cyber security.

NATO 2022 ("Cyber defence," North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), March 23, 2022 [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_78170.htm?](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_78170.htm?NAUDL), NAUDL)

To keep pace with the rapidly changing threat landscape and maintain robust cyber defences, **NATO adopted an enhanced policy and action plan, which were endorsed by Allies at the 2014 NATO Summit in Wales. The 2014 policy established that cyber defence is part of the Alliance's core task of collective defence, confirmed that international law applies in cyberspace, set out the further development of NATO's and Allies' capabilities, and intensified NATO's cooperation with industry.** At the 2016 NATO Summit in Warsaw, Allies reaffirmed NATO's defensive mandate and recognised cyberspace as a domain of operations in which NATO must defend itself as effectively as it does in the air, on land and at sea. As most crises and conflicts today have a cyber dimension, treating cyberspace as a domain enables NATO to better protect and conduct its operations and missions. **At the Warsaw Summit, Allies also pledged to strengthen and enhance the cyber defences of national networks and infrastructures, as a matter of priority.** Together with the continuous adaptation of NATO's cyber defence capabilities, this will reinforce the cyber defence and overall resilience of the Alliance. At the 2021 NATO Summit in Brussels, Allies endorsed a new Comprehensive Cyber Defence Policy, which supports NATO's three core tasks of collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security, as well as its overall deterrence and defence posture. NATO's defensive mandate was reaffirmed, and Allies committed to employing the full range of capabilities to actively deter, defend against and counter the full spectrum of cyber threats at all times. Responses need to be continuous and draw on elements of the entire NATO toolbox that include political, diplomatic and military tools. Allies also recognised that the impact of significant malicious cumulative cyber activities might, in certain circumstances, be considered as an armed attack. The nature of cyberspace requires a comprehensive approach through unity of effort at the political, military and technical levels. The 2021 policy and its corresponding action plan will drive forward activities across these three levels. Developing the NATO cyber defence capability The NATO Computer Incident Response Capability (NCIRC), based at SHAPE in Mons, Belgium, protects NATO's own networks by providing centralised and round-the-clock cyber defence support. This capability evolves on a continual basis and maintains pace with the rapidly changing threat and technology environment. NATO has also established a Cyberspace Operations Centre in Mons, Belgium. The Centre supports military commanders with situational awareness to inform the Alliance's operations and missions. It also coordinates NATO's operational activity in cyberspace, ensuring freedom to act in this domain and making operations more resilient to cyber threats. To facilitate an Alliance-wide common approach to cyber defence capability development, NATO also defines targets for Allied countries' implementation of national cyber defence capabilities via the NATO Defence Planning Process. **NATO helps Allies to enhance their national cyber defences by facilitating information-sharing, exchange of best practices and by conducting cyber defence exercises to develop national expertise.** Similarly, individual Allied countries may, on a voluntary basis and facilitated by NATO, assist other Allies to develop their national cyber defence capabilities.

Working with NATO would improve the U.S.' own security.

Cavelty 2012 ("Cyber-Allies: Strengths and Weaknesses of NATO's Cyberdefense Posture," Myriam Dunn Cavelty, January 2012 Cavelty is a senior lecturer for security studies and deputy for research and teaching at the Center for Security Studies (CSS). She studied International Relations, History, and International Law at the University of Zurich. She was a visiting fellow at the Watson Institute for International Studies (Brown University) in 2007 and fellow at the stiftung neue verantwortung in Berlin, Germany 2010-2011. [\(PDF\) Cyber-Allies: Strengths and Weaknesses of NATO's Cyberdefense Posture](#), NAUDL)

NATO has more of a history with cybersecurity than is widely known. With its new strategy and continued investments, the Alliance seems to want to expand its cybersecurity capabilities and responsibilities dramatically. But NATO needs to avoid its Article 5 aspirations for cyberattacks and risks taking on too much cybersecurity accountability NATO's New Tricks Looking back, **2010 seems to have been dominated by reports on one security issue in particular: cyber threats. The discovery of Stuxnet, the industry-sabotaging super worm that scared politicians all over the world; tales of (Chinese) cyberespionage in many variations; the growing sophistication of cybercriminals as evidenced by their impressive scams;** as well as Wikileaks' release of US diplomatic cables and the subsequent actions of the hacker group Anonymous all catapulted the cyber topic from the realm of geeky experts and military strategists to a mainstream public fear. Whether the damage inflicted by cyberattacks is becoming more frequent, more organized, and more costly or if our perception has merely changed is unimportant. **The outcome is clear: cyberattacks are considered one of the top security threats and have been anchored firmly in national strategy documents all over the world.** Given this general mood, **NATO's mention of cyberattacks as one of the primary future security concerns** in its new Strategic Concept of November 2010 was widely applauded. But NATO was not just following the common strategic trend: this reference in its new roadmap marked the temporary culmination point of the Alliance's dealing with the threat.

Passing the AFF would provide the U.S. with tools to better protect their cyber space.

Pham 2022 (“IN CYBERSPACE, NO ONE CAN HEAR YOU BLUFF,” By Captain Tuan N. Pham, U.S. Navy, Center for International Maritime Security May 11, 2022 <https://cimsec.org/in-cyberspace-no-one-can-hear-you-bluff/>, NAUDL)

Despite a considerable arsenal of sophisticated offensive and defensive cyber capabilities, American political and military systems still struggle at times with inconsistent strategic communications and a dogged credibility gap. The new deterrent framework in cyberspace must therefore focus more on communicating clear intent and building enduring credibility through redlines, deterrent language, and cross-domain options to impose further costs, deny added benefits, encourage greater restraints, and control more the narratives. Declaratory redlines make clear the unwanted risks, costs, and consequences of specific actions. They are an important way to influence an adversary’s risk perception and rational calculus, lower the likelihood of misunderstanding, and encourage restraint. They also outline the conditions of and willingness to inflict unacceptable retaliatory damage or destruction. **U.S. policymakers should therefore “privately” reinforce to strategic competitors** (and potential adversaries) the deterrent public statements contained therein the 2018 National Cyber Strategy (NCS), 2021 Interim National Security Strategic Guidance (INSSG), 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS), and (anticipated) forthcoming National Security Strategy (NSS). **U.S. law enforcement officials should likewise continue to “publicly” warn cyber criminals of egregious illicit cyber acts. In doing so, they should make it clear to both state and non-state threat actors that any cyber attack or cyber act that threatens U.S. national security interests, U.S. economic prosperity, and U.S. political stability is unacceptable and will be met with severe and disproportionate consequences for them. If they attack or act, they should not expect a proportionate response. They should expect prompt and devastating force that will cause retaliatory damages much greater than what they intended to inflict. This clear warning should have the effect of causing malicious cyber actors to think twice before acting and consider that the real costs may be much greater than any intended benefits. For cyber powers like China and Russia, it should be made unequivocally clear that any cyber attack on** critical military space systems – missile warning, command and control of nuclear forces, and positioning, navigation, and timing – **is an act of war and will be dealt with accordingly.** Doing so interlocks the 2020 National Space Policy with the 2018 NCS, both of which acknowledge the imperative of and calls for improvements to space cybersecurity. Like any other increasingly digitized and networked critical infrastructure, space-based and ground-based space systems and their communication links are vulnerable to cyber attacks. A future space conflict will undoubtedly involve cyber attacks, and conversely, a future cyber conflict may also involve space attacks.

NATO's cyber-security is considerably stronger than the U.S.

Dolan 2022 ("NATO's 2022 Strategic Concept Must Enhance Digital Access and Capacities," Dr. Chris J. Dolan, June 8, 2022, Dr. Chris J. Dolan is Professor of Political Science and Director of the Master's of Science program in Intelligence and Security Studies at Lebanon Valley College, <https://www.justsecurity.org/81839/natos-2022-strategic-concept-must-enhance-digital-access-and-capacities/>, NAUDL)

**Note: Since the date this article was made the 2022 Strategic Concept has been passed. Although this card is in future tense, in reality, it is happening currently.*

This month **in Madrid, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) will update its Strategic Concept, the principal document that guides the alliance's political-military strategy and collective defense operations.** The war in Ukraine has put resilience in the face of Russian aggression front and center, especially in the cyber and information operation domains. Over the years, NATO has digitized and enhanced its security platforms, emphasizing interoperability of systems among its now 30 current member states. **If NATO is to become more resilient against advanced persistent threats, hackers, and the maligned states that sponsor them, then the 2022 Strategic Concept must infuse multinational warfighting and deterrence against hybrid threats with methods that facilitate access to data and information sharing on its platforms and across multiple domains,** namely in air, cyber, information, land, maritime, and space operations. **The Strategic Concept is among NATO's most important documents as it informs alliance planning, resource allocation, and programming based on changes in the threat environment.** But the document has not been updated since 2010. The 2010 Strategic Concept, entitled "Active engagement, Modern Defense," contained just one brief sentence about cyber attacks and did not even mention China. It also stated that "Today, the Euro-Atlantic area is at peace," even though Russia had invaded Georgia two years before and the threat of a return to great power competition loomed. To argue that a lot has happened between 2010 and 2022 would be an understatement. **Russia's annexation of Crimea and intervention in the Donbas in 2014 and the invasion of Ukraine in 2022 shattered any illusions of a lasting peace with Russia. China's territorial ambitions, economic assertiveness, threats against Taiwan, and military modernization threaten the rules-based order. Emerging technologies – in the form of hypersonic weapons, artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and machine learning – have intensified great power competition.** The 2022 Strategic Concept should highlight the essential role of technology in collective defense. To build greater digital capacity while also emphasizing resilience, NATO must adopt a new technological orientation on the military strategic level of command, especially within the Allied Command Transformation (ACT) in Norfolk, Virginia and the Allied Command Operations (ACO) in Mons, Belgium. ACT leverages advanced technologies for security and defense in capabilities, procedures, public-private partnerships, civil-military relations, and at NATO's Centers of Excellence. Led by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, ACO is responsible for collective defense through direction, requirements, planning, and execution at the strategic level. However, **the Strategic Concept 2022 should focus less on the emergence of new technologies and more on how NATO's military and civilian personnel use them.** ACO and ACT must emphasize greater accessibility to information and data for its multinational warfighters, cyber operators, and civilian professionals. **NATO must reach out to experts in the private sector, academia, and non-governmental organizations to harness ways to expand access and emphasize flexibility in multi-domain operations. NATO can do this by providing more grants to private sector partners and establish a new center of excellence on data and information sharing.** ACO and ACT should also enable personnel and partners to readily access data and information in DIMEL domains: diplomatic, information/cyber, military, economic, and legal. This would expand

the range of measures needed by ACT and ACO to connect and correlate deterrence with evolving hybrid threats. To deter hybrid threats across multiple domains, with enhanced access on different digital platforms, **NATO members should develop smarter and lethal capabilities to confront threats from state and non-state actors. This would allow ACT and ACO to prepare for any contingency and respond to adversaries in battlefields and battlespaces.**

2AC Extensions

2AC Cyber Russia Advantage-Extensions

The U.S. is vulnerable to a cyberattack now. We do not have sufficient defenses and past Russian cyberattacks prove that Russia will attack.

Roger 2021 ("Why America would not survive a real first strike cyberattack today," Mike Rogers is a former member of Congress who served as chairman of the House Intelligence Committee and now is a senior fellow with the Intelligence Project at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University, 02/22/21, <https://thehill.com/opinion/cybersecurity/539826-we-would-not-survive-true-first-strike-cyberattack/>, VY)

If a full on "turn the lights off" cyber war were to happen today, we would lose. Think about that. We would lose a cyber war. With a few clicks of the mouse, and in just a few seconds, hackers in Beijing or Moscow could turn off our electricity, millions would lose heat, groceries would spoil, banking machines would not work, and people could not get gasoline. It would be what we have seen down in Texas, but on national scale and with no end in sight. That we have escaped a digital catastrophe thus far is not due to skill. **It is due to blind luck and restraint from our adversaries.** Just a few weeks ago, hackers attacked a water treatment plant in Florida, trying to increase the amount of lye in the water to toxic levels. A worker was able to prevent the contamination. Luck was all that stood between hackers and a potentially deadly cyber incident. If that were not enough, we are still uncovering the full scale of the Solar Winds hack nearly three months on from its first disclosure. At least nine federal departments or agencies and over 100 companies were compromised and, as the probe continues, it remains likely that more targets are identified. Think about how significant this breach was. **Hackers likely from Russian intelligence penetrated the software supply chain and used the software update feature to spread malicious code to more than 18,000 users.** Their aim was to steal as much data and credentials as possible for their Russian interests and to undermine our own security. This almost certainly will be one of the broadest espionage efforts in history, like the Chinese theft of over 22 million background investigation records in 2015. **The Russian attack was launched from within the United States using our servers. This was an incredibly clever way to mask the origin and ensure that our intelligence agencies would not see a foreign attack, as they are barred by law from running inside our country.** Once inside government networks, the hackers monitored the way we identify and intercept their systems penetration efforts and designed an attack that made it difficult to identify. These foreign hackers know about our weak spots. **The only thing that prevented the Russians from launching a destructive malware attack or inserting malicious code was the Russians themselves.** They could have caused a major disruption across our government and private sector networks, changing or deleting data, planting viruses, or simply turning off the networks. Restarting the systems and deleting the offending code alone is not a solution. In 2016, the Ukrainian electricity grid was targeted by the Russians and, until this day, the country is still finding and removing vulnerabilities left behind by Moscow. **We had to rely on Russian restraint rather than our defenses to stop what could have been a devastating offensive attack.** Sadly, we have confused luck and the restraint of our adversaries with our own skill. Policymakers, business owners, and everyday citizens are

numb to the regular attacks. We assume that if they have not yet been destructive or damaging then they will never be, and that our protections are sufficient. Nothing could be further from the truth. Our adversaries are moving forth with plans to cause massive disruption. **Our country should harden our defenses and offer credible deterrents. If we simply wait, it will be too late.**

Cyber-strikes could escalate through tit-for-tat retaliation and lead to nuclear war.

Klare 19 ("Cyber Battles, Nuclear Outcomes? Dangerous New Pathways to Escalation," Michael Klare, professor emeritus of peace and world security studies at Hampshire College and senior visiting fellow at the Arms Control Association, Arms Control Association, November 2019, <https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-11/features/cyber-battles-nuclear-outcomes-dangerous-new-pathways-escalation>)

Yet **another pathway to escalation could arise from a cascading series of cyberstrikes and counterstrikes against vital national infrastructure rather than on military targets. All major powers,** along with Iran and North Korea, **have developed and deployed cyberweapons designed to disrupt and destroy major elements of an adversary's key economic systems, such as power grids, financial systems, and transportation networks.** As noted, Russia has infiltrated the U.S. electrical grid, and it is widely believed that the United States has done the same in Russia.¹² The Pentagon has also devised a plan known as "Nitro Zeus," intended to immobilize the entire Iranian economy and so force it to capitulate to U.S. demands or, if that approach failed, to pave the way for a crippling air and missile attack.¹³ **The danger here is that economic attacks of this sort, if undertaken during a period of tension and crisis, could lead to an escalating series of tit-for-tat attacks against ever more vital elements of an adversary's critical infrastructure, producing widespread chaos and harm and eventually leading one side to initiate kinetic attacks on critical military targets, risking the slippery slope to nuclear conflict.** For example, a Russian cyberattack on the U.S. power grid could trigger U.S. attacks on Russian energy and financial systems, causing widespread disorder in both countries and generating an impulse for even more devastating attacks. **At some point, such attacks "could lead to major conflict and possibly nuclear war."**¹⁴ These are by no means the only pathways to escalation resulting from the offensive use of cyberweapons. Others include efforts by third parties, such as proxy states or terrorist organizations, to provoke a global nuclear crisis by causing early-warning systems to generate false readings ("spoofing") of missile launches. Yet, they do provide a clear indication of the severity of the threat. **As states' reliance on cyberspace grows and cyberweapons become more powerful, the dangers of unintended or accidental escalation can only grow more severe.**

Cyberattacks escalate – deterrence fails, and the risk of miscalculation is high.

Schulze 19 ("Cyber Deterrence is Overrated," Matthia Schulze, Deputy Head of Research Division of International Security at German Institute for International and Security Affairs ", August 2019, https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2019C34_she.pdf, JHW)

The damage potential of cyber capabilities is unreliable and difficult to control. It is complicated, although not impossible, to limit cyber capabilities to one target and to avoid collateral damage, for example in uninvolved third countries. This is particularly true in time-critical situations. The effectiveness and thus the exact damage potential of cyber capabilities are often difficult to determine in advance. **The potential damage is largely determined by the configuration of the target system.** In this respect, **it is often impossible to anticipate how long a cyber attack can disrupt a system.** for instance. **This fact complicates the proportional and controlled use of such capabilities. This** in turn **increases the risk of deterrence failure.** **Even attacks** such as Stuxnet (2010), **which were carefully tailored to specific targets, also infected other systems worldwide. Collateral effects** such as WannaCry or NotPetya (both 2017) **are habitual in cyber conflicts.** No one can realistically estimate where else a certain system configuration is in use. On the other hand, threat of punishment can be made too specific. If, for example, D is about to respond to a cyber attack on a dam by A with a retaliatory strike on a dam owned by A, A can take this off the grid as a precaution. **It is difficult to find the right measure for potential damage that is neither too precise nor too vague, especially as the risk of deterrence failure is high.** Furthermore, **the risk of escalation increases in asymmetric contexts. This makes cyber capabilities seem unreliable as a deterrent.**

***IMPACT - Nuclear war leads to extinction**

Starr 2015 [Steven Starr, 10-14-15, "Nuclear war, nuclear winter, and human extinction," Federation of American Scientists, <https://fas.org/pir-pubs/nuclear-war-nuclear-winter-and-human-extinction/>]

A nuclear winter would cause most humans and large animals to die from nuclear famine in a mass extinction event similar to the one that wiped out the dinosaurs. Following the detonation (in conflict) of US and/or Russian launch-ready strategic nuclear weapons, nuclear firestorms would burn simultaneously over a total land surface area of many thousands or tens of thousands of square miles. These mass fires, many of which would rage over large cities and industrial areas, would release many tens of millions of tons of black carbon soot and smoke (up to 180 million tons, according to peer-reviewed studies), which would rise rapidly above cloud level and into the stratosphere. [For an explanation of the calculation of smoke emissions, see Atmospheric effects & societal consequences of regional scale nuclear conflicts.] The scientists who completed the most recent peer-reviewed studies on nuclear winter discovered that the sunlight would heat the smoke, producing a self-lofting effect that would not only aid the rise of the smoke into the stratosphere (above cloud level, where it could not be rained out), but act to keep the smoke in the stratosphere for 10 years or more. The longevity of the smoke layer would act to greatly increase the severity of its effects upon the biosphere. **Once in the stratosphere, the smoke (predicted to be produced by a range of strategic nuclear wars) would rapidly engulf the Earth and form a dense stratospheric smoke layer.** The smoke from a war fought with strategic nuclear weapons would quickly prevent up to 70% of sunlight from reaching the surface of the Northern Hemisphere and 35% of sunlight from reaching the surface of the Southern Hemisphere. Such an enormous loss of warming sunlight would produce Ice Age weather conditions on Earth in a matter of weeks. For a period of 1-3 years following the war, temperatures would fall below freezing every day in the central agricultural zones of North America and Eurasia. For an explanation of nuclear winter, see Nuclear winter revisited with a modern climate model and current nuclear arsenals: Still catastrophic consequences. **Nuclear winter would cause average global surface temperatures to become colder than they were at the height of the last Ice Age.** Such extreme cold would eliminate growing seasons for many years, probably for a decade or longer. Can you imagine a winter that lasts for ten years? **The results of such a scenario are obvious. Temperatures would be much too cold to grow food, and they would remain this way long enough to cause most humans and animals to starve to death.** Global nuclear famine would ensue in a setting in which the infrastructure of the combatant nations has been totally destroyed, resulting in massive amounts of chemical and radioactive toxins being released into the biosphere. **We don't need a sophisticated study to tell us that no food and Ice Age temperatures for a decade would kill most people and animals on the planet.**

2AC Cyber Social Media-Extensions

An increasing share of Americans get their news through social media.

Shearer 2021 ("More than eight-in-ten Americans get news from digital devices," By Elisa Shearer, research associate focusing on journalism research at Pew Research Center, January 12, 2021, <https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2021/01/12/more-than-eight-in-ten-americans-get-news-from-digital-devices/>)

The transition of news from print, television and radio to digital spaces has caused huge disruptions in the traditional news industry, especially the print news industry. It is also reflected in the ways individual Americans say they are getting their news. A large majority of Americans get news at least sometimes from digital devices, according to a Pew Research Center survey conducted Aug. 31-Sept. 7, 2020. Large majority of Americans get news on digital devices **More than eight-in-ten U.S. adults (86%) say they get news from a smartphone, computer or tablet** "often" or "sometimes," including 60% who say they do so often. **This is higher than the portion who get news from television,** though 68% get news from TV at least sometimes and 40% do so often. Americans turn to radio and print publications for news far less frequently, with half saying they turn to radio at least sometimes (16% do so often) and about a third (32%) saying the same of print (10% get news from print publications often). How we did this Roughly half of Americans prefer to get news on a digital platform; about a third prefer TV **When asked which of these platforms they prefer to get news on, roughly half (52%) of Americans say they prefer a digital platform – whether it is a news website (26%), search (12%), social media (11%) or podcasts (3%).** About a third say they prefer television (35%), and just 7% and 5% respectively say they prefer to get their news on the radio or via print. Though digital devices are by far the most common way Americans access their news, **where they get that news on their devices is divided among a number of different pathways. About two-thirds of U.S. adults say they get news at least sometimes from news websites or apps (68%) or search engines, like Google (65%). About half (53%) say they get news from social media,** and a much smaller portion say they get news at least sometimes from podcasts (22%).

Russia attacks social media and spreads disinformation to Americans.

Bushwick 2022 (“Russia’s Information War Is Being Waged on Social Media Platforms,” Sophie Bushwick, associate editor covering technology at Scientific American, on March 8, 2022, <https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/russia-is-having-less-success-at-spreading-social-media-disinformation/>)

Days after Russia invaded Ukraine, multiple social media platforms—including Facebook, Twitter and YouTube—announced they had dismantled coordinated networks of accounts spreading disinformation. These networks, which were comprised of fabricated accounts disguised with fake names and AI-generated profile images or hacked accounts, were sharing suspiciously similar anti-Ukraine talking points, suggesting they were being controlled by centralized sources linked to Russia and Belarus. Russia’s Internet Research Agency used similar disinformation campaigns to amplify propaganda about the U.S. election in 2016. But their extent was unclear until after the election—and at the time, they were conducted with little pushback from social media platforms. “There was a sense that the platforms just didn’t know what to do,” says Laura Edelson, a misinformation researcher and Ph.D. candidate in computer science at New York University. Since then, she says, platforms and governments have become more adept at combating this type of information warfare—and more willing to deplatform bad actors that deliberately spread disinformation. Edelson spoke to Scientific American about how an information war is being waged as the conflict continues. [An edited transcript of the interview follows.] ADVERTISEMENT How do social media platforms combat accounts that spread disinformation? **These kinds of disinformation campaigns—where they are specifically misleading users about the source of the content**—that’s really easy for platforms to take action against because Facebook has this real name policy: **misleading users about who you are is a violation of Facebook’s platform rules.** But there are [other] things that shouldn’t be difficult to take down—that historically Facebook has really struggled with—and that is actors like RT. RT is a Russian state-backed media outlet. And Facebook has really struggled historically on what to do with that. That’s what was so impressive about seeing that [Facebook and other platforms] really did start to take some action against RT in the past week, because this has been going on for such a long time. And also, frankly, [social media platforms] have had cover from governments, where governments in Europe have banned Russian state media. And that has given cover to Facebook, YouTube and other major platforms to do the same thing. In general, banning anyone—but especially banning media—is not a step anyone should take lightly. But RT and Sputnik [another Russia state-backed media outlet] are not regular media: they have such a long track record of polluting the information space.

*** Americans distrust the election process now – 2 reasons: Media and government.**

Jones and Matsa 2022

("Why Americans are losing trust in elections and the media," Bradley Jones and Katerina Eva Matsa, both researchers at the Pew Research Center, January 16, 2022, <https://www.npr.org/2022/01/16/1073505164/why-americans-are-losing-trust-in-elections-and-the-media>, VY)

MICHEL MARTIN, HOST: **Americans' trust in both their government and in each other is declining. That might be something you have concluded on your own from watching the news or even talking with your neighbors.** But the respected research institute, the Pew Research Center, did what researchers do. They tried to get their hands around this by taking a fresh look at the data they've gathered in recent years to try to understand how and why Americans are losing trust in a number of their critical institutions. **Right now, we want to focus on two of those institutions, elections and the media.** By elections, we're thinking about how elections are administered. As you must know, Democrats and many Republicans are engaged in a furious fight over new restrictions that Republican-led states are trying to, or, in many cases, have imposed on the administration of elections. Republicans are calling these common-sense measures to tighten up lax practices or to respond to voter concerns. But Democrats say most of these are unnecessary at best and unfair, punitive and racist at worst, with a clear strategy to keep minorities and others from voting. As you probably know, the White House and progressive congressional Democrats have been trying to pass new legislation that would standardize some of these rules around the country, an effort that has been stymied both by Republicans and more conservative Democrats. And **trust in the media - well, that's been on the decline for some time, even before former President Trump and his allies started haranguing news reporters and outlets he didn't like as enemies of the people.** We wanted to hear more about what researchers have to say about this, so we called two of the researchers at Pew, Bradley Jones and Katerina Eva Matsa, to tell us more about what they found out. And they're with us now. Thank you both so much for joining us. KATERINA EVA MATSA: Thank you for having us. BRADLEY JONES: Thank you. MARTIN: So, Katerina, I'm going to start with you. And this is a basic question, but why focus on trust? MATSA: **We know that the news media is an important pillar of U.S. democracy, of democracy overall. So trust is a huge part of that, right? Like, we want to see how trust in the news media may have a relationship with the sources that people turn to and how, especially now, with this misinformation environment that people are in, how they manage to make sense of the world.**

*** U.S. democracy is necessary to prevent large-scale wars.**

Epstein et al. 2007

(Susan B. Epstein, Nina M. Serafino, and Francis T. Miko, Specialists in Foreign Policy, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, "Democracy Promotion: Cornerstone of U.S. Foreign Policy?" CRS Report for Congress, December 26, 2007, <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34296.pdf>, VY)

A common rationale offered by proponents of democracy promotion, including former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and current Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, is that democracies do not go to war with one another. This is sometimes referred to as the democratic peace theory. Experts point to European countries, the United States, Canada, and Mexico as present-day examples. According to President Clinton's National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement: **"Democracies create free markets that offer economic opportunity, make for more reliable trading partners, and are far less likely to wage war on one another."**²² Some have refined this democracy peace theory by **distinguishing between mature democracies and those in transition, suggesting that mature democracies do not fight wars with each other,** but that countries transitioning toward democracy are more prone to being attacked (because of weak governmental institutions) or being aggressive toward others. States that made transitions from an autocracy toward early stages of democracy and were involved in hostilities soon after include France in the mid-1800s under Napoleon III, Prussia/Germany under Bismarck (1870-1890), Chile shortly before the War of the Pacific in 1879, Serbia's multiparty constitutional monarchy before the Balkan Wars of the late 20th Century, and Pakistan's military guided pseudo-democracy before its wars with India in 1965 and 1971.²³ The George W. Bush Administration asserts **that democracy promotion is a long-term antidote to terrorism.** The Administration's Strategy for Winning the War on Terror asserts that **inequality in political participation and access to wealth resources in a country, lack of freedom of speech, and poor education all breed volatility. By promoting basic human rights, freedoms of speech, religion, assembly, association and press, and by maintaining order within their borders and providing an independent justice system, effective democracies can defeat terrorism in the long run,** according to the Bush White House.²⁴ Another reason given to encourage democracies (although debated by some experts) is the belief that **democracies promote economic prosperity.** From this perspective, as **the rule of law leads to a more stable society and as equal economic opportunity for all helps to spur economic activity, economic growth,** particularly of per capita income, is likely to follow. In addition, **a democracy under this scenario may be more likely to be viewed by other countries as a good trading partner and by outside investors as a more stable environment for investment,** according to some experts. Moreover, **countries that have developed as stable democracies are viewed as being more likely to honor treaties,** according to some experts.²⁵

2AC Answers to Journalism Turn

<The affirmative focuses on cybersecurity, not journalism and free speech, means there is no link.>

Public trust in the media is at record lows. Means there is no journalism impact.

Brenan 2021 ("Americans' Trust in Media Dips to Second Lowest on Record," Megan Brennan, October 7, 2021, [Americans' Trust in Media Dips to Second Lowest on Record](#), VY)

WASHINGTON, D.C. -- **Americans' trust in the media to report the news fully, accurately and fairly has edged down four percentage points since last year to 36%, making this year's reading the second lowest in Gallup's trend. In all, 7% of U.S. adults say they have "a great deal" and 29% "a fair amount" of trust and confidence in newspapers, television and radio news reporting** -- which, combined, is four points above the 32% record low in 2016, amid the divisive presidential election campaign between Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton. In addition, 29% of the public currently registers "not very much" trust and 34% have "none at all." Line graph. Americans' trust in the mass media when it comes to reporting the news fully, accurately and fairly, since 1997. In 2021, 36% have a great deal or fair amount of trust in the mass media, and 63% have not very much or none at all. **This is the lowest rating since 2016, when trust was 32%, the lowest on record.** These findings, from a Sept. 1-17 poll, are the latest in Gallup's tracking of the public's confidence in key U.S. institutions, which began in 1972. Between 1972 and 1976, 68% to 72% of Americans expressed trust in the mass media; yet, by 1997, when the question was next asked, trust had dropped to 53%. Trust in the media, which has averaged 45% since 1997, has not reached the majority level since 2003. After hitting its lowest point in 2016, trust in the media rebounded, gaining 13 points in two years -- mostly because of a surge among Democrats amid President Donald Trump's antagonistic relationship with the press and increased scrutiny of his administration by the media. Since 2018, **however, it has fallen a total of nine points, as trust has slid among all party groups.** Democrats' Trust in Media Dwarfs Republicans' and Independents' **Partisans' trust in the media continues to be sharply polarized. Currently, 68% of Democrats, 11% of Republicans and 31% of independents say they trust the media a great deal or fair amount.** The 57-point gap in Republicans' and Democrats' confidence is within the 54- to 63-point range for the two groups since 2017. While **both Democrats' and independents' trust has slid five points over the past year,** Republicans' has held steady. **Historically, Republicans' confidence in the accuracy and fairness of the news media's reporting has not risen above 52% over the past quarter century.** At the same time, Democrats' confidence has not fallen below the 2016 reading of 51%. For their part, independents' trust in the media has not been at the majority level since 2003.

2AC Cyber Solvency Extensions

NATO has an excellent track-record of reaching consensus. This is a democratic tool, not a solvency deficit.

Skaluba and Rodihan 2022 (“No consensus? No problem. Why NATO is still effective.” Christopher Skaluba, the Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and previously served as principal director for European and NATO policy in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and Conor Rodihan, associate director in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security’s Transatlantic Security Initiative, January 18, 2022, <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/no-consensus-no-problem-why-nato-is-still-effective/>, VY)

Critics of the alliance (and even some supporters) have interpreted NATO’s unwillingness to militarily support Ukraine—especially during the most significant challenge to the European security order since the Cold War—as an indicator of its declining relevance, timidity, or its divisions. But that overstates **the importance of political consensus to NATO’s value and understates its role as an effective** and flexible defensive alliance. This is a role with potentially critical benefits for Ukraine. First, it sets too high a bar for an alliance of thirty members with aligned, but distinct, priorities. Unanimity on every issue is impossible, let alone one as complex as military support to Ukraine. **Debate and disagreement, as it should be for any democratic institution, are built-in features of NATO—not bugs. In reality, it’s astounding how often NATO does reach consensus about issues big and small, creating an unrealistic expectation that it always will.** The opposite of consensus is not failure. Suggesting otherwise turns any debate that doesn’t end harmoniously into an indictment of NATO, playing straight into Russian propaganda. Second, **a belief that NATO’s value is tied primarily to achieving consensus on every issue misses the more mundane (and important) ways it supports its allies and partners. Its affinity for process—particularly its ability to build a common situational understanding among its members—is an invaluable tool. Habits of consultation and information sharing, buttressed by deep cooperation on operations, intelligence sharing, defense planning, and interoperability, create the foundation upon which any consensus is to be built. Even in the absence of that agreement, the ability to collectively define threats and jointly train to confront them is immensely valuable in its own right.** Third, these habits of cooperation give NATO members the flexibility to act outside of the Alliance’s frameworks. While NATO does much by consensus—such as its missions in the Baltic states—the skills it helps members develop is central to enabling them to form separate coalitions for action. This happened recently with ample success in taking on the Islamic State. **Such flexibility should be a point in NATO’s favor,** not evidence of its ineptitude.

* Working with NATO improves Cyber Security

Maigre 2022 Maigre, Merle. "NATO's Role in Global Cyber Security." April 6th, 2022. German Marshall Fund.

<https://www.gmfus.org/news/natos-role-global-cyber-security>

Ultimately, what matters is that states engaging in unlawful actions using cyber means will face consequences. With attribution, policymakers show that they know what is happening in these networks and can investigate incidents. It also clearly spells out unacceptable behavior and can help create state practice. **The best way to implement the international norms is by calling out behavior and having consequences when these norms are breached. Attribution will make clear to the malicious actor that their actions will be seen and addressed. It is the basis, under international law, for countermeasures and self-defense.** Effective public attribution requires a clear understanding of the attributed cyber operation and the cyber-threat actor, but also the broader geopolitical environment, allied positions and activities, and the legal context. When should states publicly attribute cyberattacks? **Effective public attribution requires a clear understanding of the attributed cyber operation and the cyber-threat actor, but also the broader geopolitical environment, allied positions and activities, and the legal context.** The public attribution framework put forward by Max Smeets and Florian Egloff in March 2021 distinguishes four factors that act as enablers or constraints in public attribution. These factors are intelligence, incident severity, geopolitical context, and post-attribution actions. The combination of these four components enables consistent decision-making about whether to publicly disseminate information about an adversary's actions, privately tell the adversary, or restrict knowledge of the intrusion to the government and potentially other partners.

Collecting and processing intelligence—information about foreign countries and their agents—provides a technical basis for attribution. How could allies improve intelligence sharing to conduct more rapid attribution and enable a response to adversary cyber activity? During the Nordic-Baltic foreign ministers meeting in Tallinn in September 2020, a 90-minute tabletop exercise was organized to test the ministers' ability to respond to and attribute an escalating cyberattack. They answered multiple-choice questions on communication of and possible diplomatic countermeasures to the attack. The ministers learned through first-hand experience that a timely exchange of technical intelligence can be key in attributing any cyberattack. "The shared view [of the countries involved]—especially when it comes to complicated issues—is crucial," said Urmas Reinsalu, Foreign Minister of Estonia.

Attribution is only as good as the information that allies are willing to share. NATO's value can be in becoming the preferred platform for sharing cyber information. General Paul Nakasone, who heads US Cyber Command, told the House Armed Services subcommittee on intelligence that "in 35 years" he has never seen a better sharing of accurate, timely, and actionable intelligence than what has transpired with Ukraine. Sharing information and intelligence with allies "builds coalitions" and can "shine a light on disinformation" campaigns, like the one Russia used to lay the groundwork for their invasion of Ukraine.

As the second course of action, NATO should use the current crisis to accelerate the progress with setting up **NATO's own cyber command** and sharpen allied responses to malicious cyber actions. Overall, this **would give more credibility to its cyber defense.** In February 2019, allies endorsed a set of tools to respond to cumulative cyber activities, but not much has happened to take it forward. It is now time to build upon this set and develop concrete steps at the political, military, and technical levels to model alliance behavior according to the threat landscape. This means **a sharper focus on future responses to high- and low-end cyberattacks along with concrete deterrence actions and tools for individual sectors and target types. Much of this is based on the high-end cyber capabilities of select individual allies called "volunteer sovereign cyber effects," where cyber-capable nations deliver voluntarily offensive cyber effects on a target designated by an operational-level commander. The NATO Cyber Command would be responsible for matching military needs with the willingness and capabilities of the nations potentially able to deliver**

such effects. The alliance should clarify which allies are responsible for offensive cyber operations against certain targets and the information-sharing and notification requirements.

A good plan requires practice. The scenarios of cyber responses that are under the Article 5 threshold should be regularly practiced, and the **NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) Locked Shields exercise is a good way to do so. Organized since 2010, it enables cyber-security experts to enhance their skills in defending national IT systems and critical infrastructure under real-time attacks.** The focus should be on realistic scenarios simulating the entire complexity of a massive cyber incident, including strategic decision-making and legal and communication aspects. **Locked Shields is a unique opportunity to encourage experimentation, training, and cooperation among allies in an authentic but safe training environment.**

NATO should also make more use of its Cyber Range, a platform for NATO exercises and training in Estonia operated by the Estonian Ministry of Defense. The Cyber Range already facilitates NATO's flagship annual cyber defense exercise Cyber Coalition, and NATO CCDCOE has based Locked Shields on Cyber Range for over a decade. **The versatility and computing power of the platform allows a different, complex scenario to be simulated every year for an increasing number of participants.** The technical, red-teaming exercise CrossedSwords, organized by NATO CCDCOE, tests the capabilities and skills needed when executing a full-spectrum cyber operation in real life, focusing on experimentation with integrating kinetics and offensive cyber operations in the context of a modern battlefield.

More operational- and technical-level joint activities should be practiced among allies and with like-minded partners in order to contribute to imposing costs to malicious actors in cyberspace. Given that NATO's cyber response teams are stretched thin due to protecting NATO's own networks, bi- and multilateral collaboration enables countries to share best practices and, in the event of an emergency, provide mutual rapid assistance in crisis response.

Answers to Off-Case

2AC Frontline- Russia Aggression DA

1. Non-unique: NATO expansion to include Sweden and Finland thumps or overwhelms the disadvantage. This means the disadvantage should have already happened.

Siebold and Emmott on June 29, 2022 ("NATO invites Finland, Sweden to join, says Russia is a 'direct threat,'" Sabine Siebold and Robin Emmott, June 29, 2022, [NATO invites Finland, Sweden to join, says Russia is a 'direct threat' | Reuters](#), VY)

MADRID, June 29 (Reuters) - **NATO invited Sweden and Finland on Wednesday to join the military alliance in one of the biggest shifts in European security in decades after Russia's invasion of Ukraine** pushed Helsinki and Stockholm to drop their traditional of neutrality. **NATO's 30 allies took the decision** at their summit in Madrid **and also agreed to formally treat Russia as the "most significant and direct threat to the allies' security"**, according to a summit statement. **"Today, we have decided to invite Finland and Sweden to become members of NATO,"** NATO leaders said in their declaration, **after Turkey lifted a veto on Finland and Sweden joining.** Ratification in allied parliaments is likely to take up to a year, but once it is done, **Finland and Sweden will be covered by NATO's Article 5 collective defence clause, putting them under the United States' protective nuclear umbrella.** "We will make sure we are able to protect all allies, including Finland and Sweden," Stoltenberg said. **In the meantime, the allies are set to increase their troop presence in the Nordic region, holding more military exercises and naval patrols in the Baltic Sea to reassure Sweden and Finland.** After four hours of talks in Madrid on Tuesday, Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan agreed with his Finnish and Swedish counterparts a series of security measures to allow the two Nordic countries to overcome the Turkish veto that Ankara imposed in May due to its concerns about terrorism. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation was founded in 1949 to defend against the Soviet threat. Russia's Feb. 24 invasion of Ukraine gave the organisation a new impetus after failures in Afghanistan and internal discord during the era of former U.S. President Donald Trump. "We are sending a strong message to (Russian President Vladimir) Putin: 'you will not win'," Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez said in a speech. **Allies also agreed on NATO's first new strategic concept - its master planning document - in a decade. Russia, previously classed as a strategic partner of NATO, is now identified as NATO's main threat.** Russia's invasion of Ukraine is "a direct threat to our Western way of life," Belgian Prime Minister Alexander de Croo added, citing the wider impact of the war, such as rising energy and food prices. The planning document also cited China as a challenge for the first time, setting the stage for the 30 allies to plan to handle Beijing's transformation from a benign trading partner to a fast-growing competitor from the Arctic to cyberspace. Unlike Russia, whose war in Ukraine has raised serious concerns in the Baltics of an attack on NATO territory, China is not an adversary, NATO leaders said. But Stoltenberg has repeatedly called on Beijing to condemn Russia's invasion of Ukraine, which Moscow says is a "special operation". 'MORE NATO' At the summit, NATO agreed a longer-term support package for Ukraine, in addition to the billions of dollars already pledged in weapons and financial support. German

Chancellor Olaf Scholz said that arms would continue to be supplied to Kyiv, which seeks help to overpower Russian artillery, particularly in eastern Ukraine, where Russia is slowly advancing in a grinding war of attrition. "The message is: We will continue to do so - and to do this intensively - for as long as it is necessary to enable Ukraine to defend itself," Scholz said. The Western alliance is also in agreement that big allies such as the United States, Germany, Britain and Canada pre-assign troops, weapons and equipment to the Baltics and intensify training exercises. **NATO is also aiming to have as many as 300,000 troops ready for deployment in case of conflict, part of an enlarged NATO response force.** read more Russia is achieving the opposite of what Putin sought when he launched his war in Ukraine in part to counter the expansion of NATO, Western leaders say. Both Finland, which has a 1,300 km (810 mile) border with Russia, and Sweden, home of the founder of the Nobel Peace Prize, are now set to bring well-trained militaries into the NATO, aimed at giving the alliance Baltic Sea superiority. "One of the most important messages from President **Putin** ... was that he was against any further NATO enlargement," Stoltenberg said on Tuesday evening. "He **wanted less NATO. Now President Putin is getting more NATO on his borders.**"

2. No Link: Putin's warnings are propaganda to rally his country behind the invasion of Ukraine. He does not have the resources to actually be more aggressive against NATO.

Martinez and Edmonds 2022 Martinez, A and Edmonds, Jeff. "A Closer Look at Some of Russia's Military Failures in the War on Ukraine." May 3rd 2022. NPR's Morning Edition. Jeff Edmonds is a senior researcher at the Center for Naval Analysis. [Full article: A Brutal Examination: Russian Military Capability in Light of the Ukraine War](#)

After more than two months of war in Ukraine, Russian forces have been deeply undermined. **A quarter of Russian units have been rendered combat ineffective**. Now, that's according to a new intelligence assessment from **Britain's Ministry of Defense**. The ministry also **said it'll likely take years for Russia to reconstitute some of its most elite units, including the country's airborne forces**. Now, the Pentagon is not echoing the British assessment, saying only that a number of units have been degraded from the fighting. But for some, **Russian failures have altered what had been the common wisdom regarding Russia's military power with future implications for the U.S., NATO and Russia's neighbors**. Jeff Edmonds is a senior analyst at the Center for Naval Analyses. He previously focused on Russia and Central Asia as a member of the National Security Council. Jeff, welcome to the show.

JEFF EDMONDS: Thanks so much for having me.

MARTINEZ: All right. The British say that a quarter of Russian units have been rendered combat ineffective. So if that's true, what does that mean for the war?

EDMONDS: I think what **it means** is that, you know, the operation that we're seeing now in the east, many military analysts believe that **this is the last large operation that the Russian military is able to conduct right now**. I mean, it really is staggering. You know, we often think that, you know, 10 to - you know, 20% to 30% losses, a unit is no longer able to conduct offensive operations, and that's where we think the Russian military is right now. And we're seeing **this operation in the east, and it's really not producing a lot of results, and that's probably likely a result of these staggering losses**.

MARTINEZ: So if this is a last operation for Russia, does it suggest that maybe their war in Ukraine, in particular, where it's focused in the east right now, might be something that they might dig in on?

EDMONDS: They might dig in on it, but **there's a real solid chance that the Russian military will not be able to achieve even these revised strategic goals** of taking over these two provinces in the east. It's not clear at all that they'll actually be able to, you know, break through and control both regions.

3. No internal link: Increased NATO strength does not lead to more conflict in Ukraine. The Ukraine conflict is not about NATO presence but Russia's power ambitions.

Cornell 2022 ("No, the war in Ukraine is not about NATO," Svante Cornell, director of the American Foreign Policy Council's Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, 03/09/2022, <https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/597503-no-the-war-in-ukraine-is-not-about-nato/>, VY)

Russia's invasion of Ukraine has led to widespread condemnation and an unparalleled outpouring of support for Ukraine. At the same time, a motley crew, including some academics and former U.S. officials, has essentially blamed the war on the West, and in particular NATO enlargement. **The argument is basically that Russia would not have become so aggressive if Western powers had been more accommodating. This line of thinking, however, is simply incorrect.** That's because Russia rediscovered its imperial vocation before NATO enlargement, and **the war in Ukraine is, in fact, about Putin's great power ambitions.** Russian leaders have emphatically argued that NATO countries, led by the United States, violated assurances made to Moscow at the end of the Cold War that the alliance would not expand to the east. This claim, however, has been debunked as a myth. Even the last Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, has denied that the issue of NATO enlargement was even discussed at the time. Russian President Vladimir Putin himself did not have much to say about NATO enlargement until his infamous speech at the 2007 Munich Security Conference. NATO's enlargement began in the mid-1990s, at a time when the alliance was embarking on a strategic shift, focusing on out-of-area operations instead territorial defense. NATO urged new member states to focus on specific cutting-edge expertise, and programs for partner countries like Georgia were mostly about training for peacekeeping operations in places like Afghanistan. NATO's shift is perhaps best illustrated by the fact that the alliance lacked a workable plan to defend the Baltic states when Russia invaded Georgia in 2008. It is really only after that war, and in particular after Moscow's annexation of Crimea in 2014, that NATO returned to its original focus on collective defense. **The real reason for the deteriorating security situation in Europe – and most blatantly the Russian invasion of Ukraine – can be found in changes that have taken place within Russia itself, and most directly the increasingly imperialist worldview of the Russian leadership.** This change began as early as 1994 and accelerated after Putin came to power. The war in the Russian breakaway republic of Chechnya from 1994 to 1996 was in many ways the starting point. Russia's defeat there showed how far the country had fallen, leading many former Soviet republics to part ways with Russia. Moscow responded by systematically undermining neighboring states like Moldova, Georgia and Azerbaijan through the incitement of ethnic conflicts on their territories – a classic divide-and-rule tactic. It is largely forgotten today that Putin built his political career on regaining control of Chechnya, something he did by starting a bloody war on the basis of a lie. It is generally well established today that the explosions in apartment buildings in Moscow in the summer of 1999 that Putin blamed on Chechen rebels were in fact carried out by the Russian security service under Putin's own leadership – the purpose being to create popular support for Putin's war, and by extension his leadership. **Putin's view of the world, in turn, is closely linked to his own hold on power – and that explains Russia's increasingly aggressive actions.** The "color revolutions" in Georgia and Ukraine in 2003-4 had the potential to show that democratic change could happen in former Soviet countries, something that would undermine Putin's pursuit of authoritarian rule (what he called a "vertical of power"). Democratic rule in neighboring countries therefore had to fail. Ukraine, in particular, was central to Putin. If a kindred Slavic and Orthodox country like Ukraine developed into a functioning democracy, this could pull the rug out from under Putin's project. If Ukraine showed that something better was possible, why should Russians be content with

living under an authoritarian and corrupt regime? For a time, Moscow tried other tactics. Pro-Russian politician Viktor Yanukovich managed to get elected as president of Ukraine in 2010, but his misrule led to the popular uprising of 2013. That event, in turn, showed that the Ukrainian people saw Europe, rather than Russia, as their future. Putin responded by annexing Crimea and starting a war in eastern Ukraine. At home, Putin's rhetoric became increasingly nationalistic, and now focused on concepts such as the "Russian world" in order to foment a divide between Russia and an allegedly decadent West. **For this to succeed, however, Putin needs to bring Belarus and Ukraine into the "Russian world," by force if necessary. This, rather than NATO enlargement, is what the war in Ukraine is about.**

<4. We solve better for Russian escalation. Our Russia advantage is clear that cyberattacks present unique opportunities for Russia aggression and lead to escalation.>

5. No impact: The conflict in Ukraine won't escalate, Russia won't use nuclear weapons, and there will be no draw-in. History proves.

Rose 2022 ("Why the War in Ukraine Won't Go Nuclear," Gideon Rose, Distinguished Fellow in U.S. Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations and the author of How Wars End, April 25, 2022, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2022-04-25/why-war-ukraine-wont-go-nuclear>, VY)

As the fighting grinds on, however, **the war is looking more familiar and increasingly resembles many other conflicts over the last seven decades. This suggests that general, structural features of the situation are imposing themselves on the belligerents, guiding their choices into surprisingly well-worn grooves.** **Ukraine, in short, is following the pattern of limited war in the nuclear age,** echoing a script written in Korea and copied many times since. **This is not a new era, only a new phase in the old one. And even the new phase is playing by the same old rules—with significant implications for the remainder of the war and beyond.** IT FEELS LIKE THE FIRST TIME In the late 1940s, U.S. policymakers faced an unprecedented problem: what do you do with weapons that can destroy the world? Throughout history, states had settled their biggest differences through war. But over time, the wars had gotten more and more destructive, culminating in the total war just ended—which had itself culminated in the dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, destroying entire cities in a single blast. Nobody knew what would come next. Breaking the cycle of war seemed impossible. Continuing it seemed unthinkable. Tensions ratcheted up further when the Soviet Union got the bomb in 1949. And then, in June 1950, North Korean forces invaded South Korea. Washington and its allies quickly jumped in on Seoul's side, facing off against Moscow, which along with Beijing was backing Pyongyang. How would war play out in the nuclear age? Now the question would be answered. For three years, as brutal fighting raged up and down the Korean peninsula, the two sides gradually felt each other out and tacitly settled on rules of the road for the new epoch. Neither of the nuclear powers wanted another total war, so both put strict limits on the conflict's means, ends, and scope. They chose not to use nuclear weapons. They chose not to attack each other's territory or regime, keeping the fighting to the Koreas. And beyond that, the war was allowed to proceed conventionally, as viciously as the belligerents wanted. These rules weren't read out of a book or arrived at through negotiations. They weren't followed out of faith, or hope, or charity. They were rooted in practicality. Policymakers in Moscow and Washington had to make crucial decisions in real time about how to pursue their objectives during the war, and the logic inherent in the situation made some courses of action much more attractive than others. Nuclear weapons, for all their power—because of all their power—turned out to be surprisingly powerless. Using them would carry many costs and bring few benefits. It would create more problems than it solved. And so neither superpower did it. A decade later, the Cuban missile crisis reinforced the growing taboo against nuclear use and left the parties still more risk averse. Then Vietnam followed the same pattern as Korea. None of the nuclear powers, now including China, used nuclear weapons. None attacked another nuclear power's territory or regime. And beyond that, anything went. The same rules held in the Gulf War, the Iraq War, and the Soviet and American wars in Afghanistan. They held for conflicts involving nuclear powers elsewhere (apart from some minor skirmishing). And they are holding now in Ukraine. HOW THIS ENDS **Russia's plan A was to conquer Ukraine quickly,** install a friendly government,

and present the world with a fait accompli. **When that was blocked by determined military resistance, Moscow turned to plan B, pounding cities from a distance and trying to crush Ukrainian morale.** When that didn't work either, the Kremlin turned to plan C, abandoning the attempt to seize the whole country and refocusing on trying to capture and hold a swath of territory in the east and south. The coming battles in the Donbas will be crucial in shaping the outcome, but already much can be said about how this war will end. **The struggle will either conclude with a negotiated settlement involving a territorial status quo ante, or it will subside into a frozen conflict along the armies' stalemated line of contact in the east. That is, the war's end will resemble those in the Korean and Gulf Wars or the situation in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transnistria.** Either way, as in Korea, the shock of the initial aggression has galvanized a broader balancing coalition that will remain even when the fighting stops. **Russia chose a hot war and will get a cold one in the bargain.** Whatever some interpretations of Russian military doctrine might suggest, Moscow **will not use nuclear weapons during the conflict.** Since 1945, every leader of a nuclear power, from homespun politicians such as U.S. Presidents Harry Truman and Lyndon Johnson to mass-murdering sociopaths such as Joseph Stalin and Mao Zedong, has rejected the use of nuclear weapons in battle for excellent reasons. Putin will be no exception, acting not from a soft heart but a hard head. **He knows that extraordinary retaliation and universal opprobrium would follow, with no remotely comparable strategic upsides to justify them—not to mention the fact that the radioactive fallout from such use might easily blow back onto Russia itself. For related reasons, NATO will not attack Russia or try to decapitate the Russian regime so as to avoid making Putin desperate. There will be no introduction of NATO troops, no no-fly zone, and no hot pursuit of Russian forces should they withdraw back into home territory.** All these actions would carry major risks of escalation, which NATO wants to avoid as much as Moscow. Conversely, NATO will feel compelled to deny Moscow a significant victory, not just for Ukraine's sake but to avoid setting the dangerous precedent that nuclear weapons are useful for protecting the ill-gotten gains of conventional aggression.

2AC Frontline–China Focus DA

1. Non-unique: NATO's focus is on Russia, not on counterbalancing China now. China has taken a backseat for NATO.

Fitch Solutions 2021 ("NATO Unlikely To Focus On Countering China, As Russia Will Remain Priority," Fitch Solutions, 15 Jun, 2021, <https://www.fitchsolutions.com/defence-security/nato-unlikely-focus-countering-china-russia-will-remain-priority-15-06-2021, VY>)

Despite the inclusion of China in its communique, NATO is unlikely to prioritise counterbalancing Beijing's growing power in the near term. Of the 79 points in NATO's communique, China was the focus of only points 55 and 56, and was mentioned only 10 times, compared to 63 mentions of Russia, 25 of Ukraine, 23 of terror or terrorism, 18 of Georgia, 10 of Afghanistan, and three of Iran. In our view, **the US will continue to counterbalance China's growing military power in the Indo-Pacific region** by means of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue ('the Quad'), which also includes Japan, India, and Australia, and through Washington's bilateral defence pacts with Japan, South Korea, and other regional allies, **rather than through NATO, whose main focus will remain the Euro-Atlantic area and western Eurasia.** European NATO members, most notably the United Kingdom and France, are likely to increase their participation in **US-led military activities in Asia**, but this **will be limited and not be under the auspices of NATO.** Biden Keen To Reaffirm US' Alliance Network That said, many European NATO states are hardening their attitudes towards China, and the alliance may increasingly be used to step up diplomatic criticism of Beijing on issues such as Indo-Pacific security and China's alleged human rights abuses. For its part, China will view these developments – correctly in our view – as part of an effort by the US Biden administration to build a multilateral front to pressure China. The deterioration of EU-China relations was most visibly underscored on May 20, when the European Parliament suspended the ratification of the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) after China imposed sanctions on 10 EU officials in response to Western sanctions against Chinese officials accused of mass detentions of ethnic Uighurs in China's Xinjiang province. The CAI was only finalised in December 2020 after seven years of negotiations. Meanwhile, President Joe Biden is seeking to improve US relations with the EU, which became very strained over trade and climate change issues during the presidency of Donald Trump (2017-2021). Biden is holding a summit with EU leaders on June 15. One area of cooperation is likely to be a new EU-US Trade and Technology Council (TTC) to set standards for emerging technology, strengthen and diversify supply chains, and rein in the growing power of 'Big Tech'. Although NATO and the EU are completely separate organisations, their close overlap in membership means that there is a broad 'Western coalition' emerging to challenge China. Russia Will Remain NATO's Focus **Russia will remain NATO's overwhelming security challenge, amid ongoing tensions in Ukraine and Belarus, as well as NATO and Russian military activities in Eastern Europe.** Although European NATO and EU leaders are increasingly cognisant of the challenges posed by China, they will continue to focus on Russia, given that Moscow poses much more geographically closer and more immediate security risks. In particular, the governments of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland remain very concerned about recurring Russian military pressure on Ukraine, and Russia's support for Belarus' embattled President Alexander Lukashenko. Meanwhile, Western European leaders will remain concerned about potential Russian interference in their domestic affairs, cyber attacks, and

Russia's harsh treatment of opposition figures such as Alexei Navalny. Indeed, the NATO summit also announced a new Comprehensive Cyber Defence Policy, aimed at deterring and defending against cyber attacks. Although President Biden is scheduled to hold a summit with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Switzerland on June 16, the wide range of issues that divide their two countries implies that there is no clear path to a rapprochement.

2. No link: NATO can focus on both China and Russia's invasion of Ukraine, which means that NATO can focus on both China AND the affirmative.

Sprenger and Gould 2022 ("US military readies to 'walk and chew gum' as multiple crises loom," Sebastian Sprenger is Europe editor for Defense News, and Joe Gould, senior Pentagon reporter for Defense News, Jan 28, 2022, <https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2022/01/28/us-military-readies-to-walk-and-chew-gum-as-multiple-crises-loom/>, VY)

WASHINGTON — **As roughly 100,000 Russian troops amass around Ukraine, a series of emerging crises around the world — the Middle East, China, North Korea — are demanding the full attention of NATO,** and particularly its most powerful member, the United States. **Now, there's a growing sense among national security experts that the crisis in Ukraine is just one of many conflicts on the precipice, putting pressure on the alliance and its member countries to address this threat and at the same time brace for the next one.** Indeed, China this week flew 39 warplanes toward Taiwan. And consider the United Arab Emirates reported this week it had intercepted multiple ballistic missiles aimed at Abu Dhabi. Julianne Smith, the U.S. ambassador to NATO, described the ongoing dispute between Russia and Ukraine as a "microcosm" of the types of threats Western analysts were expecting all along. "All of this is becoming very real," she said this week at a panel in Brussels sponsored by the German Marshall Fund of the United States. At the same time, "something could happen on China and Taiwan next week," said Ian Lesser, vice president at the think tank, referring to the possibility of China attacking the U.S.-backed island nation that Beijing sees as a renegade province to be eventually united with the mainland. Asked about that possibility on Thursday, Defense Department spokesman John Kirby said the military remains watchful of other theaters. **"I think the gist of your question is, why can't we walk and chew gum at the same time,"** he told reporters at the Pentagon, **"We can, and we are. ... Just because we're focused on bolstering our allies because of the worrisome accumulation of combat-credible power by the Russians in and around Ukraine doesn't mean that we aren't focused on the pacing challenge that China represents to the department."**

<3. No Link: The affirmative is part of the NATO Strategy against China. It fights back against future cyberattacks by China.>

4. Internal-link turn: The NATO focus and threat construction of China is what causes China to be a threat.

Lonas 2021 ("China warns NATO to stop 'hyping up' threat posed by Beijing," Lexi Lonas, 06/15/21,

<https://thehill.com/policy/international/china/558484-china-warns-nato-to-stop-hyping-up-threat-posed-by-beijing/>, VY)

China on Tuesday issued a warning to NATO, saying the group needs to stop going after Beijing. The statement accused the group of a "Cold War mentality," and said it needs to stop "hyping up" the threat posed by Beijing, a spokesperson of China's mission to the European Union said, according to NBC News. **NATO is "slandering China's peaceful development and misjudging the international situation and its own role,"** the spokesperson said. China's statement comes after NATO said on Monday that the country poses "systemic challenges to the rules-based international order," according to the outlet. China rebuked the statement, saying it won't "sit by and do nothing if 'systemic challenges' come closer to us." "I think there is a growing recognition over the last couple years that we have new challenges," President Biden said on Monday. "We have Russia that is not acting in a way that is consistent with what we had hoped, as well as China." **The back and forth between NATO and China comes after G-7 leaders met to discuss how to compete with China, and called for the country to engage in a transparent investigation into the origins of COVID-19. "The days when global decisions were dictated by a small group of countries are long gone," a spokesman for the Chinese Embassy responded.**

5. No Impact: No US-China war. 4 reasons: mutually assured destruction, weak Chinese military, China's focus on soft-power, and economic interdependence.

Krulak and Friedman 2021 (“The US and China are not destined for war,” Charles C. Krulak, a retired four-star general, is a former commandant of the US Marine Corps and former president of Birmingham-Southern College, and Alex Friedman is a former chief financial officer of the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, 24 Aug 2021, <https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/the-us-and-china-are-not-destined-for-war/>, VY)

True, throughout history, when a rising power has challenged a ruling one, war has often been the result. But there are notable exceptions. A war between the US and China today is no more inevitable than was war between the rising US and the declining United Kingdom a century ago. And in today's context, there are four compelling reasons to believe that war between the US and China can be avoided. First and foremost, any military conflict between the two would quickly turn nuclear. The US thus finds itself in the same situation that it was in vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Taiwan could easily become this century's tripwire, just as the 'Fulda Gap' in Germany was during the Cold War. **But the same dynamic of 'mutually assured destruction' that limited US-Soviet conflict applies to the US and China.** And the international community would do everything in its power to ensure that **a potential nuclear conflict did not materialise**, given that the consequences would be fundamentally transnational and—unlike climate change—immediate. A US-China conflict would almost certainly take the form of a proxy war, rather than a major-power confrontation. Each superpower might take a different side in a domestic conflict in a country such as Pakistan, Venezuela, Iran or North Korea, and deploy some combination of economic, cyber and diplomatic instruments. We have seen this type of conflict many times before: from Vietnam to Bosnia, the US faced surrogates rather than its principal foe. **Second, it's important to remember that, historically, China plays a long game.** Although **Chinese** military power has grown dramatically, it **still lags behind the US on almost every measure that matters.** And while China is investing heavily in asymmetric equalisers (long-range anti-ship and hypersonic missiles, military applications of cyber, and more), it will not match the US in conventional means such as aircraft and large ships for decades, if ever. **A head-to-head conflict with the US would thus be too dangerous for China to countenance at its current stage of development.** If such a conflict did occur, China would have few options but to let the nuclear genie out of the bottle. In thinking about baseline scenarios, therefore, we should give less weight to any scenario in which the Chinese consciously precipitate a military confrontation with America. The US military, however, tends to plan for worst-case scenarios and is currently focused on a potential direct conflict with China—a fixation with overtones of the US-Soviet dynamic. This raises the risk of being blindsided by other threats. Time and again since the Korean War, asymmetric threats have proven the most problematic to national security. Building a force that can handle the worst-case scenario does not guarantee success across the spectrum of warfare. **The third reason to think that a Sino-American conflict can be avoided is that China is already chalking up victories in the global soft-power war.** Notwithstanding accusations that Covid-19 escaped from a virology lab in Wuhan, China has emerged from the pandemic looking much better than the US. And with its Belt and Road Initiative to finance infrastructure development around the world, it has aggressively stepped into the void left by US retrenchment during Donald Trump's four years as president. **China's leaders may very well look at the current status quo and conclude that they are on the right strategic path. Finally, China and the US are deeply intertwined economically.** Despite Trump's trade war, **Sino-American bilateral trade in 2020 was around US\$650 billion, and China was America's largest trade partner. The two countries' supply-chain linkages are vast, and China holds more than US\$1 trillion in US Treasuries, most of which it can't easily unload, lest it reduce their value and incur massive losses.**

Answers to Taiwan Impact Module

Internal-link Turn: It is the NATO focus on Asia that causes Chinese aggression and a possible invasion of Taiwan.

Bloomberg News 2022 ("China Warns U.S. Over Forming Pacific NATO, Backing Taiwan," Bloomberg News, March 7, 2022, <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-03-07/china-urges-world-not-to-add-fuel-to-fire-in-war-in-ukraine>, VY)

China warned the U.S. against trying to build what it called a Pacific version of NATO, while declaring that security disputes over Taiwan and Ukraine were “not comparable at all.” Foreign Minister Wang Yi told his annual news briefing Monday that the “real goal” of the U.S.’s Indo-Pacific strategy was to form Asia’s answer to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. China has often accused the U.S. of trying to form blocs to suppress its growth, a complaint that’s likely to attract greater attention after President Vladimir Putin cited similar grievances before his invasion of Ukraine. **“The perverse actions run counter to the common aspiration of the region for peace,** development, cooperation and win-win outcomes,” Wang added. **“They are doomed to fail.”** **Complaints about U.S. efforts to strengthen its alliance network in Asia were among several points of contention raised by Wang in the almost two-hour briefing on the sidelines of the National People’s Congress in Beijing.** The senior diplomat repeatedly alluded to the U.S. as the source of problems with countries around the globe and issued some of China’s most pointed warnings yet against calls to expand U.S. ties with Taiwan. **“This would not only push Taiwan into a precarious situation, but will also bring unbearable consequences for the U.S. side,”** Wang said on the sidelines of the National People’s Congress in Beijing, later adding: “Taiwan will eventually return to the embrace of the motherland.”

No Impact: China will not go to war with Taiwan – peaceful military approach, US deterrence, and risk of economic sanctions.

Scobell and Stevenson-Yang 2022 (“China is Not Russia. Taiwan Is Not Ukraine.” Andrew Scobell, Ph.D.; Lucy Stevenson-Yang, United States Institute of Peace, March 4, 2022, [China Is Not Russia. Taiwan Is Not Ukraine. | United States Institute of Peace](#), VY, *2 page card*)

China Is Not Russia Russia under Putin has repeatedly dispatched its armed forces for combat missions overseas to a range of countries, including Georgia, Syria and Ukraine, as well as conducted major military interventions against other states, most recently Kazakhstan (albeit at the invitation of that country’s president). Moscow has also actively supported armed groups and militias in some of these same countries and others. **Although China has also been active and assertive in the use of its armed forces beyond its borders in recent years, Beijing has eschewed large-scale combat operations.** Around its periphery, China has engaged in provocations, confrontations and even violent clashes. **But China, unlike Russia, has refrained from massive interventions, invasions or occupations of other countries** since it invaded Vietnam in 1979. **China’s largest deployments of troops overseas in the post-Cold War era have been on U.N. Peacekeeping missions.** Whereas Russia has more than 20 military installations beyond its borders, to date, China has only one official military base on foreign soil — in Djibouti (established in 2017) — and a handful of other facilities it does not formally acknowledge. Of course, Beijing has a history of using its potent armed forces and muscular coercive apparatus within China’s borders to repress vigorously peaceful protesters, political dissidents and disaffected ethnic minority peoples. The locations of these operations include Beijing, Tibet and Xinjiang, as well as Hong Kong. China has also not hesitated to employ armed force and a wide array of coercive instruments around its periphery. This includes building roads and bunkers in remote frontier areas of the high Himalayas along its contested border with India and constructing artificial islands and military installations in disputed waters of the South China Sea. In recent years, China’s armed forces have also engaged in deadly clashes and violent confrontations with Indian army units along the disputed Line of Actual Control and harassed and rammed the fishing boats and coast guard vessels of Vietnam, the Philippines and other countries. Putin appears to relish projecting the image of a strongman who is routinely willing to thumb his nose at the rest of the world. By contrast, **Xi — at least to date — has mainly sought to cultivate a statesmanlike image on the global stage. At times he has given speeches attempting to cast China as a more responsible, less meddlesome and values-free version of the United States. And Xi has invested a lot of time and resources in promoting a set of high-profile international efforts intended to demonstrate that China is a constructive and proactive great power.** Employing positive rhetoric touting “win-win” solutions and aspirations to build a “community with a shared future for mankind,” China under Xi’s leadership has launched ambitious efforts such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. Putin, by contrast, has made no real effort to offer an alternative to U.S. global leadership beyond delivering vague grandiose declarations (often in tandem with Xi) and has offered the world little in the way of economic stimulus beyond the prospect of more energy exports and hype about the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). Despite consisting of only a handful of Soviet successor states, the EAEU is touted as Russia’s answer to China’s BRI. In terms of geostrategic activism, Russia’s major multilateralist initiatives have tended to involve China. These include the establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in 2001 and the formation of the BRICS grouping in 2010. The former is a security community with a Central Asian focus consisting of Russia, China and four Central and two South Asian states. The latter is a loose association of some of the world’s largest “emerging economies”: Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. However, Moscow’s most significant geostrategic maneuver under Putin has been to strengthen Russia’s strategic

partnership with China. Both Beijing and Moscow insist that their relationship is not an alliance and their 2001 treaty of friendship — which was renewed in 2021 — does not commit either signatory to come to the defense of the other in case of military conflict. Yet, the Sino-Russian relationship is a clearly consequential alignment that has grown closer in recent years, particularly as their respective relationships with the United States have deteriorated. Russia's invasion of Ukraine has put China in a very uncomfortable position: Beijing does not want to antagonize Moscow but neither does it want to damage its relations with Washington and European capitals. Consequently, China has equivocated in its statements and actions. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi has called for peace but has stopped short of condemning Russia or calling upon Moscow to withdraw its military. The lengthy joint statement of February 4, 2022, issued by Putin and Xi during the Russian leader's visit to Beijing on the eve of the Winter Olympics, makes no mention at all of Ukraine — and China has pointedly abstained on all U.N. Security Council resolutions related to Russia's invasion. Xi appears to have asked Putin to delay any military action against Ukraine until after the Olympics. Russia's invasion poses other difficulties for China both in terms of running counter to Beijing's long espoused principles in foreign affairs and its adverse impact on China's national interests in Ukraine. Russia's actions clearly contradict China's cornerstone foreign policy principles of noninterference in other countries' affairs and respecting territorial integrity. Moreover, China has sizable economic investments in Ukraine and is a good customer of Ukraine's armaments industry. In 2020, Ukraine signed the BRI cooperation agreement, which further bolstered the economic relationship between the two countries and marked Ukraine as an important partner in Beijing's signature foreign policy and economic initiative.

Taiwan Is Not Ukraine The fact that Ukraine is not a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was almost certainly a decisive factor in Putin's calculus to invade Ukraine. Russia's commander in chief knew that his invading forces would likely not have to contend with the militaries of any other countries. And if there were any lingering doubts in the Kremlin about the disposition of the most powerful member of NATO, U.S. President Joe Biden stated publicly that the United States would not send military forces to help defend Ukraine. Nevertheless, the Biden administration has taken strong steps to reinforce NATO allies in Eastern Europe and provide robust military assistance to Ukraine. By contrast, **Xi and his Politburo colleagues have long been convinced that Taiwan has the resolute support of the world's most capable military. The People's Liberation Army** — as all branches of China's armed forces are known — **continues to assume that if it launches an invasion of Taiwan, the U.S. military will swiftly and decisively intervene.** The U.S.-Taiwan relationship, while technically “unofficial” due to the One China policy, has strengthened in recent years. On February 28, **the Biden administration sent an unofficial delegation of former U.S. defense and national security officials to Taiwan as a signal to China of that commitment. It remains true that the greatest deterrence to a massive Chinese military attack on the island is Beijing's assumption that war with Taiwan also means a war with the United States.** However, there is no formal military alliance between the United States and Taiwan. The defense pact binding Washington to Taipei was formally abrogated in 1979. So why is Beijing convinced that Washington has an ironclad alliance-like relationship with Taiwan? There are at least two reasons. First, successive U.S. administrations have publicly committed themselves to support Taiwan against Chinese aggression and have regularly sold arms to the island's armed forces. Second, although there is no language in the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) that explicitly commits the United States to come to Taiwan's defense in the event of an attack on the island by China, many in Washington believe that such a commitment exists. While there are different interpretations as to what the TRA means, the most significant fact is that the vast majority of U.S. political and military leaders are fully convinced that this legislation binds the United States to a de facto alliance with Taiwan. China's increased military assertiveness and greater level of armed provocations in the Taiwan Strait and elsewhere around China's periphery in recent

years have only served to strengthen the conviction in Washington that the island is a staunch democratic partner worthy of U.S. support as it tries to defend tiny Taiwan against efforts by Beijing to coerce the island into unwanted unification with China. However, Taiwan, unlike Ukraine, is not a member of the United Nation. While Ukraine has ambassador-level diplomatic relations with more than 180 countries, including China and the United States, Taiwan only has full diplomatic ties with approximately a dozen countries and none of these are major powers. Yet, thanks to the TRA, Taipei enjoys robust quasi-diplomatic relations with Washington, and thanks to Taiwan's pragmatic ingenuity, the island possesses a vibrant worldwide network of de facto diplomatic missions. Although Ukraine's diplomatic standing is far superior to Taiwan's, the European country's military alliance status is less impressive — Ukraine is not a member of NATO, although it is a very active member of NATO's Partnership for Peace initiative. While Taiwan also has no formal military allies, the island has several close and consequential security partners, most notably the United States. China Is China and Taiwan Is Taiwan Taiwan continues to be the most contentious issue in U.S.-China relations. Moreover, the Taiwan Strait is routinely identified as the most plausible location of a military confrontation between the United States and China. For Xi and his Politburo colleagues, Taiwan looms large and is prominently identified as a "core" national interest of China's, with Xi reiterating in 2021 that "resolving the Taiwan question and realizing China's complete reunification is a historic mission and an unshakable commitment of the Communist Party of China" and that "no one should underestimate the resolve, the will, and the ability of the Chinese people to defend their national sovereignty and territorial integrity." Moreover, most Chinese citizens consider Taiwan to be Chinese territory and view the island as something worth fighting for. Indeed, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has staked its political legitimacy on the ultimate goal of unifying Taiwan with China and in the meantime is working resolutely to prevent the island from becoming de jure independent. Beijing's preferred means of realizing unification or preventing independence is peaceful but the CCP has never renounced the use of armed force. Furthermore, the PLA's central warfighting scenario is Taiwan and China's military has been focused on planning and preparing for an operation against the island for decades. A Cautionary Tale? The above differences notwithstanding, Russia's combat experience in Ukraine will have a spillover impact on how China thinks about Taiwan. If the Russian armed forces remain bogged down in a stalemate in Ukraine for an extended period and/or face a prolonged and widespread insurgency, this may give Xi and his fellow Politburo members pause. If Russia's military experiences major setbacks and perhaps even embarrassing defeats, this may make China's political leaders think twice about the advisability of an invasion of Taiwan. After all, an invasion of Ukraine is relatively straightforward — the country is geographically contiguous to Russia, sharing an extended land border with mostly gentle terrain. By contrast, an invasion of the island of Taiwan is a far more complex operation — a successful campaign requires careful planning and coordinated execution between air, naval and ground forces. It would also involve amphibious landings in addition to considerable urban warfare — on an even larger scale than in Ukraine — including operations on rugged mountainous terrain. Certainly, the PLA will carefully study Russia's Ukrainian campaign and draw lessons from it, much as they have studied campaigns of other major powers. Such analyses are conducted with great seriousness because China's armed forces themselves have not fought a major war since 1979 (when Chinese forces invaded Vietnam) and have not conducted a major island landing campaign since 1950 (against Hainan Island). **One way that China's leadership might be taking notes from Russia's Ukraine invasion is by rethinking the risks associated with escalation.** In addition to noting the potential military embarrassment that Russia is facing, **China might be wary of the sweeping economic sanctions levied by the international community. If China were to receive similar backlash for an invasion of Taiwan, it would raise the possibility of truly crippling sanctions at a time when the Chinese economy is experiencing anemic growth and structural**

challenges. In particular, the weaponization of the SWIFT payments system might give China pause. Russia has been trying to popularize a cross-border financial information transmission system, and China is committed to developing the CIPS payment network, but neither has had significant success outside Russian or Chinese borders. **Despite its flaws, SWIFT remains the most efficient system for international financial transactions for banks and being removed from SWIFT could potentially be devastating to the Chinese economy. Furthermore, the lessons of Russia's invasion of Ukraine to date are that the costs of armed aggression are high in blood and treasure, as well as strong international censure of Moscow and a resolute collective response by NATO member countries.**

2AC Frontline–US Unilateral CP

1. Perm: do both – NATO is purely transactional to US military interests.

Thimm 2018 (“NATO: US Strategic Dominance and Unequal Burden-Sharing Are Two Sides of the Same Coin, Johannes Thimm, PhD, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, 04.09.2018, <https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/nato-us-strategic-dominance-and-unequal-burden-sharing-are-two-sides-of-the-same-coin>, VY)

The asymmetry in NATO contributions between the United States and Europa is no accident. Johannes Thimm writes. Europeans should not be too alarmed about President Trump’s threats to withdraw from the alliance – and instead follow their own priorities. US President Donald Trump accuses Europe of exploiting the United States, because most NATO members, including Germany, spend less than 2 percent of their GDP on defense. He calls for a significant increase in defense budgets – most recently to 4 percent of GDP, and threatens that the US will otherwise abandon its alliance commitments. **It is true that Europe benefits from American security guarantees, and the diagnosis of European “free-riding” is not completely unfounded either. However, this does not mean that the US is being taken advantage of.** There are three important arguments here: **NATO provides practical support and legitimacy to US supremacy First, even if NATO is viewed in purely transactional terms, leaving aside values like solidarity among allies, it is a good deal for Washington.** Americans calling for more equal burden-sharing, including Trump himself, suggest that the US supports NATO mostly for altruistic reasons. In other words that America is doing Europe a favor. But this picture is incomplete. **For the US military, NATO is a force multiplier, providing legitimacy to American power.** European allies are engaged in numerous missions like Afghanistan, while **the United States mostly calls the shots.** US bases in Europe not only protect European allies, but serve as logistics hubs to project power into the Middle East. These are assets the US military would not want to give up.

2. Perm: do the aff – NATO just proves legitimacy, but acts in the U.S.’s interests.

Shiffrinson 2021 (“The Dominance Dilemma: The American Approach to NATO and its Future,” Joshua R. Shiffrinson, Non-Resident Fellow at the Quincy Institute and Assistant Professor with the Pardee School of Global Studies at Boston University, January 28, 2021, [The Dominance Dilemma: The American Approach to NATO and its Future – Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft](#), VY)

Introduction Since its creation in the early days of the Cold War, American policymakers have been of two minds about the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). **Seeking to project American power and influence in Europe and gain legitimacy for U.S. ambitions, policy planners have seen NATO as a useful vehicle for organizing Europe in ways conducive to broader American interests.** At the same time, the United States has proven reluctant to pay or risk too much to achieve this result. For a country that is secure at home, **influence in Europe is desirable for some** but of dubious necessity. These contradictory impulses have been reflected not only in the variety of America’s approaches to the alliance over time, but also in the attitudes of different policymakers. Now, having successfully helped to foster an unprecedented level of European stability and security, and facing growing pressure to reduce America’s strategic burdens, **American strategists in the years ahead must be prepared to revisit the fundamentals of the U.S. presence in Europe and devolve authority to local actors.**

3. Counterplan can't solve the aff: The U.S. working within NATO to fight cyberattacks will strengthen its own cyber capabilities and signal that cyberattacks are a military attack which increases deterrence and credibility.

Herr and Schneider 2018 ("Sharing is Caring: The United States' New Cyber Commitment for NATO," Trey Herr, visiting fellow at the Hoover Institution, and Jacquelyn Schneider, an assistant professor and affiliate faculty at the Center for Cyber Conflict Studies at the U.S. Naval War College, Council on Foreign Relations, October 10, 2018, [Sharing is Caring: The United States' New Cyber Commitment for NATO | Council on Foreign Relations](#), VY, *2 page card*)

Given the recent blockbuster headlines about alleged Chinese snooping on server hardware sold to major technology companies and the latest joint-denunciation of Russian cyber operations, you could be forgiven for having missed an important NATO-related development. The Associated Press reports that **the U.S. Defense Department will announce a new commitment to use offensive and defensive cybersecurity capabilities on behalf of NATO allies. The new commitment is notable given how cybersecurity has long been treated as an exceptional domain of operations, and cyber capabilities reserved as strategic national assets to be shared with only the closest of allies.** With this announcement, **the Pentagon is suggesting that cyber capabilities might be used alongside conventional weapons with allies and indeed, equal weight appears to be given to offensive and defensive operations. Perhaps most significantly, the announcement moves NATO partners closer to what has been a tight coterie of U.S.-favored signals intelligence partners** such as the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Australia, and Canada. **The DoD announcement is a sign of the continued, if nascent, normalization of cybersecurity under the current administration and in Europe.** Even where offensive cyber operations may not rise to the level of war, they provide decision-makers with options to influence the geopolitical environment. **This aligns with recent trends in the U.S. military to integrate cyber capabilities into maneuver units and large exercises, and reflects the shift towards more risk acceptant and offensive measures to counter cyberattacks found in the 2018 DoD Cyber Strategy. Moving cyber capabilities into the same strategic frame as conventional weapons, especially with NATO, reflects a shift in institutional cyber arrangements within the United States and the growing power of the military relative to the intelligence community.** For the United States, cyber capabilities have always had a complicated relationship with the intelligence community, in particular the National Security Agency (NSA). When Cyber Command stood up in 2010 as a sub-unified combatant command within the Department of Defense, it moved into the NSA's headquarters, staffed its management ranks with longtime NSA employees, borrowed networks and technical capabilities, and to this day shares a dual-hatted commander. In the immediate years after the command was created, it was logical that the structure of partnerships with allies looked more like the special signals intelligence relationships formed around the NSA rather than traditional alliance networks in NATO and Asia. **The recent announcement aligns cyber operations more closely with Department of Defense missions, which are more likely to posture capabilities for deterrent effects, than intelligence missions, which view capabilities as assets to be carefully husbanded. Treating cybersecurity capabilities more like conventional arms and less like national assets also helps drive the integration of cyber operations into the planning and execution of a broader array of conventional military missions.** Early cyber operations were largely conventional espionage and surveillance activities supercharged by the spread of computing and the internet. In the United States, this led to the creation of large and complex software tools, carefully guarded by the intelligence community as national assets (sometimes unsuccessfully). The DoD's announcement indicates a move towards treating at least some of these capabilities, along with their supporting infrastructure, more like conventional armaments and making them

available for broader use; a model closer to Central or Special Operations Command and less like the National Security Agency. The Pentagon's new commitment also reflects changes in how Europe talks about cybersecurity and characterizes the Russian threat. The last two years have seen a trend toward more open discussion of offensive cyber operations and the possibility of the alliance adopting more assertive postures to counter cyber operations against its members. After years of devastating ransomware attacks and cyber-enabled information attacks, NATO members are more willing to explore cyber triggers to Article 5. They have also been more willing to articulate the cyber threat against the alliance. In addition to last week's denunciation by Dutch, UK, and U.S. authorities, Russian state actors are widely suggested to be responsible for an increasingly brazen series of operations, including targeting German government ministries, French and British TV stations, and more. Sharing offensive cyber capabilities raises the question of whether cyber operations can extend effective deterrence to NATO partners. There seems to be little focus on using these operations to deter conventional or nuclear attacks on NATO countries, but this may evolve. **The United States seems to want NATO to use cyber operations to deter other cyber operations, particularly those falling under the threshold of armed conflict.** Cyber operations have all sorts of problems for deterrence: signaling is difficult, they can be perceived as a cheap threat, and their effects are largely uncertain. By contrast, moving new military forces in Eastern Europe or conducting ground exercises are credible signals of extended deterrence, but are costly and time consuming. Cyber capabilities aren't free, nor are they necessarily cheap, but the promise to use them can add new credibility to a deterrent threat without the same investment and delay as conventional alternatives. **Sharing cyber capabilities may be a cheaper way to signal alliance commitment than other options and might signal a further maturation, and acceptance, of cybersecurity into geopolitics.**

<4. The counterplan links to the net benefit:

The Russia DA: Russia will still see the counterplan as NATO imperial ambitions because the US is the leader of NATO and their adversary. There is no net benefit.

The China DA: Since the US is the largest contributor to NATO, the CP will also cause a lack of focus and resources to focus on China. Working with NATO actually helps share the burden.

Nuclear Mod DA: The US will still not be able to focus on nuclear modernization. Working with NATO helps spread the burden.

2AC Topicality Frontline–Cyber Warfare

1. Counter-interpretation: Security Cooperation is extremely broad. NATO cooperation can utilize Cyber Command strategy and apply it to allied engagement

Bilms 2021 (Kevin; January; career Department of Defense civilian serving in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict; War on the Rocks; “What’s in a name? Reimagining irregular warfare activities for competition,” <https://warontherocks.com/2021/01/whats-in-a-name-reimagining-irregular-warfare-activities-for-competition>)

Merge “Civil-Military Operations” and “Security Cooperation” Into “Security Partner Engagement” **Civil-military operations and security cooperation are similar, but each term contains ambiguity that prevents non-practitioners from fully understanding how they fit in competition.** For example, “civil-military operations” risks confusion with “civil-military relations,” the study of the dynamic between the military and civil society writ large. As a term, **“security cooperation” is broad enough to encompass virtually anything involving a partner. Both activities specifically emphasize the use of military forces to establish, maintain, influence, and leverage security relationships** through increased defense interactions. Recent history exemplified the importance of non-standard (i.e., non-military) security partners to consolidate strategic gains, and the ability to manage complex and non-traditional security relationships could yield even greater impact in great-power competition. **Concerted security engagements before conflict help align U.S. efforts with allies and partners, provide invaluable access and placement in event of crisis, and facilitate U.S. campaign and contingency plans. Both conventional forces and special operators are capable of engaging partners and allies to not only increase interoperability, but also enhance U.S. influence, as a low-cost contribution in competition below armed conflict.** “Security partner engagement” acknowledges the importance of security partnerships and ensuring that regular engagements will secure U.S. influence and preserve the United States as the preferred partner of choice. **This terminology adapts U.S. Cyber Command’s concept of “persistent engagement,” where regular engagement helps to get ahead of problems and forestall opponents’ abilities to gain advantage.** Applying this logic to civil-military security engagements acknowledges that the influence and advantages afforded by a deep network of security partners are neither predetermined nor indefinite, and require concerted effort to deter opponents that seek to make headway or generate fissures among partners and allies. Reshaping “security partner engagement” in this fashion could account for one way that the department operationalizes its Guidance for Development of Alliances and Partnerships, which looks to maintain and sustain this asymmetric advantage in all stages of competition.

2. We Meet: NATO is military-to-military cooperation, so the affirmative will be military-to-military cooperation on emerging technology.

NATO 2022

NATO "NATO's Purpose." Nato.int July 4th, 2022

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_68144.htm#:~:text=NATO's%20essential%20and%20enduring%20purpose.and%20cohesion%20among%20its%20members.

During the Cold War, NATO focused on collective defence and the protection of its members from potential threats emanating from the Soviet Union. **With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the rise of non-state actors affecting international security, many new security threats have emerged, such as terrorism.** Moreover, since 2014, Russia's aggressive actions against Ukraine and its brutal and unprovoked war on the country since February 2022 have radically altered the security environment.

NATO is countering this vast array of threats by strengthening its deterrence and defence as the backbone of its commitment to collective defence; helping to prevent and manage crisis situations; and encouraging cooperative security, as outlined in the 2022 Strategic Concept.

3. Prefer our interpretation –

Standards:

A. Ground – regulations and cooperation are important affirmative ground. The negative's interpretation destroys affirmative ground and does not garner good negative ground either. New regulations give important stable negative links.

B. Limits – military-to-military is over-limiting. The topic areas are not generally military-to-military so new cooperation within NATO is necessary to the affirmative ground on this topic. Anything that adds to their collective defense increases security.

4. Voters:

A. Education – nearly any affirmative is going to be broad NATO cooperation. Their definition excludes important topic education like LAWS, cybersecurity, and biotech regulations.

B. Literature checks limits and ground loss – affirmatives have to have an expert or legitimate card that supports their solvency argument, the negative must do the same

C. Reasonability – The affirmative only must be reasonably close to the topic to allow for educational debates. If we are close to the topic, it is not a reason to reject the affirmative.

Cyber Warfare Case Negative

1NC Frontlines

1NC Russia Advantage Answers

1. Russia's cyber technology is too weak now. Their attacks are failing and they are too busy with Ukraine to be a threat.

Wolff 2022 ("Why Russia Hasn't Launched Major Cyber Attacks Since the Invasion of Ukraine," Josephine Wolff, associate professor of cybersecurity policy at The Fletcher School at Tufts University, March 2, 2022, [Why Russia Hasn't Launched Major Cyber Attacks Since the Invasion of Ukraine](#), VY)

As tensions escalated between Russia and Ukraine, many people were expecting the conflict to have significant cyber components—the United States Department of Homeland Security even issued a warning to businesses to be on high alert for Russian cyberattacks, as did the U.K.'s National Cyber Security Centre. **What is surprising is that**—so far, at least—**the devastating Russian cyberattacks everyone has been expecting have yet to materialize.** There's no guarantee, of course, that a large-scale cyberattack on Ukraine's electrical grid or global banks or anything else isn't just around the corner. Russia has proven time and again that it has few compunctions about targeting critical infrastructure and causing considerable collateral damage through acts of cyber aggression. But as the invasion continues with few signs of any sophisticated cyber conflict, **it seems less and less likely that Russia has significant cyber capabilities in reserve, ready to deploy if needed. Instead, it begins to look like Russia's much vaunted cyber capabilities have been neglected in recent years, in favor of developing less expensive, less effective cyber weapons that cause less widespread damage and are considerably easier to contain and defend against.** For instance, many of the cyberattacks directed at Ukraine in the past month have been relatively basic distributed denial-of-service attacks, in which hackers bombard Ukrainian government websites and servers with so much online traffic that those servers cannot respond to legitimate users and are forced offline for some period of time. Denial-of-service attacks can be effective for short-term disruptions but they're hardly a new or impressive cyber capability—in fact, they're what Russia used to target Estonia more than a decade ago in 2007. Moreover, launching these types of attacks requires no sophisticated technical capabilities or discovery of new vulnerabilities, and they typically have fairly contained impacts on the specific, targeted computers. Similarly, recent reports that Belarusian hackers are trying to phish European officials using compromised accounts belonging to Ukrainian armed services members suggests that **not only are these efforts relying on fairly basic tactics like phishing emails, they are not even being carried out by Russian military hackers directly.**

<2. The attacks in the evidence are from rogue hackers who already bypass security systems now. Since they are not part of a military, NATO's deterrence won't solve.>

3. The status quo solves for hackers – the Justice Department has increased resources to prevent and investigate hacks.

Jenkins 2021 ("Justice Dept. to give ransomware attacks same priority as terrorism," Cameron Jenkins - 06/03/21, [Justice Dept. to give ransomware attacks same priority as terrorism | The Hill](#))

The Justice Department announced this week that it will begin elevating ransomware investigations to a similar level of priority as terrorist attacks. John Carlin, the acting deputy attorney general at the Justice Department, told Reuters on Thursday that **the federal government will prioritize ransomware cases through a new process. "It's a specialized process to ensure we track all ransomware cases regardless of where it may be referred in this country, so you can make the connections between actors and work your way up to disrupt the whole chain."** he said. According to Reuters, guidance to U.S. attorney's offices nationwide on Thursday advised that **all information regarding any ransomware cases be sent to a recently formed task force based in Washington, D.C.** The Hill has reached out to the Justice Department for comment. **The move follows a ransomware attack against Colonial Pipeline and other entities in the U.S. in recent weeks.** Colonial Pipeline, which provides roughly 45 percent of the fuel consumed on the East Coast, faced a cyberattack last month that left many states in the southeast with gasoline shortages. A cyber criminal group that federal authorities traced to Russia was able to infiltrate Colonial Pipeline's systems and demand a ransom. The company paid the hackers \$4.4 million in order to have control of the systems returned to them. **"To ensure we can make necessary connections across national and global cases and investigations, and to allow us to develop a comprehensive picture of the national and economic security threats we face, we must enhance and centralize our internal tracking."** read the federal guidance obtained by Reuters. Carlin told the news outlet that **officials have "used this model around terrorism before but never with ransomware," saying it reflected how the federal government is further prioritizing such attacks.** U.S. attorney's offices operating under the new guidance will be required to share updated ransomware attack case details as well as active technical information with the Justice Department.

<4. Their evidence gives no warrant as to how increased NATO cybersecurity will decrease the risk of Russian attacks. Either the US is sufficiently protected OR new efforts will fail for the same reason past ones did.>

5. Turn: If United States increases cyber protections, Russia will attack.

Melendez 2022 ("What a Russian cyberattack on the U.S. could look like and how it could affect you," Steven Melendez, Fast Company February 25, 2022, <https://www.fastcompany.com/90725292/what-a-russian-cyberattack-on-the-u-s-could-look-like-and-how-it-could-affect-you>, NAUDL)

As President Biden intensifies sanctions against Russia in response to the invasion of Ukraine, experts warn that cyberattacks against public and private targets in the United States are a possibility. The Department of Homeland Security this week warned U.S. organizations to be prepared for a cyberattack, though DHS Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas said there is no "specific credible cyber threat" against the U.S. homeland. **Officials in the U.K. issued a similar warning.** Government and banking sites in Ukraine are believed to have already been hit by Russian digital attacks. Exactly what form any hacks in the U.S. may take remains to be seen: CNN reports that the **FBI warned local governments and companies to be on the watch for ransomware. Ransomware attacks, like the one that crippled the Colonial Pipeline last year—causing sporadic gasoline shortages—are typically launched by independent hackers in Russia trying to make money, not by government agents. But ransomware groups typically operate with some tacit approval from the regime of Vladimir Putin, and the Russian government may be more tolerant of hacks on major Western targets if tensions continue to ramp up.** Since so much infrastructure is tied to networked computers that can be deliberately or unintentionally targeted by ransomware, such attacks in the past have disrupted everything from the fuel pipeline to shipping to schools and hospitals. **Even attacks on Ukrainian targets could unintentionally spread malware to computers in the U.S. and other countries as happened with the NotPetya ransomware attack in 2017, which chiefly targeted Ukrainian computers but caused havoc around the world.**

<6. They have no internal link why Russian CYBER attacks escalate, only why conventional attacks escalate. Because cyber criminals are often rogue, there is no way to blame it on the Russia MILITARY even if it is a Russia citizen. This means there is no reason for escalation and no impact.>

7. Turn: Cyberattacks do not escalate. They actually deescalate conflict and stabilize power conflicts.

Jensen and Valeriano 2019 ("What Do We Know About Cyber Escalation? Observations From Simulations and Surveys," Benjamin Jensen, Associate Professor of International Relations, Marine Corps University, and Brandon, Bren Chair of Military Innovation at the Marine Corps University, Cyber Security Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council, November 2019, [WHAT DO WE KNOW ABOUT CYBER ESCALATION? OBSERVATIONS FROM SIMULATIONS AND SURVEYS](#))

Unlike the Cold War in the twentieth century, **this competition involves a new domain: cyberspace.** From the United States to Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea, **states are using cyber operations to exert influence and control.** Whether massive military and commercial espionage campaigns⁵ or international extortion rings and theft,⁶ **the cyber domain offers an outlet for states to advance their interests. Does the resulting cyber competition create new escalation risks?** Do cyber operations alter how states respond to international crises in a way that creates incentives for decision makers to cross the Rubicon and use military force to settle disputes? This question is central to current cyber strategy debates and the idea of persistent engagement and defending forward in cyberspace.⁷ **The answer is surprising: no. To date, cyber operations have tended to offer great powers escalatory offramps. They have provided signaling mechanisms that have let states shape an adversary's behavior without engaging military forces and risking military escalation.**⁸ Despite the uncertainty surrounding how states use new technologies for strategic ends, **cyber operations tend to be stabilizing and provide options for avoiding costly, protracted conflicts.** This issue brief draws on new academic research, simulations, and survey experiments to study how cyber operations alter crisis decision-making during great power competition. Specifically, it analyzes escalation pathways and how the informed public and foreign policy actors conceptualize disruptive technologies and integrate them into larger competitive strategies. Based on the evidence, cyber operations offer a valuable escalatory offramp. **Even states with more escalatory attitudes tend not to respond militarily to disputes when they have the option of imposing costs and signaling through cyberspace.** How states use cyber operations and the resulting escalation risk is a crucial area of policy-relevant research. Outside of Iran, the majority of cyber operations have been initiated by nuclear-armed states.⁹ Despite popular images of lone hackers in basements, cyber operations require an investment in networks, infrastructure, and human capital or sufficient sums of money to buy capability on the black market.¹⁰ **These operations are complex instruments of statecraft that foreign policy actors integrate with other diplomatic, information, military, and economic instruments of power.**¹¹ A combination of these instruments sends a clear signal to rival states. **Cyber operations may, therefore, help stabilize great power competition in the twenty-first century.**

8. US/Russia war will not escalate into nuclear war. Two reasons: Russia's military capabilities and lack of powerful allies.

Simhony 2022 ("NATO Intervention in Ukraine Won't Spark World War III," Limor Simhony, a policy advisor and researcher based in London. She was previously the director of counterextremism at the political consultancy firm TRD Policy and a research fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies. She holds a doctorate from the Department of War Studies at King's College London. April 1, 2022, [A NATO-Russia Conflict Over Ukraine Won't Spark World War III](#), VY)

However, Russia's indiscriminate attacks against Ukrainian civilians—including bombing hospitals and schools as well as the use of horrific weapons, such as cluster bombs and white phosphorus—should drive the West to reevaluate its war engagement policy and take a more active role by implementing a no-fly zone or securing evacuation corridors—perhaps even actively fighting Russian forces. **The main concern is any such escalation could lead to World War III. There are two reasons that this is unlikely. The first is that Russia's military capabilities are poor relative to those of Western armies. Their forces are not sufficiently trained; their equipment and weapons are dated and inferior; they experience major logistical, operational, and tactical difficulties; and their soldiers have low morale. Damaging economic sanctions also mean that Russia may not be able to fund a wider war. The expectation that Moscow will be able to escalate the war** into other theaters in an effective way, especially by conventional means, **is unrealistic.** It is possible that if the Russian military continues to struggle, Russian President Vladimir Putin will deploy chemical or even nuclear weapons to increase gains and deter the West from interfering—but that is unlikely. **The second is that Russia has become isolated. To fight a world war, Russia needs powerful allies, which it does not have.** Its strongest ally, China, has largely remained on the sidelines since the war started. It abstained from voting against the U.N. resolution demanding that Russia ends its offensive, and it is worried about secondary sanctions if it aids Russia. The only countries besides Russia that voted to reject the resolution were Belarus, North Korea, Eritrea, and Syria—hardly a winning alliance. **Both world wars saw blocks of powerful allies fight one another. Currently, such a bloc does not exist on Russia's side. These factors mean that there is not a high risk of substantial escalation into total global war.** This should be enough to convince Western nations to change their engagement policy and help Ukraine win the war by repulsing an opponent that is considerably inferior militarily to their own forces. It is unlikely to happen for two main reasons: fear of Russian nukes and the West's aversion to casualties.

1NC Social Media Disinformation

1. Alt causes to their social media impacts: Cognitive biases and algorithms lead to extremism and are inevitable. Even if they stopped every single instance of Russian interference, they would not solve their impact.

Menczer and Hills 2020 ("Information Overload Helps Fake News Spread, and Social Media Knows It," Filippo Menczer, Luddy Distinguished Professor of Informatics and Computer Science at Indiana University, and Thomas Hills is a professor of psychology and director of the Behavioral and Data Science master's program at the University of Warwick in England, December 1, 2020, [Information Overload Helps Fake News Spread, and Social Media Knows It - Scientific American](#), VY)

This winner-take-all popularity pattern of memes, in which most are barely noticed while a few spread widely, could not be explained by some of them being more catchy or somehow more valuable: the memes in this simulated world had no intrinsic quality. **Virality resulted purely from the statistical consequences of information proliferation in a social network of agents with limited attention.** Even when agents preferentially shared memes of higher quality, researcher Xiaoyan Qiu, then at OSoMe, observed little improvement in the overall quality of those shared the most. Our models revealed that **even when we want to see and share high-quality information, our inability to view everything in our news feeds inevitably leads us to share things that are partly or completely untrue. Cognitive biases greatly worsen the problem.** In a set of groundbreaking studies in 1932, psychologist Frederic Bartlett told volunteers a Native American legend about a young man who hears war cries and, pursuing them, enters a dreamlike battle that eventually leads to his real death. Bartlett asked the volunteers, who were non-Native, to recall the rather confusing story at increasing intervals, from minutes to years later. He found that as time passed, the rememberers tended to distort the tale's culturally unfamiliar parts such that they were either lost to memory or transformed into more familiar things. We now know that our minds do this all the time: **they adjust our understanding of new information so that it fits in with what we already know. One consequence of this so-called confirmation bias is that people often seek out, recall and understand information that best confirms what they already believe. This tendency is extremely difficult to correct.** Experiments consistently show that even when **people** encounter balanced information containing views from differing perspectives, they **tend to find supporting evidence for what they already believe.** And when people with divergent beliefs about emotionally charged issues such as climate change are shown the same information on these topics, they become even more committed to their original positions. **Making matters worse, search engines and social media platforms provide personalized recommendations based on the vast amounts of data they have about users' past preferences. They prioritize information in our feeds that we are most likely to agree with—no matter how fringe—** and shield us from information that might change our minds. **This makes us easy targets for polarization.** Nir Grinberg and his co-workers at Northeastern University recently showed that conservatives in the U.S. are more receptive to misinformation. But our own analysis of consumption of low-quality information on Twitter shows that the vulnerability applies to both sides of the political spectrum, and no one can fully avoid it. Even our ability to detect online manipulation is affected by our political bias,

though not symmetrically: Republican users are more likely to mistake bots promoting conservative ideas for humans, whereas Democrats are more likely to mistake conservative human users for bots.

2. Russia is focused on planting propaganda about the Ukraine invasion, NOT meddling with U.S. politics. Their evidence is too old and doesn't reflect current priorities.

Dale 2022 ("Fact check: Pro-Russia social media accounts spread false claims that old videos show Ukrainian 'crisis actors,'" Daniel Dale, reporter in CNN's Washington Bureau, where he fact-checks political claims, March 10, 2022, [Fact check: Pro-Russia social media accounts spread false claims that old videos show Ukrainian 'crisis actors'](#) | CNN Politics, VY)

Washington (CNN) **Pro-Russia accounts on social media are trying to convince the public not to believe accurate news reports about Ukrainians suffering and dying. To sow doubt, the pro-Russia accounts, joined by accounts that are critical of the "mainstream media," are spreading false claims that media outlets have been broadcasting phony footage of Ukrainian "crisis actors":** happy, healthy people who are merely playing the role of terrified or deceased war victims for the cameras. Videos that are being falsely described as depicting Ukrainian "crisis actors" have been viewed millions of times on various social media platforms over the past two weeks. **Thousands of people appear to have shared these videos because they had been duped, not because they were maliciously trying to spread incorrect information.** Their confusion is unfortunate but understandable. False claims about "crisis actors" rely on a two-step process that can be bewildering to people who aren't experts on conspiratorial thinking. Here's how the deception works. First, the people behind the deception find videos that were indeed staged -- but staged for benign purposes unrelated to the war in Ukraine. One example is footage of actors pretending to be terrified during a 2013 film shoot for a British science fiction movie. Second, **social media accounts falsely claim or suggest that the acting was done by people pretending to be Ukrainian war victims, even though the footage actually has nothing to do with the war, and falsely claim or suggest that the mainstream media promoted this footage as if it was from the war, even though media outlets didn't actually do so.**

<3. Their evidence is talking about Russia state-run media, not social media posts. Their evidence also is only about the Ukraine propaganda, not interfering with US politics.>

4. Social media companies rarely fact check or regulate news on their platforms. This is the largest cause for increasing fake news. The affirmative cannot solve fake news on social media.

Stewart 2020 ("America's growing fake news problem, in one chart." Emily Stewart, 2020, December 22, Vox. Retrieved June 17, 2022, from [America's growing fake news problem on social media, in one chart - Vox](#), NAUDL)

America's [fake news](#) problem is getting worse, not better. According to an analysis released by [NewsGuard](#) and first reported by [Axios](#)'s Sara Fischer on Tuesday, **websites that provide "unreliable news" increased their share of social media interactions this year. In 2019, 8 percent of engagement with the 100 top-performing news sources on social media was dubious. In 2020, that number more than doubled to 17 percent.** NewsGuard, which rates news websites according to reliability, found that people are engaging in a lot more news this year than they were last year. Engagement with the top 100 US news sources (meaning likes, shares, and comments on Facebook and Twitter) went from 8.6 billion reactions to 16.3 billion reactions between 2019 and 2020. That makes sense given, well, everything that has happened in 2020. **There has been a lot of news, and due to pandemic-related factors such as unemployment and lockdowns, people have a lot of time on their hands to read stuff online. But an increasing amount of the news people are seeing is problematic, inaccurate, or suspicious.** And that's something to worry about. The analysis found that the Daily Wire, the outlet founded by right-wing commentator Ben Shapiro, saw 2.5 times more interactions this year than last. The blossoming of false and unreliable news on the internet is a cultural, political, and technological phenomenon that's hard to get your head around, let alone tackle. **Conspiracy theories, misinformation, and disinformation run rampant on the internet, and it's often difficult for people to tell what is true and what's not. Social media companies are not exactly doing a bang-up job of addressing the problem,** either. Right-wing content, in particular, thrives on platforms such as Facebook. But just because someone sees certain content doesn't necessarily mean they are particularly influenced by it, and figuring out just how powerful certain messages are can be complicated. Over the summer, Kevin Roose at [the New York Times](#) reported on what he described as a "parallel media universe" of super-conservative content on Facebook, noting that right-leaning pages and posts on the platform consistently get more interactions and shares than more liberal and mainstream ones. (Though just because someone likes a news post doesn't mean they actually read it.)

<5. Their evidence concedes that the real problem is faked documents and stories, not cyberattacks. This means the affirmative doesn't solve the problem.>

6. Social media misinformation comes from all platforms, independent of cyber attacks

Burns 2022 (“Journalists give thumbs down to social media,” Greg Burns, Editorial Board member, columnist and business editor at the Chicago Tribune and as a reporter for BusinessWeek magazine and the Chicago Sun-Times, February 9, 2022, Local News Initiative. Retrieved June 19, 2022, from [Journalists Give Thumbs Down to Social Media | Local News Initiative](#), NAUDL)

Journalists say social-media platforms have hurt their industry, contributing to inaccurate and one-sided news accounts by exerting too much control over the mix of news that people see, according to a recent survey. More than nine of every 10 survey respondents said **social-media companies deliver a “worse mix of news” to their users**, according to the online survey of journalists by Northwestern University’s Medill school of Journalism, Media, Integrated Marketing Communications. The survey also found that nearly eight of 10 said harassment of journalists on social media is a “very big” or “moderately big” problem. The second-ever Medill Media Industry Survey was conducted at the end of 2021 by Associate Professor Stephanie Edgerly of Medill, and Danielle K. Brown, the Cowles Professor of Journalism, Diversity and Equality at the University of Minnesota. More than 1,500 members of the U.S. news media completed the questionnaire. Medill used Cision, a media listings database, to obtain email contact information from individuals who had at least one of the following keywords in their profile: columnist, correspondent, director, editor, producer, reporter, writer, then sorted the list for news organizations exceeding a minimal audience size. Exactly 25,000 people were invited to participate in the survey, which was open between Nov. 30 and Dec. 31. Among the findings, **90.7 percent of respondents said the role social media companies play in delivering the news results is a worse mix of news, while 86.5 percent said social media companies have too much control over the mix of news people see. Some 79.3 percent said social media has a mostly negative impact on the journalism industry, and an overwhelming 94.3 percent of respondents blamed social media for spreading inaccurate news.** The survey was the subject of a discussion at a Medill Centennial panel on Feb. 3, featuring newsroom leaders of ABC News, The Wall Street Journal, Vox Media and the Los Angeles Times. “There’s certainly a lot of frustration,” observed Kevin Merida, Executive Editor at the Times. But Merida also said social-media platforms are an important gateway to the work of journalists, who must learn to operate on them. “We’re not putting the genie back in the bottle,” he said. “Within the platforms, we have the ability to also hop in and define our relationship, how we’re going to access them and how we’re going to communicate through them.” ABC News President Kimberly Godwin said **journalists need to help people become smarter consumers of news on social platforms. “They keep sending you misinformation,” she said. “We have to find ways to break through the clutter so that they get at the truth.”**

<7. They jump to the impact of fascism. This is incorrect for a few reasons:

1. It blames the Trump presidency. If this were true, the new Biden Administration would solve.

2. There is no connection between fascism and social media. Even if there were, it is caused by extremist echo chambers, which the aff doesn't solve.

3. Increasing cybersecurity does not increase media literacy or prevent actors from making fake social media posts.>

1NC Journalism Turn

1. Government policies aimed at limiting disinformation have a “chilling” or silencing impact on free speech and journalism.

Nielsen and Common 2021 (“How to respond to disinformation while protecting free speech.” Rasmus Kleis Nielsen is Director of the Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism and Professor of Political Communication at the University of Oxford. He has a PhD in Communications from Columbia University. MacKenzie Common is a Research Fellow at the Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism at the University of Oxford. She has a PhD in Law from the London School of Economics (LSE). 19 February 2021, [How to respond to disinformation while protecting free speech | Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism](#), VV, *2 page card*)

They risk creating a situation where measures meant, at least nominally, to address very specific problems of narrowly defined types of disinformation, for political reasons or in response to much wider public concern, end up restricting much broader terrains of information that may be problematic, but are often neither demonstrably harmful nor demonstrably false. Furthermore, they would expand attempts to counter disinformation to forms of speech that would normally often be protected under the human right to impart information and ideas, which, as the United Nations (UN) Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Representative on Freedom of the Media, the Organization of American States (OAS) Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and Access to Information pointed out in their 2017 joint statement, **“is not limited to “correct” statements, that the right also protects information and ideas that may shock, offend and disturb”.**¹¹ Why free expression may be at risk **Platform companies have their own content moderation policies. In many cases, these have historically been very permissive on political issues, in line with the First Amendment tradition of the US,** where many of these companies were founded and are headquartered, even as they have been more restrictive on some specific issues (such as nudity) in ways that reflect a mix of commercial and cultural considerations. **How these policies are implemented in practice varies, and, like other aspects of how platforms operate, sometimes seem to disadvantage already historically marginalised and disadvantaged communities.**¹² **At least on paper, the policies are generally meant to apply equally to all users everywhere. It is important to note that, while these content moderation policies are often significantly more restrictive than US laws regulating free speech,** they can be more permissive than local laws across the world that are often more restrictive than those found in the US. Platform companies’ content moderation policies and their practical enforcement has already led to a number of instances where important forms of free speech and the work of journalists and independent news media have been restricted in problematic ways – ranging from YouTube removing content documenting the civil war in Syria to Facebook removing articles accompanied by the iconic photo of Phan Thị Kim Phúc running naked after being severely burned on her back by a South Vietnamese napalm attack.¹³ Especially since 2016, and even more so in the course of the coronavirus pandemic, many platform companies’ content moderation policies have been revised and expanded in part to cover a wider range of problematic information, including various kinds of disinformation, misinformation, and malinformation. Companies have expanded their policies and in some cases in enforcement to various degrees even as disinformation problems have also continued to

evolve. While in some ways welcome, **these expansions also come with the risk of restricting legitimate speech, as they are often enforced inconsistently, with little transparency, and no independent oversight or due process.** There are also real risks associated with the enforcement of these policies, whether through artificial intelligence systems, human content moderation or, more commonly, some combination. While automation can be used to scale up content moderation to deal with things at great scale and great pace, **the very real limitations of necessarily imperfect technologies combined with the inherently political nature of decisions over what constitutes disinformation means there are serious practical and principled limitations to how useful artificial intelligence will be in dealing with disinformation.** The role of governments increasingly, however, governments take an active and direct role in content moderation online, issues that were in practice left more or less to private companies in much of the world. There are clearly many instances in which governments taking a more active role, on the basis of clear and precise legislation, and in ensuring independent oversight, transparency, and due process, is entirely appropriate. **But there is also a risk that some governments will pursue responses to disinformation that – irrespective of whether they in fact help address specific problems of narrowly defined types of disinformation – risk restricting free speech.**¹⁴ Governments may, for example, pass laws that define disinformation as including, among other things, content that is critical of the government or counters government messaging. A controversial law in Pakistan provides no definition of fake news and states that content should be labelled as false if the Pakistani regulatory authority says it is false.¹⁵ Similarly, Vietnam’s Law on Cybersecurity has a broad prohibition on disinformation (although it is only labelled as “conduct which is strictly prohibited”) which includes “distorting history, denying revolutionary achievements, destroying the national solidarity block” and “providing false information, causing confusion amongst the citizens,” and “cheating or tricking, manipulating, training or drilling people to oppose the State of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.”¹⁶ **Disinformation laws that are too broad and vague or pose a risk to human rights can, therefore, like similarly broad and vague laws already on the books, risk chilling legitimate speech and can be used selectively or indiscriminately by governments to encourage or require private companies to police speech in ways that can harm free expression and limit public debate.**

2. Protecting freedom of press is an important part of democracy. This turns their impact by undermining US democracy.

Menchu 2022 ("Democracy Backslides When A Free Press is Considered an Enemy of the People," Sofia Menchu, a Guatemalan journalist and reporter for Reuters. She is a member of the Central America Prosperity Project (CAPP) at the George W. Bush Institute, March 22, 2022, [Democracy Backslides When A Free Press is Considered an Enemy of the People | Bush Center](#), VY)

How do you define freedom of expression? Every person has the right to freedom of thought and expression. This right is about the freedom to search for and receive information and ideas without any restriction. **For journalists, this means having the ability to investigate and publish about every topic. It means having the freedom to publish and discover information about the government, politicians, businessmen, or anything or anyone else without it being a risk. Guaranteeing and respecting this freedom of speech is an important part of democracy.** What does freedom of expression mean to you personally and to your work? **It's very important that I have the freedom to publish and to discover information about any topic. The people have a right to the real information about different topics. The government should guarantee this right. It's very important in journalism.**

1NC Solvency Answers

1. NATO is weak now and lacks consensus on cybersecurity policy. This consensus model means there is a delay in execution of the affirmative.

Alemanly et al. on March 9, 2022 (Alemany, J., Meyer, T., & Raji, T. (2022, March 9). Analysis | lawmakers wonder whether NATO is ready to robustly defend against a cyberattack against one of its own. The Washington Post. Retrieved June 16, 2022, from [Lawmakers wonder whether NATO is ready to robustly defend against a cyberattack against one of its own - The Washington Post](#), NAUDL)

Article 5 James Andrew Lewis, the director of the strategic technologies program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said NATO has “actually done a pretty good job of figuring out what their response would be to a significant cyber attack,” Lewis said, adding that “there would have to be some equivalence with a physical attack” in order to trigger Article 5. “But **NATO might not have the political consensus,**” Lewis added, referring to the need for the consent of all 28 members in order for any invocation of the collective defense clause. At least one NATO member, for example, “has taken a broad view suggesting a cyber operation would be an armed attack 'if it caused substantial loss of life or considerable physical or economic damage,'" Michael Schmitt, a distinguished scholar at West Point, wrote [in Just Security](#) last month. But: “**The prevailing view is that ... an armed attack is the ‘most grave form’ of a use of force. Thus, the scale and effects of any Russian cyber operations would have to be especially severe before triggering the right of individual or collective self-defense,**” Schmitt writes. Ivo Daalder, U.S. ambassador to NATO from 2009 to 2013, added that updates to Article 5 are irrelevant if the overall system “**to act collectively in defense of NATO territory has eroded.**” “Although NATO has done what it needs to do in order to maintain some significant capability of defense, the system as a whole really hasn't lived with the prospect of a military or cyber attack on its territory in a credible way,” Daalder said. Ukraine was admitted to NATO's Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) last week, [Cyberscoop's Suzanne Smalley reports](#) of the NATO-accredited military research institution. NATO Sec. Gen. Jens Stoltenberg said in January that CCDCOE's cyber experts “had been exchanging information with their Ukrainian counterparts 'on the current malicious cyber activities' that Ukraine was experiencing in the lead-up to Russia’s invasion,” per Smalley. **But another potential setback for NATO is that it has not taken steps to acquire offensive cyber capabilities and is dependent on member states that boast them.** “We need to add into our plans the way we fight offensive cyber capability because you better believe Russia is going to use it on us ... But **what NATO is good at is being a defensive alliance, and sometimes they're slow to pick up on we have to also be capable of offensive action,**” retired former NATO supreme commander and retired U.S. Air Force Gen. Philip Breedlove told The Early.

<2. Increasing cyber security fails. As defenses increase, the hackers just get more sophisticated. This means the affirmative will always fail to stop cyberattacks.>

2NC/1NR Russia Advantage Answers Extensions

The status quo solves hacks. The Department of Justice has elevated hacks to a high priority and is fighting hacks.

Bing 2021 ("Exclusive: U.S. to give ransomware hacks similar priority as terrorism," Christopher Bing, June 3, 2021, [Exclusive: U.S. to give ransomware hacks similar priority as terrorism | Reuters](#))

WASHINGTON, June 3 (Reuters) - **The U.S. Department of Justice is elevating investigations of ransomware attacks to a similar priority as terrorism in the wake of the Colonial Pipeline hack and mounting damage caused by cyber criminals,** a senior department official told Reuters. Internal guidance sent on Thursday to U.S. attorney's offices across the country said **information about ransomware investigations in the field should be centrally coordinated with a recently created task force in Washington. "It's a specialized process to ensure we track all ransomware cases regardless of where it may be referred in this country, so you can make the connections between actors and work your way up to disrupt the whole chain,"** said John Carlin, principle associate deputy attorney general at the Justice Department. Last month, a cyber criminal group that the U.S. authorities said operates from Russia, penetrated the pipeline operator on the U.S. East Coast, locking its systems and demanding a ransom. The hack caused a shutdown lasting several days, led to a spike in gas prices, panic buying and localized fuel shortages in the southeast. Colonial Pipeline decided to pay the hackers who invaded their systems nearly \$5 million to regain access, the company said. **The DOJ guidance specifically refers to Colonial as an example of the "growing threat that ransomware and digital extortion pose to the nation." "To ensure we can make necessary connections across national and global cases and investigations, and to allow us to develop a comprehensive picture of the national and economic security threats we face, we must enhance and centralize our internal tracking,"** said the guidance seen by Reuters and previously unreported. The Justice Department's decision to push ransomware into this special process illustrates how the issue is being prioritized, U.S. officials said. "We've used this model around terrorism before but never with ransomware," said Carlin. The process has typically been reserved for a short list of topics, including national security cases, legal experts said. In practice, it means that investigators in U.S. attorney's offices handling ransomware attacks will be expected to share both updated case details and active technical information with leaders in Washington. The guidance also asks the offices to look at and include other investigations focused on the larger cybercrime ecosystem. According to the guidance, the list of investigations that now require central notification include cases involving: counter anti-virus services, illicit online forums or marketplaces, cryptocurrency exchanges, bulletproof hosting services, botnets and online money laundering services. Bulletproof hosting services refer to opaque internet infrastructure registration services which help cyber criminals to anonymously conduct intrusions. A botnet is a group of compromised internet-connected devices that can be manipulated to cause digital havoc. Hackers build, buy and rent out botnets in order to conduct cyber crimes ranging from advertising fraud to large cyberattacks. **"We really want to make sure prosecutors and criminal investigators report and are tracking ... cryptocurrency exchanges, illicit online forums or marketplaces where people are selling hacking tools, network access credentials - going after the botnets that serve multiple purposes,"** said Carlin. Mark Califano, a former U.S. attorney and cybercrime expert, said **the "heightened**

reporting could allow DOJ to more effectively deploy resources” and to “identify common exploits” used by cybercriminals.

The risk of cyber escalation is exaggerated. Cyberattacks are a poor tool of escalation.

Borghard and Longeran 2019 (“Cyber Operations as Imperfect Tools of Escalation”, Erica D. Borghard, Ph.D Assistant Professor in the Army Cyber Institute at the United States Military Academy, and Shawn W. Longeran, Senior Advisor to the U.S. Cyberspace Solarium Commission at U.S. Cyber Command, Strategic Studies Quarterly, Fall 2019, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/SSO/documents/Volume-13_Issue-3/Borghard.pdf)

However, **there are important empirical reasons to suspect that the risks of cyber escalation may be exaggerated. Specifically, if cyberspace is in fact an environment that** (perhaps even more so than others) **generates severe escalation risks, why has cyber escalation not yet occurred? Most interactions between cyber rivals have been characterized by limited volleys that have not escalated beyond nuisance levels and have been largely contained below the use-of-force threshold.**⁵ For example, in a survey of cyber incidents and responses between 2000 and 2014, Brandon Valeriano et al. find that **“rivals tend to respond only to lower-level [cyber] incidents and the response tends to check the intrusion as opposed to seek escalation dominance. The majority of cyber escalation episodes are at a low severity threshold and are non-escalatory.** These incidents are usually ‘tit-for-tat’ type responses within one step of the original incident.”⁶ Even in the two rare examples in which states employed kinetic force in response to adversary cyber operations—the US counter-ISIL drone campaign in 2015 and Israel’s airstrike against Hamas cyber operatives in 2019—the use of force was circumscribed and did not escalate the overall conflict (not to mention that force was used against nonstate adversaries with limited potential to meaningfully escalate in response to US or Israeli force).⁷ We posit that **cyber escalation has not occurred because cyber operations are poor tools of escalation.** In particular, we argue that this stems from key characteristics of offensive cyber capabilities that limit escalation through four mechanisms. First, retaliatory offensive cyber operations may not exist at the desired time of employment. Second, **even under conditions where they may exist, their effects are uncertain and often relatively limited.** Third, **several attributes of offensive cyber operations generate important tradeoffs for decision-makers that may make them hesitant to employ capabilities in some circumstances.** Finally, **the alternative of cross-domain escalation—responding to a cyber incident with noncyber, kinetic instruments—is unlikely to be chosen except under rare circumstances, given the limited cost-generation potential of offensive cyber operations.** In this article, we define cyber escalation and then explore the implications of the technical features and requirements for offensive cyber operations. We also consider potential alternative or critical responses to each of these logics. Finally, we evaluate the implications for US policy making.

Lack of response to cyberattacks means that there is no escalation or military response.

Libicki 2020 ("Correlations Between Cyberspace Attacks and Kinetic Attacks," Martin C. Libicki Ph.D., Center for Cyber Security Studies, U.S. Naval Academy, 2020, <https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9131731>)

Overall, **there is little public evidence that hostile events in cyberspace echo strongly outside it. Indeed, rarely do events in cyberspace – much less escalation in cyberspace – lead to serious responses at all. Some research suggests that even severe cyberattacks would generally be less likely than kinetic attacks to induce a response.** Although opening cyberattacks can precede kinetic attacks, there are also cases when war comes as a surprise and cyberattacks are not used until the proper accesses to target systems have been gained. Cyberattacks have the potential to put hitherto sacrosanct targets – notably space systems, and other NC3 elements – in play, but **cyberattacks have reportedly taken place against satellites while kinetic attacks (weapons tests aside) have not, so far. The failure to respond to cyberattacks may have played a role in enabling missile attacks** on Saudi Aramco facilities, but the link is distant (seven years earlier) and tenuous. There is no analog (yet) in the Russo-Ukrainian conflict. **Several reasons could be adduced to explain the lack of correlation.** One is that while there could be cyberattacks **consequential enough to induce echoes in the physical world, none have reached that threshold and it may well be that none could reach that threshold.** Even as the attack surface for cyberspace operations keeps growing, hackers grow more talented, and their leaders more aware of the gains available from such operations – **defense is not sleeping. Those who own networks are taking cybersecurity seriously** (at long last), cloud computing may have helped put defenses in the hands of those for whom protection is a profit center, and the cybersecurity industry itself is robust. Succeeding generations of software – e.g., versions of Windows operation systems – are also more impervious to intrusions. Two is that, in common with many widely-feared phenomena, cyberattacks have evolved from an acute problem (one both rare and fearsome) to a chronic problem (more common, but something that one can adjust to). Three, the oft-expressed belief that cyberwar is war has yet to take hold. **Because cyberspace operations are ambiguous** (and not easily grasped even when clear) and **their effects almost always temporary and not (yet) lethal, they may be considered something separate and apart.** Time will tell whether this distinction will continue to be observed.

Russia/US war will not happen – Russia just pushing nuclear rhetoric.

Ellyat on April 29, 2022 (“Could there be war between Russia and the west? strategists predict what could happen next.” Holly Ellyatt, 2022, April 29, CNBC. Retrieved June 19, 2022, from [Could there be war between Russia and the West? Strategists predict what could happen next](#). NAUDL)

The saber-rattling and rhetoric between Moscow and the West have become notably more aggressive this week, prompting concerns that a direct confrontation between the two power blocs could be more likely. In the last few days alone, for example, Russia stopped gas supplies to two European countries and has warned the West several times that the risk of a nuclear war is very “real.” In addition, [Russian President Vladimir Putin](#) has said that any foreign intervention in Ukraine would provoke what he called a “lightning fast” response from Moscow, while his Foreign Ministry warned NATO not to test its patience. **For their part, Western officials have dismissed Russia’s “bravado” and “dangerous” nuclear war rhetoric**, with the U.K. calling on Western allies to “double down” on their support for Ukraine. CNBC asked strategists about the likelihood of a direct confrontation between Russia and the West. Here’s what they said. Nuclear attack? At the start of the week, Russia’s foreign minister warned that the threat of a nuclear war “cannot be underestimated” and said NATO’s supply of weapons to Ukraine was tantamount to the military alliance engaging in a proxy war with Russia. Putin doubled down on the bellicose rhetoric Wednesday, threatening a “lightning fast” retaliation against any country intervening in [the Ukraine war](#) and creating what he called “strategic threats for Russia.” He then appeared to allude to Russia’s arsenal of intercontinental ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons when he warned that Russia has the “tools” for a retaliatory response “that no one else can boast of having now ... we will use them if necessary.” **But strategists told CNBC that Putin is playing on risk aversion in the West and that the chances of a nuclear war are remote. “I think it’s outside the realm of possibility right now that there’s going to be a nuclear war or World War III that really spills over that far beyond Ukraine’s borders.”** Samuel Ramani, a geopolitical analyst and associate fellow at the Royal United Services Institute, told CNBC. **“If there’s a border spillover right now, we’re still probably most likely looking at something like Moldova being vulnerable to an invasion,”** he said. A U.S. infantryman at a combined arms live fire exercise at Al-Ghalail Range in Qatar, on Nov. 14, 2018. **He noted that Russia has a long history of using “nuclear brinkmanship” as a way of preventing the West from pursuing security policies that it doesn’t like, with the escalation in hostile rhetoric aimed at deterring NATO members from making heavy arms deliveries to Ukraine.** Moment of danger Nonetheless, Ramani noted the threat posed by Russia could become more acute if it felt humiliated on the battlefield. In particular, military setbacks in Ukraine around May 9 could pose some danger. That’s Russia’s “Victory Day” — the anniversary of Nazi Germany’s defeat by the Soviet Union in World War II. “Putin has had a history of escalating unpredictability if he feels that Russia is being humiliated in some way ... and if there are major setbacks, especially on around the 9th [of May] then there’s a risk of unbreakable action,” he said. “But also there’s a logic of mutually assured destruction that hopefully will rein everybody in.”

2NC/1NR Social Media Disinformation Extensions

Social media leads to an echo chamber where extreme positions are amplified and spread. This is inevitable in social media and caused by human psychology, not Russia or cyberattacks.

Menczer and Hills 2020 ("Information Overload Helps Fake News Spread, and Social Media Knows It," Filippo Menczer, Luddy Distinguished Professor of Informatics and Computer Science at Indiana University, and Thomas Hills is a professor of psychology and director of the Behavioral and Data Science master's program at the University of Warwick in England, December 1, 2020, [Information Overload Helps Fake News Spread, and Social Media Knows It - Scientific American](#), VY)

Most of us do not believe we follow the herd. But **our confirmation bias leads us to follow others who are like us, a dynamic that is sometimes referred to as homophily—a tendency for like-minded people to connect with one another. Social media amplifies homophily by allowing users to alter their social network structures through following, unfriending, and so on. The result is that people become segregated into large, dense and increasingly misinformed communities commonly described as echo chambers.** At OSoMe, we explored the emergence of online echo chambers through another simulation, EchoDemo. In this model, each agent has a political opinion represented by a number ranging from -1 (say, liberal) to +1 (conservative). These inclinations are reflected in agents' posts. Agents are also influenced by the opinions they see in their news feeds, and they can unfollow users with dissimilar opinions. Starting with random initial networks and opinions, we found that the combination of social influence and unfollowing greatly accelerates the formation of polarized and segregated communities. **Indeed, the political echo chambers on Twitter are so extreme that individual users' political leanings can be predicted with high accuracy: you have the same opinions as the majority of your connections.** This chambered structure efficiently spreads information within a community while insulating that community from other groups. In 2014 **our research group was targeted by a disinformation campaign claiming that we were part of a politically motivated effort to suppress free speech. This false charge spread virally mostly in the conservative echo chamber, whereas debunking articles by fact-checkers were found mainly in the liberal community. Sadly, such segregation of fake news items from their fact-check reports is the norm.**

Fake news stories are distributed by political extremists, not Russia. Cybersecurity won't solve.

Marshall 2020 (“Who shares the most fake news? New study sheds light,” Lisa Marshall, June 17, 2020, [Who shares the most fake news? New study sheds light | CU Boulder Today](#), VY)

Fake news at the fringes **In all, about one-fifth of users at the far ideological extremes were responsible for sharing nearly half of the fake news on the two platforms.** “It is not just Republicans or just Democrats, but rather, **people who are—left or right—more ideologically extreme,**” said Hopp. **Those in the ideological middle and those with high levels of media and social trust were—generally speaking—the least likely to share fake news.** “People with high levels of social trust are more likely to compile online social networks comprised of diverse individuals, and this can hamper the spread of fake news,” said Hopp, noting that when a fellow user calls out a post as inaccurate, others may be less likely to share it. “If someone posts something that is incorrect, false or misleading, I don’t think it hurts for individual users to provide a factual rebuttal.” The authors note that the sample is not necessarily representative of the general population of all social media users nationwide, and more research is necessary. With several other papers in the works, **the authors,** including Assistant Professor of Journalism Pat Ferucci and Assistant Professor of Advertising Chris Vargo, **hope to provide insight to lawmakers, companies and individual users hoping to stem the fake news tide.** **We can disagree, but when we have fundamentally different views about what information is true and what is not, democracy becomes very difficult to maintain,**” said Hopp.

Algorithms which run social media newsfeed preferences are biased towards outrage and views, thus promoting news regardless of its accuracy or reliability.

Stewart 2020 (“America’s growing fake news problem, in one chart.” Emily Stewart, 2020, December 22, Vox. Retrieved June 17, 2022, from [America’s growing fake news problem on social media, in one chart - Vox](#), NAUDL)

There’s now [a running debate](#) among academics, analytics experts, and observers like Roose around what we know about what’s happening on Facebook and why. Dartmouth political scientist Brendan Nyhan recently [argued](#) that “likes,” comments, and shares are just a small part of what people actually see on Facebook, and that it’s difficult to draw conclusions from these interactions alone or to know what they might mean for an election. Still, the trend is concerning. **Social media is making political polarization worse in America, and it’s often the case that people no longer agree on even basic facts. What people consume shapes what they see — basically, someone clicks on a certain article and algorithms start to predict what else they might like in alignment with that.** And the further down the rabbit hole they go, the more they begin to seek out that media, often winding up in an information bubble. For people who complain so much about supposed social media censorship, they are not really being censored Republicans have spent years complaining that social media companies are biased against them and that their content is being censored and removed. President Donald Trump [has often lashed out](#) against tech companies with unfounded claims of bias. He and his administration [have also attempted to undercut and scrap Section 230](#), a law that basically says social media companies are allowed to police their platforms however they want and aren’t liable for the content third parties post on them. ([Recode’s Sara Morrison has a full explainer on Section 230](#). Rather than bias toward a certain political leaning, **social media algorithms are often biased toward outrage — they push content that people have an emotional reaction to and are likely to engage with.** The NewsGuard data and other **research shows that people are increasingly being drawn to unreliable content** — and often, unreliable content that has a conservative bent. And that content can influence all sorts of attitudes and cause confusion on even basic facts. [The New York Times](#) recently took a look at Georgia and how misinformation and unreliable news is playing a role in the [US Senate runoffs](#) there. A conservative local news network called Star News Group announced it would launch the Georgia Star in November, and NewsGuard’s analysis found that the website has published misleading information about the presidential election and the Senate races. One story making false claims about Georgia’s presidential election results reached up to 650,000 people on Facebook. Combating fake and misleading news would require efforts from multiple stakeholders. Yet Facebook [recently rolled back changes](#) to its algorithm that would promote news from reliable sources. **Given the pace at which the problem is growing, the matter is likely to worsen without intervention.**

Status Quo Solves: Journalists and news reporters already fighting to improve accuracy, reliability, and quality of news information on social media platforms

Burns 2022 (“Journalists give thumbs down to social media,” Greg Burns, Editorial Board member, columnist and business editor at the Chicago Tribune and as a reporter for BusinessWeek magazine and the Chicago Sun-Times, February 9, 2022, Local News Initiative. Retrieved June 19, 2022, from [Journalists Give Thumbs Down to Social Media | Local News Initiative](#), NAUDI)

Social media challenges journalists to understand its strengths and weaknesses so they can interest an audience and deliver strong, accurate messages, said Melissa Bell, publisher of Vox Media. “It is important for us to recognize how much of an impact social media has had on our reporting,” she said. “There are strengths in it. There are ways to reach people that you couldn’t reach before.” Journal Editor in Chief Matt Murray warned that journalists should not mistake dialogue on social media for the “richer, fuller, more varied and dramatic” stories that reporters can uncover in “real life.” **“Social media is a tool, from a journalist’s perspective, to be used,” he said. “It’s a tool to get news out there,” Murray said.** The survey indicates that journalists are more critical of social media than are U.S. adults at large. The percentage of U.S. adults saying the companies have too much control over the mix of news they see was 62 percent in a Pew Research Center survey from July 2019. That response was nearly 25 percentage points lower than that of journalists in the 2021 Medill survey. Similarly, the percentage of U.S. adults who said social-media companies provide a worse mix of news was 55 percent in the Pew survey, far less than the 90.7-percent response from journalists surveyed by Medill. Edgerly, who oversaw the survey, said its results suggest that social media is not living up to its potential to make vital news stories more visible. **“A clear majority of journalists are seeing the potential gains are not matching the realities,”** she said. “The survey suggests that we’re not seeing quality information reaching a broader audience. That is not the reality of how social media functions.” The University of Minnesota’s Brown, who partnered with Edgerly, said she’s not surprised that journalists’ view of social media is more negative than the population’s at large, as measured in other surveys. “We asked journalists to think about: social-media companies and their control; loss of autonomy; and how the work they create is used by other people,” she said. “It doesn’t surprise me that they don’t like the way social-media companies control the news that people have access to. It doesn’t surprise me at all.”

2NC/1NR Journalism Turn Extensions

Policies that attempt to get rid of disinformation harm freedom of expression and journalism. Recent court victories prove.

Media Defence 2021 (“Are fake news laws the best way to tackle disinformation?” Media Defence, Dec 14, 2021, [Are fake news laws the best way to tackle disinformation? - Media Defence](#), VY)

Legislating Disinformation There is an ongoing debate about regulating false news and misinformation. Is legislation necessary to protect citizens from misleading information, or does it infringe on the right to freedom of expression? In March 2017 the UN and regional human rights bodies published the Joint Declaration on Freedom of Expression and “Fake News”, Disinformation and Propaganda. **The Declaration found that criminalising the sharing of information based on vague and ambiguous ideas, such as “false news”, is incompatible with international standards for restrictions on freedom of expression.** In spite of the Joint Declaration, **many governments have passed heavy-handed “false news” laws in response to the problem.** For example, following the outbreak, South Africa approved vague and sweeping regulations criminalising misleading content about the pandemic or the steps taken by the government to respond to COVID-19. In early 2021, the Malaysian government used emergency powers to pass a fake news law after earlier attempts were repealed. The regulations set a jail term of up to three years for publishing or sharing any “wholly or partly false” information about either the pandemic or a state of emergency that took effect in January. Our role **False news laws undoubtedly hinder the work of journalists and have a chilling effect on freedom of expression. Where possible, we challenge these laws at a national and regional level.** In December 2014, a Zambian High Court Judge struck down the provisions of section 67 of the Penal Code, which prohibited the publication of so-called “false news”. In essence, the law required journalists to verify the accuracy of any statements, be it their own or those made by others, before they could be reported. **With our support, lawyer Marshal Muchende successfully argued that the law was a grave impediment to the freedom of the press.** You can read more about this decision here. More recently, the ECOWAS Court of Justice delivered a landmark judgment in the case of the Federation of African Journalists and Others v The Gambia. The Court found that state authorities had violated the rights of four Gambian journalists under false news laws. It found that security agents arbitrarily arrested, harassed and detained the journalists. As a consequence of their reporting, many were forced into exile for fear of persecution. Alongside our primary approach of taking strategic cases, which aim to have these laws declared unconstitutional, we also support individuals. This year alone, we are funding the emergency defence of journalists facing false news charges in Bangladesh, Rwanda, Cameroon and Poland. Education not legislation **Effectively combatting misinformation remains a pressing contemporary issue, with jurists, academics, and activists suggesting various remedies. Whatever approach we take, it is essential that we curb disinformation without violating freedom of expression.** Increasingly, governments are turning to social and educational strategies to combat misinformation. This avoids broad legislative provisions that criminalise or infringe on the right to freedom of expression. Take Finland, for example – recently rated Europe’s most resistant nation to fake news.[6] The country has started teaching children how to identify false news in primary school through Media

and Information Literacy. To reinforce these skills, secondary schools introduced multi-platform information literacy in 2016. Strong critical thinking is a core, cross-subject component of a national curriculum. Other countries, such as Nigeria, Canada and the Netherlands, are taking similar approaches. We are also seeing a growing investment in fact-checking. Over the past decade, independent fact-checkers have emerged in more than 50 countries spanning every continent. According to the most reliable global count, 113 such groups are active today.[7] Back in 2019, we joined forces with the International Fact-Checking Network and the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press to provide a new mechanism for fact-checkers. As the demand for fact-checking increases, so too does the abuse and harassment that independent fact-checkers face. This partnership helped to ensure fact-checkers could continue doing their important work, by providing legal support and publishing guides to help navigate and mitigate emerging threats. Conclusion The advent of the internet has facilitated the spread of false news – both more quickly and more widely than ever before. This misinformation can fuel political polarisation, impact elections, and disrupt public health. **Yet it is essential that we avoid far-reaching legislation that violates the right to freedom of expression.** Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, Anthony Kennedy, in his majority decision in *United States v Alvarez* held that **“[t]he remedy for speech that is false is speech that is true. This is the ordinary course in a free society.” Media and Information Literacy strategies, coupled with fact-checking and the publication of counter-narratives, remain the primary vanguard in the fight for the truth.**

A free press that can openly report is necessary for democracy. This turns their democracy impact.

Policinski 2021 (“You Can’t Have Democracy Without A Free Press,” Gene Policinski, senior fellow for the First Amendment, Freedom Forum, March 10, 2021, <https://www.freedomforum.org/2021/03/10/you-cant-have-democracy-without-a-free-press/>, VY)

There’s a reason we need a free press, despite its faults and foibles: Democracy won’t work without it. The grand experiment in self-governance that is the United States is rooted in trust and confidence we all will work toward the greater good. But the nation’s founders had experience with a king and his expected benevolence — and what could happen when things didn’t work out. So, they provided for three branches of government to balance each other, along with periodic elections and the rights for us to assemble and seek change when we think things have gone astray. All fine, but also relatively long-term solutions. **How do we know what our government is doing, how well it is operating or whether our elected officials are up to the job? Enter the only profession mentioned in the Constitution: A free press, to serve as a “watchdog on government.” A free press the government cannot control, to offer an independent, regular update on behalf of the rest of us.** Let’s stop to acknowledge that many of us are dissatisfied with the free press we have. Survey after survey shows low public trust in our news outlets and in the journalists who staff them. But in those same Freedom Forum surveys about the First Amendment that began in 1997, **the desire for that watchdog role remains high, often supported by a majority of people questioned.**

MS NATO Baltics Affirmative/Negative

Affirmative

1AC Inherency

Baltic states are calling for an increase in NATO forces now, but Western European leaders are pushing back.

Gramer and Detsch on May 19, 2022 (“Baltic States Are Pushing NATO for More Than Just a Tripwire Against Russia,” Robbie Gramer, a diplomacy and national security reporter at Foreign Policy, and Jack Detsch, Foreign Policy’s Pentagon and national security reporter, May 19, 2022, [Baltic States Are Pushing NATO for More Than Just a Tripwire Against Russia](#), VY, *2 page card*)

The three Baltic states are pushing to dramatically scale up NATO’s military footprint on its eastern flank to deter Russia from making any military moves on alliance territory as it battles to conquer land in Ukraine. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are advocating that NATO upgrade its presence in the Baltic region to include divisional-sized headquarters and larger contingents of multinational forces in each of the three countries,

according to multiple European and U.S. defense officials familiar with the matter. It’s still unclear whether NATO countries will ultimately approve the proposal, as internal negotiations between the 30 alliance members are ongoing. Yet the debate within the alliance over the plan reflects a growing sense of alarm among some of NATO’s eastern members that the alliance needs to quickly strengthen its deterrence posture against Moscow, lest Russian President Vladimir Putin set his sights on military action against NATO territory after his misadventure in Ukraine. That debate is heating up ahead of a major NATO summit in Madrid next month and amid Finland’s and Sweden’s formal bids for NATO membership after decades of military nonalignment. The summit is being billed as the most significant meeting between NATO leaders since Russia launched its military invasion of Ukraine in late February. Under an initiative called “Enhanced Forward Presence,” NATO in 2017 began deploying one battalion-sized multinational battlegroup to each of the Baltic countries and Poland on a rotational basis. The Baltic states are pushing to increase the size of these battlegroups and set up more permanent stationing plans. While specifics of the plans are still being negotiated, one proposal under discussion is to upgrade the size of the battlegroups to three multinational battalions, alongside adding a divisional-sized command headquarters to each of the three countries. A divisional command headquarters would allow NATO allies to lay the groundwork for quickly scaling up their military presence in the Baltic region in the event of any showdown with Russian forces. This includes putting in place reinforcement plans, command structures, and logistics and communications infrastructure for rapid troop deployments, the officials said. It’s unclear whether NATO’s other members would accept these proposals, which are expected to be hashed out behind the scenes before the Madrid summit in June. Still, the proposals showcase a possible shift in strategy for NATO defense planners amid Russia’s Ukraine invasion as they look to revamp the alliance’s presence on its eastern flank from its current “tripwire” posture to a “forward defense posture.” Under the “tripwire” posture, smaller units rotate through NATO’s vulnerable eastern flank to deter Russian military action, but they could lack the forces to fully repel an invasion. This compels NATO troops to train for contingencies where they need to retake alliance territory after falling back from an initial invasion. “Under the backdrop of what has happened in Ukraine, this is politically suicidal to accept the strategy for each and every prime minister and president in eastern front but also, I think, in NATO more widely,” said one senior Baltic defense official, who spoke on condition of anonymity.

“Committing yourself to a strategy where you accept that parts of NATO will be occupied, even for a weekend, is a disastrous political strategy. No one can commit to this. So this is something that needs to be changed.” **A “forward defense” posture could pour enough NATO military resources into the Baltic region to credibly face a Russian invading force toe-to-toe and repel it. Baltic defense officials believe expanding NATO’s military presence, including by increasing the size of NATO’s multinational forces in the region and establishing division-sized command structures,** is the best way to ward off any plans by Putin to lunge for more territory beyond Ukraine. **There could be pushback from NATO allies in Western Europe,**

however. Some NATO allies feel that the current presence in the Baltic region is adequate and believe Putin understands the message that the alliance, backed by the powerful U.S. military, won't cede an inch of its territory to Russia. They also believe that Putin won't make any moves on NATO territory given that the Russian military remains overstretched and bogged down in Ukraine, while being hamstrung by poor training, tactics, and equipment. **Additionally, some allies are stretched thin militarily as they rush to ship as many heavy weapons and as much ammunition to the Ukrainian military as possible, draining their own supplies and limiting their ability to dispatch more troops and equipment to the Baltic states. "Clearly, if this would be an easy thing to do, then it would've been done already,"** the senior Baltic defense official conceded. Still, Russia's brazen invasion of Ukraine has drastically altered how European countries view their own security in recent months, with Finland and Sweden readying to join NATO and Germany, long a proponent of balancing ties between Russia and the West, committing to dramatically ramp up its defense spending. "It feels like it's not going to happen imminently, but I could imagine in the future they might decide that is the way to go," said another Western diplomat familiar with the deliberations, speaking on condition of anonymity. "I think they would rather have something more stable, something more predictable, and something that they can hold up to the Russians." NATO's mutual defense clause, known as Article 5, forms the backbone of the military alliance's collective security agreement and extends the umbrella of protection from the United States and other allied militaries across all NATO territory. NATO has steadily expanded since the end of the Cold War, adding new members from the former Soviet Union into the fold as they transitioned into democracies. Top Russian officials have said they view NATO and its expansion eastward as an existential threat to Moscow's security, despite NATO's insistence to the contrary. **Baltic states have long pushed for a permanent NATO presence in their countries, arguing that it could serve as a stronger deterrent if the Russians consider military action in the region.** In addition, some Baltic officials have pushed for NATO allies to deploy higher-end defensive equipment to their region, such as U.S.-made Patriot air defenses, artillery, and coastal defense missiles. There has also been a push in the region for more U.S. military financial assistance.

Thus the Plan: The United States federal government should substantially increase its security cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the Baltic States.

1AC Advantage—Russia Deterrence

The Baltic states are at a high risk of Russia attack now due to geography and Russian aggression. Increasing NATO defense of these countries is necessary to deter Russian advancement.

White 2022 ("How To Make Sure Russia Never Invades The Baltics," Sarah White, Senior Research Analyst and Editor at the Lexington Institute, May 11, 2022, [How to Make Sure Russia Never Invades the Baltics - 19FortyFive](#), VY, *2 page card*)

Would Putin ever dare consider attacking or invading the Baltic states next? Here is how to deter such actions now and in the future from a prominent defense expert: Now that Russia's invasion of Ukraine has passed the 60-day mark, the focus on the possibility that Russia might invade the Baltics next has lessened, but the risk may be no less heightened than in the war's early days. **The three Baltic countries—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—are all at a geographical disadvantage to Russian aggression, and, as members of NATO, carry the highest possible stakes in the event of an attack. Many neighboring countries are re-evaluating their own**

defense policies in the event that Russian aggression reaches their borders. Even Germany, which had a default policy of non-aggression after the Second World War, has committed to buying the F-35 fighter jet from the U.S., anticipating the need to defend itself. Finland and Sweden, which had a policy of neutrality when it came to joining NATO, are now seriously considering membership. In response to Finland and Sweden's statements, **the Kremlin threatened to reposition nuclear weapons in the Baltic region.** While the threat may be empty, and not one that is going to stop Finland and Sweden from joining NATO, **it is still a reminder that the Baltic countries are in the crosshairs of hostile rhetoric between Russia and the alliance, not to mention actual war. There are several reasons why the Baltic states are uniquely vulnerable to Russian invasion. The prime reason why they might be the Kremlin's next target is that each of them, particularly Estonia and Latvia, has an ethnic Russian minority population.** Moscow's justification for prior invasions, including the ongoing one in Ukraine, is that ethnic Russians have to be "liberated" from oppressive non-Russian governments. **However, geography plays a significant role in adding to the Baltics' vulnerability.** More so than Finland, which shares an 800-mile border with Russia, and countries such as Poland, which borders Russian ally Belarus, are relatively disconnected from allies by geography. **As of now, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania do not have allies in close proximity in the Baltic region. The three countries are essentially trapped between Russia and the Baltic Sea with few NATO allies close by.** In terms of logistics, this means that it will be difficult to send troops and supplies to the Baltic states on short notice in the event of a Russian attack. **Estonia and Lithuania share a border with Russia;** potentially worse is the fact that Latvia is hemmed in by Kaliningrad, the heavily armed Russian enclave loaded with nuclear-capable Iskander-M missiles. Finland and Sweden, the two countries that would be able to deliver military support most quickly, are not NATO members yet and have not been since the alliance was established. Thus, until they decide to join, if that does indeed happen, the Baltic countries will remain stuck with the status quo. Those geographical disadvantages could end in the whole region being squeezed like a vise if the Russian military becomes more sophisticated in the time between the current invasion of Ukraine and a future invasion of one of the Baltic countries. However, that scenario is looking less likely than it did prior to February 24th, as the Russian army has shown that it is not the invulnerable fighting force the world once thought it to be, suffering casualties in troops and in equipment at the hands of the Ukrainian army that are becoming increasingly hard to explain away at home. The sinking of the warship Moskva is one such example. **To make up for that geographical disadvantage, the Baltic countries should probably be reinforced with additional military support from NATO allies as soon as possible, whether in the form of extra troops or weapons systems.** As of January, there was already some discussion of this within NATO. As Russian forces were observed massing on the Ukrainian border, Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas told Reuters that her government was currently "discussing with our allies to increase their presence here to act as a deterrent" and voiced worries in Tallinn that the Baltics were a "NATO peninsula." However, those discussions have largely appeared to take a backseat as the Russian invasion progresses, more is learned about Russian atrocities against civilians, and millions leave Ukraine for safety abroad. About 2,700 additional U.S. troops, as well as extra NATO forces, have been distributed across the three countries, but **Baltic leaders have been pushing for a more substantial solution.** In March, NATO's summit in Brussels did not produce a permanent agreement that would fortify any of the Baltic countries and create a credible deterrent. Rihards Kols, chair of the Latvian parliament's foreign affairs committee, stated afterward that **"We welcome these reinforcements, but it's not enough — absolutely not enough."** **Another reason the Baltics could look like an easy next target for the Kremlin is because of their small size;** Lithuania, the largest of the three, has a population of only 3.7 million. **Moscow may very well assume that its advantage in numbers would allow it to overwhelm any local defenses in an invasion. But additional weapons systems as deterrents in the Baltics are more likely to make Russia think twice before repeating its invasion of Ukraine in one of the three countries.** At least temporarily, Russia could be deterred if NATO delivered the same systems to the Baltics that are already scheduled for delivery to Poland: the F-35 fighter, the Patriot missile system, and the M1 Abrams tank. Likewise, given that the U.S. has sent 100 surplus towed 155mm howitzers to Ukraine, mobile 155mms would be a realistic, quickly deliverable option for Baltic defense. Other systems such as the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS), Iron Dome missile defense system, and Predator missiles should also be considered. This would require bypassing two obstacles. First, the process of approving the sale and the schedule of delivering the systems would have to be massively accelerated. Poland, which ordered the F-35 in 2020, only began to receive them this year, and has yet to receive the other systems. Second, the U.S. and the Baltic countries would have to agree to a plan that ameliorates the cost to the three countries' governments. The current system of rotating troop deployments and other reinforcements from NATO exists because Tallinn, Vilnius, and Riga do not have the budget to purchase systems like the F-35 on their own. And in addition to making the decision to deliver these weapons systems, the logistical challenges of delivering them have to simultaneously be addressed. **Estonia, Latvia, and**

Lithuania may need military support now more than ever, as all three have depleted their own weapons reserves in order to aid Ukraine. There is no more opportune moment than the present to prepare for a second onslaught of Russian aggression in Europe, and there is no place where NATO's credibility is more at risk than in the Baltic countries.

NATO forces in the Baltics are weak now and would not stand against a Russian attack.

Veebel 2018 ("NATO options and dilemmas for deterring Russia in the Baltic States," Viljar Veebel, Department of Political and Strategic Studies, Baltic Defence College, Tartu, Eston, 2018, [\(PDF\) NATO options and dilemmas for deterring Russia in the Baltic States](#), VY)

3.1.2. Conventional military capabilities in the Baltic region **As far as conventional capabilities are compared, Russia has an unarguable conventional supremacy in the Baltic region.** Shlapak and Johnson (2016, 5–6) estimate that in a shortterm (within approximately 10 days), Russia could force 27 fully ready battalions (30–40,000 soldiers) equipped with armoured vehicles for an attack on the Baltics without needing to stop its military activities in Ukraine. **NATO, on the contrary, will be able to immediately respond only with predominantly lightly armoured forces consisting of the military forces of the Baltic countries and of a severely limited number of the military forces of the US and its partners.** They suggest that, according to an optimistic estimate, NATO could deploy elements from 3 airborne infantry brigades, 1 Stryker brigade, and 1 US armor brigade. **Hence, in the early stage of the conflict, Russia has advantages in tanks (7:1), infantry fighting vehicles (5:1), attack helicopters (5:1), artillery (4:1), long-range rocket artillery (16:1), shortrange air defense (24:1), and long-range air defense (17:1)** (Shlapak and Johnson 2016, 7). Russia has an advantage also as far as the range of the cannon and rocket artillery and the range of the Multiple-Launch Rocket Systems are concerned. **Assuming that in the early stage of the conflict between Russia and the Baltic States the resilience is mostly based on the local military forces of Estonia, Latvia or Lithuania, the disproportion of conventional capabilities becomes even more apparent.** In peacetime the Latvian National Armed Forces should consist of 6500 professional soldiers, 8000 homeguards and 3000 reserve soldiers. Alas, the number of combat-ready home-guards and reserve soldiers can be estimated at least twice as small given the still relevant conclusions of the State Audit Office in 2015 and the high rate of no-show of the reserve soldiers for training (National Armed Forces of Latvia 2017a). The Estonian armed forces include 5700 professional active servicemen (including active conscripts), 37,800 conscripts registered for the compulsory military service and 16,000 members of the voluntary Estonian Defence League. Latvia's wartime structure of the armed forces is considered to be approximately 17,500 men and women, whereas approximately one-half to maximum two-thirds of the number is true in reality. Estonia's wartime structure of the armed forces is estimated to reach 60,000 (Estonian Defence Forces 2016). Considering the above, **it is not surprising that the currently dominating belief in the Estonian military forces is that "the more, the better", having in mind more conscripts, more costs, more troops of the allied nations, etc.** It is expected in political and military circles that this approach is making a potential opponent be more afraid. Yet, even if the Estonian defence model enables to mobilise a relative large number of people, it is by its nature still fully non-aggressive, without any room for pre-emptive initiatives, extra territoriality or hybrid tools, not to mention the difference in scales and numbers compared to the Russian military forces. In this light, the conventional rebalancing is unachievable anyway. Moreover, the Estonian defence model (to be precise, also the Latvian one) does not involve independent retaliation capabilities, which could allure Russia to opt for painless testing-risking. **Thus, it does not matter however advanced or extensive the static defence is, it could be expected that sooner or later the lack of retaliation motivates the opponent to test the actual survivability of the system form convenient area for Russian military forces to challenge and pressurise NATO collective commitment and solidarity.** To sum it up, the conventional balance in the Baltic area is not achievable neither for the Baltic countries in total nor even with the pre-positioned battalions of other NATO member states. **Thus, the deterrence occurring from conventional capabilities is rather weak from the viewpoint of both NATO and the Baltic countries. The one and only argument which could partially speak in favour of credible deterrence in terms of conventional**

forces is that NATO has much higher capability of additional long-term deployment when sufficiently mobilized. However, while existing conventional reserves of the NATO member states are sizeable; safe and quick deployment is a critical variable in case of conflict scenario in Baltic States, caused by very limited safe transportations options available in region. Baltic States, by neighbouring NorthWest military district of Russia are one of few areas were Russian options in terms of resupplying, logistical support and regrouping of military forces are very promising in terms of safety and alternative logistical options, when compared to NATO similar needs and options. **Russian advantage could be even growing, should Russia believe that there exists a winning regional strategy for conflict with NATO and focusing on rapid improvement of its antiaccess/area of denial capabilities near the Baltic borders.**

A more robust defense of the Baltic states from NATO is key to deter Russia in the region

Lucas 2022 (“NATO Is Dangerously Exposed in the Baltic,” Edward Lucas, a nonresident fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis, February 2, 2022, [NATO Is Dangerously Exposed in the Baltic](#), VY)

How can NATO’s problems in the Baltic region be fixed? One of the easier steps would be to align the region’s security objectives by compiling and publishing a common threat assessment. An unclassified version would boost public awareness. The classified version would form the basis for military planning, exercises, and budgeting. For more than 20 years, Estonia’s counterintelligence service has published a hard-hitting annual report about Russian subversion and other threats. Although this may give the Kremlin clues about sources, methods, and targeting, the benefits in terms of deterrence, political will, and societal resilience are much greater. **This highlights our next recommendation: fostering a public security culture that increases not only military resistance but also economic, social, and political resilience.** Finland is the standout example of this, with military conscription, extensive training for civilian decision-makers, counter-disinformation training in schools, and regular exercises. **The tripwire forces in the Baltic states are currently hostages—a reminder to the Kremlin that an attack on what Russian hard-liners regard as renegade provinces would also mean tangling with Britain, France, and Germany. These deployments need to be on a war-fighting footing.** It is therefore time to plug the gaping holes in air and missile defense as well as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. Some of these are expensive, and the countries that need them most cannot afford them. Rich countries that are farther from the front line should pay to have them where they matter most. **Proper intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities—which combine drone, sensor, and satellite capabilities with modern computing power—create an unblinking eye that can look deep inside Russia, identifying what Kremlin forces are doing long before a crisis actually develops.** Rewriting the rules on data-sharing with non-NATO members Sweden and Finland would maximize the usefulness of these insights. NATO needs to change too, writing a new strategic concept—in essence, the alliance’s manifesto—to more clearly stress defense against and deterrence of a Russian attack in the region. The European Union’s fumbling efforts to codify its approach to common security and defense policy need clear language on military preparedness and its willingness to use force in response to aggression. Decision-making needs streamlining. It is the United States that makes the NATO security guarantee fully credible. It therefore makes sense for the senior U.S. officer on the continent—the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, known as SACEUR—to have the political preauthorization they need to issue orders in circumstances short of war. By the time the North Atlantic Council, NATO’s political body, has met, been briefed, deliberated, ironed out potentially dissenting views from countries such as Hungary, and reached a decision, it could be too late. A lightning attack by Russian forces, likely following a period of intense, artificially created confusion, could reach the Baltic Sea or cut the Suwalki corridor in a matter of hours. **Above all, NATO needs exercises. The best way to increase the internal and external credibility of defense is to practice using difficult scenarios in real time.** These must include surprises, disruptions, escalations, and hard decision-making, with advanced technology at the forefront. A good result of these exercises would be if they produced numerous embarrassments. For example, a Polish exercise last year, despite making generous assumptions about their access to advanced weaponry, ended with Polish forces being slaughtered in five days and the Russians poised to take Warsaw. That caused a furor in Poland—but the brickbats should have been bouquets. Nobody in Poland—or, for that matter, anyone else involved in the region’s security—would claim privately that defenses against Russia are adequate. **For everyone living around the Baltic Sea, it will be better to find their shortcomings early and fix them than to wait until the enemy is at the gates.**

Increasing NATO forces in the Baltics are key to stabilizing the region.

Mac Dougall on May 20, 2022 ("Sea changes: How NATO's expansion could stabilise the Baltic region," David Mac Dougall, 05/20/2022, <https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2022/05/19/sea-changes-how-nato-s-expansion-could-stabilise-the-baltic-region>. VY)

Exercise Hedgehog might have been planned long before Russian troops invaded Ukraine, but **the huge war games taking place this month in Estonia are a prickly reminder of NATO readiness** just 64km from the closest Russian base. "Every prick counts, as always," one Estonian reserve soldier who is currently taking part in Exercise Hedgehog, told Euronews. Some 15,000 NATO military personnel from 14 countries are involved in the exercise, one of the largest of its kind since Estonia gained independence for the second time, in 1991. **Offshore, there's a robust naval presence as well, with a US Navy Wasp-class amphibious assault vessel, a guided missile destroyer, and a landing ship.** Importantly, the Finnish and Swedish navies are also taking part -- a picture of what the changed security paradigm might look like in the Baltic Sea if and when both countries are admitted to NATO. The Finns are even throwing in some anti-ship missile live firing training from their south coast, in case anyone didn't get the message. **There's no doubt that the governments of the three Baltic States see the intrinsic value of having Finland and Sweden as members of NATO. "When we see that in our neighbourhood also other democratic countries belong to NATO, it would mean that we could have broader joint exercises and also ... more defence cooperation,"** Estonia's Foreign Minister Eva-Maria Liimets told reporters recently. **Liimets said that Estonia appreciates NATO enforcing its presence in the Baltic region, but would like the allies to move from enhancing their presence to enhancing their defence. "It would mean that we would have more robust presence of land forces, but also air and maritime defence,"** she added. Becoming a NATO sea **The Baltic Sea will soon become a NATO sea, says Glen Grant, a defence expert at the Baltic Security Foundation in Riga. "I see the Baltic Sea area as a common operational space, but I see the Baltic States cooperation, Nordic defence cooperation, NATO reinforcement in the Baltic States, US agreements with Finland and Sweden, all as parts of a jigsaw but missing a single operational picture and focus."** Finland and Sweden becoming part of NATO will put a few more pieces of the jigsaw puzzle in place but there also needs to be more operational coherence in the region, and the key players must also take the Baltic more seriously, Grant adds. **"NATO thinks about deterrence with extra troops and about reinforcement or regaining ground - after the event."** Whilst the EU has no visible regional policy at all. Mind, I suggest that it has no proper military policy for anywhere. Who pulls the regional strings to respond coherently in the early stages of a crisis is not at all clear," says Grant, a former British military officer and Defence Attaché at the British Embassies in Helsinki and Riga. **Looking at the whole Baltic region security picture** Martin Hurt at the International Centre for Defence and Security ICDS in Tallinn explains that Moscow has certainly seen Sweden and Finland as being part of the West since the mid-90s and that in any war, they were likely to support NATO. He also sees NATO membership for the Nordic neighbours as helping to complete the overall security picture of the region -- on land, at sea and in the air -- enhancing security in the round, an upgrade from the current situation. "Today if we look at NATO's operation planning, we cannot rely on Sweden and Finland. In our planning, they do not exist because we cannot count on them, on using their airspace, water and land. We have to plan with what we can trust, which is our own allies," he tells Euronews. "It would make a huge impact if especially Sweden, but also Finland, would join." One of the key force multipliers the two applicant countries bring to the table is their naval capabilities. Although Finland is prohibited by treaty from having submarines, Sweden does maintain its own submarine fleet. The Finns have extensive experience in minesweeper activities, and both countries have in-shore patrol boats with expertise operating in the shallow archipelago waters, strewn with thousands of tiny islands and rocky outcrops. **"In the Baltic states, the navies are relatively weak and focusing on minor countermeasures.** It's not a primary war fighting capability of course. The Finnish and Swedish navies are stronger. They have extremely good quality, not good quantity, but still much more than Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania combined," explains Hurst. **That focus on Baltic naval capabilities is important because the other regional naval powers Germany, Norway and Denmark are looking towards the North Atlantic, to keep key lines of communication open rather than being available for Baltic Sea defence.**

A Russian attack in the Baltics would lead to escalation.

Kuhn 2018 (“Consequences for NATO,” Ulrich Kuhn, a nonresident scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and the head of the arms control and emerging technologies program at the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg, From Preventing Escalation in the Baltics, A NATO Playbook, March 28, 2018, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/03/28/consequences-for-nato-pub-75881>, VY, *2 page card*)

THE RISKS OF CONVENTIONAL ESCALATION **The regional imbalance between NATO’s and Russia’s conventional forces, NATO’s own deterrence loopholes, and the geography of the Baltics all make both deliberate and inadvertent escalation possible.** Although NATO as a whole has much greater conventional military capabilities than Russia, **Moscow enjoys a significant margin of conventional superiority in the wider Baltic region** (see map). **Russia has been heavily funding and modernizing its aging armed forces over the last decade, making them a credible force again.** In addition, Moscow continues to expand its arsenal of long-range cruise missiles and other precision-guided munitions. To be fair, Russian modernization efforts continue to experience serious setbacks, as a result of widespread corruption and mismanagement, for instance. The Kremlin’s goal of equipping 70 percent of its forces with the latest military equipment by 2020 is generally considered largely aspirational.¹⁰ Nevertheless, **Western analysts assume that in case of an open military attack on one or more of the Baltic states, Russian forces would most likely overrun Baltic defenses within only a few days, presenting NATO with a military fait accompli.**¹¹

Recognizing these weaknesses, the NATO allies agreed at the 2016 Warsaw Summit to deploy four multinational battalions—a so-called Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP)—to the three Baltic states and Poland. NATO also agreed to increase the intensity and scope of its exercises in the region to deter Russian aggression and assure its eastern members. Separately, the United States has sent additional forces and military equipment under a U.S. national program known as the European Deterrence Initiative. (See Box 1 for a description of the forces deployed under the EFP and the European Deterrence Initiative.)

BOX 1: NATO’S ENHANCED FORWARD PRESENCE AND THE U.S. EUROPEAN DETERRENCE INITIATIVE NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP) consists of four battalion-sized battlegroups (totaling about 4,500 personnel) deployed in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland. Each battalion is led by a framework nation—the United Kingdom in Estonia, Canada in Latvia, Germany in Lithuania, and the United States in Poland. These framework nations contribute the majority of forces to each battalion. In addition to the framework nations, twelve other NATO allies participate in the EFP. NATO is also establishing eight small headquarters—the so-called NATO force integration units (NFIUs). One NFIU is located in each country in the region; these units are designed to serve as reinforcement hubs and to link NATO forces to their national hosts. The four EFP battlegroups are assigned to NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), but effectively have three lines of command: (1) NATO’s command structure; (2) national lines of command from contributing nations; and (3) the command line from the respective host nation. The EFP’s contributing nations and the four host states are in the process of determining common rules of engagement, specific to the regional deployments.¹² In the event of a conflict, NATO’s Graduated Response Plan (known as Eagle Defender) would come into play; this plan contains its own detailed rules of engagement. In any case, even in the event of a conflict, SACEUR can only move forces in a very limited fashion—and not beyond borders without a North Atlantic Council executive directive. Under the European Deterrence Initiative, the United States deployed a range of forces including an armored brigade combat team (of about 3,500 personnel) that continuously rotates through NATO’s easternmost member states. This deployment also includes a combat aviation brigade (of about 2,200 personnel), headquartered in Germany; a combat sustainment support battalion (of about 750 personnel), based in Poland with a logistics hub in Romania; and a support team in Lithuania. These steps have increased the overall number of U.S. combat brigades in Europe to three, while also pre-positioning stocks of military equipment for a fourth brigade. NATO force deployments to Eastern Europe—the EFP in particular—are intended to increase pressure on NATO members to respond more forcefully in the event of combat. The logic behind this strategy is that involving NATO forces from a variety of nations in a conflict against Russia—and hence giving them a direct stake in the outcome—would help minimize pressure within the alliance to simply cede to Russia any territory it may take, thus strengthening deterrence and preventing deliberate Russian escalation. However, the benefits of this multinational approach might be significantly overstated. As some Western analysts have pointed out, a limited, targeted Russian attack could implicate only a small subset of the nations that contribute to the EFP.¹³ If Russia were to solely attack, say, Latvia (which has about 5,300 active national personnel), its forces would face about 1,100 additional soldiers from Albania, Canada, Italy, Poland, Slovenia, and Spain—but Russia would not face British, French, German, or U.S. forces.¹⁴ In fact, given that the EFP base in Latvia is located in Ādaži, more than 200 kilometers from the Latvian-Russian border, even the Latvian EFP battlegroup would not necessarily be involved in the initial stages of combat if Russia were to attack and rapidly seize only a small part of eastern Latvia. Moreover, Russia has repeatedly shown that it can muster a force of up to 100,000 personnel in its Western Military District on relatively short notice.¹⁵ The small EFP force that would line up against them would essentially constitute a trip wire that could neither halt nor push back a serious Russian intervention. The main purpose of the EFP personnel would be to ensure that as many NATO allies as possible would be involved in combat, or to put it more bluntly, would die.¹⁶ **The grim logic of this arrangement is that once the trip wire is pulled, NATO would be**

forced to retake the Baltic states if it were to not accept (temporary) defeat at Russia's hands. In the event of a crisis or combat, the EFP could, according to current plans, receive two waves of reinforcements. The first to arrive would be NATO's Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF)—also known as the Spearhead Force—which consists of, at most, 13,000 personnel. The Spearhead is the most rapidly deployable part of the Enhanced NATO Response Force (eNRF) the rest of which would follow later. At most, the complete eNRF consists of 40,000 personnel (including the Spearhead).¹⁷ Assembling, moving, and deploying those forces would take time. NATO estimates that it would take less than seven days to deploy the Spearhead.¹⁸ Little is known publicly about the readiness of the rest of the eNRF.¹⁹ Some experts believe that “between 30 and 45 days” would be needed “from notice to movement”—a timeline that does not include actual deployment.²⁰ How long it would take European allies to muster additional credible forces for a potential third wave, given the atrophied state of some European allies' forces, is even less clear.²¹ One study concluded that even British, French, or German forces would have a hard time providing a combat-ready heavy brigade at short notice.²² Of course, in the event of a crisis, it would be possible for individual NATO states, most notably the United States, to bypass NATO's political command structure and intervene independently ahead of a NATO decision.²³ However, doing so would come at the political price of rendering NATO's collective decisionmaking in the North Atlantic Council (NAC) obsolete. Moreover, given the current U.S. administration's ambiguous commitment to Article V, Washington's willingness to intervene independently is questionable. In any case, all military crisis planning ultimately depends on NATO allies politically agreeing to use force to counter a potential Russian attack. While the decision to enter war with Russia would certainly not be an easy one, it would require a unanimous vote by the twenty-nine members of the NAC.²⁴ **NATO's long reaction times create another problem—the risk of inadvertent escalation. In the event that Russia threatened a conventional attack, NATO decisionmakers would be under potentially enormous pressure to ready the Spearhead** and perhaps also the eNRF as early as possible to prevent deliberate escalation. **But Moscow could misinterpret these actions as an imminent threat, leading Russia to rapidly escalate in response.**²⁵ NATO could try to communicate the purposes behind its actions to Russia, but doing so persuasively could be difficult. The current configuration has loopholes that might provide Russia with the opportunity for a military fait accompli, effectively taking a small part of Latvia. This increases the risk of deliberate escalation. To make matters worse, the geography of the Baltics would not be conducive to NATO operations. Russia enjoys considerable strategic depth in its vast Western Military District and has a well-integrated railroad system to reinforce troops quickly in the event of a conflict. By contrast, NATO allies would have to fly or ship in reinforcements of personnel and military equipment—a much slower process.²⁶ NATO has decided against pre-positioning equipment in the Baltic states; much U.S. equipment is, for example, based 1,500 kilometers away in Germany. Reinforcing by land would entail multiple challenges, ranging from NATO's atrophied logistics or missing railway links in Eastern Europe to Russia's abilities to hold NATO's transportation nodes at risk. Particularly the latter represents a serious problem for NATO. The flow of NATO's reinforcements—by air, sea, and land routes—could be disrupted by Russia's substantial modern anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) capabilities, which are centered in the Kaliningrad exclave and around Saint Petersburg. These capabilities include conventional and dual-capable guided missiles, anti-ship weapons, air defense systems, and several layers of modern radar.²⁷ If accusations that Russia has violated the INF Treaty are correct, then Moscow might well also possess dual-capable intermediate-range missiles that could be used to target key transport nodes and pre-positioned equipment deep in Western Europe. Taken together, the current EFP configuration has loopholes that might provide Russia with the opportunity for a military fait accompli, effectively taking a small part of Latvia. **This increases the risk of deliberate escalation.** Without the EFP directly involved in early combat, NATO members might find it hard to agree on immediate military counteractions. **If Russia were to only threaten a conventional attack, the risk of inadvertent escalation might increase once NATO decides to deploy additional forces to the Baltics.** Russia might simply misread NATO's defensive move as offensive. Last but not least, in any crisis or open conflict with Russia, NATO would face serious but not insurmountable obstacles reinforcing its troops.

NATO-Russia escalation would “leap-frog” into nuclear war.

Kulesa 2018 (“Envisioning a Russia-NATO Conflict: Implications for Deterrence Stability,” Lukasz Kulesa, European Leadership Network, February 2018, <http://www.jstor.com/stable/resrep17437>, VY)

Escalation: **Can a NATO - Russia conflict be managed? Once a conflict was under way, the “fog of war” and rising unpredictability would inevitably set in, complicating the implementation of any predetermined theories of escalation,** deescalation and inter-conflict management. The actual dynamics of a conflict and the perceptions of the stakes involved are extremely difficult to predict. Simulations and table-top exercises can give only limited insights into the actual decisionmaking processes and interactions. Still, Russian military theorists and practitioners seem to assume that a conflict with NATO can be managed and controlled in a way that would bring it to a swift end consistent with Russian aims. The Russian theory of victory would seek to exploit weak points in an Alliance war effort. Based on the conviction that democracies are weak and their leaders and populations are risk-averse, **Russia may assume that its threats of horizontal or vertical escalation could be particularly effective. It would also try to bring home the notion that it has much higher stakes in the conflict (regime survival) than a majority of the NATO members involved, and thus will be ready to push the boundaries of the conflict further.** It would most likely try to test and exploit potential divisions within the Alliance, combining selective diplomacy and activation of its intelligence assets in some NATO states with a degree of selectivity in terms of targets of particular attacks. **Any NATO-Russia conflict would inevitably have a nuclear dimension. The role of nuclear weapons as a tool for escalation control for Russia has been thoroughly debated by experts,** but when and how Russia might use (and not merely showcase or activate) nuclear weapons in a conflict remains an open question. Beyond catch phrases such as “escalate to de-escalate” or “escalate to win” there are a wider range of options for Russian nuclear weapon use. For example, a single nuclear warning shot could be lethal or non-lethal. It could be directed against a purely military target or a military-civilian one. Detonation could be configured for an EMP effect. A “false flag” attack is also conceivable. These options might be used to signal escalation and could significantly complicate NATO’s responses. Neither NATO nor its member states have developed a similar theory of victory. Public NATO documents stipulate the general goals for the Alliance: defend against any armed attack and, as needed, restore the full sovereignty and territorial integrity of member states. **It is less clear how far the Alliance would be willing to escalate the conflict to achieve these goals, and what mechanisms and means it would use while trying to maintain some degree of control over the conflict.** The goals and methods of waging a conflict with Russia would probably have to be limited in order to avoid a massive nuclear exchange. Such limitations would also involve restrictions on striking back against targets on Russian territory. But too narrow an approach could put too much restraint on NATO’s operations: **the Russian regime’s stability may ultimately need to be threatened in order to force the leadership into terminating the conflict. NATO would thus need to establish what a proportional self-defence response to Russian actions would involve,** and to what extent cyber operations or attacks against military targets in quite different parts of Russia would be useful as tools of escalation to signal NATO’s resolve. Moreover, **individual NATO Allies, especially those directly affected by Russia’s actions, might pursue their individual strategies of escalation.** With regards to the nuclear dimension in NATO escalation plans, given the stakes involved, this element would most likely be handled by the three nuclear-weapon members of the Alliance, with the US taking the lead. The existence of three independent centres of nuclear decision-making could be exploited to complicate Russian planning and introduce uncertainty into the Russian strategic calculus, but some degree of “P3” dialogue and coordination would be beneficial. This coordination would not necessarily focus on nuclear targeting, but rather on designing coordinated operations to demonstrate resolve in order to keep the conflict below the nuclear threshold, or bring it back under the threshold after first use. Relying on concepts of escalation control and on lessons from the Cold War confrontation might be misleading. The circumstances in which a Russia -NATO conflict would play out would be radically different from the 20th century screenplay. Moreover, **instead of gradual (linear) escalation or salami tactics escalation, it is possible to imagine surprising “leap frog” escalation,** possibly connected with actions in different domains (e.g. a cyberattack against critical infrastructure). Flexibility, good intelligence and inventiveness in responding to such developments would be crucial.

1AC Solvency

The U.S. should increase its security cooperation with NATO by increasing its military support of the Baltic states.

Kuhn 2018 ("Preventing Escalation in the Baltics: A NATO Playbook,," Ulrich Kuhn, a nonresident scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and the head of the arms control and emerging technologies program at the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg, March 28, 2018, [Preventing Escalation in the Baltics: A NATO Playbook - Carnegie Endowment for International Peace](#), VY)

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR NATO **To maintain alliance unity and counter Russia's strategy of new-generation warfare, NATO must develop a comprehensive strategy consisting of deterrence and assurance, resilience, and risk-reduction measures.** DETERRENCE AND ASSURANCE **To ensure the trip wire is pulled in a conflict, NATO should ask Washington to deploy a U.S. Army battalion, split equally among the three EFP deployments in the Baltic states and tasked with continuously patrolling and monitoring borders with Russia.** Yet, to maintain alliance unity, NATO should avoid additional large-scale force deployments to the Baltics. **NATO must clarify the roles of the EFP and reinforcement forces in the event of externally instigated domestic unrest in the Baltics or if NATO forces are deliberately targeted by protesters.** Allies should streamline NATO's internal decisionmaking process, perhaps by clarifying internally what military or political events would trigger reinforcement, so that the alliance can respond swiftly should a crisis occur. **The alliance must make sure that it can move forces if reinforcement becomes necessary.** It should consider enhancing the defenses of its vital logistics and transportation nodes in Western Europe and adapting its logistics in Eastern Europe. **To bolster deterrence and assurance, NATO heads of state and government should convey clearer public and private messages of political resolve,** while avoiding changes to NATO's current nuclear posture. If diplomatic efforts to resolve the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty crisis fail, then, to preserve alliance unity, NATO members should consider military countermeasures consistent with the treaty. Until then, all diplomatic means of resolving the standoff must be explored.

NATO's defense of the Baltics is not sufficient now.

Lucas 2022 ("NATO Is Dangerously Exposed in the Baltic," Edward Lucas, a nonresident fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis, February 2, 2022, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/02/02/nato-baltic-states-sea-russia-military-defense/>, VY, *2 page card*)

Nowhere is the credibility of the United States and its allies at greater risk than in the Baltic Sea region.

NATO's Article 5 pledges the alliance to defend its members. Doing that for the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—three thinly populated states squeezed between Russia, Belarus, and the Baltic Sea—is hard.

Years of cost-cutting, timidity, and wishful thinking by NATO governments make it harder. As the Russian military buildup around Ukraine raises fears of a broader East-West security crisis, **NATO allies are hastening to bolster the Baltic states'**

defenses while non-NATO members Sweden and Finland are tightening their ties with the alliance. In late January, U.S. Air Force F-15 fighters arrived in Estonia as part of a wide-ranging reassurance effort. At bases elsewhere in Europe and the United States, 8,500 U.S. military personnel are on heightened alert, ready to deploy to the region as part of NATO's 40,000-strong Response Force. **These moves, though desirable, are**

belated and insufficient. Regional security in the Baltic Sea has been a problem for much longer than the current standoff with Russia. Solving this requires more than a one-off, reactive deployment. With Ben Hodges, a former U.S. Army commander in Europe and now my colleague at the Center for European Policy Analysis, I have spent the past year deep in the weeds,

looking at the problems of Baltic Sea regional security and how to fix them. On the surface, **everything looks fine. NATO allies have stationed so-called enhanced forward presence tripwire forces, roughly 1,000 troops strong, in Estonia,**

Latvia, and Lithuania. These units obviously cannot withstand a Russian assault; they are there to make sure the Kremlin knows an attack on the Baltic states would also be an attack on other NATO members. In nearby Poland, the United States has a more substantial presence of 5,000 service members. The Baltic states and Poland play their part too: Their defense budgets exceed the minimum 2 percent of GDP mandated by NATO. These funds are spent wisely, including on modern weaponry that could at least slow, and thus help deter, a Russian attack. Across the Baltic Sea, Sweden and Finland have also been boosting their spending. These two non-NATO countries have close military ties with each other as well as NATO. Neighboring Norway, though not a littoral state, is closely involved in Baltic Sea security through its logistical, intelligence, and military aviation capabilities. Denmark has upended its previous defense posture, which discounted any need for territorial and regional defense. Combined, Poland plus the Nordic countries and three Baltic states have a greater GDP than Russia's. Their combined defense spending is around half of Russia's—but the Kremlin has global ambitions, such as space weapons, a blue-water navy, and a strategic nuclear arsenal. The black hole in the region's security is Germany. Its size and location would add crucial heft, but the other countries around the Baltic Sea are privately mistrustful of decision-makers in Berlin. Germany has backed the two Nord Stream natural gas pipelines along the Baltic seabed. Other countries in the region see them as a grave threat, entrenching the Kremlin's dominance of the region's energy supply. (In a countermove, Poland has just built a pipeline to Norway to secure another source of gas.) In the event of a Russian provocation, would Germany back deterrence or call for dialog and compromise? Germany's shilly-shallying over Ukraine, which included banning Estonia from donating some much-needed howitzers to the beleaguered Ukrainians, have intensified doubts. Last week, Latvian Defense Minister Artis Pabriks described Germany's approach as "immoral and hypocritical." Many think that NATO's presence in the region has gone far enough already. Russian President Vladimir Putin has demanded NATO withdraw all outside forces from the region and commit to Sweden and Finland never being allowed to join. Yet below the surface, the region's defense and security arrangements, far from threatening Russia, look troublingly flimsy. In our Center for European Policy Analysis report, we identified more than a dozen serious problems. It starts with the West's attitude to Russia. Politicians and decision-makers in the region still have radically different threat assessments. The Baltic states have been sounding the alarm since the 1990s. Other countries are much later to the party and more cautious in what they say—and that's before you get to the huge problem of Germany.

These differing threat assessments and political approaches are obstacles to everything else. Intelligence collection and sharing are hampered by the gulf between NATO and non-NATO members. Washington jealously guards its best intelligence—for example, anything involving Russian submarines. Even within NATO, there are inner and outer circles. For example, there is the British-U.S. intelligence-sharing agreement, which also includes the other so-called Five Eyes: Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. Military mobility—the vital business of moving large numbers of troops and equipment—is patchy too. There is no common maritime strategy, though control of the Baltic Sea in a crisis will determine what happens on land. Systems to defend ground targets against air and missile attacks are costly. **No country in the region has enough of these defensive systems, and**

some have none. NATO's small air policing deployment—typically just four warplanes based in Estonia or Lithuania—is there to deal with peacetime problems, such as airspace intrusions, not to fight off the Russian

Air Force. The command structure is like a bowl of spaghetti. Each country guards its national decision-making jealously. Although the Baltic states are one small operational area in military terms, they have three national headquarters, each commanding pint-sized forces. NATO has two divisional and one corps headquarters, with Estonian and Latvian forces under a Danish headquarters that is based partly in Denmark and partly based in Latvia. The two

other headquarters are in Poland. Further up the hierarchy, NATO's main land forces headquarters is in the Netherlands—but splits taking charge on a six-month rotating basis with its naval counterpart in Naples, Italy. Behind all that is the regional U.S. headquarters in Poland and its main headquarters for Europe in Virginia. Somewhere else are the Brits with their Joint Expeditionary Force—a 10-nation military framework for rapid deployment—and the Germany-based Joint Support and Enabling Command, which is meant to ensure that the right forces are in the right place at the right time. Confused yet? And I haven't even mentioned the five-nation Nordic Defence Cooperation framework, the French-led European Intervention Initiative, and, of course, the European Union's own nascent defense efforts: battle groups that mainly exist on paper. The assumption is that in a crisis, this spaghetti will spontaneously straighten under the pressure of events and thanks to U.S. leadership. It would be good to test that assumption with realistic, hard exercises where decision-makers can practice surmounting the bureaucratic and physical obstacles hampering effectiveness in real time. **Current exercises in the region are too small, too well scripted, and too devoid of complexity.** Planners are given many months to ensure that everything goes smoothly. All too often, the highlight is a distinguished visitor day closer to a theatrical performance than a training event, where participants identify problems by experiencing them.

2AC Advantage Extensions

The risk of Russia invading the Baltics states now is high.

Szumski 2022 (“Ex-NATO general: Risk that Russia invades Baltics is ‘real’” Charles Szumski, Mar 27, 2022, [Ex-NATO general: Risk that Russia invades Baltics is ‘real’ – EURACTIV.com](#), VY)

The risk of war in the Baltic states is real. General Sir Richard Shirreff, former deputy head of NATO in Europe, told the Swedish broadcaster SVT in an exclusive interview on Sunday. **Shirreff, who was in Sweden to give a lecture at the Royal Academy of War Sciences, gave a clear message about where he thinks the Kremlin is heading – which might be the Baltics. “It is palpable. Putin’s intention has been clear all along”,** Shirreff said. “After all, he has said that the most appropriate security settlement for Europe is a new Yalta, which I interpret as meaning that he wants to re-establish Russian rule in the former republics of the Soviet Union,” he said. **“And as we know, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are former republics of the Soviet Union,”** he added. **“This is a danger that we must take very seriously and be concerned about, not least because there are significant Russian-speaking minorities in at least two of these countries,”** the general also said, referring to Estonia and Latvia which have many Russian speakers. **This is in line with what Russian President Vladimir Putin has previously said about wanting to reunite all Russians under the banner of ‘Mother Russia’,** according to Shirreff. Shirreff, one of NATO’s top military officers from 2011 to 2014, did not rule out a Russian invasion of Poland or other Eastern European countries. **“If you look at this in a broader perspective, all the Eastern European countries that were once part of the Warsaw Pact and are now part of NATO are under threat. Therefore, NATO must be prepared to discourage any form of attack on any NATO member country,”** he added.

With the Ukraine conflict, the Baltic states feel like the NATO support is no longer enough to protect them against Russia.

McCausland 2022 (“Baltics fear NATO membership isn't sufficient to protect against Russia,” Phil McCausland, NBC News, March 31, 2022, [Baltics fear NATO membership isn't sufficient to protect against Russia](#), v7)

TALLINN, Estonia — **Each new bomb and missile that strikes Ukraine casts a long shadow across this country and the other Baltic states that share a border with Russia Unlike Ukraine, however, these states — Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania — are members of NATO and are close allies of the United States. For years, they have raised the alarm that Russia is their most existential threat. Yet, they feel they received little response prior to the invasion of Ukraine. Now, unless they get further support from their allies, some worry they could be the next target of the Kremlin** and the very bombs and missiles that it has used to level Ukrainian cities. Estonian Foreign Affairs Minister Eva-Maria Liimets told NBC News on Tuesday that Russia is not a direct threat at the moment, but her nation’s defense and its future as a liberal democracy depend on the clear support of its allies, especially Washington. **“It’s very important to see U.S. military presence in Europe, and we would also welcome U.S. troops here in Estonia, in addition to the other allied presence we have at the moment: troops from the United Kingdom, from France, from Denmark,”** she said, later **sharing her hopes that the addition of NATO’s battle groups would be a permanent fixture of Estonia’s defense.** The Department of State and the National Security Council did not respond to requests for comment. Liimets, who has served in her role since January 2021, emphasized that Estonia and the U.S. maintain “very good relations,” noting her visit to Washington in February and Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s stop in Estonia in March. Still, she said, **more could be done to make that support concrete.** “From our perspective, of course, it would be very important to also see a new U.S. ambassador here in Estonia,” she said. The post has sat empty since James Melville Jr., the most recent U.S. ambassador to Estonia, resigned in protest in 2018 over then-President Donald Trump’s comments about the European Union and NATO. This year is the 18th anniversary of Estonia’s membership in NATO, and the 100th year of diplomatic relations with the U.S. But most remarkably for Estonians, the first shells fell in Ukraine on Feb. 24 — the day they celebrate their independence from the occupation of the then-Soviet Union. **‘It’s not enough’ Baltic states’ officials and lawmakers see Ukraine’s struggle and its future as intertwined with their own security and the fate of their liberal democracies. Russia’s latest acts of aggression, they say, are affirmation that the Kremlin remains their greatest threat,** despite close allies telling them for years that they were alarmist. Here in Estonia’s capital city, which boasts a history that stretches back to the 13th century, newly built skyscrapers of glass and steel are lit up at night with the blue and yellow of Ukraine. In the old town sector — made up of towering ancient churches and castle walls — shops and restaurants display small Ukrainian flags and collection tins for Ukrainian refugees. At the Russian Embassy, the building’s entrance is protected by police barriers plastered with anti-war signs. There is often the sound of ripping duct tape as more protest posters are affixed to the fence. “This war is very worrisome and our society really feels it because we have accepted more than 24,000 refugees from Ukraine,” Liimets said. “This is a big number of refugees. Bear in mind that Estonia is a small nation of 1.3 million people.” With Russia waging war in Ukraine, **Baltic leaders say there needs to be enough NATO-backed defenses in their countries to convince the Kremlin that the cost of any attack would be too high.**

More NATO support of the Baltics is necessary to deter Russia.

Grady on June 16, 2022 (“Baltic States Need More NATO Forces to Deter a Russian Invasion, Says Estonian Official,” John Grady, a former managing editor of Navy Times, retired as director of communications for the Association of the United States Army, June 16, 2022, [Baltic States Need More NATO Forces to Deter a Russian Invasion, Says Estonian Official - USNI News](#), VY)

Despite the Kremlin’s heavy losses in invading Ukraine, the Russians are “going to come back stronger” in a year or so to threaten the Baltics, Estonian Ministry of Defence Permanent Secretary said on Thursday. Speaking at a Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment event, Kusti Salm said that even given Moscow’s rising number of casualties, destruction of armored forces and depletion of precision-guided weapons, the Kremlin can still mass fires as it is showing in fighting in eastern and southern Ukraine. He called NATO’s “trip-wire” strategy and even its “forward presence” in limited numbers obsolete in light of Russia’s Feb. 24 invasion of Ukraine. **Because the Baltic nations are on Russian borders and small, they could be quickly overwhelmed in a full-scale Russian invasion. “Deterrence by denial,”** Salm said Wednesday, cannot be achieved by a battalion of NATO troops in his country or any other Baltic member of the alliance. **He called it “a joke” that “the second largest nuclear nation would be deterred by a battalion.” The presence “has to be at the divisional level” to “be able to project power across the Russian border.”** Force structure on NATO’s eastern and southern flanks is expected to be high on the agenda at the alliance’s summit meeting later this month in Madrid. In the first quarter of 2022, Salm added that Estonia has seen the need to “punch above [its] weight” and has been spending about 3 percent of its gross domestic product on defense. Among the systems he mentioned were anti-ship, anti-tank and anti-armor. At the same time, it has doubled its territorial defense force to 20,000 and is training and equipping it to defend against invasion. The CSBA report on Baltic deterrence calls for the three nations to raise defense spending to 3 percent. Salm said that the attitude of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania toward Moscow now is “if you want to fight one Baltic state, you’ll fight all the Baltic states and NATO.” He added later, **“There is no stepping back” from Estonia’s building up its defenses and NATO’s need to remain unified.** “We feel that the notion is there: ‘Let’s get it done’” when it comes to assisting Ukraine and raising the alliance’s capabilities. Chris Bassler, one of the authors of the CSBA report on Baltic deterrence, said **some of the larger powers inside NATO need to be asking “what are the front line states asking for” to deter Russia from turning on them.** He added that with so many weapons like Javelins, Stingers and sophisticated drones going to Ukraine, the United States could not be the single supplier of systems to the alliance, but all members needed to rebuild their stocks and lay aside prepositioned equipment for follow-on forces. The report, prepared before Finland and Sweden applied for NATO membership, states, “While full integration of the national defense plans is likely not an attainable goal, the Baltic states should start by focusing on further coordination of regional investments in [intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance], air and missile defense, and longer-range fires capabilities.” By doing this, they could reduce costs and increase interoperability with other alliance members. Looking at continuing gaps in command and control among NATO forces, especially for forces that rotate between host nations, Jan van Tol, another author, said basic questions like “who’s going to be where” and when need to be addressed. **Another important question is whether alliance forces now rotating in the Baltic should be permanently stationed there, he added. The report calls for doubling the number of NATO forces in the three Baltic nations,** he added CSBA also recommended rotating F-35 Lightning II Strike Fighters to the Baltics to better coordinate air defense and policing. Bassler said the F-35s provide “instant interoperability.” Van Tol said that maritime defenses were not addressed in detail because the report was finished before Finland and Sweden applied for membership. A lesson the Baltics could learn from Ukraine is the value of anti-ship missiles. Ukraine’s use of these missiles has made Russian ship captains feel more threatened after the sinking of RTS Moskva (121) and has been a factor in fighting there. He added another lesson for the Baltics would also include “mines are a poor man’s weapon” in naval defenses.

Credibility and strengthening the alliance is necessary for NATO deterrence in the Baltics.

Veebel 2018 (“NATO options and dilemmas for deterring Russia in the Baltic States,” Viljar Veebel, Department of Political and Strategic Studies, Baltic Defence College, Tartu, Eston, 2018, [PDF NATO options and dilemmas for deterring Russia in the Baltic States](#), VY)

Particularly in the context of nuclear deterrence that the field lines in the international political arena are not as clear today as they used to be during the Cold War period which is also called “the first nuclear age” (Haffa et al. 2009, 45),

with a bipolar and constant competition between the two technologically sophisticated states and their allies, large inventories of strategic nuclear weapons, continuing communications through arms control negotiations, escalation restraint, and mutual rationality postulating that neither side would ultimately risk the destructive consequences of nuclear war. Nowadays, as far nuclear capabilities are concerned, the competition is confined to more than two principal players (including non-deterrable actors), there exist varied inventories of nuclear arsenals and only a limited number of communication channels between the “owners” of nuclear capabilities, etc. In this context, escalation and first-use of nuclear capabilities is considered to be a plausible option. Furthermore, domestic pressure to acquire nuclear capabilities could outweigh external pressure to discontinue nuclear weapon proliferation. Accordingly, in current “second nuclear age”, national interests in terms of deterrence are understood in a more complex way, where political and moral dilemmas, public support, analytical confusions, inadequacy of the available technical means and new conceptual challenges play bigger role than in times of first nuclear age and bipolar world order (Haffa et al. 2009). **The credibility of deterrence is clearly dependent on specific circumstances, yet, because of its controversial nature it is difficult to assess under which circumstances and at which point of time deterrence becomes credible.** In principle, we are studying something which is expected to never occur. This poses several methodological challenges, e.g. if deterrence is successful there is no behaviour to see; only if deterrence fails behaviour does occur and can be observed; deterrence theory also fails because while all the conditions for deterrence are present, there is “no deterrence” (Starr 2005). **A number of factors have been suggested in the academic and military literature which could contribute to the credibility of deterrence.** For example, Van der Putten et al. (2015, 29) argue that **To achieve effective deterrence, in addition to international cooperation, there are a few more conditions. The measures taken must be credible, the deterrence message must be clearly communicated to the potential perpetrator (communication), the threat and the actors from which it emanates must be known (intelligence), and the deterrence must be based on actual capabilities and an integrated approach.** So, capabilities, information, communication, cooperation and integrity are relevant in terms of deterrence. This view basically overlaps with the statement of Paulauskas (2016, 1) in respect of NATO: “Alliance credibility can be pictured as a three-legged stool, comprising cohesion, capability and communication”. Capability refers to military capabilities, cohesion to the unity and solidarity of the Alliance, and communication to the existence of a clear and unambiguous communication strategy. To create successful deterrence, all three components need to be present – as argued by Paulauskas, “take away one leg, and the stool topples over” (Paulauskas 2016, 1). **In order to understand the matter, especially as expressed by the presence of the large Russophone minorities in the Baltic States,** next to the 3C model one needs to figure in other aspects such as related to interdependencies and acceptance of norms. In terms of methodology, this introduces an element of constructivism to the otherwise rationalist setting of the 3C model. This way the authors propose to combine the old model with a normative and ethical layer of deterrence. To sum up and provide an outline of the proffered research model, **these three components – capability, cohesion and communication – are also selected as the basis for the following analysis that attempts to assess the credibility of NATO’s deterrence strategy in discouraging Russia’s potentially aggressive ambitions in the Baltic countries. Since the collective-actor deterrence comprises both the deterrence provided by the alliance and by individual members of the group** (Von Hlatky 2015, 6–7), **these three aspects are discussed from the point of view of both NATO and the Baltic countries.**

Escalation between NATO and Russia goes nuclear and draws in great powers.

Kuhn 2018 (“Consequences for NATO,” Ulrich Kuhn, a nonresident scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and the head of the arms control and emerging technologies program at the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg, From Preventing Escalation in the Baltics, A NATO Playbook, March 28, 2018, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/03/28/consequences-for-nato-pub-75881>, VY)

THE RISKS OF NUCLEAR ESCALATION **Beyond the aforementioned risks of conventional escalation, additional escalation pathways extend to the nuclear realm of the NATO-Russia relationship.** In its official documents, **NATO is upfront and states that the alliance reserves the right to use nuclear weapons.** At the same time, it concedes that “the circumstances in which any use of nuclear weapons might have to be contemplated are extremely remote.”⁴³ However, that does not necessarily imply that the alliance would be unwilling to use nuclear weapons in the event of a crisis. But words are only one part of the equation. The other is that NATO has put much less emphasis on its nuclear deterrent in Europe since the end of the Cold War. The alliance has forward-deployed an estimated 150 U.S. B-61 gravity bombs in Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey.⁴⁴ The gravity bombs deployed in Turkey are not operational as long as nuclear-capable aircraft are not stationed at the İncirlik Air Base. As noted before, **Russia has an estimated 2,000 tactical nuclear arms, many of which are assumed to be stored in depots in the western (European) part of the country, and Moscow regularly conducts exercises to simulate the transition from conventional to nuclear warfare.** That said, **even though Russia now relies heavily on the threat of nuclear use, and even though NATO has reduced its reliance on nuclear arms, the alliance still threatens nuclear use to try and deter a Russian attack against the Baltics.**⁴⁵

2AC Solvency Extensions

The NATO defense of the Baltic countries is not sufficient now and their leaders are calling for increase cooperation between the U.S. and NATO.

Gallo 2022 (“After Russia’s Ukraine Invasion, Baltics Push for Permanent NATO Presence,” William Gallo, March 23, 2022, [After Russia’s Ukraine Invasion, Baltics Push for Permanent NATO Presence](#), VY)

The small Baltic countries, whose militaries have long been dwarfed by that of neighboring Russia, are renewing their push for NATO to establish a larger and more permanent presence on their territory following the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania — with a combined population of only about six million people — have long been seen as some of NATO’s most vulnerable nations. The countries joined the Western military alliance in 2004 but are connected to the rest of European NATO countries by only a narrow corridor, which lies between the heavily armed Russian exclave of Kaliningrad and Russia-allied Belarus. **The Baltics, former Soviet states, have watched with concern as Moscow tries to reassert influence across Eastern Europe.** However, they have also been encouraged as Western countries fortify the NATO alliance in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. NATO had no forces in the eastern part of the alliance until 2014, when it decided to deploy four multinational battlegroups on a rotational basis to the Baltics and Poland in response to Russia’s annexation of Crimea. The NATO presence was further strengthened this year after Russia attacked Ukraine. In total, the Baltics now host about 7,700 foreign NATO troops — nearly twice as many compared to earlier this year. **But even with those reinforcements, NATO forces in the Baltics likely could not defeat a large-scale Russian invasion, Baltic leaders warn.** “If we want to be ready from the first minute of any kind of attack to defend our citizens, and if you want to give citizens of Latvia the same feeling of security as the citizens of France, Britain, Spain, (and) Germany... then there must be this permanent presence and more firepower and capabilities,” Latvian Minister of Defense Artis Pabriks told VOA in an interview. **Baltic leaders have long pushed for a permanent basing of U.S. troops, seeing it as the ultimate deterrent against a Russian invasion.** Currently, U.S. troops are part of NATO’s Baltic rotational battlegroups, which are led by Germany, Britain, and Canada. During a Baltics tour earlier this month, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said “more permanent deployments” were being considered as part of a larger review of NATO’s defense posture. He did not offer details. But the United States has been reluctant to permanently station forces on Russia’s doorstep, fearing it would further upset relations with Moscow. **Many Baltic leaders hope a permanent NATO presence will be discussed** this week when U.S. President Joe Biden visits Brussels, Belgium, for meetings with NATO and other European leaders. Asked about Biden’s visit, Latvian Minister of Foreign Affairs Edgars Rinkēvičs told VOA he believes **“it is time that NATO states clearly that (its) presence in the Baltic states and Poland and Romania, in what we call the ‘eastern flank,’ is permanent.”**

Answers to Off-Case

2AC Frontline-Russia Aggression DA

1. Non-unique: NATO expansion to include Sweden and Finland thumps or overwhelms the disadvantage. This means the disadvantage should have already happened.

Siebold and Emmott on June 29, 2022 ("NATO invites Finland, Sweden to join, says Russia is a 'direct threat'," Sabine Siebold and Robin Emmott, June 29, 2022, <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/sweden-finland-course-join-nato-russia-china-focus-allies-2022-06-29/>, vV)

MADRID, June 29 (Reuters) - **NATO invited Sweden and Finland on Wednesday to join the military alliance in one of the biggest shifts in European security in decades after Russia's invasion of Ukraine** pushed Helsinki and Stockholm to drop their traditional of neutrality. **NATO's 30 allies took the decision** at their summit in Madrid **and also agreed to formally treat Russia as the "most significant and direct threat to the allies' security"**, according to a summit statement. **"Today, we have decided to invite Finland and Sweden to become members of NATO,"** NATO leaders said in their declaration, **after Turkey lifted a veto on Finland and Sweden joining.** Ratification in allied parliaments is likely to take up to a year, but once it is done, **Finland and Sweden will be covered by NATO's Article 5 collective defence clause, putting them under the United States' protective nuclear umbrella.** "We will make sure we are able to protect all allies, including Finland and Sweden," Stoltenberg said. **In the meantime, the allies are set to increase their troop presence in the Nordic region, holding more military exercises and naval patrols in the Baltic Sea to reassure Sweden and Finland.** After four hours of talks in Madrid on Tuesday, Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan agreed with his Finnish and Swedish counterparts a series of security measures to allow the two Nordic countries to overcome the Turkish veto that Ankara imposed in May due to its concerns about terrorism. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation was founded in 1949 to defend against the Soviet threat. Russia's Feb. 24 invasion of Ukraine gave the organisation a new impetus after failures in Afghanistan and internal discord during the era of former U.S. President Donald Trump. "We are sending a strong message to (Russian President Vladimir) Putin: 'you will not win'," Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez said in a speech. **Allies also agreed on NATO's first new strategic concept - its master planning document - in a decade. Russia, previously classed as a strategic partner of NATO, is now identified as NATO's main threat.** Russia's invasion of Ukraine is "a direct threat to our Western way of life," Belgian Prime Minister Alexander de Croo added, citing the wider impact of the war, such as rising energy and food prices. The planning document also cited China as a challenge for the first time, setting the stage for the 30 allies to plan to handle Beijing's transformation from a benign trading partner to a fast-growing competitor from the Arctic to cyberspace. Unlike Russia, whose war in Ukraine has raised serious concerns in the Baltics of an attack on NATO territory, China is not an adversary, NATO leaders said. But Stoltenberg has repeatedly called on Beijing to condemn Russia's invasion of Ukraine, which Moscow says is a "special operation". 'MORE NATO' At the summit, NATO agreed a longer-term support package for Ukraine, in addition to the billions of dollars already pledged in weapons and financial support. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz said that arms would continue to be supplied to Kyiv, which seeks help to overpower Russian artillery, particularly in eastern Ukraine, where Russia is slowly advancing in a grinding war of attrition. "The message is: We will continue to do so - and to do this intensively - for as long as it is necessary to enable Ukraine to defend itself," Scholz said. The Western alliance is also in agreement that big allies such as the United States, Germany, Britain and Canada pre-assign troops, weapons and equipment to the Baltics and intensify training exercises. **NATO is also aiming to have as many as 300,000 troops ready for deployment in case of conflict, part of an enlarged NATO response force.** read more Russia is achieving the opposite of what Putin sought when he launched his war in Ukraine in part to counter the expansion of NATO, Western leaders say. Both Finland, which has a 1,300 km (810 mile) border with Russia, and Sweden, home of the founder of the Nobel Peace Prize, are now set to bring well-trained militaries into the NATO, aimed at giving the alliance Baltic Sea superiority. "One of the most important messages from President **Putin** ... was that he was against any further NATO

enlargement," Stoltenberg said on Tuesday evening. "He **wanted less NATO. Now President Putin is getting more NATO on his borders.**"

<2. No Link: Putin's warnings are propaganda to rally his country behind the invasion of Ukraine. He does not have the resources to actually be more aggressive against NATO.>

3. No internal link: Increased NATO presence does not lead to more conflict in Ukraine. The Ukraine conflict is not about NATO presence but Russia's power ambitions.

Cornell 2022 “No, the war in Ukraine is not about NATO,” Svante Cornell, director of the American Foreign Policy Council's Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, 03/09/2022, <https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/597503-no-the-war-in-ukraine-is-not-about-nato/>, VY)

Russia's invasion of Ukraine has led to widespread condemnation and an unparalleled outpouring of support for Ukraine. At the same time, a motley crew, including some academics and former U.S. officials, has essentially blamed the war on the West, and in particular NATO enlargement. **The argument is basically that Russia would not have become so aggressive if Western powers had been more accommodating. This line of thinking, however, is simply incorrect.** That's because Russia rediscovered its imperial vocation before NATO enlargement, and **the war in Ukraine is, in fact, about Putin's great power ambitions.** Russian leaders have emphatically argued that NATO countries, led by the United States, violated assurances made to Moscow at the end of the Cold War that the alliance would not expand to the east. This claim, however, has been debunked as a myth. Even the last Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, has denied that the issue of NATO enlargement was even discussed at the time. Russian President Vladimir Putin himself did not have much to say about NATO enlargement until his infamous speech at the 2007 Munich Security Conference. NATO's enlargement began in the mid-1990s, at a time when the alliance was embarking on a strategic shift, focusing on out-of-area operations instead territorial defense. NATO urged new member states to focus on specific cutting-edge expertise, and programs for partner countries like Georgia were mostly about training for peacekeeping operations in places like Afghanistan. NATO's shift is perhaps best illustrated by the fact that the alliance lacked a workable plan to defend the Baltic states when Russia invaded Georgia in 2008. It is really only after that war, and in particular after Moscow's annexation of Crimea in 2014, that NATO returned to its original focus on collective defense. **The real reason for the deteriorating security situation in Europe — and most blatantly the Russian invasion of Ukraine — can be found in changes that have taken place within Russia itself, and most directly the increasingly imperialist worldview of the Russian leadership.** This change began as early as 1994 and accelerated after Putin came to power. The war in the Russian breakaway republic of Chechnya from 1994 to 1996 was in many ways the starting point. Russia's defeat there showed how far the country had fallen, leading many former Soviet republics to part ways with Russia. Moscow responded by systematically undermining neighboring states like Moldova, Georgia and Azerbaijan through the incitement of ethnic conflicts on their territories — a classic divide-and-rule tactic. It is largely forgotten today that Putin built his political career on regaining control of Chechnya, something he did by starting a bloody war on the basis of a lie. It is generally well established today that the explosions in apartment buildings in Moscow in the summer of 1999 that Putin blamed on Chechen rebels were in fact carried out by the Russian security service under Putin's own leadership — the purpose being to create popular support for Putin's war, and by extension his leadership. **Putin's view of the world, in turn, is closely linked to his own hold on power — and that explains Russia's increasingly aggressive actions.** The “color revolutions” in Georgia and Ukraine in 2003-4 had the potential to show that democratic change could happen in former Soviet countries, something that would undermine Putin's pursuit of authoritarian rule (what he called a “vertical of power”). Democratic rule in neighboring countries therefore had to fail. Ukraine, in particular, was central to Putin. If a kindred Slavic and Orthodox country like Ukraine developed into a functioning democracy, this could pull the rug out from under Putin's project. If Ukraine showed that something better was possible, why should Russians be content with living under an authoritarian and corrupt regime? For a time, Moscow tried other tactics. Pro-Russian politician Viktor Yanukovich managed to get elected as president of Ukraine in 2010, but his misrule led to the popular uprising of 2013. That event, in turn, showed that the Ukrainian people saw Europe, rather than Russia, as their future. Putin responded by annexing Crimea and starting a war in eastern Ukraine. At home, Putin's rhetoric became increasingly nationalistic, and now focused on concepts such as the “Russian world” in order to foment a divide between Russia and an allegedly decadent West. **For this to succeed, however, Putin needs to bring Belarus and Ukraine into the “Russian world,” by force if necessary. This, rather than NATO enlargement, is what the war in Ukraine is about.**

<4. We solve better for Russian escalation in Ukraine. Our Russia advantage is clear that the most likely scenario for escalation is through the Baltics.>

2AC Frontline–China Focus DA

1. Non-unique: NATO's focus is on Russia, not on counterbalancing China now. China has taken a backseat for NATO.

Fitch Solutions 2021 (“NATO Unlikely To Focus On Countering China, As Russia Will Remain Priority,” Fitch Solutions, 15 Jun, 2021, [NATO Unlikely To Focus On Countering China, As Russia Will Remain Priority](#), VY)

Despite the inclusion of China in its communique, NATO is unlikely to prioritise counterbalancing Beijing's growing power in the near term. Of the 79 points in NATO's communique, China was the focus of only points 55 and 56, and was mentioned only 10 times, compared to 63 mentions of Russia, 25 of Ukraine, 23 of terror or terrorism, 18 of Georgia, 10 of Afghanistan, and three of Iran. In our view, **the US will continue to counterbalance China's growing military power in the Indo-Pacific region** by means of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue ('the Quad'), which also includes Japan, India, and Australia, and through Washington's bilateral defence pacts with Japan, South Korea, and other regional allies, **rather than through NATO, whose main focus will remain the Euro-Atlantic area and western Eurasia.** European NATO members, most notably the United Kingdom and France, are likely to increase their participation in **US-led military activities in Asia**, but this **will be limited and not be under the auspices of NATO.** Biden Keen To Reaffirm US' Alliance Network That said, many European NATO states are hardening their attitudes towards China, and the alliance may increasingly be used to step up diplomatic criticism of Beijing on issues such as Indo-Pacific security and China's alleged human rights abuses. For its part, China will view these developments – correctly in our view – as part of an effort by the US Biden administration to build a multilateral front to pressure China. The deterioration of EU-China relations was most visibly underscored on May 20, when the European Parliament suspended the ratification of the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) after China imposed sanctions on 10 EU officials in response to Western sanctions against Chinese officials accused of mass detentions of ethnic Uighurs in China's Xinjiang province. The CAI was only finalised in December 2020 after seven years of negotiations. Meanwhile, President Joe Biden is seeking to improve US relations with the EU, which became very strained over trade and climate change issues during the presidency of Donald Trump (2017-2021). Biden is holding a summit with EU leaders on June 15. One area of cooperation is likely to be a new EU-US Trade and Technology Council (TTC) to set standards for emerging technology, strengthen and diversify supply chains, and rein in the growing power of 'Big Tech'. Although NATO and the EU are completely separate organisations, their close overlap in membership means that there is a broad 'Western coalition' emerging to challenge China. Russia Will Remain NATO's Focus **Russia will remain NATO's overwhelming security challenge, amid ongoing tensions in Ukraine and Belarus, as well as NATO and Russian military activities in Eastern Europe.** Although European NATO and EU leaders are increasingly cognisant of the challenges posed by China, they will continue to focus on Russia, given that Moscow poses much more geographically closer and more immediate security risks. In particular, the governments of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland remain very concerned about recurring Russian military pressure on Ukraine, and Russia's support for Belarus' embattled President Alexander Lukashenko. Meanwhile, Western European leaders will remain concerned about potential Russian interference in their domestic affairs, cyber attacks, and Russia's harsh treatment of opposition figures such as Alexei Navalny. Indeed, the NATO summit also announced a new Comprehensive Cyber Defence Policy, aimed at deterring and defending against cyber attacks. Although President Biden is scheduled to hold a summit with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Switzerland on June 16, the wide range of issues that divide their two countries implies that there is no clear path to a rapprochement.

2. No link: NATO can focus on both China and Russia's invasion of Ukraine, which means that NATO can focus on both China AND the affirmative.

Sprenger and Gould 2022 ("US military readies to 'walk and chew gum' as multiple crises loom," Sebastian Sprenger is Europe editor for Defense News, and Joe Gould, senior Pentagon reporter for Defense News, Jan 28, 2022, [US military readies to 'walk and chew gum' as multiple crises loom](#), VY)

WASHINGTON — **As roughly 100,000 Russian troops amass around Ukraine, a series of emerging crises around the world — the Middle East, China, North Korea — are demanding the full attention of NATO,** and particularly its most powerful member, the United States. **Now, there's a growing sense among national security experts that the crisis in Ukraine is just one of many conflicts on the precipice, putting pressure on the alliance and its member countries to address this threat and at the same time brace for the next one.** Indeed, China this week flew 39 warplanes toward Taiwan. And consider the United Arab Emirates reported this week it had intercepted multiple ballistic missiles aimed at Abu Dhabi. Julianne Smith, the U.S. ambassador to NATO, described the ongoing dispute between Russia and Ukraine as a "microcosm" of the types of threats Western analysts were expecting all along. "All of this is becoming very real," she said this week at a panel in Brussels sponsored by the German Marshall Fund of the United States. At the same time, "something could happen on China and Taiwan next week," said Ian Lesser, vice president at the think tank, referring to the possibility of China attacking the U.S.-backed island nation that Beijing sees as a renegade province to be eventually united with the mainland. Asked about that possibility on Thursday, Defense Department spokesman John Kirby said the military remains watchful of other theaters. **"I think the gist of your question is, why can't we walk and chew gum at the same time,"** he told reporters at the Pentagon. **"We can, and we are. ... Just because we're focused on bolstering our allies because of the worrisome accumulation of combat-credible power by the Russians in and around Ukraine doesn't mean that we aren't focused on the pacing challenge that China represents to the department."**

3. Internal-link turn: The NATO focus and threat construction of China is what causes China to be a threat.

Lonas 2021 ("China warns NATO to stop 'hyping up' threat posed by Beijing," Lexi Lonas, 06/15/21, [China warns NATO to stop 'hyping up' threat posed by Beijing | The Hill](#), VY)

China on Tuesday issued a warning to NATO, saying the group needs to stop going after Beijing. The statement accused the group of a "Cold War mentality," and said it needs to stop "hyping up" the threat posed by Beijing, a spokesperson of China's mission to the European Union said, according to NBC News. **NATO is "slandering China's peaceful development and misjudging the international situation and its own role,"** the spokesperson said. China's statement comes after NATO said on Monday that the country poses "systemic challenges to the rules-based international order," according to the outlet. China rebuked the statement, saying it won't "sit by and do nothing if 'systemic challenges' come closer to us." "I think there is a growing recognition over the last couple years that we have new challenges," President Biden said on Monday. "We have Russia that is not acting in a way that is consistent with what we had hoped, as well as China." **The back and forth between NATO and China comes after G-7 leaders met to discuss how to compete with China, and called for the country to engage in a transparent investigation into the origins of COVID-19. "The days when global decisions were dictated by a small group of countries are long gone," a spokesman for the Chinese Embassy responded.**

4. No Impact: No US-China war. 4 warrants: mutually assured destruction, weak Chinese military, China's focus on soft-power, and economic interdependence.

Krulak and Friedman 2021 (“The US and China are not destined for war,” Charles C. Krulak, a retired four-star general, is a former commandant of the US Marine Corps and former president of Birmingham-Southern College, and Alex Friedman is a former chief financial officer of the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, 24 Aug 2021, [The US and China are not destined for war | The Strategist](#), VY)

True, throughout history, when a rising power has challenged a ruling one, war has often been the result. But there are notable exceptions. A war between the US and China today is no more inevitable than was war between the rising US and the declining United Kingdom a century ago. And in today's context, there are four compelling reasons to believe that war between the US and China can be avoided. First and foremost, any military conflict between the two would quickly turn nuclear. The US thus finds itself in the same situation that it was in vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Taiwan could easily become this century's tripwire, just as the 'Fulda Gap' in Germany was during the Cold War. **But the same dynamic of 'mutually assured destruction' that limited US-Soviet conflict applies to the US and China.** And the international community would do everything in its power to ensure that **a potential nuclear conflict did not materialise,** given that the consequences would be fundamentally transnational and—unlike climate change—immediate. A US-China conflict would almost certainly take the form of a proxy war, rather than a major-power confrontation. Each superpower might take a different side in a domestic conflict in a country such as Pakistan, Venezuela, Iran or North Korea, and deploy some combination of economic, cyber and diplomatic instruments. We have seen this type of conflict many times before: from Vietnam to Bosnia, the US faced surrogates rather than its principal foe. **Second, it's important to remember that, historically, China plays a long game.** Although **Chinese** military power has grown dramatically, it **still lags behind the US on almost every measure that matters.** And while China is investing heavily in asymmetric equalisers (long-range anti-ship and hypersonic missiles, military applications of cyber, and more), it will not match the US in conventional means such as aircraft and large ships for decades, if ever. **A head-to-head conflict with the US would thus be too dangerous for China to countenance at its current stage of development.** If such a conflict did occur, China would have few options but to let the nuclear genie out of the bottle. In thinking about baseline scenarios, therefore, we should give less weight to any scenario in which the Chinese consciously precipitate a military confrontation with America. The US military, however, tends to plan for worst-case scenarios and is currently focused on a potential direct conflict with China—a fixation with overtones of the US-Soviet dynamic. This raises the risk of being blindsided by other threats. Time and again since the Korean War, asymmetric threats have proven the most problematic to national security. Building a force that can handle the worst-case scenario does not guarantee success across the spectrum of warfare. **The third reason to think that a Sino-American conflict can be avoided is that China is already chalking up victories in the global soft-power war.** Notwithstanding accusations that Covid-19 escaped from a virology lab in Wuhan, China has emerged from the pandemic looking much better than the US. And with its Belt and Road Initiative to finance infrastructure development around the world, it has aggressively stepped into the void left by US retrenchment during Donald Trump's four years as president. **China's leaders may very well look at the current status quo and conclude that they are on the right strategic path. Finally, China and the US are deeply intertwined economically.** Despite Trump's trade war, **Sino-American bilateral trade in 2020 was around US\$650 billion, and China was America's largest trade partner. The two countries' supply-chain linkages are vast, and China holds more than US\$1 trillion in US Treasuries, most of which it can't easily unload, lest it reduce their value and incur massive losses.**

Baltics Case Negative

Negative

1NC Russia Deterrence Advantage Answers

1. Russia does not have the capacity to invade the Baltics now. European leaders agree this is not a threat.

Birnbaum and Ryan on May 17, 2022 (“Splits open at NATO about how to boost presence in Eastern Europe,” By Michael Birnbaum and Missy Ryan, May 17, 2022, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/05/17/nato-troops-europe-russia-ukraine/> VY)

TALLINN, Estonia — **Divisions are opening among NATO members about how to boost military deployments in Eastern Europe after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, amid disagreements about whether the Kremlin’s faltering battlefield effort means it cannot significantly threaten alliance territory.** The debate underlines different assessments of the lessons from nearly three months of war in Ukraine. The Baltic states and Poland are asking for a significantly expanded military presence on their soil and new capabilities such as anti-aircraft defense that could make it far harder for Russia to invade. Other policymakers, including from **France and Italy, are voicing skepticism that the shambolic Russian invasion force will pose a threat to NATO territory anytime soon.** An initial decision must be made by the end of June, when NATO leaders will meet at a summit in Madrid. At that gathering, they are also expected to give initial approval to Finland and Sweden’s membership applications, assuming Turkey dials back its objections. The expansion would itself significantly increase NATO’s military capability in the eastern part of the alliance. “Russia’s direct military aggression against NATO allies cannot be excluded,” according to a confidential joint proposal from the Baltic states of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia that was obtained by The Washington Post. “Russia can rapidly mass military forces against NATO’s eastern border and confront the Alliance with a short war and fait accompli,” the document said, proposing that a division-size contingent of about 20,000 troops be tasked with speeding to each of the countries if they are under threat. What happened in Mariupol, the city Russia besieged and captured? **Other countries are more cautious about robust new commitments in Eastern Europe, wary of signing on to large deployments that would be costly and would divert troops from other areas.** “We will have a peace to build tomorrow, let us never forget that,” French President Emmanuel Macron told reporters last week, **warning against taking actions that would make it impossible to work with Russia in the future.** “We will have to do this with Ukraine and Russia around the table. The end of the discussion and the negotiation will be set by Ukraine and Russia. But it will not be done in denial, nor in exclusion of each other, nor even in humiliation.” “We are not at war with Russia,” he said in a separate tweet. Eastern European leaders say that opting for a muted response would be a strategic mistake in the same category as the limited Western reaction to Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia and its 2014 annexation of Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula. Those were a signal to Russian President Vladimir Putin that he could get away with attacking his neighbors, Eastern European officials say. In invading Ukraine in February, Putin “clearly miscalculated on some basic things,” said Jonatan Vseiov, the secretary general of the Estonian Foreign Ministry. “He believes his own propaganda. He got it wrong [in Ukraine], so he could get it wrong here” on NATO territory, and convince himself that invading the Baltic states would not draw a major response from the rest of the alliance, Vseiov said. That would be a mistake, he said, but Putin would be less likely to make the mistake if he saw a military force ready to fight back. The deployments were one subject of a weekend meeting in Berlin of NATO foreign ministers, who agreed to keep negotiating ahead of the Madrid summit. Eastern European officials see a narrow window to secure commitments. They are worried that support will ebb in Western Europe when the Ukraine war ends. “As soon as it’s over many of our partners in Western Europe will be quite eager to return to the status quo ante. Some of the declarations and the general spirit that we see right now might just disappear,” said one official who, like others, spoke on the condition of anonymity to describe the sensitive and ongoing negotiations. “We wouldn’t like that because we believe we’ve seen a tectonic shift” in European security, the official said. “We believe there’s no going back.” While **most countries in Eastern Europe don’t expect an imminent invasion, citing the fact that Russian troops are now bogged down in Ukraine and will probably take time to regroup after the war, they argue that a stronger force in the east is needed to prevent a repeat of Russia’s actions in Ukraine.**

<2. Russia is currently too busy with Ukraine and has no incentive to invade the Baltic States. Unlike Ukraine with Crimea, there has been no prior invasion. And NATO membership makes the Baltics different from Ukraine.>

3. The Baltic states are in NATO which sufficient deters a Russian invasion via Article 5 commitments now.

Commercio 2022 ("How NATO guarantees the security of the Baltic states," Michele E. Commercio is an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Vermont, March 7th, 2022, [How NATO guarantees the security of the Baltic states | EUROPPE](#), VY)

Russia's invasion of Ukraine has raised concerns in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania that they could also come under attack. Michele E. Commercio explains how **the Baltic states' membership of NATO will ensure their security in the face of Russian aggression. While Putin's invasion of Ukraine has generated concern – to say the least – in neighbouring post-Soviet states like Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, these countries are in a fundamentally different situation than Ukraine that, in effect, renders them secure from Russian aggression.** Heightened security concerns voiced by Baltic elites are grounded in the reality that is unfolding in Ukraine. Baltic elites watched Russia annex Crimea in 2014, start a secession war in the Donbas region, recognise the independence of Luhansk and Donetsk, and then viciously invade the country. These security concerns are also grounded in the ugly history experienced by the Baltic peoples in 1940, when the Soviet Union illegally occupied and annexed three independent states while the international community essentially looked the other way. Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians were then subjected to Moscow's political, economic, and cultural control until the Soviet Union collapsed in 1992. In addition, the security concerns of Baltic elites are grounded in democratic values that underpin a Baltic perspective on sovereignty that unambiguously supports an independent state's right to maintain its territorial integrity and manage its own domestic and foreign affairs. And finally, these security concerns are grounded in geography: all three Baltic states border Russia, and Latvia and Lithuania border Russia's close ally in its war against Ukraine – Belarus. And so, it is not surprising that Baltic elites voiced, and continue to voice, apprehension over Putin's invasion of Ukraine. Lithuania's Foreign Minister, Gabrielius Landsbergis, for example, has argued that "the battle for Ukraine is a battle for Europe," and warned that "if Putin is not stopped there, he will go further." The state secretary of Latvia's Defence Ministry, Janis Garisons, issued a similar warning: "Russia always measures the military might but also the will of countries to fight... Once they see a weakness, they will exploit that weakness." Adopting a more cautionary position that entails close monitoring of the situation, the director general of Estonia's foreign intelligence service, Mikko Marran, argued that as of February 28, 2022, Russia posed no direct military threat to Estonia: "It is calm next to our borders [with Russia]. The troops from there have been taken to fight in Ukraine. But we are monitoring the situation closely." These sentiments underly a common Baltic position on Putin's invasion of Ukraine. All three states have condemned Russia's aggression and taken concrete steps to support Ukraine's sovereignty: they have advocated for punitive sanctions against Russia and Belarus, sent military and humanitarian aid to Ukraine, and urged NATO to adopt measures to ensure the security of its member states, particularly those that border Russia. These measures are having an adverse effect on Putin's ability to achieve a swift, decisive victory. In fact, along with an admirable Ukrainian President who deserves to be and will likely be the next recipient of a Nobel Peace Prize and an astounding commitment on the part of Ukrainian troops and civilians to defend their country, these measures are crippling Putin's ability to bring Ukraine to its knees. **The most important factor that sets the Baltic countries apart from Ukraine in this context is their membership in international organisations like the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Much to Putin's publicly expressed chagrin, the Baltic states joined the EU and NATO in 2004.** The benefits of EU membership are many, but the most pertinent in terms of security are the organisation's commitment to political cooperation and strengthened economic ties, and its guarantee that it will protect a member state's democracy and rule of law. We have seen the EU's response to what it deems 'democratic backsliding' in Poland and Hungary; we can imagine the EU's response to threats to Baltic democracy stemming from an external actor like Russia. It is no surprise that President Zelensky has, in the midst of Putin's invasion, submitted an application for Ukraine's membership in the European Union. **NATO membership directly addresses security concerns. Collective defence, or the notion that an attack against one NATO member is deemed an attack against all alliance members, is enshrined in Article 5** of the Washington Treaty, which has only been invoked once in reaction to the 9/11 terrorist attacks against the United

States. **When the Baltic states became members of NATO, they acquired a guaranteed collective defence of their countries by NATO forces in the face of Russian aggression.** Perhaps more important is NATO's enhanced forward presence in Poland and the Baltic states, triggered in 2016 two years after Russia annexed Crimea. NATO describes these forces as follows: "These battlegroups, led by the United Kingdom, Canada, Germany and the United States respectively, are multinational, and combat-ready, demonstrating the strength of the transatlantic bond. Their presence makes clear that an attack on one Ally will be considered an attack on the whole Alliance." In my view, this description was written for **President Putin, who is certainly cognisant of the fact that an invasion of any Baltic state will indeed trigger a collective NATO response. That deterrent is sufficient to maintain the territorial integrity of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.** Given the fact that Ukraine transferred its nuclear warheads to Russia by 1996 and in so doing lost a powerful deterrent, NATO membership remains the most critical deterrent for Ukraine today.

4. Turn: The increase of troops and support in the Baltic region would be misguided and provoke Russian aggression.

Blachford 2020 ("Can NATO and The EU Really Defend the Baltic States Against Russia?" Kevin Blachford, Lecturer of International Relations at the Baltic Defence College, Estonia. The views and opinions in this article do not reflect those of the Baltic Defence College, February 7, 2020, [Can NATO and The EU Really Defend the Baltic States Against Russia? | The National Interest](#), VY)

The Defender Exercise 2020 will be one of the biggest military exercises since the end of the Cold War. The exercise will take place in May and June of this year and will occur across the regions of Germany, Poland, and the Baltic States. Despite President Trump's outspoken criticism of European allies, it will also be one of the largest deployments of U.S. troops to Europe in twenty-five years. **The intention of the exercise is to demonstrate U.S. resolve to defend its allies and to show the deterrent ability of NATO. It will play an important part in signaling alliance commitment, testing readiness, and improving interoperability. However, at the political level, this exercise may be misguided. Such a large exercise on Russia's borders risks both intentional and unintended escalation, perhaps through unconventional means, as was seen with Russia's reaction to previous military exercises by blocking GPS location signals in the region. It also provides only a short term response to deeper military challenges in the Baltic region.** Primarily, the challenge facing NATO is dealing with the possibility of Russia using the Baltics as a way to test the credibility of the NATO alliance. **The Baltic states of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia currently rely on NATO's enhanced forward presence and air policing missions to deter Russian aggression. But this provides only short term reassurance to the region and overlooks the lessons of the Cold War in which West Germany played a vital role in the credibility of NATO's deterrence posture.** The reluctance of Germany to think seriously about the military security of Europe is, therefore, becoming a hindrance to NATO's deterrence capabilities. Germany has repeatedly emphasized its aversion to militarism in recent years and its military has faced numerous bouts of austerity. But this reluctance to be seen as a military power overlooks the role of the West German Bundeswehr which acted as the first line of NATO's defense in the Cold War. The history of the Cold War provides clues to how deterrence could be increased in the Baltic region today. The defense and deterrence capability of West Germany revolved not just around the nuclear deterrent, but on the ability of the United States and its allies to deploy forces quickly. This related to the logistic capabilities to move forces quickly to the border with East Germany. An important part of NATO strategy therefore relied on the West German autobahns as a way to move both goods and people. Today, the Baltic region lacks any meaningful infrastructure in which reinforcements could be moved quickly to the region. Train lines are outdated and travel between the Baltics to Poland or further to Germany is painstakingly slow. The Baltic states also do not have any significant capabilities to host allied forces in large scale numbers, particularly as access to the area in a conflict scenario would be limited due to Russian air superiority and anti-access, area-denial capabilities. The large placement of U.S. forces in this sensitive area would no doubt invite reprisals and escalation from Russia. But showing the capabilities to quickly respond to a crisis by having the capacity to move resources to the region would enhance NATO's deterrence in the long term. NATO should therefore consider developing its forces in Germany and even Poland, but with the added caveat of being able to move these forces quickly to where they are needed in the Baltics. The lack of infrastructure across the Baltic region, therefore, creates two main problems. Firstly, it limits NATO's credibility to respond to a crisis on the border with Russia. Secondly, infrastructure serves a dual purpose in both war and peacetime. **The lack of European investment and interest in the region creates opportunities for Russia to undermine the societies of the three Baltic nations.** This shows the primary challenge facing NATO in European defense. The European Union needs to do more to show its commitment to the East. Continual expansion

eastwards has not had the de-securitizing effect once expected. The lack of German commitment and Brussel's interest in the region is also effecting NATO's ability to defend the Baltics.

<5. The situation with the Baltic states is stable right now. The worst thing to do would be to create Russia aggression unnecessarily.>

6. Experts agree that Putin won't use nuclear weapons.

Fink 2022 ("Putin Still a Rational Man Who Won't Use Nuclear Weapons, Top Experts Say," Jenni Fink, 3/12/22, <https://www.newsweek.com/putin-still-rational-man-who-wont-use-nuclear-weapons-top-experts-say-1687297> , VY)

Despite the prevalence of opinions that Vladimir Putin has lost his mind, nuclear weapons experts continue to see the Russian president as a rational man who isn't willing yet to risk the severe consequences of using a nuclear weapon on Ukraine. Putin is growing increasingly isolated as the assault on Ukraine nears its third week, and the Russian leader's decision to put his nuclear forces on high alert has raised fears about how far he might go. But 10 nuclear weapons experts Newsweek spoke to consider it unlikely that he would hit the nuclear button because he can achieve his goals in Ukraine without doing so. Also, such an extreme measure could hurt the president's ability to hold on to power if a challenger emerges who will use the war against him. **"I don't think that the Russian leadership and Putin are irrational actors."** John Erath, senior policy director for the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, said. **"The use of a nuclear weapon would lead to the possibility of a response that would be disastrous for all."** The invasion of Ukraine prompted some to call Putin's mental capabilities into question. Former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice told Fox News recently that Putin seems "different" and "erratic," as opposed to the "calculating and cold" man he once was. Former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates characterized Putin in an interview with CNN as a man who's "gone off the rails." Speculation about Putin's mindset has raised concerns about the potential for the conflict in Ukraine to turn nuclear, but doing so would come at such a significant cost that experts don't see it happening. Although Ukraine isn't a NATO member, the deployment of a nuclear weapon after 77 years would be such a cataclysmic event that it would force the West to respond. Whether that would be in more significant economic sanctions or even military retaliation is not predictable, but Putin is feeling pressure over the Ukrainian invasion, and he could risk losing power if the political tides turn against him. **He also risks straining his relationship with China, the one leading world power that hasn't condemned his attack on Ukraine. Plus, if his goal is to decimate Ukraine to the point the people can't resist, the experts don't believe he needs to shatter world order by deploying a nuclear weapon.**

7. US/Russia war will not escalate into nuclear war. 2 reasons: Russia's military capabilities and lack of powerful allies.

Simhony 2022 ("NATO Intervention in Ukraine Won't Spark World War III," Limor Simhony, a policy advisor and researcher based in London. She was previously the director of counterextremism at the political consultancy firm TRD Policy and a research fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies. She holds a doctorate from the Department of War Studies at King's College London. April 1, 2022, [A NATO-Russia Conflict Over Ukraine Won't Spark World War III](#), VY)

However, Russia's indiscriminate attacks against Ukrainian civilians—including bombing hospitals and schools as well as the use of horrific weapons, such as cluster bombs and white phosphorus—should drive the West to reevaluate its war engagement policy and take a more active role by implementing a no-fly zone or securing evacuation corridors—perhaps even actively fighting Russian forces. **The main concern is any such escalation could lead to World War III. There are two reasons that this is unlikely. The first is that Russia's military capabilities are poor relative to those of Western armies. Their forces are not sufficiently trained; their equipment and weapons are dated and inferior; they experience major logistical, operational, and tactical difficulties; and their soldiers have low morale. Damaging economic sanctions also mean that Russia may not be able to fund a wider war. The expectation that Moscow will be able to escalate the war** into other theaters in an effective way, especially by conventional means, **is unrealistic**. It is possible that if the Russian military continues to struggle, Russian President Vladimir Putin will deploy chemical or even nuclear weapons to increase gains and deter the West from interfering—but that is unlikely. **The second is that Russia has become isolated. To fight a world war, Russia needs powerful allies, which it does not have.** Its strongest ally, China, has largely remained on the sidelines since the war started. It abstained from voting against the U.N. resolution demanding that Russia ends its offensive, and it is worried about secondary sanctions if it aids Russia. The only countries besides Russia that voted to reject the resolution were Belarus, North Korea, Eritrea, and Syria—hardly a winning alliance. **Both world wars saw blocks of powerful allies fight one another. Currently, such a bloc does not exist on Russia's side. These factors mean that there is not a high risk of substantial escalation into total global war.** This should be enough to convince Western nations to change their engagement policy and help Ukraine win the war by repulsing an opponent that is considerably inferior militarily to their own forces. It is unlikely to happen for two main reasons: fear of Russian nukes and the West's aversion to casualties.

1NC Solvency Answers

Status quo solves: The U.S. has sufficient security agreements now with the Baltic states.

Lee 2022 ("US assures nervous Baltics of NATO protection against Russia," Matthew Lee, March 7, 2022, [US assures nervous Baltics of NATO protection against Russia | AP News](#), VY)

RIGA, Latvia (AP) — **U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken on Monday assured Lithuania and Latvia of NATO protection and American support as he made quick visits to two of the three Baltic states that are increasingly on edge as Russia presses ahead with its invasion of Ukraine. Along with Estonia, which Blinken will visit on Tuesday, the former Soviet republics are NATO members, and the Biden administration is aiming to calm any fears they have about their security in the event Russia chooses to expand its military operations.** In the Latvian capital of Riga, Blinken said the Baltics have "formed a democratic wall that now stands against the tide of autocracy" that Russia is pushing in Europe. **"The United States is more committed than ever to standing with you as our democracies rise to the challenge,"** he said. **"We are bolstering our shared defense so that we and our allies are prepared,"** Blinken said. **He stressed that the U.S. commitment to NATO's mutual defense pact is "sacrosanct" and that NATO and the United States were discussing the permanent basing of troops in the Baltics. "We will defend every inch of NATO territory if it comes under attack," he said. "No one should doubt our readiness. No one should doubt our resolve."**

2NC/1NR Advantage Answers Extensions

Russia won't attack Baltics. The Baltics states are culturally and politically distinct from Ukraine, which makes it different. Russia would also not risk a full-blown war with NATO.

White 2021 ("Russian Aggression in the Baltics Will Not Look Like Crimea," Sarah White, Senior Research Analyst at Arlington's Lexington Institute, May 21, 2021, [Russian Aggression in the Baltics Will Not Look Like Crimea | RealClearDefense](#), VY)

In 2014, Russia invaded and annexed Ukraine's Crimean Peninsula in the largest land seizure in Europe since World War II. **Since then, experts have made various predictions of what Moscow's next target for expansion might be. And there is no shortage of potential next targets in the region. Since Crimea was annexed, Russia has occupied part of eastern Ukraine, engaging in skirmishes with domestic insurgents.** Over the last several months, there was a rapid buildup of Russian troops in the Donbas region of Ukraine, followed by a rapid withdrawal once the alarm raised by NATO and the criticism from the international community became more vocal. (However, about 80,000 Russian troops remain in those areas). Likewise, Moscow seized on the institutional vacuum left in Belarus after 2020's wave of protest attempting to oust authoritarian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka, who quickly converted himself into a closer Putin ally than he was before the protests erupted. This "soft takeover" in Minsk has allowed Russia to move tanks and troops to Belarus' border with Poland. **The Baltic states—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—have been one of the most commonly identified future hot spots and a particularly disastrous area for conflict to break out.** Once Russian satellites like most countries in the area, they are often seen as the next most likely targets for Russian aggression. **Because of their NATO membership, unlike with Ukraine and Belarus, military action there would automatically draw in the rest of the alliance. One of Moscow's main justifications for annexing Crimea was on the basis of reuniting Russia with Crimea's ethnic Russian majority.** In 2014, that population was about 60 percent. Each of the Baltic states has a Russian-speaking minority population, but that number is 25 percent in Latvia and Estonia. These numbers, combined with the small size of each country and their shared Soviet history, have made the Baltics seemingly vulnerable to becoming the next Crimea. They are also at a geographic disadvantage due to their small sizes and close proximity to the heavily-armed Russian oblast of Kaliningrad. However, their actual vulnerability compared to Crimea is more nuanced. **Unlike the 60 percent Russian-speaking majority in Crimea, it is extremely unlikely that Russian speakers in the Baltics would be inclined to sympathize with Moscow, nor that their national governments would hold a referendum on whether to become part of Russia, like the local government in Crimea did.** As was the case in Belarus before this year, Russian influence in the civil societies of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia is limited. **But unlike Belarus, the Baltics have had concrete institutional divisions from Russia for almost two decades; besides being NATO members, all three countries have been members of the European Union since 2004 and are committed liberal democracies. Likewise, Estonians closely identify with their Nordic neighbors, while Latvians and Lithuanians view themselves as Eastern European—but not Russian.** On the one hand, because of the strength of Baltic institutions, using hard power over covert political destabilization is likely Moscow's path of least resistance there. There is already a heightened level of preparedness for a sudden invasion; as a measure of deterrence, security forces in Estonia and Latvia are already trained to attack Russian troops on sight. Those forces are supported by NATO's Baltic Air Policing (BAP) mission, where fighters are deployed on a rotating basis by country at Estonia's Amari Air Base and Lithuania's Šiauliai Air Base. On the other hand, it should not be assumed that Russia's hard-power annexation of Crimea is the new playbook for its future expansion elsewhere. **Russian aggression in the Baltics is likely to look different from Crimea because of the risk that comes with attacking NATO members.** Russia would have to ensure that their attack is successful and that their forces are prepared to overwhelm the inevitable response from the rest of the alliance.

Russian rhetoric around Finland and Sweden joining NATO proves an increase in troops in the Baltics would cause aggression.

Reuters on June 29, 2022 ("Putin: Russia will respond if NATO sets up infrastructure in Finland, Sweden," Reuters, June 29, 2022, [Putin: Russia will respond if NATO sets up infrastructure in Finland, Sweden | Reuters](#), VY)

MOSCOW, June 29 (Reuters) - **President Vladimir Putin said on Wednesday that Russia would respond in kind if NATO deployed troops and infrastructure in Finland and Sweden after they join the U.S.-led military alliance. "With Sweden and Finland, we don't have the problems that we have with Ukraine. They want to join NATO, go ahead,"** Putin told Russian state television after talks with regional leaders in the central Asian ex-Soviet state of Turkmenistan. **"But they must understand there was no threat before, while now, if military contingents and infrastructure are deployed there, we will have to respond in kind and create the same threats for the territories from which threats towards us are created."** He said it was inevitable that Moscow's relations with Helsinki and Stockholm would sour over their NATO membership. "Everything was fine between us, but now there might be some tensions, there certainly will," he said. "It's inevitable if there is a threat to us." Putin made his comment a day after NATO member Turkey lifted its veto over the bid by Finland and Sweden to join the alliance after the three nations agreed to protect each other's security. read more The move means Helsinki and Stockholm can proceed with their application to join NATO, marking the biggest shift in European security in decades. Putin added that the objectives of what Moscow calls its "special military operation" in Ukraine remained unchanged, that its goal was to "liberate" eastern Ukraine's Donbas region and create conditions to ensure Russia's security. He said Russian troops had advanced in Ukraine and that the military intervention was going as planned. There was no need, he said, to set a deadline for an end to the campaign.

Russia/US war will not happen – Russia just pushing nuclear rhetoric.

Ellyat on April 29, 2022 ("Could there be war between Russia and the west? strategists predict what could happen next." Holly Ellyatt, 2022, April 29, CNBC. Retrieved June 19, 2022, from [Could there be war between Russia and the West? Strategists predict what could happen next](#), NAUDL)

The saber-rattling and rhetoric between Moscow and the West have become notably more aggressive this week, prompting concerns that a direct confrontation between the two power blocs could be more likely. In the last few days alone, for example, Russia stopped gas supplies to two European countries and has warned the West several times that the risk of a nuclear war is very "real." In addition, [Russian President Vladimir Putin](#) has said that any foreign intervention in Ukraine would provoke what he called a "lightning fast" response from Moscow, while his Foreign Ministry warned NATO not to test its patience. **For their part, Western officials have dismissed Russia's "bravado" and "dangerous" nuclear war rhetoric,** with the U.K. calling on Western allies to "double down" on their support for Ukraine. CNBC asked strategists about the likelihood of a direct confrontation between Russia and the West. Here's what they said. Nuclear attack? At the start of the week, Russia's foreign minister warned that the threat of a nuclear war "cannot be underestimated" and said NATO's supply of weapons to Ukraine was tantamount to the military alliance engaging in a proxy war with Russia. Putin doubled down on the bellicose rhetoric Wednesday, threatening a "lightning fast" retaliation against any country intervening in [the Ukraine war](#) and creating what he called "strategic threats for Russia." He then appeared to allude to Russia's arsenal of intercontinental ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons when he warned that Russia has the "tools" for a retaliatory response "that no one else can boast of having now ... we will use them if necessary." **But strategists told CNBC that Putin is playing on risk aversion in the West and that the chances of a nuclear war are remote. "I think it's outside the realm of possibility right now that there's going to be a nuclear war or World War III that really spills over that far beyond Ukraine's borders,"** Samuel Ramani, a geopolitical analyst and associate fellow at the Royal United Services Institute, told CNBC. **"If there's a border spillover right now, we're still probably most likely looking at something like Moldova being vulnerable to an invasion,"** he said. A U.S. infantryman at a combined arms live fire exercise at Al-Ghalail Range in Qatar, on Nov. 14, 2018. **He noted that Russia has a long history of using "nuclear brinkmanship" as a way of preventing the West from pursuing security policies that it doesn't like, with the escalation in hostile**

rhetoric aimed at deterring NATO members from making heavy arms deliveries to Ukraine. Moment of danger

Nonetheless, Ramani noted the threat posed by Russia could become more acute if it felt humiliated on the battlefield. In particular, military setbacks in Ukraine around May 9 could pose some danger. That's Russia's "Victory Day" — the anniversary of Nazi Germany's defeat by the Soviet Union in World War II. "Putin has had a history of escalating unpredictability if he feels that Russia is being humiliated in some way ... and if there are major setbacks, especially on around the 9th [of May] then there's a risk of unbreakable action," he said. "But also there's a logic of mutually assured destruction that hopefully will rein everybody in."

LAW Aff

LAW AFF Description

Lethal Autonomous Weapons “LAWS” are AI driven weapons meant to take to the battlefield and operate without direct input from an operator. The use of AI weapons, once the province of science Fiction, are finally here. AI fighters can outfly the best pilots in simulations, and programmed drones patrolling the battlefield are only a step away. Drones are already assisting both sides of the Ukraine War to identify targets for artillery strikes and launch rockets- what could happen if the systems worked all by themselves? The AFF puts forward the plan that NATO should restrict their use and call for sanctions on countries that don't follow their lead.

Advantage One argues that Russia will continue to use drones, and NATO doing the same would result in an escalating conflict that leads to nuclear war. Only restrictions on their development will keep them off the battlefield and prevent an AI arms race.

Advantage Two argues that the proliferation of autonomous weapons leads to their use by bad actors, fueling a number of wars and conflicts that lead to inevitable escalation.

Terms to Know:

Autonomous: Able to operate on their own

Proliferation: A rapid increase in numbers

Reverse Casual: A cause and effect relationship that works in the opposite direction of what most people would assume

Thumper: A situation that disproves a given impact

LAWs Affirmative

Affirmative, On-Case

1AC Inherency

Lethal autonomous weapons are here. Numerous countries are developing them but international standards do not exist.

Trager and Luca 2022 ("Killer Robots Are Here—and We Need to Regulate Them," By Robert F. Trager, an associate professor of political science at the University of California, Los Angeles, and Laura M. Luca, a graduate student in political science at the University of California, Los Angeles and former delegate of Romania to the U.N. Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, May 11, 2022, [Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems Are Here—and We Need to Regulate Them](#), VY)

Swarms of robots with the ability to kill humans are no longer only the stuff of science fiction. Lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS) are here. In Ukraine, Moscow has allegedly deployed an artificial intelligence (AI)-enabled Kalashnikov ZALA Aero KUB-BLA loitering munition, while Kyiv has used Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2 drones, which have some autonomous capabilities. Although it's always hard to determine whether a weapon's autonomous mode is used, these technologies have reportedly been employed in at least one conflict: Last year, a United Nations report suggested Turkey used autonomous firing by its Kargu-2 drones to hunt fleeing soldiers in Libya's civil war (though the CEO of the Turkish company that produced the drone denies it is capable of this). Unlike traditional drones, these systems have the ability to navigate on their own, and some can select targets. Although a human controller can still decide whether or not to strike, such weapons are acquiring ever more autonomous capabilities. Now that militaries and militaries worldwide have taken note, these technologies are poised to spread widely. The world today stands at the very moment before much more advanced versions of these technologies become ubiquitous. So far, at least Israel, Russia, South Korea, and Turkey have reportedly deployed weapons with autonomous capabilities—though whether this mode was active is disputed—and Australia, Britain, China, and the United States are investing heavily in developing LAWS with an ever-expanding range of sizes and capabilities. Already, some LAWS can loiter in an area to find targets that machine-learning algorithms have trained them to recognize, including enemy radar systems, tanks, ships, and even specific individuals. These weapons can look vastly different: For instance, the Turkish Kargu-2 drone, which was introduced in 2020 and used in Libya's war, is 2 feet long, weighs around 15 pounds, and can swarm in groups. Autonomous systems can also be much larger, such as unmanned AI-driven fighter jets like the modified L-39 Albatros, and much smaller, such as rudimentary commercial drones repurposed with autonomous software. Once these technologies have spread widely, they will be difficult to control. The world thus urgently needs a new approach to LAWS. So far, the international community has done nothing more than agree that the issue needs to be discussed. But what it really needs to do is take a page from the nuclear playbook and establish a nonproliferation regime for LAWS.

Thus the plan: The United States federal government should substantially increase its security cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the area of artificial intelligence by restricting development and use of Lethal Autonomous Weapons.

1AC Russia Advantage

1. Russia and NATO are on the brink of escalation now because of the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Hooker 2022 ("Climbing the ladder: How the West can manage escalation in Ukraine and beyond," By Richard D. Hooker, Jr., nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council, following previous service as university professor, distinguished research fellow, April 21, 2022, [Climbing the ladder: How the West can manage escalation in Ukraine and beyond - Atlantic Council](#), VY)

Moscow's invasion of Ukraine is transforming Europe's security architecture, as well as NATO's strategic priorities and its defense and deterrence posture. Russia's ruthless aggression and NATO's response increase the possibility of purposeful or inadvertent escalation in Europe. Whether this takes the form of heightened conflict in Ukraine, increased tension across the whole or parts of NATO's eastern flank—from Ukraine and the Black Sea to the Baltic Region and the High North—or in non-kinetic, subthreshold domains, **understanding how these dynamics might degrade transatlantic stability is critical.** This study will seek to identify key rungs on the escalation ladder around the war in Ukraine; assess how the current crisis might escalate inside Ukraine and across NATO's eastern flank; explore how the US and NATO posture can prevent or limit escalation; and offer recommendations for how the United States and NATO can adapt their strategy, posture, and activities to manage escalatory dynamics. In response to the invasion of Ukraine, the West has imposed stinging sanctions, disrupting the Russian economy and forcing the Kremlin to burn through its financial reserves. Major Russian banks have been disconnected from SWIFT, the international system that facilitates financial transactions, while some oligarchs have been sanctioned. Many allies and partners have provided massive financial and material aid—in the form of funding, as well as anti-tank and air-defense systems and other military equipment—to bolster Ukrainian resistance. This assistance has helped to stiffen an already stout Ukrainian defense, which has inflicted heavy losses on the Russian military. Vladimir Putin now faces the real possibility of a stalled offensive, or even outright defeat. **In this circumstance, Russia still has cards to play.** Failure in Ukraine places Putin's political survival at risk and he is, therefore, unlikely to withdraw. **His present difficulties are more likely to provoke escalation within or around Ukraine, both in the military realm and in other domains. As he climbs the escalation ladder, Putin's risk tolerance will increase, as his key subordinates will surely realize.** The ultimate risks, however, are removal from office, imprisonment, or even execution. Accordingly, Putin is far more likely to press harder in Ukraine than to

acquiesce to a negotiated settlement that leaves him without tangible gains. The following discussion of Russian escalatory options is linked to the progress of the campaign in Ukraine and presents alternate scenarios based on Russian progress or failure and the degree to which the West provides critical support and/or direct intervention. Escalatory steps are described in ascending order of severity and risk. Response options to control or mitigate Russian escalation follow. **It is important to note that Russian, Ukrainian, and Western perspectives or “lenses” on what is escalatory may differ significantly in both time and space.** This factor must be borne in mind when assessing adversary actions.

2. The Russia-Ukraine conflict is the test-case for military AI on the battlefield. Sanctions against Russia will limit their access to military AI which makes now a key time.

Sharma 2022 (“NATO’s AI Push And Military Implications – Analysis,” Dr. Sanur Sharma, Associate Fellow at Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA), May 30, 2022, [NATO’s AI Push And Military Implications – Analysis – Eurasia Review](#), VY)

The Russia-Ukraine conflict has become a test case for AI adoption in modern warfare. The US is using the conflict as a test-bed for many of its AI projects with the Pentagon’s ‘Maven’ project having contributed to the detection and classification of objects of interest from various drone footage through AI and Machine Learning (ML) algorithms. **It has been reported that the Pentagon has been using AI and ML tools to collect a vast amount of data on the Russia-Ukraine war and analyze it to learn and generate battlefield intelligence about the Russian command and control strategies.**¹⁵ The advanced AI-enabled systems with the US Department of Defense (DoD) are said to have been used for overseeing the battlefield and collecting and archiving signals intelligence. It was stated at the Defense One’s Genius AI Summit in April 2022 that all this information will be fed into systems for training of machine learning algorithms to support future decision-making processes.¹⁶ **It is believed that the US and NATO allies have already built such AI-enabled cyber weapons and defences,** information about which is said to be highly classified.¹⁷ The US DoD and its allies have taken advantage of these advanced tools to gather critical information from the publically available image data to thwart Russian attacks in Ukraine. This war data will also help NATO allies anticipate adversary attacks, their behaviour, and the use of advanced technologies in the real world by countries like China and Russia. This intelligence will also augment multifactor analysis and modelling changes dynamically by integrating different technological platforms. **Due to the sanctions imposed on Russia as a result of the Russia-Ukraine war, its AI development is expected to slow down. The ongoing conflict highlights the constraints around the use of AI.** Despite AI-enabled cyber-attacks and misinformation campaign by Russia, Ukraine has mounted effective counter-cyber operations.¹⁸ Russia’s limited use of AI in the conflict can be explained through the existing vulnerabilities in the AI systems that can be exploited in many ways. One hypothesis for Russia’s limited use of AI could be the trust in such systems where it is a matter of lives and military objectives at stake.¹⁹ The vulnerabilities in the AI systems can include data poisoning and input attacks, attacking the supply pipelines by simply crafting data and feeding it to public resources, white-box and black-box attacks.²⁰ There is always a chance of orchestrated and conflicting data in the face of AI models to derail them and to exploit the vulnerabilities in the algorithms, and active manipulation by the adversaries can be induced. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) has launched a Guaranteeing AI Robustness against Deception (GARD) programme. Under this programme, development efforts are being made to establish a theoretical foundation for defensible ML and the creation and testing of such systems.²¹ The Army Research Laboratory (ARL) is working with the Internet of Battlefield Things Collaborative Research Alliance (IoBT-CRA) to explore the use of ML and intelligent technology on the battlefield and strengthen the collaboration between autonomous actors and human soldiers in combat. They are also working on methods to understand the challenges of **AI-enabled systems employed on the battlefield and to make them less susceptible to attacks.**²² **AI technology in modern warfare will be an intractable weapon in future conflicts beyond Ukraine. Countries trying to achieve a technological edge over others have started considerable investments in AI technology to strengthen their militaries. NATO**

has invested US\$ 1 billion to develop new AI defence technologies. The US DoD has also planned to invest US\$ 874 million in AI-related technologies as a part of their army research and development budget (federal fiscal year 2022 DoD budget).²³ The UK DoD is funding suppliers to work with Defence Science & Technology Lab (Dstl) on AI projects which were £7million for the year 2021/22 and is supposed to increase to £29 million in the next year.²⁴

3. US autonomous weapon systems directly increase the risk of conflict escalation with Russia. This undermines crisis stability and fuels escalation.

Laird 2020 (“The Risks of Autonomous Weapons Systems for Crisis Stability and Conflict Escalation in Future U.S.-Russia Confrontations,” Burgess Laird, senior international defense researcher at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation. He is a contributing author of *Deterrence in the Age of Thinking Machines*, June 3, 2020, [The Risks of Autonomous Weapons Systems for Crisis Stability and Conflict Escalation in Future U.S.-Russia Confrontations](#) | RAND, VY, *2 page card*)

Implications for Crisis Stability and Conflict Escalation in U.S.-Russia Confrontations. While holding out the promise of significant operational advantages, **AWS simultaneously could increase the potential for undermining crisis stability and fueling conflict escalation in contests between the United States and Russia.** Defined as “the degree to which mutual deterrence between dangerous adversaries can hold in a confrontation,” as my RAND colleague Forrest Morgan explains, crisis stability and the ways to achieve it are not about warfighting, but about “building and posturing forces in ways that allow a state, if confronted, to avoid war without backing down” on important political or military interests. Thus, **the military capabilities developed by nuclear-armed states like the United States and Russia and how they posture them are key determinants of whether crises between them will remain stable or devolve into conventional armed conflict, as well as the extent to which such conflict might escalate** in intensity and scope, including **to the level of nuclear use. AWS could foster crisis instability and conflict escalation in contests between the United States and Russia in a number of ways:** in this short essay I will highlight only four. **First, a state facing an adversary with AWS capable of making decisions at machine speeds is likely to fear the threat of sudden and potent attack,** a threat that would compress the amount of time for strategic decisionmaking. **The posturing of AWS during a crisis would likely create fears that one's forces could suffer significant, if not decisive, strikes. These fears in turn could translate into pressures to strike first—to preempt—for fear of having to strike second from a greatly weakened position.** Similarly, within conflict, **the fear of losing at machine speeds would be likely to cause a state to escalate the intensity of the conflict possibly even to the level of nuclear use. Second, as the speed of military action in a conflict involving the use of AWS as well as hypersonic weapons and other advanced military capabilities begins to surpass the speed of political decisionmaking,** leaders could lose the ability to manage the crisis and with it the ability to control escalation. With tactical and operational action taking place at speeds driven by machines, the time for exchanging signals and communications and for assessing diplomatic options and offramps will be significantly foreclosed. However, the advantages of operating inside the OODA loop of a state adversary like Iraq or Serbia is one thing, while operating inside the OODA loop of a nuclear-armed adversary is another.

As the renowned scholar Alexander George emphasized (PDF), especially in contests between nuclear armed competitors, there is a fundamental tension between the operational effectiveness sought by military commanders and the requirements for political leaders to retain control of events before major escalation takes place. **Third, and perhaps of greatest concern to policymakers should be the likelihood that, from the vantage point of Russia's leaders, in U.S. hands the operational advantages of AWS are likely to be understood as an increased U.S. capability** for what Georgetown professor Caitlin Talmadge refers to as “conventional counterforce” operations. In brief, **in crises and conflicts, Moscow is likely to see the United States as confronting it with an array of advanced conventional capabilities** backstopped by an interconnected shield of theater and homeland missile defenses. Russia will perceive such capabilities as posing both a conventional war-winning threat and a conventional counterforce threat (PDF) poised to degrade the use of its strategic nuclear forces. **The likelihood that Russia will see them this way is reinforced by the**

fact that it currently sees U.S. conventional precision capabilities precisely in this manner. As a qualitatively new capability that promises new operational advantages, **the addition of AWS to U.S. conventional capabilities could further cement Moscow's view and in doing so increase the potential for crisis instability and escalation in confrontations with U.S. forces.** In other words, **the fielding of U.S. AWS could augment what Moscow already sees as a formidable U.S. ability to threaten a range of important targets including its command and control networks, air defenses, and early warning radars, all of which are unquestionably critical components of Russian conventional forces.** In many cases, however, they also serve as critical components of Russia's nuclear force operations. As Talmadge argues, attacks on such targets, even if intended solely to weaken Russian conventional capabilities, will likely raise Russian fears that the U.S. conventional campaign is in fact a counterforce campaign aimed at neutering Russia's nuclear capabilities. Take for example, a hypothetical scenario set in the Baltics in the 2030 timeframe which finds NATO forces employing swarming AWS to suppress Russian air defense networks and key command and control nodes in Kaliningrad as part of a larger strategy of expelling a Russian invasion force. What to NATO is a logical part of a conventional campaign could well appear to Moscow as initial moves of a larger plan designed to degrade the integrated air defense and command and control networks upon which Russia's strategic nuclear arsenal relies. In turn, such fears could feed pressures for Moscow to escalate to nuclear use while it still has the ability to do so. Finally, **even if the employment of AWS does not drive an increase in the speed and momentum of action that forecloses the time for exchanging signals, a future conflict in which AWS are ubiquitous will likely prove to be a poor venue both for signaling and interpreting signals.**

In such a conflict, instead of interpreting a downward modulation in an adversary's operations as a possible signal of restraint or perhaps as signaling a willingness to pause in an effort to open up space for diplomatic negotiations, AWS programmed to exploit every tactical opportunity might read the modulation as an opportunity to escalate offensive operations and thus gain tactical advantage. Such **AWS could also misunderstand adversary attempts to signal resolve solely as adversary preparations for imminent attack.** Of course, correctly interpreting signals sent in crisis and conflict is vexing enough when humans are making all the decisions, but in future confrontations in which decisionmaking has willingly or unwillingly been ceded to machines, the problem is likely only to be magnified. Concluding Thoughts Much attention has been paid to the operational advantages to be gained from the development of AWS. By contrast, **much less attention has been paid to the risks AWS potentially raise.** There are times in which the fundamental tensions between the search for military effectiveness and the requirements of ensuring that crises between major nuclear weapons states remain stable and escalation does not ensue are pronounced and too consequential to ignore. The development of AWS may well be increasing the likelihood that one day the United States and Russia could find themselves in just such a time. **Now, while AWS are still in their early development stages, it is worth the time of policymakers to carefully consider whether the putative operational advantages from AWS are worth the potential risks of instability and escalation they may raise.**

4. Escalation in Ukraine leads to nuclear war between NATO and Russia. Russia's nuclear weapons are already on high-alert and would lead to escalation by NATO countries.

Hill 2022 (“Is Russia increasingly likely to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine?,” Alexander Hill, Professor of Military History, University of Calgary, May 9, 2022, <https://theconversation.com/is-russia-increasingly-likely-to-use-nuclear-weapons-in-ukraine-182368>, VY)

At the beginning of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Vladimir Putin reminded the West that Russia had nuclear weapons by putting them on “special combat readiness.” Putin’s actions suggested that Russia was considering their use, even though actually launching them was a remote possibility. In precisely what circumstances Russia might use nuclear weapons was left vague — Putin’s intent was presumably to frighten NATO and discourage its intervention on behalf of Ukraine. Since then, much has changed — and not for the better in terms of the risk of nuclear war. Although NATO hasn’t sent troops to fight in Ukraine, the West has implemented increasingly tough economic sanctions against Russia and provided Ukraine with military equipment like tanks. **NATO is now involved in what is, in essence, a full-fledged proxy war against Russia**. Not only have NATO nations — particularly the United States — provided Ukraine with an array of different weapons, but they are clearly helping Ukraine with other elements of its war effort, including intelligence — some of which has been used to target Russian generals. Ukraine emboldened From the failure to take Kyiv to the plodding pace of Soviet gains in the Donbas region in eastern Ukraine, the war has not gone according to plan. Russia has taken heavy losses due to the intense Ukrainian resistance. Russian troops will likely dig in and seek to consolidate their gains in the east. Reasserting independence from Ukraine for the separatist regions — backed up by troops on the ground — could be presented by Putin as a Russian win. He could then declare his “special military operation” over. Ukraine could subsequently reach some sort of peace agreement with Russia involving loss of territory — one that probably wouldn’t be much different from the sort of agreement that could be negotiated today. Currently there is no sign of Ukrainian inclination to negotiate over the Donbas region. Nor is Ukraine willing to formally give up Crimea, seized by Russia in 2014 after the pro-western and anti-Russian Euromaidan revolution in Ukraine. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has made clear his war aim is to liberate all Ukrainian territory in Russian hands, including Crimea. His NATO backers — most vocally the U.S., the U.K. and Canada — are willing to provide Ukraine with the means to do so. These countries hope to see Russia come out of this war significantly weakened as a regional power. The Russian nuclear threat While committing NATO forces directly to Ukraine is unlikely, some hawkish western commentators have suggested NATO could do so without Russia retaliating with nuclear weapons.

Even though Russia raised the spectre of nuclear weapons at the beginning of the war, as it progressed, Russian sources suggested that nuclear weapons would only be used in the event of an existential threat to Russia. Recent Russian nuclear sabre-rattling — such as the testing and deployment of more advanced missiles or Russian TV segments showing the impact of a nuclear attack on the U.K. — is undoubtedly cause for concern, but it doesn’t make the use of nuclear weapons significantly more likely in the short term. What would? If the war was to turn in Ukraine’s favour and Ukrainian forces started not only to recapture swaths of territory in the east, but to threaten the separatist regions — or Crimea. **Some western observers have suggested that Russia might employ an “escalate to de-escalate” strategy in such circumstances, using tactical nuclear weapons.** Launching them in territory likely to be held by the enemy, instead of where Russia hopes to retain control, makes a lot more sense. **If the war escalates to the point where a western-backed**

Ukraine threatens territory Putin considers to be Russian, then the chances of nuclear weapons being employed would increase dramatically. The problem of Crimea Zelenskyy has suggested that Ukraine will not stop fighting until Crimea is in Ukrainian hands. But for Putin and many Russians, Crimea is Russian. Crimea's incorporation into Ukraine in 1954 is often seen as a historical accident, rather than an expression of Crimea being ethnically Ukrainian. Crimea's Tatar population was largely displaced by ethnic Russians — not Ukrainians — and it has a long history as Russian. From Leo Tolstoy's Sevastopol Sketches, for example, to Vasily Aksyonov's 1970s novel The Island of Crimea, Crimea is widely represented in Russian literature.

A credible western-backed threat to Crimea would undoubtedly constitute the sort of existential threat to Russian territory that would dramatically increase the risk of nuclear weapons being used. A distant but increased nuclear threat **Putin's frustration over Ukrainian resilience and western support is clearly increasing — recent nuclear posturing is evidence of that. The nuclear threat has been increasing** since February, even if the use of nuclear weapons probably isn't imminent. **Even the use of low-yield tactical nuclear weapons by Russia would likely provoke some sort of western response. Such a response would then increase the likelihood of further escalation. Informed estimates suggest Russia has more than 1,900 non-strategic or tactical nuclear weapons. The threshold for their use is lower than for larger nuclear weapons. The sort of scenarios that might lead to the use of nuclear weapons are outside the immediate confines Putin's war in Ukraine.** It would require a significant deterioration in Russian fortunes — and greater western involvement in the conflict. Nonetheless, **not since the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 or nuclear tensions in the early 1980s has the spectre of potential nuclear war loomed so large in the future.** Back in 1962, politicians on all sides ultimately showed their statesman-like qualities and stepped back from their threat to employ nuclear weapons. We can only hope that their successors will do the same over Ukraine.

1AC Proliferation Advantage

1. China is starting to export autonomous weapons now.

Kania 2020 (““Ai Weapons” In Chinese Military Innovation,” Elsa B. Kania, Elsa B. Kania is an Adjunct Senior Fellow with the Technology and National Security Program at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) and a Research Fellow with the Center for Security and Emerging Technology at Georgetown University. April 2020, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/FP_20200427_ai_weapons_kania.pdf, VY)

The proliferation of AI-enabled and/or autonomous weapons systems presents a range of risks to global security. China could export this technology to potential adversaries or militaries with poor human rights records, undermining U.S. values and interests. Occasionally, Chinese armed drones have experienced problems in their performance, including crashing in some cases¹¹⁴ However, exports may facilitate data and metrics gathering for performance improvements.¹¹⁵ Moreover, **the availability of these technologies to nonstate actors could empower terrorist organizations.**¹¹⁶ **The Islamic State group has already used Chinese drones – manufactured by DJI – for surveillance and as improvised explosive devices.**¹¹⁷ Beyond stalwarts in the arms industry, **a growing number of new enterprises are entering the field, advertising and exporting weapons systems said to possess some level of autonomy. To date, over 90% of armed drone sales have been by Chinese companies.**¹¹⁸ To the extent this trend continues, **China will also drive the diffusion of AI-enabled and autonomous weapons systems.**

2. Unregulated autonomous weapons would proliferate and destabilize global politics.

Dawes 2021 ("Autonomous robots could be more destabilizing than nukes," By James Dawes, October 13, 2021, [Autonomous robots could be more destabilizing than nukes | Salon.com](#), VY)

The proliferation problems **The next two dangers are the problems of low-end and high-end proliferation.** Let's start with the low end. **The militaries developing autonomous weapons now are proceeding on the assumption that they will be able to contain and control the use of autonomous weapons.** But if the history of weapons technology has taught the world anything, it's this: **Weapons spread. Market pressures could result in the creation and widespread sale** of what can be thought of as the autonomous weapon equivalent of the Kalashnikov assault rifle: **killer robots that are cheap, effective and almost impossible to contain as they circulate around the globe.** "Kalashnikov" **autonomous weapons could get into the hands of people outside of government control, including international and domestic terrorists. High-end proliferation is just as bad, however. Nations could compete to develop increasingly devastating versions of autonomous weapons, including ones capable of mounting chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear arms. The moral dangers of escalating weapon lethality would be amplified by escalating weapon use.** High-end autonomous weapons are likely to lead to more frequent wars because they will decrease two of the primary forces that have historically prevented and shortened wars: concern for civilians abroad and concern for one's own soldiers. The weapons are likely to be equipped with expensive ethical governors designed to minimize collateral damage, using what U.N. Special Rapporteur Agnes Callamard has called the "myth of a surgical strike" to quell moral protests. Autonomous weapons will also reduce both the need for and risk to one's own soldiers, dramatically altering the cost-benefit analysis that nations undergo while launching and maintaining wars. **Asymmetric wars – that is, wars waged on the soil of nations that lack competing technology – are likely to become more common. Think about the global instability caused by Soviet and U.S. military interventions during the Cold War, from the first proxy war to the blowback experienced around the world today. Multiply that by every country currently aiming for high-end autonomous weapons.**

3. Proliferation of autonomous weapons would be worse than the proliferation of nuclear weapons and lead to a terrible future of full-scale wars and genocide.

Walsh 2021 ("Lethal autonomous weapons and World War III: it's not too late to stop the rise of 'killer robots,'" Toby Walsh is a Laureate Fellow and Scientia Professor of Artificial Intelligence at the University of New South Wales in Sydney, Australia. He is a Fellow of the Australian Academy of Science and author of the recent book, "2062: The World that AI Made" that explores the impact AI will have on society, including the impact on war, August 11, 2021, [Lethal autonomous weapons and World War III: it's not too late to stop the rise of 'killer robots'](#), VY)

The threat comes this time from artificial intelligence, and in particular the development of lethal autonomous weapons: weapons that can identify, track and destroy targets without human intervention. The media often like to call them "killer robots". The key question for humanity today is whether to start a global AI arms race or to prevent it from starting. If any major military power pushes ahead with AI weapon development, a global arms race is virtually inevitable. The endpoint of such a technological trajectory is obvious: autonomous weapons will become the Kalashnikovs of tomorrow. **Strategically, autonomous weapons are a military dream. They let a military scale its operations unhindered by manpower constraints.** One programmer can command hundreds of autonomous weapons. An army can take on the riskiest of missions without endangering its own soldiers. Nightmare swarms **There are many reasons, however, why the military's dream of lethal autonomous weapons will turn into a nightmare.** First and foremost, there is a strong moral argument against killer robots. We give up an essential part of our humanity if we hand to a machine the decision of whether a person should live or die. **Beyond the moral arguments, there are many technical and legal reasons to be concerned about killer robots.** One of the strongest is that they will revolutionise warfare. Autonomous weapons will be weapons of immense destruction. Previously, if you wanted to do harm, you had to have an army of soldiers to wage war. You had to persuade this army to follow your orders. You had to train them, feed them and pay them. Now just one programmer could control hundreds of weapons. **In some ways lethal autonomous weapons are even more troubling than nuclear weapons.** To build a nuclear bomb requires considerable technical sophistication. You need the resources of a nation state, skilled physicists and engineers, and access to scarce raw materials such as uranium and plutonium. As a result, nuclear weapons have not proliferated greatly. **Autonomous weapons require none of this, and if produced they will likely become cheap and plentiful. They will be perfect weapons of terror. Can you imagine how terrifying it will be to be chased by a swarm of autonomous drones? Can you imagine such drones in the hands of terrorists and rogue states with no qualms about turning them on civilians? They will be an ideal weapon with which to suppress a civilian population. Unlike humans, they will not hesitate to commit atrocities, even genocide.** Time for a treaty **We stand at a crossroads on this issue.** It needs to be seen as morally unacceptable for machines to decide who lives and who dies. **And for the diplomats at the UN to negotiate a treaty limiting their use, just as we have treaties to limit chemical, biological and other weapons. In this way, we may be able to save ourselves and our children from this terrible future.**

4. Luckily, the affirmative is reverse casual. China has signaled willingness to cooperate with international norms around lethal autonomous weapon systems. This means the affirmative would solve the proliferation of LAWS.

Kania 2018 (“China’s Strategic Ambiguity and Shifting Approach to Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems,” By Elsa Kania, an adjunct senior fellow with the Technology and National Security Program at the Center for a New American Security, April 17, 2018, [China’s Strategic Ambiguity and Shifting Approach to Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems - Lawfare](#), VY)

On April 13, **China’s delegation to United Nations Group of Governmental Experts on lethal autonomous weapons systems announced the “desire to negotiate and conclude” a new protocol for the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons “to ban the use of fully autonomous lethal weapons systems.”**

According to the aptly named Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, the delegation “stressed that [the ban] is limited to use only.” The same day, the Chinese air force released details on an upcoming challenge intended to evaluate advances in fully autonomous swarms of drones, which will also explore new concepts for future intelligent-swarm combat. The juxtaposition of these announcements illustrates China’s apparent diplomatic commitment to limit the use of “fully autonomous lethal weapons systems” is unlikely to stop Beijing from building its own. Although momentum towards a ban on “killer robots” may seem promising—with a total of twenty-six countries now supporting such a measure—diplomacy and discussion about autonomous weapons may still struggle to keep up with technological advancement. Moreover, great-power militaries like the U.S. and U.K. believe a ban would be premature. Even as multiple militaries are developing or have already attained autonomous weapon systems, **the U.N. group has yet to reach a consensus on what even constitutes a lethal autonomous weapons system.** “fully autonomous” or otherwise. And despite emerging consensus on the importance of human control of these systems—however they might be defined—the U.S., Russia, Israel, France and the United Kingdom have explicitly rejected proposals for a ban. Countries recognize that artificial intelligence is a strategic technology that could be critical to future military power, so it is hardly surprising that major militaries may hesitate to constrain development, particularly at a time when rivals and potential adversaries are actively seeking an advantage.

Why might China, unlike the U.S. and Russia, have chosen to publicly support a ban? Clearly, the Chinese military is equally focused on the importance of artificial intelligence in national defense, anticipating the emergence of a new “Revolution in Military Affairs” that may transform the character of conflict. As my report “Battlefield Singularity: Artificial Intelligence, Military Revolution, and China’s Future Military Power” described, the Chinese military is actively pursuing a range of applications, from swarm intelligence to cognitive electronic warfare or AI-enabled support to command decision-making. While China’s engagement in the U.N. group should be welcomed, its objectives and underlying motivations merit further analysis. **China’s involvement is consistent with the country’s stated commitment under its 2017 artificial intelligence development plan, which calls for China to “strengthen the study of major international common problems” and “deepen international cooperation on AI laws and regulations.”** In historical perspective, China’s integration into international security institutions shows at least mixed success, as post-Mao China has proven **willing in some cases to undertake “self-constraining commitments to arms control and disarmament treaties.”** as Iain Johnston’s research has demonstrated. However, China’s recent engagement with cyber issues reflects a mixed record, including the aggressive advancement of “cyber sovereignty,” which reflects Beijing’s security priorities. In 2017, China’s reported rejection of the final report of the U.N. group on information security contributed to the collapse of that process. Meanwhile, Beijing’s repeated denouncements

of U.S. “cyber hegemonism” (sic)—and calls for cooperation and a “community of shared future” in cyberspace—have not constrained its own development of offensive cyber capabilities through the military’s new “Strategic Support Force.” Will China seek to leverage this latest Group of Governmental Experts process to condemn U.S. efforts without restraining its own development of new capabilities? China’s two position papers for the group indicate an interesting evolution in its diplomatic posture on autonomous weapon systems, which remains characterized by a degree of strategic ambiguity and apparent preference for optionality. The first paper, from the December 2016 session, declared, **“China supports the development of a legally binding protocol on issues related to the use of LAWS, similar to the Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons, to fill the legal gap.”**

1AC Solvency

1. NATO has the ability to restrict LAWs and is the best actor. In the long-run it is necessary for NATO missions and stability.

Sharma 2022 ("NATO's AI Push And Military Implications – Analysis," Dr. Sanur Sharma, Associate Fellow at Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA), May 30, 2022, [NATO's AI Push And Military Implications – Analysis – Eurasia Review](#), VY)

NATO's AI Adoption: Challenges and Limitations **The influence of AI on NATO comes with a set of opportunities, challenges and risks. Its adoption process has been incremental and prescriptive. The rising geopolitical conflicts and the use of AI in such conflicts have required the establishment of a dynamic ecosystem to support interoperability.** The military adoption of AI requires an innovation ecosystem that is self-sufficient, supports deterrence and resilience, and encompasses the strategic innovation process. **NATO's AI strategy raises many concerns related to the AI-driven autonomous weapon systems, as it does not adequately address the development of such systems, its deployment and governance.** The AI strategy mostly talks about the ethical and responsible use of AI and has omitted the challenges related to the use of lethal autonomous weapon systems. For the US, its priorities lie in ensuring responsible use of AI-enabled systems with their allies for operational and data sharing. It remains to be seen if all the 30 NATO states agree on the same rules and would be willing to agree on practical guidelines for the operational use of AI-enabled systems. **Another challenge for NATO is to standardise rules for all member states in dealing with AI-enabled autonomous weapon systems.**

Countries like Turkey are working on autonomous weapons and have developed AI-enabled loitering munitions. Turkey has requested the US for upgraded F-16 fighter jets that are said to be AI-enabled.²⁵ The Biden Administration has asked the Congress to approve the upgrade of Turkey's F-16 fighter jet fleet.²⁶ Turkey's armed drones have also been used in the Ukraine conflict. For smooth functioning of such systems, **it will be necessary for all NATO members to have standardised rules when it comes to deployment of such systems.** Also, there is no transparent allocation of roles for different NATO bodies, and "no dedicated line of funding" for its AI strategy.²⁷ The finances are shared through multiple funding like NATO Innovation Fund and DIANA which manages funding for various other projects leading to uncertainty over availability of funds and budget cuts. This will be a significant challenge for the effective implementation of the AI strategy.²⁸ Some other challenges with the adoption of AI strategy through innovation include fragmented national innovation initiatives, allied technological categorisation and digitisation gaps, speed of adoption and spending levels and the underuse of NATO's mechanisms to undertake collaborative defence innovation.²⁹ NATO will also have to focus on the vulnerabilities and intrusion issues with the AI-enabled systems and will need to set up dedicated centres for AI development and testing in order to maintain a test-safety regime for systems-of-systems employed using AI.

The challenges related to AI use in wars and geopolitical conflicts need to be addressed to generate confidence in the use of such systems. Additionally, testing mechanisms and accuracy standards need to be implemented for system components. Policymakers need to address the operational risks and ethical considerations of employing AI in military systems. Conclusion In future, AI will act as an enabler to out-adapt competitors and adversaries. **The current AI strategy of NATO needs to address the vulnerabilities in AI systems and related measures for effectively using autonomous weapon systems and military governance of AI.** The NATO accelerator has been devised to address, prioritise, and promote interoperability in transatlantic cooperation to drive the strategic innovation process. The key drivers for Innovation in AI and other EDTs will be the establishment of the NATO-Civil-Military Technology capability that will include various actors from the military, civil, state and private sectors as a part of the EDT innovation ecosystem. Another critical factor is the broadening of the NATO–EU cooperation through a joint taskforce on defence innovation and EDTs to regularise and provide strategic capabilities on ethical and adoption challenges of EDTs like AI and ML. Furthermore, NATO needs to protect the use of AI from manipulation and disruption and align it with its stated principle of “Responsible use of AI”. NATO needs to work on AI adoption challenges centred on innovation and arms control. It can look towards bringing in guiding principles on use of AI-driven lethal autonomous weapon systems. **It is expected that in the next 2–3 years, AI’s use will be confined to the field of military logistics, reconnaissance, mission planning and support, predictive maintenance of a military facility, data fusion and analysis, cyber defence and optimisation of processes. In the long run, NATO could employ AI for more complex military applications as it generates greater political support for offensive AI military projects.**

2. An international standard for responsible use solves best. A ban would fail and national interests mean that the standards must be from an international organization.

Hiebert 2022 ("Are Lethal Autonomous Weapons Inevitable? It Appears So," Kyle Hiebert, a researcher and analyst formerly based in Cape Town and Johannesburg, South Africa, as deputy editor of the Africa Conflict Monitor, January 27, 2022, [Are Lethal Autonomous Weapons Inevitable? It Appears So - Centre for International Governance Innovation](#), VY)

Finding the Middle Ground: Responsible Use **Even in the event that a ban on killer robots could be reached and somehow enforced, the algorithms used by autonomous weapons systems to identify, select and surveil targets are already streamlining and enhancing the use of lethal force by human actors. Banning hardware without including the underlying software would arguably be a half measure at best.** But governments are badly struggling with how to regulate AI — and expanding the scope of the proposed ban would add enormous complexity to an already stalled process. **Instead, establishing acceptable norms around their use — what one US official has called a non-binding code of conduct — in advance of broad adoption may represent an alternative means to harness the potential positives of LAWS while avoiding the most-feared outcomes. These norms could be based primarily on a shared commitment to avoid so-called unintended consequences.** According to Robert Work, the former US defence official, LAWS should be totally excluded from systems that can independently launch pre-emptive or retaliatory attacks, especially those involving nuclear weapons. **A code of conduct could include an expectation as well to keep autonomous weapons technology out of the hands of non-state actors.** Numerous countries party to the CCW also believe that there are grounds to extend established international human rights law, such as the Geneva Convention, to cover autonomous weapons systems, by applying the law to the human authority that ordered their use. Some proponents of LAWS agree. These are imperfect solutions — but **they may prevent dystopian sci-fi fantasies from becoming reality.** One way or another, killer robots are coming.

2AC Russia Advantage Extensions

1. The Ukraine crisis puts NATO and Russia at the brink of war.

Wright 2022 (“The Growing Fear of a Wider War Between Russia and the West,” By Robin Wright, a contributing writer and columnist, has written for The New Yorker since 1988. She is the author of “Rock the Casbah: Rage and Rebellion Across the Islamic World. March 10, 2022, [The Growing Fear of a Wider War Between Russia and the West | The New Yorker](#), VY)

The U.S., however, pushed back this week on key military requests from Ukraine, for fear of Russia’s reaction. Putin’s reckless offensive has forced the U.S. to adopt awkward policy positions. On March 5th, Zelensky made an impassioned appeal to members of the House and Senate for more military aid, notably help in obtaining Soviet-era warplanes that Ukrainian pilots are trained to fly and that could balance Russia’s air superiority. On Wednesday, the Pentagon rejected an offer from Poland to turn over twenty-eight MIG-29 fighter jets to U.S. custody—flying them to a base in Germany—for transfer to Ukraine. **U.S. intelligence officials assessed that an American role in a transfer “may be mistaken as escalatory and could result in significant Russian reaction that might increase the prospects of a military escalation with nato.”** the Pentagon spokesman, John Kirby, told reporters. U.S. involvement was deemed to be “high risk.” The majority of Ukraine’s warplanes are still intact, a senior Defense Department official added, while acknowledging that Russia’s surface-to-air missiles now have an “umbrella” that covers virtually all of Ukraine. **The Administration cited the same fears about Zelensky’s request for help from nato** in establishing a no-fly zone over part of Ukraine to protect civilians. “We also have to see to it that this war does not expand,” Blinken said on Wednesday, at a joint press conference with his British counterpart. “Our goal is to end the war, not to expand it, including potentially expand it to nato territory.” Otherwise, he warned, “it’s going to turn even deadlier, involve more people, and I think potentially even make things harder to resolve in Ukraine itself.” On Thursday, Avril Haines, the director of National Intelligence, acknowledged that the U.S. is now in a uniquely challenging position. “We are obviously providing enormous amounts of support to the Ukrainians, as we should and need to do,” she told the Senate Intelligence Committee. **“But at the same time trying not to escalate the conflict into a full-on nato or U.S. war with Russia.** And that’s a challenging space to manage.” Yet, at each of his four stops in nato countries near Russia, Blinken heard dire predictions about the broader Russian threat beyond Ukraine—and the need for the U.S. to do more. In Riga, on Monday, the Latvian Foreign Minister, Edgars Rinkēvičs, lamented to Blinken, “We have no illusions about Putin’s Russia anymore.” In Vilnius, the Lithuanian President, Gitanas Nausėda, turned to Blinken and said, “Deterrence is no longer enough. We need more defense here, because otherwise it will be too late here, Mr. Secretary. Putin will not stop in Ukraine; he will not stop.” And in Tallinn, on Tuesday, the Estonian Prime Minister, Kaja Kallas, said that nato countries “need to adapt to the new reality” of a “very aggressive Russia” and permanently strengthen their defenses in the air, on land, and at sea. Pressed on what specifically countries on Russia’s borders needed, she replied, “Everything.” Eastern European countries—notably those once allied with, or part of, the former Soviet Union’s empire—have long warned of the potential for Russian aggression. “We, the Poles, are already tired of reminding everyone: ‘We told ya so,’ ” Marek Magierowski, Poland’s Ambassador to the U.S., told me in an interview this week. He cited the forewarning by the late Polish President Lech Kaczyński during the Russian invasion of Georgia, in 2008. “Today Georgia, tomorrow Ukraine, the day after tomorrow—the Baltic states and

later, perhaps, time will come for my country, Poland,” Kaczynski had said. Magierowski added, “We have never had any doubts whatsoever about Vladimir Putin’s neo-imperial ambitions.” Putin has been waiting for this “window of opportunity” for years, he said. “He convinced himself that the West is weak, divided, wallowing in a decadent mood. He thought the free world wouldn’t care about Ukraine’s fate, as it didn’t care about Czechoslovakia’s in 1938,” when Europe tolerated Nazi Germany’s annexation of the Sudetenland. Putin, he told me, is similarly “emboldened” because the West was “tragically lenient” and “outrageously complacent” after Russia murdered the defector Alexander Litvinenko, in 2006; invaded and annexed Crimea, in 2014; helped destroy the Syrian city of Aleppo, in 2016; reportedly used chemical weapons to poison the former spy Sergei Skripal and his daughter, in 2018; and poisoned the opposition leader Alexey Navalny, in 2020. Over the past three decades, Eastern Europeans have often encountered skepticism of their view of Putin as the U.S. and Western Europeans, notably the former German Chancellor Angela Merkel, advocated dealing pragmatically with Russia. During his European trip, Blinken repeatedly promised that nato, this time, would prevent further Russian expansion. “We will defend every inch of nato territory with the full force of our collective power,” he vowed, in Estonia. But U.S. experts worry, too, about an unintended incident triggering a wider war, like the spark that ignited the First World War, a conflict that dragged on for four years and killed tens of millions. **Russia’s invasion of Ukraine “could easily escalate into a larger conflict stretching from the Baltic to the Black Sea and further west into Europe.”** Thomas E. Graham, a fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, warned in a new report issued on Tuesday. It might not matter what the U.S. does, he wrote. Crippling sanctions “could provoke Putin to lash out with greater violence,” Graham cautioned. But, if nato appeared restrained, Moscow could be “tempted to press militarily even further into Europe” to enlarge its sphere of influence. The rippling impact of broader Russian aggression would stress “the geopolitical, economic, and institutional foundations” of the international order created after the Second World War, Graham wrote. Given the Russian leader’s history, Angela Stent, a former National Intelligence officer and the author of “Putin’s World: Russia Against the West and with the Rest,” is worried about a miscalculation. **“The concern we have to have immediately is that the war in Ukraine doesn’t inadvertently spread to Poland or Romania by some unforeseen clash, which would then have to involve nato in a war with Russia.”** she told me. Stent also worries about Putin’s intentions short of war. “You can use nonmilitary means to disrupt societies. And he’s already been doing that for the past couple of decades.” As the Russian leader grows increasingly cornered, she added, he will seek to exploit popular sentiment in countries like Serbia, where a pro-Russia march to support the war was held last week. The new U.S. intelligence assessment warns that Russia will employ “an array of tools” to undermine the interests of the U.S. and its nato allies. “We expect Moscow to insert itself into crises” whenever it sees an opportunity, it concludes.

2. The conflict in Ukraine is a key testing ground for the regulation of AI in military systems. Addressing this will help reduce the risk of escalation.

Marijan 2022 ("Beyond Ukraine: AI and the Next US-Russia Confrontation," Branka Marijan, a senior researcher at Project Ploughshares, where she leads research on the military and security implication of emerging technologies, February 14, 2022, [Beyond Ukraine: AI and the Next US-Russia Confrontation – Centre for International Governance Innovation](#), VY)

Two titans from the Cold War era seem set to go another round, this time over the prospect of **Ukraine's** membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which the United States calls a sovereign Ukrainian decision and Russia opposes vehemently. Whatever the outcome of the current standoff, **another confrontation between the United States and Russia that merits closer attention is brewing – one that may fundamentally reshape the US-Russia security relationship in the not-so-distant future. Both states are heavily committed to the use of artificial intelligence (AI) in military systems and operations,** including logistics, command and control, and intelligence collection and analysis, **as well as to the development of more autonomous weapons. As tensions rise, these countries are likely to employ capabilities that are enhanced by AI** and machine learning in cyberattacks and misinformation and disinformation campaigns. **Rising political temperatures might well encourage fast-tracking of more autonomous military systems as each side seeks to gain the advantage. The United States and Russia have already tested several autonomous systems.** Russia has made important advances on autonomous tanks, while the United States has demonstrated a number of capabilities, including swarming munitions, which have the ability to destroy a surface vessel using a swarm of drones. At the moment, the United States is at the forefront of the development of autonomous systems and military AI applications. However, Russia has approached China to partner with it in building its AI readiness, and such a partnership could be a game changer. **One crucial concern is that the growing autonomy and use of AI in decision making in existing weapons platforms and in cyberspace will result in the deployment of immature systems; the result could be accidents that help to escalate conflict.** At the same time, **both Russia and the United States have prevented progress on new international norms and agreements on the development and use of autonomous systems that could help to avoid dangerous situations.** The United States and its allies are developing norms on responsible military uses of AI, but little dialogue with potential adversaries has taken place. And so, **the competition between the great powers is allowed to grow unchecked.**

3. Unregulated AI-controlled weapons lead to escalation, specifically in the context of Russia feeling threatened by other countries.

Rybarczyk 2021 ("Russia's Weapons of the Future: How AI Could Escalate Global Conflicts," Katarzyna Rybarczyk, a Political Correspondent for Immigration News, June 10, 2021, [Russia's Weapons of the Future: How AI Could Escalate Global Conflicts - The Geopolitics](#), VY)

The main threat of the Russian military placing a great effort on developing AI-controlled weapons is integrating AI into nuclear command. Such a scenario would increase the risk of conflicts between nations escalating to nuclear use. Are we facing a military AI arms race? **Russia is not the only country that has been putting more emphasis on developing AI-driven weapons.** In fact, it can be argued that the main reason for the escalation of Russia's efforts to manufacture them has been the need to keep up with the two frontrunners in the field, the US and China. China has a goal of becoming the global leader in AI research by 2030, and the US has been a proponent of using AI for military purposes for over 60 years. Both the US and China have been producing AI-powered weapons such as target recognition systems, AI-enhanced drones, and cyberattack programmes that do not require human intervention. **When one power increases investment in AI, others feel threatened and also endeavour to make their weapons more sophisticated. In turn, the never-ending cycle of trying to prove their superiority over others challenges global stability and risks escalating conflicts between nations.** The rapidly advancing AI arms race is evident. For years, the field was dominated by the US and China. Now, however, **Russia is realising Putin's ambition and is gradually becoming the most prominent developer of AI-dependent weapons. Using AI on the battlefield might come at a price** AI can be used to conduct complex military operations, including underwater ones, without putting soldiers' lives at risk. In theory, it can do a lot of good and prevent innocent lives from being lost. In practice, however, **it represents a new type of global threat.** 'Lethal autonomous weapons – machines with the power to kill on their own, without human judgment and accountability – are bringing us into unacceptable moral and political territory', said Antonio Guterres, UN Secretary-General. None of the countries wants to fall behind so the AI arms race is only intensifying and technologically advanced weapons that were once viewed as sci-fi are being invented. AI-controlled weapons have the potential to be extremely destructive. There are no humans involved in operating them, so armed conflicts can quickly reach epic proportions. Furthermore, when AI is responsible for making decisions on the battlefield, instances of lethal force being used unjustifiably are likely to happen. Concerns have been raised about the possibility of 'AI undermining human control and states manufacturing AI-controlled weapons lacking ethical self-restraints', Breaking Defense reported. Hence, it is imperative that the international community keeps an eye on Russia's grand AI-related ambitions and intervenes when the military AI race starts posing a tangible existential threat to humanity.

4. Increased NATO presence does not lead to more conflict in Ukraine. The Ukraine conflict is not about NATO presence.

Cornell 2022 ("No, the war in Ukraine is not about NATO," Svante Cornell, director of the American Foreign Policy Council's Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, 03/09/2022, [No, the war in Ukraine is not about NATO | The Hill](#), VY)

Russia's invasion of Ukraine has led to widespread condemnation and an unparalleled outpouring of support for Ukraine. At the same time, a motley crew, including some academics and former U.S. officials, has essentially blamed the war on the West, and in particular NATO enlargement. **The argument is basically that Russia would not have become so aggressive if Western powers had been more accommodating. This line of thinking, however, is simply incorrect.** That's because Russia rediscovered its imperial vocation before NATO enlargement, and **the war in Ukraine is, in fact, about Putin's great power ambitions.** Russian leaders have emphatically argued that NATO countries, led by the United States, violated assurances made to Moscow at the end of the Cold War that the alliance would not expand to the east. This claim, however, has been debunked as a myth. Even the last Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, has denied that the issue of NATO enlargement was even discussed at the time. Russian President Vladimir Putin himself did not have much to say about NATO enlargement until his infamous speech at the 2007 Munich Security Conference. NATO's enlargement began in the mid-1990s, at a time when the alliance was embarking on a strategic shift, focusing on out-of-area operations instead territorial defense. NATO urged new member states to focus on specific cutting-edge expertise, and programs for partner countries like Georgia were mostly about training for peacekeeping operations in places like Afghanistan. NATO's shift is perhaps best illustrated by the fact that the alliance lacked a workable plan to defend the Baltic states when Russia invaded Georgia in 2008. It is really only after that war, and in particular after Moscow's annexation of Crimea in 2014, that NATO returned to its original focus on collective defense. **The real reason for the deteriorating security situation in Europe – and most blatantly the Russian invasion of Ukraine – can be found in changes that have taken place within Russia itself, and most directly the increasingly imperialist worldview of the Russian leadership.** This change began as early as 1994 and accelerated after Putin came to power. The war in the Russian breakaway republic of Chechnya from 1994 to 1996 was in many ways the starting point. Russia's defeat there showed how far the country had fallen, leading many former Soviet republics to part ways with Russia. Moscow responded by systematically undermining neighboring states like Moldova, Georgia and Azerbaijan through the incitement of ethnic conflicts on their territories – a classic divide-and-rule tactic. It is largely forgotten today that Putin built his political career on regaining control of Chechnya, something he did by starting a bloody war on the basis of a lie. It is generally well established today that the explosions in apartment buildings in Moscow in the summer of 1999 that Putin blamed on Chechen rebels were in fact carried out by the Russian security service under Putin's own leadership – the purpose being to create popular support for Putin's war, and by extension his leadership. **Putin's view of the world, in turn, is closely linked to his own hold on power – and that explains Russia's increasingly aggressive actions.** The "color revolutions" in Georgia and Ukraine in 2003-4 had the potential to show that democratic change could happen in former Soviet countries, something that would undermine Putin's pursuit of authoritarian rule (what he called a "vertical of power"). Democratic rule in neighboring countries therefore had to fail. Ukraine, in particular, was central to Putin. If a kindred Slavic and Orthodox country like Ukraine developed into a functioning democracy, this could pull the rug out from under Putin's project. If Ukraine showed that something better was possible, why should Russians be content with living under an authoritarian and corrupt regime? For a time, Moscow tried other tactics. Pro-Russian politician Viktor Yanukovich managed to get elected as president of Ukraine in 2010, but his misrule led to the popular

uprising of 2013. That event, in turn, showed that the Ukrainian people saw Europe, rather than Russia, as their future. Putin responded by annexing Crimea and starting a war in eastern Ukraine. At home, Putin's rhetoric became increasingly nationalistic, and now focused on concepts such as the "Russian world" in order to foment a divide between Russia and an allegedly decadent West. **For this to succeed, however, Putin needs to bring Belarus and Ukraine into the "Russian world," by force if necessary. This, rather than NATO enlargement, is what the war in Ukraine is about.**

5. Escalation in Russia's invasion of Ukraine goes nuclear. The risk of nuclear war over Ukraine is the biggest risk since the Cold War.

Bender 2022 ("How the Ukraine war could go nuclear," Bryan Bender, senior national correspondent for POLITICO and adjunct professor at the Walter Cronkite School of Journalism at Arizona State University, 3/24/2022, [How the Ukraine war could go nuclear – POLITICO](#), VY, *2 page card*)

Not since the Cold War has the specter of nuclear war hung so heavily over a president's crisis diplomacy. As President Joe Biden meets with fellow NATO leaders, calls for a ceasefire in Ukraine are growing more urgent than ever — to alleviate the widespread human suffering but also to dial back what **veterans of nuclear planning consider an alarming potential for it to spiral into a clash of atomic superpowers. The nuclear brinkmanship from Russian President Vladimir Putin in recent weeks is unprecedented:** He ordered a snap nuclear war game before the invasion and days later put his nuclear forces on high alert. And **the Kremlin has repeatedly signaled it could resort to nuclear weapons — an option explicitly reserved in Russian military doctrine — if it determines the West's intervention in the conflict goes too far.** Again on Tuesday, in an interview with CNN, Putin's chief spokesperson refused to rule out the use of nuclear arms in the conflict. So far, Biden has sought to dial down the tensions. The Pentagon has not changed the alert status of U.S. nuclear forces and military leaders have publicly said they have not detected Russian actions suggesting they are preparing to use nuclear weapons. The Pentagon also took the unusual step early in the conflict of putting off a regularly scheduled test of an intercontinental ballistic missile to avoid fueling nuclear tensions. Yet as the conflict drags on, and Russia's conventional forces suffer surprisingly heavy losses while its economy reels, the prospect that Putin might resort to using weapons of mass destruction is increasing. Moscow has already demonstrated that it's willing to use hypersonic missiles for the first time in a war. With limited contact between the Kremlin and Western capitals, **the risk that Moscow's intentions could be misread with catastrophic consequences will only grow more acute,** according to numerous specialists. **"There has always been a chance of mistakes, but I think the chances are much higher."** said former Sen. Sam Nunn, the longtime chair of the Armed Services Committee and now co-chair of the nonprofit Nuclear Threat Initiative. **"I think we are in a different era in terms of blunders."** It is a high-wire act confronting Biden as he tries to stiffen the spines of NATO countries for what is expected to be a long struggle. Allies are helping Ukraine fend off its bigger aggressor — including sending more arms and U.S. troops to defend NATO's eastern borders — while not pushing Putin over the edge. **Russia invaded Ukraine as cooperation between Washington and Moscow on nuclear arms control has been unraveling in recent years.** The two countries have walked away from several treaties to control the deadliest weapons, including one that outlawed intermediate-range nuclear missiles that could threaten Europe. The only remaining nuclear pact between the two sides is the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, which limits deployed strategic weapons to 1,550 each. Biden and Putin agreed last year to extend it until 2026. But the treaty does not cover any of the thousands of smaller, or "battlefield," nuclear weapons in their respective arsenals, including at least 2,000 in Russian stockpiles, according to public estimates. Two Defense Department officials, who spoke on condition of anonymity, say they are vigilantly gathering intelligence on Russian military moves for any sign that it might be taking such weapons out of storage or preparing for deployment units trained in nuclear or chemical warfare. 'Raising the ante' Longtime observers of Russian nuclear policy have been startled at how reckless the Putin regime has been with its nuclear threats compared to leaders in Moscow during the Cold War. "The communist party of the Soviet Union was incredibly disciplined about this," said Rose Gottemoeller, a former undersecretary of state for arms control who has negotiated treaties with Russians and served as NATO deputy secretary general from

2016 to 2019. “There were only a few Soviet leaders who were allowed to speak about nuclear doctrine and strategy, and they did so in a very carefully scripted way. “We are in a more difficult crisis than anyone could have predicted with this constant nuclear saber-rattling that has been going on,” she added. “We have to take what [Putin’s] people say seriously, because he was serious about invading Ukraine when many of us hoped he would turn away at the last minute.” The dearth of diplomacy and growing distrust only fuels the risk of “mushroom clouds appearing on the battlefield,” Izumi Nakamitsu, United Nations high representative for disarmament affairs, warned on Tuesday. She hearkened back to the numerous instances during the decades-long standoff between the United States and then-Soviet Union when the two sides nearly came to nuclear blows. But diplomacy — and a good bit of luck — prevailed. “We are all aware of the close calls and near-misses,” she said at an event hosted by The Stimson Center. “Unfortunately, I fear we have forgotten many of those difficult lessons. A simple glance at a headline today can point to how acute nuclear risks have become.” Those concerns are shared across the spectrum by advocates for nuclear disarmament and those who believe a more robust U.S. nuclear arsenal is needed to deter adversaries. “I really am worried here that the war is going so badly for Putin ... it raises the possibility of Putin feeling like he needs to escalate to win his way out of this conflict,” said Tim Morrison, a former Trump White House nuclear policy adviser who is now a researcher at the Hudson Institute, a hawkish think tank. That, he continued, “is right in the wheelhouse of Russian [military] doctrine for a low-yield nuclear or even chemical [weapons] use.” Morrison added that he fears the situation could unravel to the point where Putin is “raising the ante, climbing the rungs of the escalation ladder to make the point to NATO ‘hey, you guys really need to knock it off with arming the Ukrainians, I will no longer tolerate this.’” Russia has already ratcheted up the war with its hypersonic missile launch in Ukraine last week, and it has also been accused of dropping phosphorus bombs, which are banned under the Geneva Convention (though using the chemical to obscure troop movements or illuminate targets is not). NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said on Wednesday the alliance will be assisting Ukraine with specialized equipment in the event of a Russian attack with chemical, biological or nuclear weapons. Gottemoeller said she fears that Moscow’s use of a tactical nuclear weapon is a serious possibility. “Putin is capable of anything,” she said. “He could declare there is an existential threat from a NATO ally resupplying the Ukrainians.” ‘You’re not going to necessarily know’ Others worry less about Putin ordering a nuclear attack and more about a miscalculation leading to the use of nuclear weapons. **Nunn has been sounding the alarm about the threat of an accidental nuclear exchange as a result of a cyber attack on nuclear command-and-control systems — including by malign actors not directly involved in the conflict who could be confused for a nuclear adversary.** “Third parties, third countries, might interfere in terms of command-and-control or warning systems,” he said of potential hackers. “Interference in command-and-control could be taken in this kind of atmosphere as probably a deliberate act.” Nunn successfully lobbied Congress last year to require the Pentagon to conduct a “failsafe review” of the U.S. nuclear arsenal “to prevent cyber-related and other risks that could lead to the unauthorized or inadvertent use of nuclear weapons as the result of an accident, misinterpretation, miscalculation, terrorism, unexpected technological breakthrough, or deliberate act.” Further complicating the task of U.S. and allied commanders to decipher Russian intentions, said Morrison, is the fact that so many Russian battlefield systems are also designed to unleash both conventional and nuclear or chemical warheads. In other words, **it could be exceedingly difficult to know when the Russian military has decided to pursue a nuclear option.** “One of the problems with Russian nuclear forces is how many of their systems are dual-capable,” Morrison said. “So you’re not going to necessarily know if the S-300 or that long-range [missile or artillery] battery is packing a conventional warhead or a nuclear one.” If U.S. military leaders detected Russian nuclear maneuvers, Nunn

said, **Biden may have no choice but to act more aggressively to deter Moscow, including putting American nuclear forces on alert.** “If you’d seen bombers in the air, all sorts of activities in the nuclear forces, it would have been a different proposition,” Nunn said. “The risk of nuclear use is in my view higher through a mistake or blunder than through intent. But nevertheless blunders get more likely when nuclear weapons are put on alert.” **The Nuclear Threat Initiative last week outlined a hypothetical but horrific scenario to underscore how the war in Ukraine could go wrong.** In a simulation based on historical examples, **the current conflict escalated with the detonation of a nuclear weapon in Ukraine and quickly spiraled into a nuclear** holocaust. **The scenario lays out a chain of events – the downing of an American spy plane by accident, the misreading of counter actions, cyber attacks that further sow confusion, and leaders with very little time to react – that result in the unthinkable: an all-out nuclear war between the United States and Russia.** “Over the course of the next hour,” it chillingly details, “82 million Americans are killed with allied countries faring similarly. Most die instantly, while more will die of radiation poisoning over the coming days and weeks.”

6. NATO-Russia escalation would “leap-frog” into nuclear war.

Kulesa 2018 (“Envisioning a Russia-NATO Conflict: Implications for Deterrence Stability,” Lukasz Kulesa, European Leadership Network, February 2018, <http://www.jstor.com/stable/resrep17437>, VY)

Escalation: **Can a NATO - Russia conflict be managed? Once a conflict was under way, the “fog of war” and rising unpredictability would inevitably set in, complicating the implementation of any predetermined theories of escalation,** deescalation and inter-conflict management. The actual dynamics of a conflict and the perceptions of the stakes involved are extremely difficult to predict. Simulations and table-top exercises can give only limited insights into the actual decisionmaking processes and interactions. Still, Russian military theorists and practitioners seem to assume that a conflict with NATO can be managed and controlled in a way that would bring it to a swift end consistent with Russian aims. The Russian theory of victory would seek to exploit weak points in an Alliance war effort. Based on the conviction that democracies are weak and their leaders and populations are risk-averse, **Russia may assume that its threats of horizontal or vertical escalation could be particularly effective. It would also try to bring home the notion that it has much higher stakes in the conflict (regime survival) than a majority of the NATO members involved, and thus will be ready to push the boundaries of the conflict further.** It would most likely try to test and exploit potential divisions within the Alliance, combining selective diplomacy and activation of its intelligence assets in some NATO states with a degree of selectivity in terms of targets of particular attacks. **Any NATO-Russia conflict would inevitably have a nuclear dimension. The role of nuclear weapons as a tool for escalation control for Russia has been thoroughly debated by experts,** but when and how Russia might use (and not merely showcase or activate) nuclear weapons in a conflict remains an open question. Beyond catch phrases such as “escalate to de-escalate” or “escalate to win” there are a wider range of options for Russian nuclear weapon use. For example, a single nuclear warning shot could be lethal or non-lethal. It could be directed against a purely military target or a military-civilian one. Detonation could be configured for an EMP effect. A “false flag” attack is also conceivable. These options might be used to signal escalation and could significantly complicate NATO’s responses. Neither NATO nor its member states have developed a similar theory of victory. Public NATO documents stipulate the general goals for the Alliance: defend against any armed attack and, as needed, restore the full sovereignty and territorial integrity of member states. **It is less clear how far the Alliance would be willing to escalate the conflict to achieve these goals, and what mechanisms and means it would use while trying to maintain some degree of control over the conflict.** The goals and methods of waging a conflict with Russia would probably have to be limited in order to avoid a massive nuclear exchange. Such limitations would also involve restrictions on striking back against targets on Russian territory. But too narrow an approach could put too much restraint on NATO’s operations: **the Russian regime’s stability may ultimately need to be threatened in order to force the leadership into terminating the conflict. NATO would thus need to establish what a proportional self-defence response to Russian actions would involve,** and to what extent cyber operations or attacks against military targets in quite different parts of Russia would be useful as tools of escalation to signal NATO’s resolve. Moreover, **individual NATO Allies, especially those directly affected by Russia’s actions, might pursue their individual strategies of escalation.** With regards to the nuclear dimension in NATO escalation plans, given the stakes involved, this element would most likely be handled by the three nuclear-weapon members of the Alliance, with the US taking the lead. The existence of three independent centres of nuclear decision-making could be exploited to complicate Russian planning and introduce uncertainty into the Russian strategic calculus, but some degree of “P3” dialogue and coordination would be beneficial. This coordination would not necessarily focus on nuclear

targeting, but rather on designing coordinated operations to demonstrate resolve in order to keep the conflict below the nuclear threshold, or bring it back under the threshold after first use. Relying on concepts of escalation control and on lessons from the Cold War confrontation might be misleading. The circumstances in which a Russia -NATO conflict would play out would be radically different from the 20th century screenplay. Moreover, **instead of gradual (linear) escalation or salami tactics escalation, it is possible to imagine surprizing “leap frog” escalation,** possibly connected with actions in different domains (e.g. a cyberattack against critical infrastructure). Flexibility, good intelligence and inventiveness in responding to such developments would be crucial.

2AC Proliferation Advantage Extensions

China is exporting lethal autonomous drones to the Middle East now.

Tucker 2019 (“SecDef: China Is Exporting Killer Robots to the Mideast,” Patrick Tucker, November 5, 2019, [SecDef: China Is Exporting Killer Robots to the Mideast - Defense One](#), VY)

China is exporting drones that it advertises as having lethal autonomy to the Middle East, Defense Secretary Mark Esper said Tuesday. **It’s the first time that a senior Defense official has acknowledged that China is selling drones capable of taking life with little or no human oversight. “As we speak, the Chinese government is already exporting some of its most advanced military aerial drones to the Middle East,** as it prepares to export its next-generation stealth UAVs when those come online,” Esper said today at the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence conference. **“In addition, Chinese weapons manufacturers are selling drones advertised as capable of full autonomy, including the ability to conduct lethal targeted strikes.”** The Chinese company Ziyang, for instance, markets the Blowfish A3, essentially a helicopter drone outfitted with a machine gun. Ziyang says it “autonomously performs more complex combat missions, including fixed-point timing detection, fixed-range reconnaissance, and targeted precision strikes.” As Greg Allen, chief of strategy and communications at the Defense Department’s Joint Artificial Intelligence Center, points out in this February paper for CNAS, **Ziyang is negotiating to sell its Blowfish A2 to the governments of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. “Despite expressing concern on AI arms races, most of China’s leadership sees increased military usage of AI as inevitable and is aggressively pursuing it. China already exports armed autonomous platforms and surveillance AI,”** Allen wrote.

Regulation of LAWS needs to happen now to prevent proliferation of LAWS and escalation that cannot be stopped by conventional deterrence.

Anzarouth 2021 ("Robots that Kill: The Case for Banning Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems," Matthew Anzarouth, December 2, 2021, [Robots that Kill: The Case for Banning Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems - Harvard Political Review](#), VY)

The first wave of the proliferation of LAWS may simply look like the natural progression of our current drone capabilities. For instance, Russia may have already used autonomous drones to attack targets in Syria, but these weapons are only different from current semi-autonomous drones in the greater degree of risk assumed by eliminating human intervention. In other instances, however, **the use of LAWS will present substantial advantages that make them different in kind from drones as we know them.** Consider, for example, Azerbaijan's use of Israeli-supplied IAI Harop drones in the war with Armenia in 2020. The loitering munition system used by the military allowed tiny and hardly-detectable autonomous drones to circle over the enemy's defense line, pick out targets and attack them, an ability that proved decisive in Azerbaijan's victory in the war. To understand what a world with LAWS will look like in the long term requires a bit of imagination. Perhaps a post-withdrawal Afghanistan will involve weapons like the Harop drones constantly roaming the skies and diving into the ground to take out targets. Or maybe we will see the chilling predictions of science fiction come true. In their book *AI 2041*, writers Chen Qiufan and Kai-Fu Lee express their fear that LAWS will fall into the hands of armed groups and terrorists. They describe a "Unabomber-like scenario in which a terrorist carries out the targeted killing of business elites and high-profile individuals," using autonomous drones that rely on facial recognition to identify their targets. Leading expert in artificial intelligence Toby Walsh warns of these weapons falling into the hands of dictators and being used as tools of ethnic cleansing. **Even if we assume that LAWS are operated primarily by legitimate militaries, additional complications arise** when we consider what happens in the case of unjust killings. Philosopher Robert Sparrow argues that the autonomy of LAWS makes it impossible to hold anyone accountable for illegitimate killings they commit. If the robot acted autonomously, tracing accountability back to another agent seems morally objectionable and legally infeasible. But it would also be unjust to not punish illegitimate killings. This dilemma presents a so-called 'responsibility gap', where no one can be held responsible for illegitimate killings, and wrongful acts of war go undeterred. Preventing The Next Arms Race **Despite these grave concerns, countries are pushing ahead in the research and development of LAWS.** With large military powers leading the race, there are two potential outcomes if this trend goes uninterrupted. **One is that LAWS become tools with which powerful militaries destabilize other regions, starting a new chapter of the 'forever wars' without boots on the ground. The second potential outcome is that LAWS become front and centre in conflict between the large military powers leading the race. They may drag us into a new war between superpowers without the mutually assured destruction that prevents nuclear warfare since LAWS can engage in a series of smaller, yet still extremely impactful, attacks that will not be deterred by the threat of retaliation.** The movement against LAWS is small, but it is growing. More and more countries have expressed concern about the destabilizing effects of these weapons and stressed the need for a collective agreement to rule them out, much like existing treaties that limit chemical, biological and intermediate-range nuclear weapons. However, military powers like the U.S. and Russia have blocked regulations on LAWS at the Convention on Conventional Weapons and are quietly leading what some are calling the third revolution in warfare. The challenge in regulating or banning LAWS, as with many forms of international cooperation, is overcoming collective action problems. The development of LAWS seems like a textbook example of a "security dilemma," wherein one country perceives heightened security measures by another as a threat and decides to adopt similar measures in response.

Together, these factors increase the risk of escalation to an outcome neither party desires. Our best hope in confronting this dilemma is to foster discussions in international negotiations that expose to military superpowers the great risks that LAWS present. While many countries may fear falling behind if they make the first move to disarm and de-escalate, it is possible that when the stakes are sufficiently high and it is clear that nobody, including dominant powers, is immune to the dangers of LAWS, we may see sufficient international will to address them. **While LAWS still appear to be in their infancy, we are running out of time to prevent their uncontrolled proliferation. Once one country uses these weapons to significantly tilt the playing field in its favor, others may have no choice but to follow suit.** It is therefore imperative that we switch off the robots before they take over the battlefield and the horrors of science fiction become reality.

Proliferation of autonomous weapons is comparatively worse than nuclear weapons because there is not mutually assured destruction.

Lee 2021 (“The Third Revolution in Warfare,” Kai-Fu Lee, the CEO of Sinovation Ventures and a co-author of the new AI 2041: Ten Visions For Our Future. Lee was formerly the president of Google China and a senior executive at Microsoft, SGI, and Apple, September 11, 2021, [AI Weapons Are the Third Revolution in Warfare - The Atlantic](#), VY)

Where will this arms race take us? Stuart Russell, a computer-science professor at UC Berkeley, says, “The capabilities of autonomous weapons will be limited more by the laws of physics—for example, by constraints on range, speed, and payload—than by any deficiencies in the AI systems that control them. **One can expect platforms deployed in the millions, the agility and lethality of which will leave humans utterly defenseless.”** **This multilateral arms race, if allowed to run its course, will eventually become a race toward oblivion.** **Nuclear weapons** are an existential threat, but they **’ve been kept in check and have even helped reduce conventional warfare on account of the deterrence theory.** Because a nuclear war leads to mutually assured destruction, any country initiating a nuclear first strike likely faces reciprocity and thus self-destruction. **But autonomous weapons are different. The deterrence theory does not apply, because a surprise first attack may be untraceable.** As discussed earlier, **autonomous-weapon attacks can quickly trigger a response, and escalations can be very fast, potentially leading to nuclear war. The first attack may not even be triggered by a country but by terrorists or other non-state actors. This exacerbates the level of danger of autonomous weapons.** There have been several proposed solutions for avoiding this existential disaster. One is the human-in-the-loop approach, or making sure that every lethal decision is made by a human. But the prowess of autonomous weapons largely comes from the speed and precision gained by not having a human in the loop. This debilitating concession may be unacceptable to any country that wants to win the arms race. Human inclusion is also hard to enforce and easy to avoid. And the protective quality of having a human involved depends very much on the moral character and judgment of that individual. A second proposed solution is a ban, which has been supported by both the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots and a letter signed by 3,000 people, including Elon Musk, the late Stephen Hawking, and thousands of AI experts. Similar efforts have been undertaken in the past by biologists, chemists, and physicists against biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons. A ban will not be easy, but previous bans against blinding lasers and chemical and biological weapons appear to have been effective. The main roadblock today is that the United States, the United Kingdom, and Russia all oppose banning autonomous weapons, stating that it is too early to do so. **A third approach is to regulate autonomous weapons.** This will likewise be complex because of the difficulty of constructing effective technical specifications without being too broad. What defines an autonomous weapon? How do you audit for violations? These are all extraordinarily difficult short-term obstacles. In the very long term, creative solutions might be possible, though they are difficult to imagine—for example, can countries agree that all future wars will be fought only with robots (or better yet, only in software), resulting in no human casualties but delivering the classic spoils of war? Or perhaps there’s a future in which wars are fought with humans and robots, but the robots are permitted to use only weapons that will disable robot combatants and are harmless to human soldiers. **Autonomous weapons are already a clear and present danger, and will become more intelligent, nimble, lethal, and accessible at an alarming speed. The deployment of autonomous weapons will be accelerated by an inevitable arms race that will lack the natural deterrence of nuclear weapons.** Autonomous weapons are the AI application that most clearly and deeply conflicts with our morals and threatens humanity.

China wants AI weaponization regulations now.

Pardhi 2021 ("Behind Beijing's proposal to regulate military applications of AI," Megha Pardhi, research analyst at the Takshashila Institution, December 27, 2021, [Behind Beijing's proposal to regulate military applications of AI - Asja Times](#), VY)

The takeaway from this position paper is that countries should debate, discuss, and perhaps eschew the weaponization of AI. **By initiating a discussion on regulating military applications of AI, Beijing wants to project itself as a responsible international player. This proposal is Beijing's formal acknowledgment of AI as a technology capable of transforming the international security paradigm.** Many countries, including the US and China, are trying to leverage the advantages of AI in military applications. According to some reports, China might even be ahead of the US in integrating AI applications for military purposes. Why propose regulations? China's position paper has standard jargon like "ethics," "governance," "world peace and development," "multilateralism," and "openness and inclusiveness." These keywords are used to portray China as a responsible country. Additionally, for technological security, the position paper emphasizes the centrality of human intervention and data security, along with a restriction on the military use of AI data. However, for dual-use technology like AI, a clear distinction in the civil or military application of data might be difficult. For example, civilian data can be used to train an AI model, and this trained model can then be used for military purposes. **The move to propose regulations on the weaponization of AI could also mean the People's Liberation Army has achieved a desired level of sophistication in AI,** although it is unlikely. Or it could mean the PLA plans to achieve a certain level of sophistication by the time discussion on AI reaches a consensus. **Beijing is likely talking about regulation out of fear either that it cannot catch up with others or that it is not confident of its capabilities.** Meanwhile, formulating a few commonly agreeable rules on weaponization of AI would be prudent. **Beijing knows that even if the debate on weaponization of AI begins now,** it will take significant time to bring out regulations, since the positions of each country will differ.

2AC Solvency Extensions

Regulation of autonomous weapon systems is necessary and only a multilateral approach can solve.

Sauer 2021 (“Stepping back from the brink: Why multilateral regulation of autonomy in weapons systems is difficult, yet imperative and feasible,” Frank Sauer is a Senior Research Fellow at Bundeswehr University in Munich, IRRC No. 913 March 2021, [Stepping back from the brink: Why multilateral regulation of autonomy in weapons systems is difficult, yet imperative and feasible](#), VY)

A multilateral regulation of autonomy in weapons systems – that is, codifying a legally binding obligation to retain meaningful human control over the use of force – is difficult yet imperative to achieve. Severe strategic as well as ethical mid- and long-term risks, such as unintended conflict escalation at machine speed and the violation of human dignity, outweigh any short-term military benefits. This analysis has illustrated how **regulating weapon autonomy is feasible**, presenting a three-step process to facilitate stepping back from the brink: step one, foster the emerging consensus on the notion that a positive obligation to retain human control over weapons systems is prudent and urgently required; step two, further develop the insight that there is no one-size-fits-all standard of meaningful human control; and step three, devise differentiated, context-dependent human control schemes for weapons systems. Given the current geopolitical landscape and the lack of political will to engage in arms control efforts, the taking of these steps will resemble a marathon, not a sprint. After all, **the perceived military value of weapon autonomy is exceptionally high, and the issue itself is elusive, requiring an innovative, qualitative approach to arms control. But history clearly suggests that great powers are not devoid of sensitivity to the accumulation of collective risks – otherwise arms control on nuclear, chemical and biological weapons would never have seen the light of day. The emerging technologies of the twenty-first century present humankind with the opportunity to demonstrate that it has learned from history before the risks have manifested themselves** to their full extent. Humans do terrible things to each other in war, and there is no technological fix for that. **But the international community can at least set rules to curb against uncontrolled escalation and the crossing of fundamental moral lines.** If we fail to do so, we will not only lose the breathing room to ponder and deliberate responses,¹¹² an essential requirement of political conflict management, as the Cuban Missile Crisis strongly suggests;¹¹³ we will also allow “the ultimate indignity” of war turning into “death by algorithm”.¹¹⁴

NATO has an excellent track-record of reaching consensus. This is a democratic tool, not a solvency deficit.

Skaluba and Rodihan 2022

("No consensus? No problem. Why NATO is still effective." Christopher Skaluba, the Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council's Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and previously served as principal director for European and NATO policy in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and Conor Rodihan, associate director in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security's Transatlantic Security Initiative, January 18, 2022, [No consensus? No problem. Why NATO is still effective. - Atlantic Council](#), VY)

Critics of the alliance (and even some supporters) have interpreted NATO's unwillingness to militarily support Ukraine—especially during the most significant challenge to the European security order since the Cold War—as an indicator of its declining relevance, timidity, or its divisions. But that overstates **the importance of political consensus to NATO's value and understates its role as an effective** and flexible defensive alliance. This is a role with potentially critical benefits for Ukraine. First, it sets too high a bar for an alliance of thirty members with aligned, but distinct, priorities. Unanimity on every issue is impossible, let alone one as complex as military support to Ukraine. **Debate and disagreement, as it should be for any democratic institution, are built-in features of NATO—not bugs. In reality, it's astounding how often NATO does reach consensus about issues big and small, creating an unrealistic expectation that it always will.** The opposite of consensus is not failure. Suggesting otherwise turns any debate that doesn't end harmoniously into an indictment of NATO, playing straight into Russian propaganda. Second, **a belief that NATO's value is tied primarily to achieving consensus on every issue misses the more mundane (and important) ways it supports its allies and partners. Its affinity for process—particularly its ability to build a common situational understanding among its members—is an invaluable tool. Habits of consultation and information sharing, buttressed by deep cooperation on operations, intelligence sharing, defense planning, and interoperability, create the foundation upon which any consensus is to be built. Even in the absence of that agreement, the ability to collectively define threats and jointly train to confront them is immensely valuable in its own right.** Third, these habits of cooperation give NATO members the flexibility to act outside of the Alliance's frameworks. While NATO does much by consensus—such as its missions in the Baltic states—the skills it helps members develop is central to enabling them to form separate coalitions for action. This happened recently with ample success in taking on the Islamic State. **Such flexibility should be a point in NATO's favor,** not evidence of its ineptitude.

2AC AI Turn Answers

Regulations like the affirmatives are a better alternative than bans and solve the turn.

McGregor 2018 (“Why We Need to Stop Talking About ‘Killer Robots’ and Address the AI Backlash,” Lorna McGregor, Professor of International Human Rights Law and PI and Director of the ESRC Human Rights, Big Data and Technology Project at the University of Essex, July 9, 2018, [Why We Need to Stop Talking About ‘Killer Robots’ and Address the AI Backlash – EJIL](#), VY)

Why We Have to Be Better at Looking into the Future **In addition to addressing current issues, we need to be more effective in predicting and imagining the trajectory of technology. While we may never reach singularity, technology is evolving rapidly and the ‘art of the possible is always changing’. This is a ‘complicating factor’ for regulation but one that needs to be addressed.** One of the major critiques and concerns about law (including international law) in a world of artificial intelligence is that it is ill-equipped and lacks agility to effectively respond to the challenges posed in the ‘Fourth Industrial Revolution’. **What is needed is a shift in the methodology of regulation that looks to the future in order to have thought through the potential risks, challenges and regulatory options before the technology emerges or while it is under development. This requires** close interdisciplinary **collaborations** – stripped of hype – **and much better structures and ways of working so that the public and policymakers understand the current state of technology and its trajectory in order to be able to effectively regulate its use.**

AI consumes too much energy and is an environmental problem. It makes warming worse before being able to solve it.

Labbe 2021 ("Energy consumption of AI poses environmental problems," Mark Labbe, Aug 2021, [Energy consumption of AI poses environmental problems](#), VY)

Training an advanced AI model takes time, money and high-quality data. It also takes energy -- a lot of it. Between storing data in large-scale data centers and then using that data to train a machine learning or deep learning model, AI energy consumption is high. While an AI system may pay off monetarily, AI poses a problem environmentally. AI energy consumption during training Take some of the most popular language models, for example. OpenAI trained its GPT-3 model on 45 terabytes of data. To train the final version of MegatronLM, a language model similar to but smaller than GPT-3, Nvidia ran 512 V100 GPUs over nine days. A single V100 GPU can consume between 250 and 300 watts. If we assume 250 watts, then 512 V100 GPUS consumes 128,000 watts, or 128 kilowatts (kW). Running for nine days means the MegatronLM's training cost 27,648 kilowatt hours (kWh). The average household uses 10,649 kWh annually, according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration. Therefore, training the final version of MegatronLM used almost the amount of energy three homes use in a year. **New training techniques reduce the amount of data needed to train machine learning and deep learning models, but many models still need a huge amount of data to complete an initial training phase,** and additional data to keep up to date. Data center energy usage **As AI becomes more complex, expect some models to use even more data. That's a problem, because data centers use an incredible amount of energy.** "Data centers are going to be one of the most impactful things on the environment," said Alan Pelz-Sharpe, founder of analyst firm Deep Analysis. IBM's The Weather Company processes around 400 terabytes of data per day to enable its models to predict the weather days in advance around the globe. Facebook generates about 4 petabytes (4,000 terabytes) of data per day. People generated 64.2 zettabytes of data in 2020. That's about 58,389,559,853 terabytes, market research company IDC estimated. Data centers store that data around the world. Meanwhile, the largest data centers require more than 100 megawatts of power capacity, which is enough to power some 80,000 U.S. households, according to energy and climate think tank Energy Innovation. With about 600 hyperscale data centers -- data centers that exceed 5,000 servers and 10,000 square feet -- in the world, it's unclear how much energy is required to store all of our data, but the number is likely staggering. **From an environmental standpoint, data center and AI energy consumption is also a nightmare.** AI, data, and the environment **Using energy creates CO2, the primary greenhouse gas emitted by humans. In the atmosphere, greenhouse gases like CO2 trap heat near the Earth's surface, causing the temperature of the Earth to rise and throwing delicate ecosystems off balance.** "We have an energy consumption crisis," said Gerry McGovern, author of the book World Wide Waste. **AI is energy-intensive, and the higher the demand for AI, the more power we use, he said. "It's not simply the electrical energy to train an AI," he said. "It's building the supercomputers. It's collecting and storing the data."** McGovern pointed to estimates that by 2035, humans will have produced more than 2,000 zettabytes of data. "The storage energy along for this will be astronomical," he said. **Right now, data's biggest users aren't doing much about the carbon footprint or AI energy consumption problem.** "I'm aware of some recognition [of AI's carbon footprint problem] but not a lot of action," McGovern said. "Data centers, which are the 'food source' for AI, have focused on electrical efficiency and have definitely made major improvements over the last 10 years." While data centers have become more electrically efficient over the past decade, experts believe that electricity only accounts for around 10% of a data center's CO2 emissions, McGovern said. **A data center's infrastructure, including the building and cooling systems, also produces**

a lot of CO2. On top of that, data centers also use a lot of water as a form of evaporative cooling. This cooling method cuts down on electricity use but can use millions of gallons of water per day per hyperscale data center. In addition, the water used can get polluted in the process, McGovern noted. "There is still this broad assumption that digital is inherently green, and that is far from the case," he said.

Climate change is not a threat to human survival – too low of a risk and adaptation solves.

Farquhar 2017 (“Existential Risk: Diplomacy and Governance”, Sebastian Farquhar, Leader of the Global Priorities Project (GPP) at the Centre for Effective Altruism, et al., Jan. 23, 2017, <https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/Existential-Risks-2017-01-23.pdf>)

The most likely levels of global warming are very unlikely to cause human extinction.¹⁵ The existential risks of climate change instead stem from tail risk climate change – the low probability of extreme levels of warming – and interaction with other sources of risk. It is impossible to say with confidence at what point global warming would become severe enough to pose an existential threat. **Research has suggested that warming of 11-12°C would render most of the planet uninhabitable,**¹⁶ and would completely devastate agriculture.¹⁷ This would pose an extreme threat to human civilisation as we know it.¹⁸ Warming of around 7°C or more could potentially produce conflict and instability on such a scale that the indirect effects could be an existential risk, although it is extremely uncertain how likely such scenarios are.¹⁹ **Moreover, the timescales over which such changes might happen could mean that humanity is able to adapt enough to avoid extinction in even very extreme scenarios.** The probability of these levels of warming depends on eventual greenhouse gas concentrations. According to some experts, unless strong action is taken soon by major emitters, it is likely that we will pursue a medium-high emissions pathway.²⁰ If we do, the chance of extreme warming is highly uncertain but appears non-negligible. Current concentrations of greenhouse gases are higher than they have been for hundreds of thousands of years,²¹ which means that there are significant unknown unknowns about how the climate system will respond. Particularly concerning is the risk of positive feedback loops, such as the release of vast amounts of methane from melting of the arctic permafrost, which would cause rapid and disastrous warming.²² The economists Gernot Wagner and Martin Weitzman have used IPCC figures (which do not include modelling of feedback loops such as those from melting permafrost) to estimate that if we continue to pursue a medium-high emissions pathway, the probability of eventual warming of 6°C is around 10%,²³ and of 10°C is around 3%.²⁴ These estimates are of course highly uncertain. **It is likely that the world will take action against climate change once it begins to impose large costs on human society, long before there is warming of 10°C.** Unfortunately, there is significant inertia in the climate system: there is a 25 to 50 year lag between CO₂ emissions and eventual warming,²⁵ and it is expected that 40% of the peak concentration of CO₂ will remain in the atmosphere 1,000 years after the peak is reached.²⁶ Consequently, it is impossible to reduce temperatures quickly by reducing CO₂ emissions. **If the world does start to face costly warming, the international community will therefore face strong incentives to find other ways to reduce global temperatures.**

Answers to Off-Case

2AC Frontline-Russia Aggression DA

1. Non-unique: NATO expansion to include Sweden and Finland thumps or overwhelms the disadvantage. This means the disadvantage should have already happened.

Siebold and Emmott on June 29, 2022 ("NATO invites Finland, Sweden to join, says Russia is a 'direct threat'" Sabine Siebold and Robin Emmott, June 29, 2022, [NATO invites Finland, Sweden to join, says Russia is a 'direct threat' | Reuters](#), VY)

MADRID, June 29 (Reuters) - **NATO invited Sweden and Finland on Wednesday to join the military alliance in one of the biggest shifts in European security in decades after Russia's invasion of Ukraine** pushed Helsinki and Stockholm to drop their traditional of neutrality. **NATO's 30 allies took the decision** at their summit in Madrid **and also agreed to formally treat Russia as the "most significant and direct threat to the allies' security"**, according to a summit statement. **"Today, we have decided to invite Finland and Sweden to become members of NATO,"** NATO leaders said in their declaration, **after Turkey lifted a veto on Finland and Sweden joining.** Ratification in allied parliaments is likely to take up to a year, but once it is done, **Finland and Sweden will be covered by NATO's Article 5 collective defence clause, putting them under the United States' protective nuclear umbrella.** "We will make sure we are able to protect all allies, including Finland and Sweden," Stoltenberg said. **In the meantime, the allies are set to increase their troop presence in the Nordic region, holding more military exercises and naval patrols in the Baltic Sea to reassure Sweden and Finland.** After four hours of talks in Madrid on Tuesday, Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan agreed with his Finnish and Swedish counterparts a series of security measures to allow the two Nordic countries to overcome the Turkish veto that Ankara imposed in May due to its concerns about terrorism. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation was founded in 1949 to defend against the Soviet threat. Russia's Feb. 24 invasion of Ukraine gave the organisation a new impetus after failures in Afghanistan and internal discord during the era of former U.S. President Donald Trump. "We are sending a strong message to (Russian President Vladimir) Putin: 'you will not win'," Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez said in a speech. **Allies also agreed on NATO's first new strategic concept - its master planning document - in a decade. Russia, previously classed as a strategic partner of NATO, is now identified as NATO's main threat.** Russia's invasion of Ukraine is "a direct threat to our Western way of life," Belgian Prime Minister Alexander de Croo added, citing the wider impact of the war, such as rising energy and food prices. The planning document also cited China as a challenge for the first time, setting the stage for the 30 allies to plan to handle Beijing's transformation from a benign trading partner to a fast-growing competitor from the Arctic to cyberspace. Unlike Russia, whose war in Ukraine has raised serious concerns in the Baltics of an attack on NATO territory, China is not an adversary, NATO leaders said. But Stoltenberg has repeatedly called on Beijing to condemn Russia's invasion of Ukraine, which Moscow says is a "special operation". 'MORE NATO' At the summit, NATO agreed a longer-term support package for Ukraine, in addition to the billions of dollars already pledged in weapons and financial support. German

Chancellor Olaf Scholz said that arms would continue to be supplied to Kyiv, which seeks help to overpower Russian artillery, particularly in eastern Ukraine, where Russia is slowly advancing in a grinding war of attrition. "The message is: We will continue to do so - and to do this intensively - for as long as it is necessary to enable Ukraine to defend itself," Scholz said. The Western alliance is also in agreement that big allies such as the United States, Germany, Britain and Canada pre-assign troops, weapons and equipment to the Baltics and intensify training exercises. **NATO is also aiming to have as many as 300,000 troops ready for deployment in case of conflict, part of an enlarged NATO response force.** read more Russia is achieving the opposite of what Putin sought when he launched his war in Ukraine in part to counter the expansion of NATO, Western leaders say. Both Finland, which has a 1,300 km (810 mile) border with Russia, and Sweden, home of the founder of the Nobel Peace Prize, are now set to bring well-trained militaries into the NATO, aimed at giving the alliance Baltic Sea superiority. "One of the most important messages from President **Putin** ... was that he was against any further NATO enlargement," Stoltenberg said on Tuesday evening. "He **wanted less NATO. Now President Putin is getting more NATO on his borders.**"

2. No Link: Putin's warnings are propaganda to rally his country behind the invasion of Ukraine. He does not have the resources to actually be more aggressive against NATO.

Martinez and Edmonds 2022 Martinez, A and Edmonds, Jeff. "A Closer Look at Some of Russia's Military Failures in the War on Ukraine." May 3rd 2022. NPR's Morning Edition. Jeff Edmonds is a senior researcher at the Center for Naval Analysis. [Full article: A Brutal Examination: Russian Military Capability in Light of the Ukraine War](#)

After more than two months of war in Ukraine, Russian forces have been deeply undermined. **A quarter of Russian units have been rendered combat ineffective**. Now, that's according to a new intelligence assessment from **Britain's Ministry of Defense**. The ministry also **said it'll likely take years for Russia to reconstitute some of its most elite units, including the country's airborne forces**. Now, the Pentagon is not echoing the British assessment, saying only that a number of units have been degraded from the fighting. But for some, **Russian failures have altered what had been the common wisdom regarding Russia's military power with future implications for the U.S., NATO and Russia's neighbors**. Jeff Edmonds is a senior analyst at the Center for Naval Analyses. He previously focused on Russia and Central Asia as a member of the National Security Council. Jeff, welcome to the show.

JEFF EDMONDS: Thanks so much for having me.

MARTINEZ: All right. The British say that a quarter of Russian units have been rendered combat ineffective. So if that's true, what does that mean for the war?

EDMONDS: I think what **it means** is that, you know, the operation that we're seeing now in the east, many military analysts believe that **this is the last large operation that the Russian military is able to conduct right now**. I mean, it really is staggering. You know, we often think that, you know, 10 to - you know, 20% to 30% losses, a unit is no longer able to conduct offensive operations, and that's where we think the Russian military is right now. And we're seeing **this operation in the east, and it's really not producing a lot of results, and that's probably likely a result of these staggering losses**.

MARTINEZ: So if this is a last operation for Russia, does it suggest that maybe their war in Ukraine, in particular, where it's focused in the east right now, might be something that they might dig in on?

EDMONDS: They might dig in on it, but **there's a real solid chance that the Russian military will not be able to achieve even these revised strategic goals** of taking over these two provinces in the east. It's not clear at all that they'll actually be able to, you know, break through and control both region

3. No internal link: Increased NATO presence does not lead to more conflict in Ukraine. The Ukraine conflict is not about NATO presence but Russia's power ambitions.

Cornell 2022 ("No, the war in Ukraine is not about NATO," Svante Cornell, director of the American Foreign Policy Council's Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, 03/09/2022, [No, the war in Ukraine is not about NATO | The Hill](#), VY)

Russia's invasion of Ukraine has led to widespread condemnation and an unparalleled outpouring of support for Ukraine. At the same time, a motley crew, including some academics and former U.S. officials, has essentially blamed the war on the West, and in particular NATO enlargement. **The argument is basically that Russia would not have become so aggressive if Western powers had been more accommodating. This line of thinking, however, is simply incorrect.** That's because Russia rediscovered its imperial vocation before NATO enlargement, and **the war in Ukraine is, in fact, about Putin's great power ambitions.** Russian leaders have emphatically argued that NATO countries, led by the United States, violated assurances made to Moscow at the end of the Cold War that the alliance would not expand to the east. This claim, however, has been debunked as a myth. Even the last Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, has denied that the issue of NATO enlargement was even discussed at the time. Russian President Vladimir Putin himself did not have much to say about NATO enlargement until his infamous speech at the 2007 Munich Security Conference. NATO's enlargement began in the mid-1990s, at a time when the alliance was embarking on a strategic shift, focusing on out-of-area operations instead territorial defense. NATO urged new member states to focus on specific cutting-edge expertise, and programs for partner countries like Georgia were mostly about training for peacekeeping operations in places like Afghanistan. NATO's shift is perhaps best illustrated by the fact that the alliance lacked a workable plan to defend the Baltic states when Russia invaded Georgia in 2008. It is really only after that war, and in particular after Moscow's annexation of Crimea in 2014, that NATO returned to its original focus on collective defense. **The real reason for the deteriorating security situation in Europe – and most blatantly the Russian invasion of Ukraine – can be found in changes that have taken place within Russia itself, and most directly the increasingly imperialist worldview of the Russian leadership.** This change began as early as 1994 and accelerated after Putin came to power. The war in the Russian breakaway republic of Chechnya from 1994 to 1996 was in many ways the starting point. Russia's defeat there showed how far the country had fallen, leading many former Soviet republics to part ways with Russia. Moscow responded by systematically undermining neighboring states like Moldova, Georgia and Azerbaijan through the incitement of ethnic conflicts on their territories – a classic divide-and-rule tactic. It is largely forgotten today that Putin built his political career on regaining control of Chechnya, something he did by starting a bloody war on the basis of a lie. It is generally well established today that the explosions in apartment buildings in Moscow in the summer of 1999 that Putin blamed on Chechen rebels were in fact carried out by the Russian security service under Putin's own leadership – the purpose being to create popular support for Putin's war, and by extension his leadership. **Putin's view of the world, in turn, is closely linked to his own hold on power – and that explains Russia's increasingly aggressive actions.** The "color revolutions" in Georgia and Ukraine in 2003-4 had the potential to show that democratic change could happen in former Soviet countries, something that would undermine Putin's pursuit of authoritarian rule (what he called a "vertical of power"). Democratic rule in neighboring countries therefore had to fail. Ukraine, in particular, was central to Putin. If a kindred Slavic and Orthodox country like Ukraine developed into a functioning democracy, this could pull the rug out from under Putin's project. If Ukraine showed that something better was possible, why should Russians be content with

living under an authoritarian and corrupt regime? For a time, Moscow tried other tactics. Pro-Russian politician Viktor Yanukovich managed to get elected as president of Ukraine in 2010, but his misrule led to the popular uprising of 2013. That event, in turn, showed that the Ukrainian people saw Europe, rather than Russia, as their future. Putin responded by annexing Crimea and starting a war in eastern Ukraine. At home, Putin's rhetoric became increasingly nationalistic, and now focused on concepts such as the "Russian world" in order to foment a divide between Russia and an allegedly decadent West. **For this to succeed, however, Putin needs to bring Belarus and Ukraine into the "Russian world," by force if necessary. This, rather than NATO enlargement, is what the war in Ukraine is about.**

<4. We solve better for Russian escalation in Ukraine. Our Russia advantage is clear that the most likely scenario for escalation in Ukraine is deployment of LAWs because then Russia will escalate due to fighting new weapons.>

2AC Frontline–China Focus DA

1. Non-unique: NATO's focus is on Russia, not on counterbalancing China now. China has taken a backseat for NATO.

Fitch Solutions 2021 ("NATO Unlikely To Focus On Countering China, As Russia Will Remain Priority," Fitch Solutions, 15 Jun, 2021, [NATO Unlikely To Focus On Countering China, As Russia Will Remain Priority](#), VY)

Despite the inclusion of China in its communique, NATO is unlikely to prioritise counterbalancing Beijing's growing power in the near term. Of the 79 points in NATO's communique, China was the focus of only points 55 and 56, and was mentioned only 10 times, compared to 63 mentions of Russia, 25 of Ukraine, 23 of terror or terrorism, 18 of Georgia, 10 of Afghanistan, and three of Iran. In our view, **the US will continue to counterbalance China's growing military power in the Indo-Pacific region** by means of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue ('the Quad'), which also includes Japan, India, and Australia, and through Washington's bilateral defence pacts with Japan, South Korea, and other regional allies, **rather than through NATO, whose main focus will remain the Euro-Atlantic area and western Eurasia.** European NATO members, most notably the United Kingdom and France, are likely to increase their participation in **US-led military activities in Asia**, but this **will be limited and not be under the auspices of NATO.** Biden Keen To Reaffirm US' Alliance Network That said, many European NATO states are hardening their attitudes towards China, and the alliance may increasingly be used to step up diplomatic criticism of Beijing on issues such as Indo-Pacific security and China's alleged human rights abuses. For its part, China will view these developments – correctly in our view – as part of an effort by the US Biden administration to build a multilateral front to pressure China. The deterioration of EU-China relations was most visibly underscored on May 20, when the European Parliament suspended the ratification of the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) after China imposed sanctions on 10 EU officials in response to Western sanctions against Chinese officials accused of mass detentions of ethnic Uighurs in China's Xinjiang province. The CAI was only finalised in December 2020 after seven years of negotiations. Meanwhile, President Joe Biden is seeking to improve US relations with the EU, which became very strained over trade and climate change issues during the presidency of Donald Trump (2017-2021). Biden is holding a summit with EU leaders on June 15. One area of cooperation is likely to be a new EU-US Trade and Technology Council (TTC) to set standards for emerging technology, strengthen and diversify supply chains, and rein in the growing power of 'Big Tech'. Although NATO and the EU are completely separate organisations, their close overlap in membership means that there is a broad 'Western coalition' emerging to challenge China. Russia Will Remain NATO's Focus **Russia will remain NATO's overwhelming security challenge, amid ongoing tensions in Ukraine and Belarus, as well as NATO and Russian military activities in Eastern Europe.** Although European NATO and EU leaders are increasingly cognisant of the challenges posed by China, they will continue to focus on Russia, given that Moscow poses much more geographically closer and more immediate security risks. In particular, the governments of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland remain very concerned about recurring Russian military pressure on Ukraine, and Russia's support for Belarus' embattled President Alexander Lukashenko. Meanwhile, Western European

leaders will remain concerned about potential Russian interference in their domestic affairs, cyber attacks, and Russia's harsh treatment of opposition figures such as Alexei Navalny. Indeed, the NATO summit also announced a new Comprehensive Cyber Defence Policy, aimed at deterring and defending against cyber attacks. Although President Biden is scheduled to hold a summit with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Switzerland on June 16, the wide range of issues that divide their two countries implies that there is no clear path to a rapprochement.

2. No link: NATO can focus on both China and Russia's invasion of Ukraine, which means that NATO can focus on both China AND the affirmative.

Sprenger and Gould 2022 ("US military readies to 'walk and chew gum' as multiple crises loom," Sebastian Sprenger is Europe editor for Defense News, and Joe Gould, senior Pentagon reporter for Defense News, Jan 28, 2022, [US military readies to 'walk and chew gum' as multiple crises loom](#), VY)

WASHINGTON — **As roughly 100,000 Russian troops amass around Ukraine, a series of emerging crises around the world — the Middle East, China, North Korea — are demanding the full attention of NATO, and particularly its most powerful member, the United States. Now, there's a growing sense among national security experts that the crisis in Ukraine is just one of many conflicts on the precipice, putting pressure on the alliance and its member countries to address this threat and at the same time brace for the next one.** Indeed, China this week flew 39 warplanes toward Taiwan. And consider the United Arab Emirates reported this week it had intercepted multiple ballistic missiles aimed at Abu Dhabi. Julianne Smith, the U.S. ambassador to NATO, described the ongoing dispute between Russia and Ukraine as a “microcosm” of the types of threats Western analysts were expecting all along. “All of this is becoming very real,” she said this week at a panel in Brussels sponsored by the German Marshall Fund of the United States. At the same time, “something could happen on China and Taiwan next week,” said Ian Lesser, vice president at the think tank, referring to the possibility of China attacking the U.S.-backed island nation that Beijing sees as a renegade province to be eventually united with the mainland. Asked about that possibility on Thursday, Defense Department spokesman John Kirby said the military remains watchful of other theaters. **“I think the gist of your question is, why can't we walk and chew gum at the same time.”** he told reporters at the Pentagon. **“We can, and we are. ... Just because we're focused on bolstering our allies because of the worrisome accumulation of combat-credible power by the Russians in and around Ukraine doesn't mean that we aren't focused on the pacing challenge that China represents to the department.”**

<3. No Link: The affirmative is part of the NATO Strategy against China. It fights back against the development of LAWs by China.>

4. Internal-link turn: The NATO focus and threat construction of China is what causes China to be a threat.

Lonas 2021 ("China warns NATO to stop 'hyping up' threat posed by Beijing," Lexi Lonas, 06/15/21, [China warns NATO to stop 'hyping up' threat posed by Beijing | The Hill](#), VY)

China on Tuesday issued a warning to NATO, saying the group needs to stop going after Beijing. The statement accused the group of a "Cold War mentality," and said it needs to stop "hyping up" the threat posed by Beijing, a spokesperson of China's mission to the European Union said, according to NBC News. **NATO is "slandering China's peaceful development and misjudging the international situation and its own role,"** the spokesperson said. China's statement comes after NATO said on Monday that the country poses "systemic challenges to the rules-based international order," according to the outlet. China rebuked the statement, saying it won't "sit by and do nothing if 'systemic challenges' come closer to us." "I think there is a growing recognition over the last couple years that we have new challenges," President Biden said on Monday. "We have Russia that is not acting in a way that is consistent with what we had hoped, as well as China." **The back and forth between NATO and China comes after G-7 leaders met to discuss how to compete with China, and called for the country to engage in a transparent investigation into the origins of COVID-19. "The days when global decisions were dictated by a small group of countries are long gone," a spokesman for the Chinese Embassy responded.**

5. No Impact: No US-China war. 4 warrants: mutually assured destruction, weak Chinese military, China's focus on soft-power, and economic interdependence.

Krulak and Friedman 2021 (“The US and China are not destined for war,” Charles C. Krulak, a retired four-star general, is a former commandant of the US Marine Corps and former president of Birmingham-Southern College, and Alex Friedman is a former chief financial officer of the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, 24 Aug 2021, [The US and China are not destined for war | The Strategist](#), VY)

True, throughout history, when a rising power has challenged a ruling one, war has often been the result. But there are notable exceptions. A war between the US and China today is no more inevitable than was war between the rising US and the declining United Kingdom a century ago. And in today's context, there are four compelling reasons to believe that war between the US and China can be avoided. First and foremost, any military conflict between the two would quickly turn nuclear. The US thus finds itself in the same situation that it was in vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Taiwan could easily become this century's tripwire, just as the 'Fulda Gap' in Germany was during the Cold War. **But the same dynamic of 'mutually assured destruction' that limited US-Soviet conflict applies to the US and China.** And the international community would do everything in its power to ensure that **a potential nuclear conflict did not materialise**, given that the consequences would be fundamentally transnational and—unlike climate change—immediate. A US-China conflict would almost certainly take the form of a proxy war, rather than a major-power confrontation. Each superpower might take a different side in a domestic conflict in a country such as Pakistan, Venezuela, Iran or North Korea, and deploy some combination of economic, cyber and diplomatic instruments. We have seen this type of conflict many times before: from Vietnam to Bosnia, the US faced surrogates rather than its principal foe. **Second, it's important to remember that, historically, China plays a long game.** Although **Chinese** military power has grown dramatically, it **still lags behind the US on almost every measure that matters.** And while China is investing heavily in asymmetric equalisers (long-range anti-ship and hypersonic missiles, military applications of cyber, and more), it will not match the US in conventional means such as aircraft and large ships for decades, if ever. **A head-to-head conflict with the US would thus be too dangerous for China to countenance at its current stage of development.** If such a conflict did occur, China would have few options but to let the nuclear genie out of the bottle. In thinking about baseline scenarios, therefore, we should give less weight to any scenario in which the Chinese consciously precipitate a military confrontation with America. The US military, however, tends to plan for worst-case scenarios and is currently focused on a potential direct conflict with China—a fixation with overtones of the US-Soviet dynamic. This raises the risk of being blindsided by other threats. Time and again since the Korean War, asymmetric threats have proven the most problematic to national security. Building a force that can handle the worst-case scenario does not guarantee success across the spectrum of warfare. **The third reason to think that a Sino-American conflict can be avoided is that China is already chalking up victories in the global soft-power war.** Notwithstanding accusations that Covid-19 escaped from a virology lab in Wuhan, China has emerged from the pandemic looking much better than the US. And with its Belt and Road Initiative to finance infrastructure development around the world, it has aggressively stepped into the void left by US retrenchment during Donald Trump's four years as president. **China's leaders may very well look at the current status quo and conclude that they are on the right strategic path. Finally, China and the US are deeply intertwined economically.** Despite Trump's trade war, **Sino-American bilateral trade in 2020 was around US\$650 billion, and China was America's largest trade partner. The two countries' supply-chain linkages are vast, and China holds more than US\$1 trillion in US Treasuries, most of which it can't easily unload, lest it reduce their value and incur massive losses.**

Answers to Taiwan Impact Module

Internal-link Turn: It is the NATO focus on Asia that causes Chinese aggression and a possible invasion of Taiwan.

Bloomberg News 2022 (“China Warns U.S. Over Forming Pacific NATO, Backing Taiwan,” Bloomberg News, March 7, 2022, [China Warns U.S. Over Forming Pacific NATO, Backing Taiwan - Bloomberg](#), VY)

China warned the U.S. against trying to build what it called a Pacific version of NATO, while declaring that security disputes over Taiwan and Ukraine were “not comparable at all.” Foreign Minister Wang Yi told his annual news briefing Monday that the “real goal” of the U.S.’s Indo-Pacific strategy was to form Asia’s answer to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. China has often accused the U.S. of trying to form blocs to suppress its growth, a complaint that’s likely to attract greater attention after President Vladimir Putin cited similar grievances before his invasion of Ukraine. **“The perverse actions run counter to the common aspiration of the region for peace, development, cooperation and win-win outcomes,”** Wang added. **“They are doomed to fail.”** **Complaints about U.S. efforts to strengthen its alliance network in Asia were among several points of contention raised by Wang in the almost two-hour briefing on the sidelines of the National People’s Congress in Beijing.** The senior diplomat repeatedly alluded to the U.S. as the source of problems with countries around the globe and issued some of China’s most pointed warnings yet against calls to expand U.S. ties with Taiwan. **“This would not only push Taiwan into a precarious situation, but will also bring unbearable consequences for the U.S. side,”** Wang said on the sidelines of the National People’s Congress in Beijing, later adding: “Taiwan will eventually return to the embrace of the motherland.”

No Impact: A China will not go to war with Taiwan – peaceful military approach, US deterrence, and risk of economic sanctions.

Scobell and Stevenson-Yang 2022 (“China is Not Russia. Taiwan Is Not Ukraine.” Andrew Scobell, Ph.D.; Lucy Stevenson-Yang, United States Institute of Peace, March 4, 2022, [China Is Not Russia. Taiwan Is Not Ukraine. | United States Institute of Peace](#), VY, *2 page card*)

China Is Not Russia Russia under Putin has repeatedly dispatched its armed forces for combat missions overseas to a range of countries, including Georgia, Syria and Ukraine, as well as conducted major military interventions against other states, most recently Kazakhstan (albeit at the invitation of that country’s president). Moscow has also actively supported armed groups and militias in some of these same countries and others. **Although China has also been active and assertive in the use of its armed forces beyond its borders in recent years, Beijing has eschewed large-scale combat operations.** Around its periphery, China has engaged in provocations, confrontations and even violent clashes. **But China, unlike Russia, has refrained from massive interventions, invasions or occupations of other countries** since it invaded Vietnam in 1979. **China’s largest deployments of troops overseas in the post-Cold War era have been on U.N. Peacekeeping missions.** Whereas Russia has more than 20 military installations beyond its borders, to date, China has only one official military base on foreign soil — in Djibouti (established in 2017) — and a handful of other facilities it does not formally acknowledge. Of course, Beijing has a history of using its potent armed forces and muscular coercive apparatus within China’s borders to repress vigorously peaceful protesters, political dissidents and disaffected ethnic minority peoples. The locations of these operations include Beijing, Tibet and Xinjiang, as well as Hong Kong. China has also not hesitated to employ armed force and a wide array of coercive instruments around its periphery. This includes building roads and bunkers in remote frontier areas of the high Himalayas along its contested border with India and constructing artificial islands and military installations in disputed waters of the South China Sea. In recent years, China’s armed forces have also engaged in deadly clashes and violent confrontations with Indian army units along the disputed Line of Actual Control and harassed and rammed the fishing boats and coast guard vessels of Vietnam, the Philippines and other countries. Putin appears to relish projecting the image of a strongman who is routinely willing to thumb his nose at the rest of the world. By contrast, **Xi — at least to date — has mainly sought to cultivate a statesmanlike image on the global stage. At times he has given speeches attempting to cast China as a more responsible, less meddlesome and values-free version of the United States. And Xi has invested a lot of time and resources in promoting a set of high-profile international efforts intended to demonstrate that China is a constructive and proactive great power.** Employing positive rhetoric touting “win-win” solutions and aspirations to build a “community with a shared future for mankind,” China under Xi’s leadership has launched ambitious efforts such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. Putin, by contrast, has made no real effort to offer an alternative to U.S. global leadership beyond delivering vague grandiose declarations (often in tandem with Xi) and has offered the world little in the way of economic stimulus beyond the prospect of more energy exports and hype about the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). Despite consisting of only a handful of Soviet successor states, the EAEU is touted as Russia’s answer to China’s BRI. In terms of geostrategic activism, Russia’s major multilateralist initiatives have tended to involve China. These include the establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in 2001 and the formation of the BRICS grouping in 2010. The former is a security community with a Central Asian focus consisting of Russia, China and four Central and two South Asian states. The latter is a loose association of some of the world’s largest “emerging economies”: Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. However, Moscow’s most significant geostrategic maneuver under Putin has been to strengthen Russia’s strategic

partnership with China. Both Beijing and Moscow insist that their relationship is not an alliance and their 2001 treaty of friendship — which was renewed in 2021 — does not commit either signatory to come to the defense of the other in case of military conflict. Yet, the Sino-Russian relationship is a clearly consequential alignment that has grown closer in recent years, particularly as their respective relationships with the United States have deteriorated. Russia's invasion of Ukraine has put China in a very uncomfortable position: Beijing does not want to antagonize Moscow but neither does it want to damage its relations with Washington and European capitals. Consequently, China has equivocated in its statements and actions. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi has called for peace but has stopped short of condemning Russia or calling upon Moscow to withdraw its military. The lengthy joint statement of February 4, 2022, issued by Putin and Xi during the Russian leader's visit to Beijing on the eve of the Winter Olympics, makes no mention at all of Ukraine — and China has pointedly abstained on all U.N. Security Council resolutions related to Russia's invasion. Xi appears to have asked Putin to delay any military action against Ukraine until after the Olympics. Russia's invasion poses other difficulties for China both in terms of running counter to Beijing's long espoused principles in foreign affairs and its adverse impact on China's national interests in Ukraine. Russia's actions clearly contradict China's cornerstone foreign policy principles of noninterference in other countries' affairs and respecting territorial integrity. Moreover, China has sizable economic investments in Ukraine and is a good customer of Ukraine's armaments industry. In 2020, Ukraine signed the BRI cooperation agreement, which further bolstered the economic relationship between the two countries and marked Ukraine as an important partner in Beijing's signature foreign policy and economic initiative.

Taiwan Is Not Ukraine The fact that Ukraine is not a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was almost certainly a decisive factor in Putin's calculus to invade Ukraine. Russia's commander in chief knew that his invading forces would likely not have to contend with the militaries of any other countries. And if there were any lingering doubts in the Kremlin about the disposition of the most powerful member of NATO, U.S. President Joe Biden stated publicly that the United States would not send military forces to help defend Ukraine. Nevertheless, the Biden administration has taken strong steps to reinforce NATO allies in Eastern Europe and provide robust military assistance to Ukraine. By contrast, **Xi and his Politburo colleagues have long been convinced that Taiwan has the resolute support of the world's most capable military. The People's Liberation Army** — as all branches of China's armed forces are known — **continues to assume that if it launches an invasion of Taiwan, the U.S. military will swiftly and decisively intervene.** The U.S.-Taiwan relationship, while technically “unofficial” due to the One China policy, has strengthened in recent years. On February 28, **the Biden administration sent an unofficial delegation of former U.S. defense and national security officials to Taiwan as a signal to China of that commitment. It remains true that the greatest deterrence to a massive Chinese military attack on the island is Beijing's assumption that war with Taiwan also means a war with the United States.** However, there is no formal military alliance between the United States and Taiwan. The defense pact binding Washington to Taipei was formally abrogated in 1979. So why is Beijing convinced that Washington has an ironclad alliance-like relationship with Taiwan? There are at least two reasons. First, successive U.S. administrations have publicly committed themselves to support Taiwan against Chinese aggression and have regularly sold arms to the island's armed forces. Second, although there is no language in the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) that explicitly commits the United States to come to Taiwan's defense in the event of an attack on the island by China, many in Washington believe that such a commitment exists. While there are different interpretations as to what the TRA means, the most significant fact is that the vast majority of U.S. political and military leaders are fully convinced that this legislation binds the United States to a de facto alliance with Taiwan. China's increased military assertiveness and greater level of armed provocations in the Taiwan Strait and elsewhere around China's periphery in recent

years have only served to strengthen the conviction in Washington that the island is a staunch democratic partner worthy of U.S. support as it tries to defend tiny Taiwan against efforts by Beijing to coerce the island into unwanted unification with China. However, Taiwan, unlike Ukraine, is not a member of the United Nation. While Ukraine has ambassador-level diplomatic relations with more than 180 countries, including China and the United States, Taiwan only has full diplomatic ties with approximately a dozen countries and none of these are major powers. Yet, thanks to the TRA, Taipei enjoys robust quasi-diplomatic relations with Washington, and thanks to Taiwan's pragmatic ingenuity, the island possesses a vibrant worldwide network of de facto diplomatic missions. Although Ukraine's diplomatic standing is far superior to Taiwan's, the European country's military alliance status is less impressive — Ukraine is not a member of NATO, although it is a very active member of NATO's Partnership for Peace initiative. While Taiwan also has no formal military allies, the island has several close and consequential security partners, most notably the United States. China Is China and Taiwan Is Taiwan Taiwan continues to be the most contentious issue in U.S.-China relations. Moreover, the Taiwan Strait is routinely identified as the most plausible location of a military confrontation between the United States and China. For Xi and his Politburo colleagues, Taiwan looms large and is prominently identified as a "core" national interest of China's, with Xi reiterating in 2021 that "resolving the Taiwan question and realizing China's complete reunification is a historic mission and an unshakable commitment of the Communist Party of China" and that "no one should underestimate the resolve, the will, and the ability of the Chinese people to defend their national sovereignty and territorial integrity." Moreover, most Chinese citizens consider Taiwan to be Chinese territory and view the island as something worth fighting for. Indeed, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has staked its political legitimacy on the ultimate goal of unifying Taiwan with China and in the meantime is working resolutely to prevent the island from becoming de jure independent. Beijing's preferred means of realizing unification or preventing independence is peaceful but the CCP has never renounced the use of armed force. Furthermore, the PLA's central warfighting scenario is Taiwan and China's military has been focused on planning and preparing for an operation against the island for decades. A Cautionary Tale? The above differences notwithstanding, Russia's combat experience in Ukraine will have a spillover impact on how China thinks about Taiwan. If the Russian armed forces remain bogged down in a stalemate in Ukraine for an extended period and/or face a prolonged and widespread insurgency, this may give Xi and his fellow Politburo members pause. If Russia's military experiences major setbacks and perhaps even embarrassing defeats, this may make China's political leaders think twice about the advisability of an invasion of Taiwan. After all, an invasion of Ukraine is relatively straightforward — the country is geographically contiguous to Russia, sharing an extended land border with mostly gentle terrain. By contrast, an invasion of the island of Taiwan is a far more complex operation — a successful campaign requires careful planning and coordinated execution between air, naval and ground forces. It would also involve amphibious landings in addition to considerable urban warfare — on an even larger scale than in Ukraine — including operations on rugged mountainous terrain. Certainly, the PLA will carefully study Russia's Ukrainian campaign and draw lessons from it, much as they have studied campaigns of other major powers. Such analyses are conducted with great seriousness because China's armed forces themselves have not fought a major war since 1979 (when Chinese forces invaded Vietnam) and have not conducted a major island landing campaign since 1950 (against Hainan Island). **One way that China's leadership might be taking notes from Russia's Ukraine invasion is by rethinking the risks associated with escalation.** In addition to noting the potential military embarrassment that Russia is facing, **China might be wary of the sweeping economic sanctions levied by the international community. If China were to receive similar backlash for an invasion of Taiwan, it would raise the possibility of truly crippling sanctions at a time when the Chinese economy is experiencing anemic growth and structural**

challenges. In particular, the weaponization of the SWIFT payments system might give China pause. Russia has been trying to popularize a cross-border financial information transmission system, and China is committed to developing the CIPS payment network, but neither has had significant success outside Russian or Chinese borders. **Despite its flaws, SWIFT remains the most efficient system for international financial transactions for banks and being removed from SWIFT could potentially be devastating to the Chinese economy. Furthermore, the lessons of Russia's invasion of Ukraine to date are that the costs of armed aggression are high in blood and treasure, as well as strong international censure of Moscow and a resolute collective response by NATO member countries.**

2AC Frontline – Nuclear Modernization DA

1. Non-unique: Ukraine disproves – the US has already committed billions in security cooperation this year alone with more to come

Arabia et al 2022

[Arabia: Analyst in Security Assistance, Security Cooperation and the Global Arms Trade; Bowen: Analyst in Russian and European Affairs; Welt: Specialist in Russian and European Affairs. "U.S. Security Assistance to Ukraine" Congressional Research Service. 6-6-22. <https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF12040>]

The United States has been a leading provider of security assistance to Ukraine, both before and after Russia renewed its invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022. From 2014, when Russia first invaded Ukraine, through June 1, 2022, the **United States has provided more than \$7.3 billion** in security assistance **“to help Ukraine preserve its territorial integrity, secure its borders, and improve interoperability with NATO.”** **Since the start of the 2022 war, the Biden Administration has committed a total of more than \$4.6 billion** in security assistance to “provide Ukraine the equipment it needs to defend itself.” FY2022 security assistance **packages are being funded via more than \$23 billion in regular and supplemental appropriations**, including the Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2022 (P.L. 117-103, Division N), and the Additional Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2022 (P.L. 117-128). In total, **FY2022 appropriations include \$12.55 billion to replenish Department of Defense (DOD) equipment stocks sent to Ukraine** via presidential drawdown authority; **\$6.3 billion for DOD’s Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI); and \$4.65 billion in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) for Ukraine and “countries impacted** by the situation in Ukraine.” FY2022 **supplemental appropriations also have included funds for additional U.S. troop deployments to Europe.** Overview of Programs Since 2014, the United States has used a variety of security assistance programs and authorities to help build the defensive capacity of the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) through train, equip, and advise efforts across multiple spending accounts. Prior to the 2022 war, the two primary accounts were the State Department’s FMF (22 U.S.C. §2763) and DOD’s USAI (P.L. 114-92, §1250) (see Table 2). USAI packages have included **training, equipment, and advisory efforts** to enhance Ukraine’s defensive capabilities. FY2022 appropriations also directed that USAI funds be provided for logistics support, supplies, and services; salaries and stipends; sustainment; weapons replacement; and intelligence support. Prior to FY2022, a portion of annual USAI funds was contingent on DOD and State certifying Ukraine’s progress on key defense reforms. The United States also has been providing defense items to Ukraine via Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA), by which the President can authorize the immediate transfer of articles and services from U.S. stocks without congressional approval in response to an “unforeseen emergency” (22 U.S.C. §2318(a)(1)). **Since August 2021, the Biden Administration has authorized 11 drawdowns valued at \$4.26 billion** (see Table 1). **Ukraine also has received** assistance pursuant to DOD’s **security cooperation** authorities, notably Building Partner Capacity (10 U.S.C. §333) and Defense Institution Building (10 U.S.C. §332), and International Military Education and Training (IMET), which has provided professional military education at U.S. defense institutions for Ukrainian military officers. Other State Department- and DOD-funded security assistance has supported conventional weapons destruction, border security, law enforcement training, and counterweapons of mass destruction capabilities.

2. No link: NATO is extremely cheap, and security cooperation makes things cheaper

Díaz-Plaja 2017

[Rubén Díaz-Plaja. Senior Policy Advisor at NATO. "What does NATO need to 'project stability' in its neighbourhood?," Real Instituto Elcano. 5-18-17. <https://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/en/analyses/what-does-nato-need-to-project-stability-in-its-neighbourhood/>]

NATO's partnerships and capacity-building programmes are not resource intensive. This resource use is not likely to change in the near future. In an era of tight budgets, and increased pressure for defence spending, making a case for resource increases is not easy; but at the same time, there is a case to be made for some funding increases will probably be necessary, especially if NATO is to complement its mature support and capacity-building programmes for Eastern European and Balkan nations with increasing attention towards the Middle East and North Africa. NATO's integrated command structure is one of its unique assets. Already, a large part of the day-to-day advisory and training work with partners is conducted by teams of military officers operating out of NATO's commands. As 'projecting stability' is taken forward as an approach, it will be important to think about how this Command Structure's role in 'projecting stability' can evolve. Already, in February 2017, NATO Defence Ministers agreed a new 'Hub for the South', to be based in Naples, which will support NATO's deeper engagement with its Southern flank. Future work on the NATO Command Structure will no doubt provide other opportunities for adjustment. Finally, two key tests for this approach will lie in NATO's ability to work well with others- in particular with national programmes and the programmes of the EU. **There are significant cost savings and synergies that could be generated by aligning NATO programmes more effectively** with bilateral capacity-building and defence assistance programmes offered by Allies and some partners. Some of these programmes might plug well into NATO programmes. **NATO already has a very well developed network** of national education, training and research centres. **A good use of new NATO structures and human resources would be to invest them into** managing clearing houses and networks of **cooperation,** thus **acting as multipliers for national efforts.**

3. No link: There will be no tradeoff - the DoD is flexible and can accommodate the budget item

Bergmann & Schmitt 2021

[Max Bergmann, senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, focuses on European security and U.S.-Russia policy, formerly served in the U.S. Department of State as senior adviser to the assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs and special assistant to the undersecretary for arms control and international security, MA comparative politics, London School of Economics; and Alexandra Schmitt, senior policy analyst on the National Security and International Policy team at the Center for American Progress, MPP Harvard Kennedy School; "A Plan To Reform U.S. Security Assistance," Center For American Progress, 3-9-2021, <https://www.americanprogress.org/article/plan-reform-u-s-security-assistance/>]

DOD officials can work around the State Department's diplomats. In part due to restrictions from the Budget Control Act and **with new programs at the DOD, Pentagon officials had more flexibility on security assistance programs** than their State Department counterparts. **The DOD had budgetary space to reallocate significant funds from the substantial Pentagon budget to respond to sudden emergencies or new crises,** something that is virtually impossible for the State Department, making the DOD often the lead actor in a crisis.⁴⁴ Regional combatant commands aggressively sought more resources from Congress to conduct their own security assistance programs, giving them added flexibility to work with partners in the field

that their State Department counterparts lacked.⁴⁵ A Government Accountability Office report found that 56 DOD security assistance programs do not require any involvement from the State Department.⁴⁶

4. No internal link: Modernization fails – it is unnecessary and useless against emerging tech such as LAWs

Bajema 2021

[Natasha Bajema; July 2; Director of the Converging Risks Lab at the Council on Strategic Risks; IEEE Spectrum. <https://spectrum.ieee.org/2022-united-states-budget-funds-new-icbms-reckless-diversion>; AS]

With the Biden administration’s 2022 defense budget coming in at US \$753 billion, **it’s easy to get diverted by the megaton-sized sum that the United States plans to spend on modernizing its nuclear forces** over the coming decades. But a bigger question about the future of nuclear deterrence arguably looms—namely, **how might** intercontinental ballistic missiles (**ICBMs**) **affect** national security in an era of **emerging tech** threats? Some of those tech threats are not even typically associated with warfare: social media, deepfakes, cyber weapons, machine learning, commercial satellites, and autonomous systems, to name a few. To the surprise of many, President Biden decided in May 2021 to push ahead with a strategic-weapons modernization proposed by past administrations. The centerpiece is a planned replacement for the aging Minuteman III ICBMs called the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD), for which a whopping \$2.6 billion has been pledged to begin development. Given Biden’s promise to take a closer look at reducing the size of the U.S. nuclear arsenal during his campaign, many arms control advocates were stunned by the administration’s full endorsement of the GBSD in the budget. The new land-based missiles are scheduled to replace the 400 Minuteman III missiles deployed under the New Start Treaty in the states of Colorado, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, and Wyoming over the next sixteen years; they will be in active service until sometime in the 2080s, at least. In the lead up to the budget request, experts on both sides of the issue engaged in a spirited debate about the necessity, or lack thereof, for maintaining all three legs of the U.S. nuclear triad—nuclear-armed bombers, land-based ICBMs, and submarine-launched missiles. A recurring theme in these arguments revolves around the role that ICBMs might play in the deterrence equation in the 21st century. And yet, **conspicuously missing from the discussion was sufficient consideration of the dangerous, destabilizing implications for ICBMs and other strategic weapons created by the categories of emerging technologies** indicated above: **cyber weapons, autonomous systems, and so on.** Proponents view ICBMs as a key component of a sound U.S. nuclear deterrent in the future, raising the threshold for nuclear war—and thereby reducing any likelihood of a nuclear attack by an adversary. In an interview, Dr. Brad Roberts, Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy, suggests two scenarios, one without any ICBMs and the other with the current stockpile: “In one, the adversary has the means to eliminate most of the U.S. nuclear force with preemptive attacks on a few submarine and bomber bases, reserving the bulk of its nuclear force for punishment of the U.S. if it retaliates. In the other, the adversary must launch hundreds of nuclear weapons into the American heartland, depleting its arsenal while killing millions. In which scenario can U.S. leaders be expected by enemy leaders to have the political will to retaliate? The latter. The ICBM force helps adversaries to understand that the U.S. will defend its interests if attacked—and thereby to avoid a serious miscalculation.” Other experts vehemently disagree. Former Secretary of Defense Bill Perry has argued that **ICBMs** in particular

are highly unstable, increasing the risk of miscalculation, accidental launch, and thus **nuclear war**. As such, an **enormous program to make new ICBMs is a dangerous enterprise**. In Perry's view it's also an unnecessary expense, especially when the lifetime of existing Minutemen III can be extended until 2030, allowing for these missiles to be phased out in the course of future arms treaties or other weapons-reduction initiatives. However, it still remains unclear whether such life extension would result in any cost savings. Meanwhile, the total costs for the new land-based missiles could reach more than \$264 billion over the course of their development and eventual deployment.

5. No impact: COVID made cuts inevitable, but there's no impact because US deterrence can be maintained at a lower level of funding

Hartung 2020

[April 21, 2020, William D. is the director of the Arms and Security Project at the Center for International Policy. "Now isn't the time to push for nuclear modernization", <https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/04/21/now-isnt-the-time-to-push-for-nuclear-modernization/> RVP]

If the new coronavirus pandemic has taught us one thing, it is that **we need to rethink what we need to do to keep America safe.** That's why Secretary of Defense Mark Esper's recent tweet **calling modernization of U.S. nuclear forces a "top priority ... to protect the American people and our allies" seemed so tone deaf.** **COVID-19 has already killed more** Americans than died in the 9/11 attacks and the Iraq and Afghan wars combined, with projections of many more to come. **The pandemic underscores the need for a systematic, sustainable, long-term investment in public health resources, from protective equipment, to ventilators and hospital beds, to research and planning resources needed to deal with future outbreaks of disease.** As Kori Schake, the director of foreign and defense policy studies at the American Enterprise Institute, has noted: **"We're going to see enormous downward pressure on defense spending because of other urgent American national needs like health care."** And **that's as it should be,** given the relative dangers posed by outbreaks of disease and climate change relative to traditional military challenges. The U.S. nuclear arsenal is particularly ripe for a fresh look. Organizations such as the Arms Control Association and Global Zero have crafted plans that could save hundreds of billions of dollars over the next three decades while maintaining a robust nuclear deterrent. The Global Zero plan is particularly notable in that it calls for the elimination of the intercontinental ballistic missile leg of the nuclear triad, which former Secretary of Defense William Perry has described as "some of the most dangerous weapons in the world." ICBMs are dangerous because of the short decision time a president would have to decide whether to launch them in a crisis to avoid having them wiped out in a perceived first strike — a matter of minutes. This reality greatly increases the prospect of an accidental nuclear war based on a false warning of attack. **This is a completely unnecessary risk given that the other two legs of the nuclear triad — ballistic missile submarines and nuclear-armed bombers — are more than sufficient to deter a nuclear attack, or to retaliate, should the unlikely scenario of a nuclear attack on the United States occur.** Restructuring the U.S. nuclear arsenal would open the way to invest substantial sums the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, state and local public health agencies, and the World Health Organization, which will be on the front lines in preventing or mitigating any future mass outbreak of disease. In the long-term, over the next three decades, buying and maintaining new nuclear-armed missiles, submarines, bombers, and warheads could cost an astonishing \$1.5 to \$2 trillion. And President Donald Trump's latest budget proposal, released earlier this year, called for an increase of nearly 20% in spending on nuclear weapons while cutting funds for the CDC, WHO, and other public health agencies. Eliminating ICBMs and reducing the size of the U.S. arsenal will face strong opposition in Washington, both from strategists who maintain that the nuclear triad should be sacrosanct, and from special interests that benefit from excess spending on nuclear weapons. The Senate ICBM Coalition, composed of senators from states with ICBM bases or substantial ICBM development and maintenance work, has been particularly effective in fending any changes in ICBM policy, from reducing the size of the force to merely studying alternatives, whether those alternatives are implemented or not. Meanwhile, Northrop Grumman — currently the sole bidder for the new ICBM program — has announced that it expects to have hundreds of subcontractors spread throughout the United States for its work on the new system, known formally as the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent. The company also claims that the next phase of the work could create 10,000 jobs. That's a tiny fraction of national employment but will pack a political punch among members of Congress whose states or districts benefit from ICBM-related employment. **Now is the time to reduce our bloated nuclear arsenal and invest in more urgent security priorities. Deterrence can be sustained at lower levels of spending, but a robust public health system needs considerably more resources. It's a trade-off that can and should be made.**

2AC Frontline-US Unilateral CP

1. Perm do both – NATO is purely transactional to US military interests.

Thimm 2018 (“NATO: US Strategic Dominance and Unequal Burden-Sharing Are Two Sides of the Same Coin, Johannes Thimm, PhD, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, 04.09.2018, [NATO: US Strategic Dominance and Unequal Burden-Sharing Are Two Sides of the Same Coin](#), VY)

The asymmetry in NATO contributions between the United States and Europa is no accident, Johannes Thimm writes. Europeans should not be too alarmed about President Trump’s threats to withdraw from the alliance – and instead follow their own priorities. US President Donald Trump accuses Europe of exploiting the United States, because most NATO members, including Germany, spend less than 2 percent of their GDP on defense. He calls for a significant increase in defense budgets – most recently to 4 percent of GDP, and threatens that the US will otherwise abandon its alliance commitments. **It is true that Europe benefits from American security guarantees, and the diagnosis of European “free-riding” is not completely unfounded either. However, this does not mean that the US is being taken advantage of.** There are three important arguments here: **NATO provides practical support and legitimacy to US supremacy First, even if NATO is viewed in purely transactional terms, leaving aside values like solidarity among allies, it is a good deal for Washington.** Americans calling for more equal burden-sharing, including Trump himself, suggest that the US supports NATO mostly for altruistic reasons. In other words that America is doing Europe a favor. But this picture is incomplete. **For the US military, NATO is a force multiplier, providing legitimacy to American power.** European allies are engaged in numerous missions like Afghanistan, while **the United States mostly calls the shots.** US bases in Europe not only protect European allies, but serve as logistics hubs to project power into the Middle East. These are assets the US military would not want to give up.

2. Perm do the aff – NATO just proves legitimacy, but acts in the U.S.’s interests.

Shiffrinson 2021 (“The Dominance Dilemma: The American Approach to NATO and its Future,” Joshua R. Shiffrinson, Non-Resident Fellow at the Quincy Institute and Assistant Professor with the Pardee School of Global Studies at Boston University, January 28, 2021, [The Dominance Dilemma: The American Approach to NATO and its Future - Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft](#), VY)

Introduction Since its creation in the early days of the Cold War, American policymakers have been of two minds about the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). **Seeking to project American power and influence in Europe and gain legitimacy for U.S. ambitions, policy planners have seen NATO as a useful vehicle for organizing Europe in ways conducive to broader American interests.** At the same time, the United States has proven reluctant to pay or risk too much to achieve this result. For a country that is secure at home, **influence in Europe is desirable for some** but of dubious necessity. These contradictory impulses have been reflected not only in the variety of America’s approaches to the alliance over time, but also in the attitudes of different policymakers. Now, having successfully helped to foster an unprecedented level of European stability and security, and facing growing pressure to reduce America’s strategic burdens, **American strategists in the years ahead must be prepared to revisit the fundamentals of the U.S. presence in Europe and devolve authority to local actors.**

3. Counterplan can't solve the aff: NATO is uniquely positioned to regulate AI in weapon systems. Past standards have proven that NATO regulations will be effective and set international standards.

Stanley-Lockman and Trabucco 2022 (“NATO’s Role in Responsible AI Governance in Military Affairs,” Zoe Stanley-Lockman, previously an Associate Research Fellow at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, and Lena Trabucco, Postdoctoral Researcher at the Centre for Military Studies at the University of Copenhagen, The Oxford Handbook of AI Governance, Mar 2022, [NATO’s Role in Responsible AI Governance in Military Affairs](#), VY)

One vital and unique contribution for NATO is facilitating legal interoperability among the Allies to resolve some of the most pressing legal barriers for AI implementation in future Allied operations. Legal interoperability, a subset of larger coalition interoperability, refers to the operational coordination around partner legal obligations and interpretations.⁷⁵ It ensures “that within a military alliance, military operations can be conducted effectively consistent with the legal obligations of each nation.”⁷⁶ Legal interoperability is a critical component of multilateral operations that has thus far been under-examined, despite its centrality to successful military operations. This is largely because “legal factors have a bearing on everything in alliances and coalition operations—from determining basic ‘troop-to-task’ considerations to decisions regarding the targets to be engaged—and the types of ordinances that may be used.”⁷⁷ **To enhance legal interoperability, NATO can exert its influence on how Allies can develop and deploy AI consistent with their legal obligations through its unique standardization capacities.** Historically, NATO has taken significant steps to bridge the legal gap between Allies on critical procedures that bridge responsible state behavior with such “troop-to-task” considerations. One instructive example from past operations is detention policies in non-international armed conflicts.⁷⁸ **The promulgation of detention standards illustrates the operational significance of NATO’s common legal procedures,** even for coalitions of the willing that formally operate outside NATO structures. By way of background, the U.S.-led coalition in Afghanistan had internal debates regarding the 96-hour security detention time period.⁷⁹ The United States advocated extending the 96-hour rule, where coalition partners insisted adhering to the NATO standard, even though it was not a NATO operation.⁸⁰ Generally the detention example illustrates NATO legal standards providing clarity to non-NATO operations; in some cases, **Allies adopt NATO standards as accepted thresholds that continue to inform coalition policies beyond NATO structures and operations.** Implementing AI in future military operations will almost certainly complicate legal interoperability as there is a lack of uniform standards, as in the detention example. Even some of the more basic implementation measures will garner legal uncertainty and Allies will inevitably navigate with minimal legal clarity and no standard procedures. Despite the roots of the legal debate stemming from the question of lethality, the most pressing (and urgent) legal issues will address the integration of necessary AI-enablers, such as data gathering and sharing. Furthermore, **NATO has coordinated initiatives to promote awareness of Allies’ legal obligations and has a dedicated office focusing on legality.** This centralizes the institutional capacity to focus on alignment not only between the policies of NATO Allies, but coherence with the international community more broadly. Among others, the NATO Legal Practitioners’ Workshop and inter-organizational dialogue between NATO, the UN, and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the latter of which has a delegation to NATO that provides legal training and education to practitioners.⁸¹ The NATO Office of Legal Affairs (OLA) itself can also play a central role in navigating the challenges to legal interoperability. As the example of detention standards illustrates, **NATO has been successful in implementing legal standards which translated into operational clarity and coalition policy outside NATO**

operations. As part of its focus on responsibility in its EDT agenda, NATO has opportunities to facilitate AI legal standard-setting and coalition policies to ensure safer and responsible use of AI in Allied operations.

4. The counterplan links to the net benefit:

The Russia DA: Russia will still see the counterplan as NATO imperial ambitions because the US is the leader of NATO and their adversary.

The China DA: Since the US is the largest contributor to NATO, the CP will also cause a lack of focus and resources to focus on China.

Nuclear Mod DA: Since the US would still need to spend the time and money to implement the plan, doing the CP will not make LAW restrictions any easier. Working with NATO would help share the burden.

1AR Answer to Consensus

NATO has an excellent track-record of reaching consensus. This is a democratic tool, not a solvency deficit.

Skaluba and Rodihan 2022 (“No consensus? No problem. Why NATO is still effective.” Christopher Skaluba, the Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and previously served as principal director for European and NATO policy in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and Conor Rodihan, associate director in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security’s Transatlantic Security Initiative, January 18, 2022, [No consensus? No problem. Why NATO is still effective. - Atlantic Council](#), VY)

Critics of the alliance (and even some supporters) have interpreted NATO’s unwillingness to militarily support Ukraine—especially during the most significant challenge to the European security order since the Cold War—as an indicator of its declining relevance, timidity, or its divisions. But that overstates **the importance of political consensus to NATO’s value and understates its role as an effective** and flexible defensive alliance. This is a role with potentially critical benefits for Ukraine. First, it sets too high a bar for an alliance of thirty members with aligned, but distinct, priorities. Unanimity on every issue is impossible, let alone one as complex as military support to Ukraine. **Debate and disagreement, as it should be for any democratic institution, are built-in features of NATO—not bugs. In reality, it’s astounding how often NATO does reach consensus about issues big and small, creating an unrealistic expectation that it always will.** The opposite of consensus is not failure. Suggesting otherwise turns any debate that doesn’t end harmoniously into an indictment of NATO, playing straight into Russian propaganda. Second, **a belief that NATO’s value is tied primarily to achieving consensus on every issue misses the more mundane (and important) ways it supports its allies and partners. Its affinity for process—particularly its ability to build a common situational understanding among its members—is an invaluable tool. Habits of consultation and information sharing, buttressed by deep cooperation on operations, intelligence sharing, defense planning, and interoperability, create the foundation upon which any consensus is to be built. Even in the absence of that agreement, the ability to collectively define threats and jointly train to confront them is immensely valuable in its own right.** Third, these habits of cooperation give NATO members the flexibility to act outside of the Alliance’s frameworks. While NATO does much by consensus—such as its missions in the Baltic states—the skills it helps members develop is central to enabling them to form separate coalitions for action. This happened recently with ample success in taking on the Islamic State. **Such flexibility should be a point in NATO’s favor,** not evidence of its ineptitude.

2AC Frontline–Topicality

1. We Meet - The proliferation of LAWS is relatively new and have mainly taken place in the past two years. This is why we need to act now with the aff.

2. Counter Interpretation - “Increase” doesn’t require prior existence

Reinhardt 2005

[U.S. Judge for the UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT (Stephen, JASON RAY REYNOLDS; MATTHEW RAUSCH, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. HARTFORD FINANCIAL SERVICES GROUP, INC.; HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendants-Appellees., lexis]

Specifically, we must decide whether charging a higher price for initial insurance than the insured would otherwise have been charged because of information in a consumer credit report constitutes an "increase in any charge" within the meaning of FCRA. First, we examine the definitions of "increase" and "charge." Hartford Fire contends that, limited to their ordinary definitions, these words apply only when a consumer has previously been charged for insurance and that charge has thereafter been increased by the insurer. The phrase, "has previously been charged," as used by Hartford, refers not only to a rate that the consumer has previously paid for insurance but also to a rate that the consumer has previously been quoted, even if that rate was increased [**23] before the consumer made any payment. Reynolds disagrees, asserting that, under [*1091] **the ordinary definition of the term, an increase in a charge also occurs whenever an insurer charges a higher rate than it would otherwise have charged because of any factor**--such as adverse credit information, age, or driving record 8 --**regardless of whether the customer was previously charged some other rate.** According to Reynolds, he was charged an increased rate because of his credit rating when he was compelled to pay a rate higher than the premium rate because he failed to obtain a high insurance score. Thus, he argues, the definitions of "increase" and "charge" encompass the insurance companies' practice. Reynolds is correct. **“Increase” means to make something greater.** See, e.g., OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989) ("The action, process, or fact of becoming or making greater; augmentation, growth, enlargement, extension."); WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN ENGLISH (3d college ed. 1988) (defining "increase" as "growth, enlargement, etc[.]"). "Charge" means the price demanded for goods or services. See, e.g., OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989) ("The price required or demanded for service rendered, or (less usually) for goods supplied."); WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN ENGLISH (3d college ed. 1988) ("The cost or price of an article, service, etc."). **Nothing in the definition of t** these words implies that the term **"increase** in any charge for" **should be limited to cases in which a company raises the rate that an individual has previously been charged.**

3. Prefer our interpretation – Standards:

A. Ground – new regulations are important affirmative ground. The negative’s interpretation destroys affirmative ground and does not garner good negative ground either. New regulations give important stable negative links.

B. Limits – only increasing existing regulation is over-limiting. There have been few effective restrictions on artificial intelligence, which is why we need the affirmative.

4. Voters:

A. Education – nearly any affirmative is going to be a new regulation in AI or cybersecurity. Understanding the need for creating new regulations in the area of LAWS is an important part of the topic and the educational value of debate.

B. Literature checks limits and ground loss – affirmatives have to have a solvency advocate based in the topic literature

C. Reasonability – The affirmative only must be reasonably close to the topic to allow for educational debates. If we are close to the topic, it is not a reason to reject the affirmative.

LAWs Case Negative

Negative

1NC Russia Advantage Answers Frontline

1. Russia has been clear that they will not follow any ban or regulation on LAWs.

Tucker 2017 ("Russia to the United Nations: Don't Try to Stop Us From Building Killer Robots," Patrick Tucker, technology editor for Defense One, November 21, 2017, [Russia to the United Nations: Don't Try to Stop Us From Building Killer Robots - Defense One](#), VY)

Arms control advocates had reason for hope when scores of countries met at the United Nations in Geneva last week to discuss the future of lethal autonomous weapons systems, or LAWs. Unlike previous meetings, this one involved a Group of Governmental Experts, a big bump in diplomatic formality and consequence, and those experts had a mandate to better define lethal autonomy in weapons. **But hopes for even a small first step toward restricting "killer robots" were dashed as the meeting unfolded. Russia announced that it would adhere to no international ban, moratorium or regulation on such weapons.** Complicating the issue, the meeting was run in a way that made any meaningful progress toward defining (and thus eventually regulating) LAWs nearly impossible. Multiple attendees pointed out that that played directly toward Russia's interests. **Russia's Nov. 10 statement amounts to a lawyerly attempt to undermine any progress toward a ban. It argues that defining "lethal autonomous robots" is too hard, not yet necessary, and a threat to legitimate technology development.** "According to the Russian Federation, the lack of working samples of such weapons systems remains the main problem in the discussion on LAWs...this can hardly be considered as an argument for taking preventive prohibitive or restrictive measures against LAWs being a by far more complex and wide class of weapons of which the current understanding of humankind is rather approximate," **it** says and **goes on to warn that too much effort to ban lethal robots could have an unintended chilling effect on AI generally. "The difficulty of making a clear distinction between civilian and military developments of autonomous systems based on the same technologies is still an essential obstacle in the discussion on LAWs. It is hardly acceptable for the work on LAWs to restrict the freedom to enjoy the benefits of autonomous technologies being the future of humankind."** An attendee who did not feel comfortable providing a name on the record, given the highly sensitive nature of the talks, said that **"the Russians are not interested in making progress on this."** When asked if the lack of progress during the meeting, an effect of the unusual way the meeting was run, seemed to serve Russia's interests, the participant responded: "Yes, of course."

<2. *Russia does not currently have operating LAWs. This means that LAWs won't cause escalation in Ukraine.*>

3. Turn: An increase in NATO cooperation is what causes escalation in Ukraine.

O'Connor and Jamali 2022 ("Russia Could Launch Cyber Attacks Against U.S. if Biden Sends Wrong Signals, Intel Warns," Tom O'Connor And Naveed Jamali, 1/24/22, [Russia Could Launch Cyber Attacks Against U.S. if Biden Sends Wrong Signals, Intel Warns](#), VY, *2 page card*)

In a new memo obtained by Newsweek, **the Department of Homeland Security has warned of Russia's potential to launch cyberattacks against the United States in response to a possible escalation of the crisis unfolding at the border with Ukraine. "We assess that Russia would consider initiating a cyber attack against the Homeland if it perceived a US or NATO response to a possible Russian invasion of Ukraine threatened its long-term national security."** the memo, dated January 23 and attributed to the Office of Intelligence and Analysis, reads in bold text. The warning came as President Joe Biden sent additional weapons to Ukrainian forces and reportedly weighed the option of sending thousands of U.S. troops to the Baltic states bordering Russia over concerns that Moscow was planning imminent military action against Ukraine. Kyiv has defied the Kremlin's protests by seeking membership in the NATO Western military alliance, something that Russian officials have said threatened their country's national security. The bloc has expanded eastward since the fall of the Soviet Union three decades ago and has refused to rule out including Ukraine as well. **The memo detailed a range of ways in which Russia may choose to unleash its cyber arsenal in the event of a flare-up** while noting such an action would be unprecedented. "Russia maintains a range of offensive cyber tools that it could employ against US networks — from low-level denials-of-service to destructive attacks targeting critical infrastructure," the memo read. "However, we assess that Russia's threshold for conducting disruptive or destructive cyber attacks in the Homeland probably remains very high and we have not observed Moscow directly employ these types of cyber attacks against US critical infrastructure — notwithstanding cyber espionage and potential prepositioning operations in the past." Reached for comment, a spokesperson for the Department of Homeland Security told Newsweek said it "regularly shares information with federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial officials and the private sector to ensure the safety and security of all communities across the country." "We have increased operational partnerships between private sector companies and the federal government to strengthen our nation's cyber defenses, including through CISA's newly established Joint Cyber Defense Collaborative (JCDC)," the spokesperson said. "The JCDC brings these partners together to help us understand the full threat landscape and enable real-time collaboration to empower our private sector partners to gain information and take action against the most significant threats to the nation." The memo, which was first reported on by CNN, has already generated reactions from experts and former officials, some of whom expressed concern that a wider conflagration could erupt. Alexander Vindman, a retired U.S. Army lieutenant colonel who served as director for European Affairs at the National Security Council under former President Donald Trump, said the Biden administration has tried to "keep the U.S. out of bilateral confrontation" with Russia, and "that's why they kind of took this approach limited to diplomacy" as the U.S. leader ruled out the deployment of U.S. soldiers to Ukraine itself. "Already we see that's eroding," Vindman, who was reassigned from his position in early 2020 following his testimony to lawmakers regarding a controversial call between Trump and Ukrainian counterpart Volodymyr Zelensky, told Newsweek. "Already we see the risks in a full-spectrum type of scenario, starting out

kind of low-end with regards to cyber operations, those risks are increasing." **And if these risks turn kinetic, he warned such an escalation could pass the point of no return.** "Once the shots are fired, there is no putting the genie back in the bottle," Vindman said. One former U.S. intelligence analyst said Russian President Vladimir Putin was likely calculating these risks as he planned his next moves vis-à-vis the situation in Ukraine and deterring U.S. actions. "Russia certainly has the ability to carry out cyber attacks against U.S. systems, but also very much wants to avoid direct confrontation with the United States through deliberate acts that might result in their loss of 'escalation control,'" the former intelligence analyst told Newsweek. "Attacks targeting U.S. critical infrastructure systems would almost certainly prompt more serious reprisals from the Biden administration, something Putin wants to avoid, as he'll likely seek to keep conflict confined to Ukraine." Given past cyber attacks Washington has attributed to Moscow and the current level of escalation, however, others emphasized a need to reinforce digital defenses. "Russia has telegraphed that they are willing to attack critical infrastructure here in the U.S.," Brian Harrell, who served as former Department of Homeland Security Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection before his resignation in August 2020, told Newsweek. "The private sector should work to understand enemy tactics, including spear-phishing and brute force attacks while conducting proactive threat hunting efforts," he added. "We have absolutely entered a heightened period of awareness given the threats that have been made and the demonstrated attacks we've seen from the Russian GRU and Foreign Intelligence Service." Mike McNerney, who serves as senior vice president of security at Resilience Insurance, a San Francisco-based firm that offers cybersecurity and insurance services, commended the Department of Homeland Security's Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency for having set out to prepare the private sector for such attacks, regardless of their origin. "CISA is absolutely doing the right thing by telling US companies to be prepared against cyber threats," McNerney told Newsweek. "While Russia is unlikely to escalate tensions with the U.S. right now by launching cyber attacks here, there is also the possibility of opportunistic attacks from criminal groups." Kyiv has already accused Moscow of employing covert cyber tactics throughout the course of the current dispute, which first began to grab global attention in March of last year and then again in November as up to 100,000 Russian troops amassed near the country's restive border with Ukraine, where Russia-aligned separatists have been active since 2014. An apparent cyber attack gripped the post-Soviet Eastern European state earlier this month, but Russian officials have dismissed any allegations their government was behind the incident. "We are nearly accustomed to the fact that Ukrainians are blaming everything on Russia, even their bad weather," Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov told reporters last week, according to the state-run Tass Russian News Agency. As Washington and Moscow struggle to find common ground in talks, the Biden administration has also publicly the likelihood of Russia waging cyberwarfare, though often in the context of actions that would target Ukraine itself. In an interview with NBC News on Sunday, Secretary of State Antony Blinken warned that "in the event that there is a renewed Russian incursion, Russian forces going into Ukraine, there is going to be a swift, a severe, and united response" and also threatened such a reaction in response to other things "Russia could do short of sending forces into Ukraine again to try to destabilize or topple the government – cyber attacks, hybrid means, et cetera." In Ukraine, officials have sought to downplay the threat of any major escalation on the horizon, even as three embassies in Kyiv, those of Australia, the United Kingdom and the U.S., sent diplomats out of the country. On Monday, Ukrainian National Security Council Secretary Alexey Danilov called on those in the media "to turn down the heat." That same day, Peskov too criticized what he called "information hysteria" when it came to the situation between Russia and Ukraine. **He placed the blame on the U.S. and NATO, however, and said Western powers were also responsible for real-world provocations as well. "As for concrete actions, we see the statements**

published by NATO about the increase of the contingent and relocations of forces and means to the eastern flank," Peskov said. "All this leads to an escalation of tensions."

<4. ANALYTIC: Restrictions on LAWs won't solve quickly enough. The Ukraine crisis is happening now, not some time in the distant future. This means the aff can't solve. Either escalation is inevitable or it won't escalate.>

5. The conflict in Ukraine won't escalate, Russia won't use nuclear weapons, and there will be no draw-in. History proves.

Rose 2022 ("Why the War in Ukraine Won't Go Nuclear," Gideon Rose, Distinguished Fellow in U.S. Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations and the author of How Wars End, April 25, 2022, [Why the War in Ukraine Won't Go Nuclear | Foreign Affairs](#), VY)

As the fighting grinds on, however, **the war is looking more familiar and increasingly resembles many other conflicts over the last seven decades. This suggests that general, structural features of the situation are imposing themselves on the belligerents, guiding their choices into surprisingly well-worn grooves. Ukraine, in short, is following the pattern of limited war in the nuclear age, echoing a script written in Korea and copied many times since. This is not a new era, only a new phase in the old one. And even the new phase is playing by the same old rules—with significant implications for the remainder of the war and beyond.** IT FEELS LIKE THE FIRST TIME In the late 1940s, U.S. policymakers faced an unprecedented problem: what do you do with weapons that can destroy the world? Throughout history, states had settled their biggest differences through war. But over time, the wars had gotten more and more destructive, culminating in the total war just ended—which had itself culminated in the dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, destroying entire cities in a single blast. Nobody knew what would come next. Breaking the cycle of war seemed impossible. Continuing it seemed unthinkable. Tensions ratcheted up further when the Soviet Union got the bomb in 1949. And then, in June 1950, North Korean forces invaded South Korea. Washington and its allies quickly jumped in on Seoul's side, facing off against Moscow, which along with Beijing was backing Pyongyang. How would war play out in the nuclear age? Now the question would be answered. For three years, as brutal fighting raged up and down the Korean peninsula, the two sides gradually felt each other out and tacitly settled on rules of the road for the new epoch. Neither of the nuclear powers wanted another total war, so both put strict limits on the conflict's means, ends, and scope. They chose not to use nuclear weapons. They chose not to attack each other's territory or regime, keeping the fighting to the Koreans. And beyond that, the war was allowed to proceed conventionally, as viciously as the belligerents wanted. These rules weren't read out of a book or arrived at through negotiations. They weren't followed out of faith, or hope, or charity. They were rooted in practicality. Policymakers in Moscow and Washington had to make crucial decisions in real time about how to pursue their objectives during the war, and the logic inherent in the situation made some courses of action much more attractive than others. Nuclear weapons, for all their power—because of all their power—turned out to be surprisingly powerless. Using them would carry many costs and bring few benefits. It would create more problems than it solved. And so neither superpower did it. A decade later, the Cuban missile crisis reinforced the growing taboo against nuclear use and left the parties still more risk averse. Then Vietnam followed the same pattern as Korea. None of the nuclear powers, now including China, used nuclear weapons. None attacked another nuclear power's territory or regime. And beyond that, anything went. The same rules held in the Gulf War, the Iraq War, and the Soviet and American wars in Afghanistan. They held for conflicts involving nuclear powers elsewhere (apart from some minor skirmishing). And they are holding now in Ukraine. HOW THIS ENDS **Russia's plan A was to conquer Ukraine quickly, install a friendly government, and present the world with a fait accompli. When that was blocked by determined military resistance, Moscow turned to plan B, pounding cities from a distance and trying to crush Ukrainian morale.** When that didn't work either, the Kremlin turned to plan C, abandoning the attempt to seize the whole country and refocusing on trying to capture and hold a swath of territory in the east and south. The coming battles in the Donbas will be crucial in shaping the outcome, but already much can be said about how this war will end. **The struggle will either conclude with a negotiated settlement involving a territorial status quo ante, or it will**

subside into a frozen conflict along the armies' stalemated line of contact in the east. That is, the war's end will resemble those in the Korean and Gulf Wars or the situation in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transnistria. Either way, as in Korea, the shock of the initial aggression has galvanized a broader balancing coalition that will remain even when the fighting stops. **Russia chose a hot war and will get a cold one in the bargain. Whatever some interpretations of Russian military doctrine might suggest, Moscow will not use nuclear weapons during the conflict.** Since 1945, every leader of a nuclear power, from homespun politicians such as U.S. Presidents Harry Truman and Lyndon Johnson to mass-murdering sociopaths such as Joseph Stalin and Mao Zedong, has rejected the use of nuclear weapons in battle for excellent reasons. Putin will be no exception, acting not from a soft heart but a hard head. **He knows that extraordinary retaliation and universal opprobrium would follow, with no remotely comparable strategic upsides to justify them—not to mention the fact that the radioactive fallout from such use might easily blow back onto Russia itself. For related reasons, NATO will not attack Russia or try to decapitate the Russian regime so as to avoid making Putin desperate. There will be no introduction of NATO troops, no no-fly zone, and no hot pursuit of Russian forces should they withdraw back into home territory.** All these actions would carry major risks of escalation, which NATO wants to avoid as much as Moscow. Conversely, NATO will feel compelled to deny Moscow a significant victory, not just for Ukraine's sake but to avoid setting the dangerous precedent that nuclear weapons are useful for protecting the ill-gotten gains of conventional aggression.

1NC Proliferation Advantage Answers Frontline

1. Safeguards prevent any terrible impacts from lethal autonomous weapons.

Scharre 2017 ("Why You Shouldn't Fear "Slaughterbots" A dystopian future in which killer robots are massacring innocents is terrifying, but let's be clear: It's very much science fiction," Paul Scharre, the vice president and director of studies at the Center for a New American Security. From 2009-2012, Scharre led the Defense Department's working group that resulted in the DoD policy directive on autonomy in weapons, 22 Dec 2017, [Why You Shouldn't Fear "Slaughterbots" - IEEE Spectrum](#), VY)

First, there is no evidence that governments are planning to mass-produce small drones to kill civilians in large numbers. In my forthcoming book, *Army of None: Autonomous Weapons and the Future of War*, I examine next-generation weapons being built in defense labs around the world. Russia, China, and the United States are all racing ahead on autonomy and artificial intelligence. But **the types of weapons they are building are generally aimed at fighting other militaries. They are "counter-force" weapons, not "counter-value" weapons that would target civilians. Counter-force autonomous weapons raise their own sets of concerns, but they aren't designed for mass targeting of civilians, nor could they be easily repurposed to do so.** Second, in the video, we're told the drones can defeat "any countermeasure." TV pundits scream, "We can't defend ourselves." This isn't fiction; it's farce. **Every military technology has a countermeasure, and countermeasures against small drones aren't even hypothetical. The U.S. government is actively working on ways to shoot down, jam, fry, hack, ensnare, or otherwise defeat small drones.** The microdrones in the video could be defeated by something as simple as chicken wire. The video shows heavier-payload drones blasting holes through walls so that other drones can get inside, but the solution is simply layered defenses. **Military analysts look at the cost-exchange ratio between offense and defense, and in this case, the costs heavily favor static defenders.** In a world where terrorists launch occasional small-scale attacks using DIY drones, people are unlikely to absorb the inconveniences of building robust defenses, just like people don't wear body armor to protect against the unlikely event of being caught in a mass shooting. But if an enemy country built hundreds of thousands of drones to wipe out a city, you bet there'd be a run on chicken wire. The video takes a plausible problem—terrorist attacks with drones—and scales it up without factoring in how others would respond. **If lethal microdrones were built en masse, defenses and countermeasures would be a national priority, and in this case the countermeasures are simple. Any weapon that can be defeated by a net isn't a weapon of mass destruction.** Third, the video assumes that militaries are incapable of preventing terrorists from getting access to military-grade weapons. But we don't give terrorists hand grenades, rocket launchers, or machine guns today. Terrorist attacks with drones are a concern precisely because they involve DIY explosives strapped to readily available technology. This is a genuine problem, but again the video scales this threat up in ways that are unrealistic. **Even if militaries were to build lethal microdrones, terrorists are no more likely to get their hands on large numbers of them than other military technologies. Weapons do proliferate over time to nonstate actors in war zones, but just because antitank guided missiles are prevalent in Syria doesn't mean they're commonplace in New York.** Terrorists use airplanes and trucks for attacks precisely because successfully smuggling military-grade weapons into a Western country isn't that easy. Fourth, the video assumes terrorists can carry out coordinated attacks at a scale that is not plausible. In one scene, two men release a swarm of about 50 drones from the

back of a van. This specific scene is fairly realistic; one of the challenges of autonomy is that a small group of people could launch a larger attack than might otherwise be possible. Something like a truck full of 50 drones is a reasonable possibility. Again, though, the video takes this scenario to the absurd. The video claims that 8,300 people are killed in simultaneous attacks. If the men in the van depict a typical attack, then this level of casualties would equate to over 160 coordinated attacks worldwide. **Terrorist groups often launch coordinated attacks, but usually on the scale of single digit numbers of attacks.** The video assumes not just superweapons but ones that are in the hands of supervillains.

<2. Either safeguards solve or China will have incentive to cheat. This is a double-bind. Either way the affirmative does not solve.>

3. Huge impacts from killer robots is hyped and unlikely.

Devlin 2018 (“Killer robots will only exist if we are stupid enough to let them,” Hannah Devlin, PhD in biomedical imaging from the University of Oxford, 11 Jun 2018, [Killer robots will only exist if we are stupid enough to let them](#), VY)

The idea of killer robots rising up and destroying humans is a Hollywood fantasy and a distraction from the more pressing dilemmas that intelligent machines present to society, according to one of Britain’s most influential computer scientists. Sir Nigel Shadbolt, professor of computer science at the University of Oxford, predicts that AI will bring overwhelming benefits to humanity, revolutionising cancer diagnosis and treatment, and transforming education and the workplace. **If problems arise, he said, it will not be because sentient machines have unexpectedly gone rogue in a Terminator-like scenario. “The danger is clearly not that robots will decide to put us away and have a robot revolution,” he said. “If there [are] killer robots, it will be because we’ve been stupid enough to give it the instructions or software for it to do that without having a human in the loop deciding.”** Prof Shadbolt made the comments ahead of a talk at the CogX conference in London on Monday, at which a number of leading figures are presenting on the latest developments in AI and their potential impact. Jürgen Schmidhuber, **a German computer scientist** and a pioneer of modern machine learning, **was also dismissive of the idea that the dawn of AI could result in doom for humankind. “The entertainment industry is powerful at planting these ideas in your heads, but actually the plots in these movies are really silly.”** he said.

<4. The countries that the affirmative is worried about proliferating are countries outside of NATO. Mean the aff can’t solve.>

5. Turn: China sees increasing military AI as part of its strategy to beat the U.S. in military strength. They only have incentive to avoid NATO regulations that will hamper the U.S. and allow them more ground.

Jing 2021 ("How Does China Aim to Use AI in Warfare?," Yuan-Chou Jing, colonel and associate professor at the Graduate Institute of China Military Affairs Studies (GICMAS), NDU, Taiwan, December 28, 2021, [How Does China Aim to Use AI in Warfare? – The Diplomat](#), VY)

Having observed U.S. theater operations and war campaigns for more than three decades, the **leaders of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) are keenly aware of the huge disparity between its capabilities and those of the U.S. military in information and communication technology (ICT)**, and the gap seems unlikely to be eliminated in the near future. Aside from ICT, cutting-edge technologies, also called **disruptive technology, including artificial intelligence (AI), quantum, big data, cloud computing and the Internet of Things are all becoming relevant to the military domain. AI in particular is seen as a "game-changing" critical strategic technology; increased machine speed and processing power are expected to be applied to military planning, operational command and decision support as part of the "intelligentization" of warfare. AI is most meaningful to the PLA as it provides an opportunity for Beijing to compete with Washington on an even footing to develop an emerging technology.** China's AI policy was first described in "The Development Plan on the New Generation of Artificial Intelligence," issued by the State Council in 2017, the plan named using military-civilian fusion (MCF) as one of the "Main Duties" for AI development. MCF is being used as an approach to develop AI on the basis of **China's belief that it can accomplish "corner-overtaking" to surpass the United States. As Xi Jinping outlined** in his work report to the 19th Party Congress in October 2017, **the PLA must "accelerate the development of military intelligentization, [and] improve joint operations capabilities and all-domain combat capabilities** based on network information systems" **to fulfill China's military development aims. The remark reflects Xi's determination to elevate the concept of intelligentization as a guideline for future Chinese military modernization.** Echoing this, a 2019 defense white paper called attention to the changing landscape of modern warfare, stating that "the evolution of warfare nowadays is opening up toward an informationized mode, indicating a horizon of intelligentized warfare on the rise." Meanwhile, in line with the Third Offset Strategy, the U.S. subsequently opts for AI to develop brand-new battle modes such as swarm and centaur. Beijing is certainly aware of these U.S. strategic moves, the 2019 defense white paper also expressed its vivid concern that "U.S. is engaging in technological and institutional innovation in pursuit of absolute military superiority." The PLA's Views on Intelligentized Warfare In an article published after the Fifth Plenary Session of the 19th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, Xu Qiliang, vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission, noted that as the **PLA has entered the era of intelligentization, it must promote the integrated development of the "three modernizations" of mechanization, informatization, and intelligentization.** Xu also emphasized the need for China to "broaden strategic thinking and accelerate the transition from adapting to the way of operations passively to designing it proactively." Xu's statements show that China aims to use disruptive technology to conceptualize and win a new type of warfare. Chinese military thinkers believe that under conditions of informatized warfare, dominating a system of systems confrontation rather than the large-scale attrition of enemy forces is the key factor in winning. Therefore, the PLA's main strategy to defeat an adversary on the battleground is by creating disruption or paralysis on the enemy side through a system of systems operations. AI is believed to play a central role in intelligentized warfare to target and crash key elements of opponent operational systems. A PLA Senior Colonel Li Minghai pointed out that algorithms, **unmanned platforms and extreme domains are emerging factors**

contributing to the form of intelligentized warfare. In the meantime, Guo Ruobing, dean of the National Security College of the National Defense University of China, believes that the PLA should have a unique way of intelligentized warfighting, based upon Mao Zedong's concept that "You fight your way and we'll fight our way." Guo argues that only in this way can the PLA successfully develop technological and military abilities to seize a new force posture and create its advantages of "exploiting strength to defeat weakness" in the intelligentization era. Namely, the PLA must develop its own AI military capabilities and target the U.S.' vulnerable underbelly rather than competing with the U.S. in a full-spectrum confrontation. Guo adds that China must be careful to avoid being trapped into an arms race and suffer the same experience of the former Soviet Union during the Cold War. Innovation – the Doctrine of Developing Intelligentized Capabilities In response to the U.S.' offset strategy, **Xi Jinping highlights the wholehearted effort of "building an innovative people's army" and emphasizes the logic that "whoever implements scientific and technological innovation well will be able to get a head start and win an advantage."**

1NC Solvency Contention Frontline

1. NATO can only regulate LAWs if every member state agrees. This means that one rogue actor can doom the affirmative.

Heikkila 2021 (“NATO wants to set AI standards. If only its members agreed on the basics.” Melissa Heikkilä, March 29, 2021, [NATO wants to set AI standards. If only its members agreed on the basics.](#), VY)

On paper, NATO is the ideal organization to go about setting standards for military applications of artificial intelligence. But **the widely divergent priorities and budgets of its 30 members could get in the way. The Western military alliance has identified artificial intelligence as a key technology needed to maintain an edge over adversaries, and it wants to lead the way in establishing common ground rules for its use.** “We need each other more than ever. No country alone or no continent alone can compete in this era of great power competition,” NATO Deputy Secretary-General Mircea Geoană, the alliance’s second in command, said in an interview with POLITICO. The standard-setting effort comes as China is pressing ahead with AI applications in the military largely free of democratic oversight. David van Weel, NATO’s assistant secretary general for emerging security challenges, said Beijing’s lack of concern with the tech’s ethical implications has sped along the integration of AI into the military apparatus. “I’m ... not sure that they’re having the same debates on principles of responsible use or they’re definitely not applying our democratic values to these technologies,” he said. **Meanwhile, the EU — which has pledged to roll out the world’s first binding rules on AI in coming weeks — is seeking closer collaboration with Washington to oversee emerging technologies, including artificial intelligence. But those efforts have been slow in getting off the ground.** For Geoană, that collaboration will happen at NATO, which is working closely with the European Union as it prepares AI regulation focusing on “high risk” applications. The pitch NATO does not regulate, but “once NATO sets a standard, it becomes in terms of defensive security the gold standard in that respective field,” Geoană said. The alliance’s own AI strategy, to be released before the summer, will identify ways to operate AI systems responsibly, identify military applications for the technology, and provide a “platform for allies to test their AI to see whether it’s up to NATO standards,” van Weel said. The strategy will also set ethical guidelines around how to govern AI systems, for example by ensuring systems can be shut down by a human at all times, and to maintain accountability by ensuring a human is responsible for the actions of AI systems. “If an adversary would use autonomous AI powered systems in a way that is not compatible with our values and morals, it would still have defense implications because we would need to defend and deter against those systems,” van Weel said. “We need to be aware of that and we need to flag legislators when we feel that our restrictions are coming into the realm of [being detrimental to] our defense and deterrence,” he continued. Mission impossible? **The problem is that NATO’s members are at very different stages when it comes to thinking about AI in the military context. The U.S., the world’s biggest military spender, has prioritized the use of AI in the defense realm. But in Europe, most countries — France and the Netherlands excepting — barely mention the technology’s defense and military implications in their national AI strategies.** “It’s absolutely no surprise that the U.S. had a military AI strategy before it has a national AI strategy,” but the Europeans “did it exactly the other way around,” said Ulrike Franke, a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign

Relations, said: **That echoes familiar transatlantic differences** — **and** previous U.S. President Donald Trump's complaints — over defense spending, but also **highlights the different approaches to AI regulation more broadly.** The EU's AI strategy takes a cautious line, touting itself as "human-centric," focused on taming corporate excesses and keeping citizens' data safe. The U.S., which tends to be light on regulation and keen on defense, sees things differently. **There are also divergences over what technologies the alliance ought to develop, including lethal autonomous weapons systems** — often dubbed “killer robots” — programmed to identify and destroy targets without human control.

2. Turkey is already utilizing LAWs now. They have broad political support in Turkey. This means Turkey will block the affirmative in NATO.

Gurcan 2021 (“Turkish drone sets off international buzz over ‘killer robots,’” Metin Gurcan, obtained his PhD in 2016 with a dissertation on changes in the Turkish military over the preceding decade, June 8, 2021, [Turkish drone sets off international buzz over ‘killer robots’ – Al-Monitor](#), VY)

Turkey’s flourishing drone industry is back in the international spotlight following a UN report suggesting that Turkish-made artificial intelligence-based drones might have been used to kill enemy troops in Libya last year. If confirmed **the incident would mark the debut of “killer robots” in the global theater of war. The report by the UN Panel of Experts on Libya indicates that a Kargu-2 kamikaze drone manufactured by Turkey’s state-owned company STM was likely used** in March 2020 in clashes between the forces of the Turkish-backed Government of National Accord and the Libyan National Army of eastern warlord Khalifa Hifter following the latter’s besiegement of Tripoli. Logistics convoys and retreating Hifter forces “were hunted down and remotely engaged by the unmanned combat aerial vehicles or the lethal autonomous weapons systems such as the STM Kargu-2 and other loitering munitions,” the report says. **“The lethal autonomous weapons systems were programmed to attack targets without requiring data connectivity between the operator and the munition: in effect, a true ‘fire, forget and find’ capability.”** it noted without specifying whether anyone was actually killed. **Turkish military sources familiar with the matter confirmed that Kargu-2s had been used in Libya on multiple occasions,** but denied that the drones — which have both autonomous and manual operation modes — were allowed to use artificial intelligence to select and hit targets. The drones operated autonomously only to reach target areas, after which operators on the ground made the decisions to strike, the sources told Al-Monitor on condition of anonymity. STM describes Kargu-2 as a loitering rotary-wing attack drone with real-time image processing capabilities and embedded machine learning algorithms that are also equipped with swarming capabilities that allow up to 20 drones to work together. In its autonomous mode, Kargu-2 can be programmed to attack targets without data connectivity between the ground unit/operator and the munition. **The UN report was met with nationalist euphoria in Turkey’s pro-government media, which lauded Kargu-2 as further proof of how far the domestic defense industry has progressed under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan** with drone sales to Azerbaijan, Qatar and Ukraine. Foreign observers, meanwhile, focused on the global ramifications of the events in Libya and the advance of drones in theaters of war across the region. In a June 3 article headlined “Armed Low-Cost Drones, Made by Turkey, Reshape Battlefields and Geopolitics,” The Wall Street Journal reported, “Smaller militaries around the world are deploying inexpensive missile-equipped drones against armored enemies, a new battlefield tactic that proved successful last year in regional conflicts, shifting the strategic balance around Turkey and Russia. Drones built in Turkey with affordable digital technology wrecked tanks and other armored vehicles, as well as air-defense systems, of Russian protégés in battles waged in Syria, Libya and Azerbaijan.” According to defense analysts at the Istanbul-based Center for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies, **Turkey’s political and military decision-makers see unmanned military systems and robotic warfare as not mere military modernization but “an opportunity to pioneer [the country’s] next geopolitical breakthrough.”** Along with Kargu-2, **the Alpagu fixed-wing loitering munition system and the Togan autonomous multi-rotor reconnaissance drone — both also developed by STM — stand out as examples of advanced autonomous capabilities in the Turkish defense industry.** According to the company, **all three unmanned aerial vehicles use computer imaging for targeting and are programmed with machine learning algorithms to optimize target classification, tracking and attack capabilities without the need for a GPS connection.**

1NC Artificial Intelligence Turn

1. Debates and regulations on LAWs spill over to other types of AI and cause more restrictions and stunt development.

McGregor 2018 (“Why We Need to Stop Talking About ‘Killer Robots’ and Address the AI Backlash,” Lorna McGregor, Professor of International Human Rights Law and PI and Director of the ESRC Human Rights, Big Data and Technology Project at the University of Essex, July 9, 2018, [Why We Need to Stop Talking About ‘Killer Robots’ and Address the AI Backlash – EJIL](#), VY)

However, as I argue below, **the debates on artificial intelligence are now much wider than AWS and the use of the term is distracting from the challenges posed by the current applications of artificial intelligence outside of the military context. This is not to say that dealing with AWS is not important.** Indeed, since 2013, there has been a process underway to look at how AWS should be regulated. The Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons at the UN has met annually to discuss the issue, including whether negotiations should begin into a treaty. However, there has not yet been resolution of the issue and some commentators have questioned whether it is the best forum for addressing these issues. In addition to the process, a number of key substantive issues still need to be addressed. For example, commentators have observed that the issues are not only whether or not to ban AWS but **there is also debate on what constitutes AWS and whether it includes existing or only future technology; the meaning of autonomy and human control;** whether a prohibition or a focus on implementation of international humanitarian law constitutes the best course of action; the implications of not developing AWS where others have; and the wider role of AWS in cyber defence. It is therefore an area of complex and ongoing discussion with little yet resolved. The Spill-Over into Wider AI Debates The advent of big data and more advanced and cheaper computational power has meant that machine learning, at least, has become much more accessible and available to a wider set of actors. **Beyond military uses, debates on the opportunities and risks of artificial intelligence are now taking place within governments and across a wide range of industries and sectors of societies.** This is illustrated by the range of national reports and plans on AI (see, for example, three of the most recent: the UK House of Lords report on ‘AI in the UK’, the report of the Indian government’s Task Force on Artificial Intelligence and the US Government Accountability Office report on Artificial Intelligence: Emerging Opportunities, Challenges and Implications). **In this wider context, references to ‘killer robots’ (or robots generally) can create hype and focus the mind on science fiction and singularity: a point in time (which many dispute will ever come) where machines become smarter than humans and ‘use their superior intelligence to take over the planet’.** In the recent House of Lords report, Sarah O’Connor of the Financial Times was quoted as stating that ‘if you ever write an article that has robots or artificial intelligence in the headline, you are guaranteed that it will have twice as many people clicking on it’. The report also noted that, ‘at least some journalists were sensationalising the subject’. Mary Wareham has also spoken about the risks that robots such as ‘Sophia’ can create the impression of much greater sophistication, intelligence and autonomy than they actually have. **This type of hype can have the effect of drawing the public and policymakers away from current issues with artificial intelligence. It can also mean that attention is only focused on addressing the issues for a short period of time and can therefore thwart efforts for a sustained response to the challenges that artificial intelligence presents.**

The Current Challenges Posed by Artificial Intelligence **The recent 'AI backlash' is beginning to shift attention to the real and urgent challenges that need to be addressed today.** In the space of this post, there is insufficient room to set out all the pressing issues. However, some key themes from the 'backlash' exemplify the point.

2. AI could be game changing in the fight against climate change.

Dimock 2022 (“What AI Can Do for Climate Change, and What Climate Change Can Do for AI,” Wai Chee Dimock, professor at Yale for many years and is now at Harvard’s Center for the Environment, April 5, 2022, [What AI Can Do for Climate Change, and What Climate Change Can Do for AI - Scientific American](#), VY)

The April 4, 2022 report from the U.N. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change makes it clear that it is “now or never” for the planet. We are “firmly on track toward an unlivable world,” U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres said in releasing the report. There’s every chance that global temperatures will soar by 3 degrees Celsius, twice as much as the agreed-upon 1.5 C limit. Unless we take drastic steps and cut down emissions by 43 percent within this decade, the full force of this existential threat will be upon us. **In this context, it is interesting that some researchers have taken artificial intelligence—a technology often considered an existential threat in its own right—and tried to turn it into a vehicle for climate action.** Since I’m writing a book on nonhuman actors in the 21st century, I have a more-than-passing interest in how these experiments turn out and what they say about our collective future. **Could it be that climate change is the catalyst that transforms AI, challenging it to be more crisis-responsive, more focused on innovations addressing large-scale hazards? Such technology could be just what we need at this juncture. It could generate emergency action very different from the profit-driven, bias-amplifying and misinformation-spreading algorithmic regime we are familiar with.** Giving much larger play to input from the field, from networks of engaged participants, **this “climate AI” could be a game changer in the tech ecosystem, as in the physical ecosystems now facing their worst risks.** This new ethos was reflected in a report written by the Global Partnership on Artificial Intelligence and presented at the COP26 climate summit last November. The 15 co-authors, researchers and activists from 12 countries, argue that while we need to be vigilant about racial and gender biases and the tendency of big data to perpetuate inequities, **AI can nonetheless play a key role in prediction, mitigation, and adaptation, in ways we can’t afford to ignore.** Take the visualization platform *This Climate Does Not Exist*, timed to coincide with the COP26 report. Built by motivated young researchers, this project demonstrates that a harmful technology can be repurposed to make climate change personal, visceral and unforgettable for the general public. Using the same machine learning algorithm that swaps visual and audio data to produce fabricated, hyperrealistic videos called deepfakes, it generates similarly real-looking views of floods or wildfires for any street address. We have become “a bit blasé” about climate disasters when they happen to strangers, says lead researcher Sasha Luccioni, a postdoc at the Quebec Artificial Intelligence Institute. Seeing our own houses standing in several feet of water makes us take notice. While the full impact of *This Climate Does Not Exist* remains to be seen, what seems clear is that **AI is phenomenally adaptive, able to pivot to entirely different demands under crisis conditions.** It’s most innovative coming from practitioners galvanized by fast-approaching disasters. Two other initiatives, from Microsoft and NASA, make clear that to fulfill ambitious climate goals, AI needs a participatory democracy, networks of on-site innovators deeply knowledgeable about their locales and acting urgently for just that reason. **Microsoft is building a planetary computer as the centerpiece of its AI for Earth program.** First proposed in 2019 by the company’s chief environmental officer Lucas Joppa, **it is designed to work as a geospatial search engine to expedite climate decision-making and “avert environmental disaster.”** Toward that end, it aggregates data from NASA, NOAA and the European Space Agency, as well as data collected through the partnership between the U.K. Met Office, the Chinese Meteorological Administration and the Institute of Atmospheric Physics in the Chinese Academy of Sciences.

3. Climate change must be addressed now with policy changes. This is the only way to avoid ecological disaster and mass extinctions.

Weston 2021 (“Top scientists warn of ‘ghastly future of mass extinction’ and climate disruption,” Phoebe Weston, 13 Jan 2021, [Top scientists warn of ‘ghastly future of mass extinction’ and climate disruption | Environment | The Guardian](#))

The planet is facing a “ghastly future of mass extinction, declining health and climate-disruption upheavals” that threaten human survival because of ignorance and inaction, according to an international group of scientists, who warn people still haven’t grasped the urgency of the biodiversity and climate crises. The 17 experts, including Prof Paul Ehrlich from Stanford University, author of *The Population Bomb*, and scientists from Mexico, Australia and the US, say **the planet is in a much worse state than most people – even scientists – understood. “The scale of the threats to the biosphere and all its lifeforms – including humanity – is in fact so great that it is difficult to grasp for even well-informed experts,”** they write in a report in *Frontiers in Conservation Science* which references more than 150 studies detailing the world’s major environmental challenges. The delay between destruction of the natural world and the impacts of these actions means people do not recognise how vast the problem is, the paper argues. **“[The] mainstream is having difficulty grasping the magnitude of this loss, despite the steady erosion of the fabric of human civilisation.” The report warns that climate-induced mass migrations, more pandemics and conflicts over resources will be inevitable unless urgent action is taken.** “Ours is not a call to surrender – we aim to provide leaders with a realistic ‘cold shower’ of the state of the planet that is essential for planning to avoid a ghastly future,” it adds. **Dealing with the enormity of the problem requires far-reaching changes** to global capitalism, education and equality, the paper says. These include abolishing the idea of perpetual economic growth, properly pricing environmental externalities, stopping the use of fossil fuels, reining in corporate lobbying, and empowering women, the researchers argue. The report comes months after the world failed to meet a single UN Aichi biodiversity target, created to stem the destruction of the natural world, the second consecutive time governments have failed to meet their 10-year biodiversity goals. This week a coalition of more than 50 countries pledged to protect almost a third of the planet by 2030. **An estimated one million species are at risk of extinction, many within decades, according** to a recent UN report. “Environmental deterioration is infinitely more threatening to civilisation than Trumpism or Covid-19,” Ehrlich told the Guardian. In *The Population Bomb*, published in 1968, Ehrlich warned of imminent population explosion and hundreds of millions of people starving to death. Although he has acknowledged some timings were wrong, he has said he stands by its fundamental message that population growth and high levels of consumption by wealthy nations is driving destruction. He told the Guardian: “Growthmania is the fatal disease of civilisation - it must be replaced by campaigns that make equity and well-being society’s goals - not consuming more junk.” **Large populations and their continued growth drive soil degradation and biodiversity loss,** the new paper warns. “More people means that more synthetic compounds and dangerous throwaway plastics are manufactured, many of which add to the growing toxification of the Earth. **It also increases the chances of pandemics that fuel ever-more desperate hunts for scarce resources.” The effects of the climate emergency are more evident than biodiversity loss, but still, society is failing to cut emissions,** the paper argues. **If people understood the magnitude of the crises, changes in politics and policies could match the gravity of the threat.** “Our main point is that once you realise the scale and imminence of the problem, it becomes clear that we need much more than individual actions like using less plastic, eating less meat, or flying less. Our point is that **we need big systematic changes and fast.**” Professor Daniel Blumstein from the University of California Los Angeles, who helped write the paper, told the Guardian. The paper cites a number of key reports published

in the past few years including: The World Economic Forum report in 2020, which named biodiversity loss as one of the top threats to the global economy. The 2019 IPBES Global Assessment report which said 70% of the planet had been altered by humans. The 2020 WWF Living Planet report, which said the average population size of vertebrates had declined by 68% in the past five decades. A 2018 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change report which said that humanity had already exceeded global warming of 1C above pre-industrial levels and is set to reach 1.5C warming between 2030 and 2052. The report follows years of stark warnings about the state of the planet from the world's leading scientists, including a statement by 11,000 scientists in 2019 that people will face "untold suffering due to the climate crisis" unless major changes are made. In 2016, more than 150 of Australia's climate scientists wrote an open letter to the then prime minister, Malcolm Turnbull, demanding immediate action on reducing emissions. In the same year, 375 scientists – including 30 Nobel prize winners – wrote an open letter to the world about their frustrations over political inaction on climate change. Prof Tom Oliver, an ecologist at the University of Reading, who was not involved in the report, said **it was a frightening but credible summary of the grave threats society faces under a "business as usual" scenario. "Scientists now need to go beyond simply documenting environmental decline, and instead find the most effective ways to catalyse action,"** he said. Prof Rob Brooker, head of ecological sciences at the James Hutton Institute, who was not involved in the study, said it clearly emphasised the pressing nature of the challenges. **"We certainly should not be in any doubt about the huge scale of the challenges we are facing and the changes we will need to make to deal with them,"** he said.

2NC/1NR Russia Advantage Answers Extensions

Russia will build killer robots despite any ban or regulation.

Hutchison 2017 ("Russia says it will ignore any UN ban of killer robots," Harold C. Hutchison, Nov 30, 2017, [Russia Says It Will Ignore Any UN Ban of Killer Robots](#), VY)

Russia says they will build killer robots no matter what. The United Nations is banning "lethal autonomous weapon systems," or LAWS. The Russians also claimed that there was a risk of harming civilian artificial intelligence capabilities. **Russian diplomats delivered a message for those who want to ban killer robots: Russia will build them no matter what.** That is the sum total of what happened during a week of discussion on the issue of weapons and vehicles operated by artificial intelligence in Geneva. According to a report by DefenseOne.com, **a statement by the Russian government** on Nov. 10 **laid out a very hard-line position against the ban on what the United Nations is calling "lethal autonomous weapon systems," or LAWS.** "According to the Russian Federation, the lack of working samples of such weapons systems remains the main problem in the discussion on LAWS," the statement said. "Certainly, there are precedents of reaching international agreements that establish a preventive ban on prospective types of weapons. However, this can hardly be considered as an argument for taking preventive prohibitive or restrictive measures against LAWS being a by far more complex and wide class of weapons of which the current understanding of humankind is rather approximate." **The Russians also claimed that there was a risk of harming civilian artificial intelligence capabilities,** saying, **"It is hardly acceptable for the work on LAWS to restrict the freedom to enjoy the benefits of autonomous technologies being the future of humankind."** The Russian hard line comes as questions percolate about Russian compliance with other arms control treaties. Russia has already been accused of violating the 1987 Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty, prompting the United States to begin development of a new ground-launched cruise missile. A report from RealClearDefense.com noted that Russia's force of Tu-22M3 Backfire bombers may have been modified in a manner that fits the definition of strategic bombers under the New START Treaty. In the past, some arms control treaties have not prevented bad guys from using banned weapons. The Chemical Weapons Convention did not prevent the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria from using mustard agent against American troops in 2016.

Turn: The expansion of NATO risks destabilizing Russia, not taming them.

Ellyatt and Macias on June 29, 2022 ("Russia calls NATO expansion deal 'destabilizing'; Ukraine releases footage of deadly mall strike," Holly Ellyatt and Amanda Macias, Jun 29, 2022, <https://www.cnn.com/2022/06/29/russia-ukraine-live-updates.html>, VY)

The Western military organization NATO has officially invited Sweden and Finland to join the alliance in a historic move on Wednesday. The development comes after the alliance reached a deal with Turkey to accept the membership bids from both countries after initial objections from Ankara. **The summit** — arguably the most important meeting of the alliance in recent months, and perhaps years — **has also seen the alliance reiterate its condemnation of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, pledge to beef up its defenses in Europe, and slam China as posing a "challenge" to its interests.** NATO's Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg announced earlier in the week that the Western military organization would increase the number of troops within its rapid response force — which comprises land, air, sea and special forces units that are capable of being deployed quickly — to 300,000 from about 40,000 personnel. **Russia has issued an initial reaction to the NATO deal that allows its expansion to go ahead, roughly doubling the land border Russia will have to share with NATO members, with one official calling it "a purely destabilizing factor."**

The conflict in Ukraine will not escalate into nuclear war. 2 reasons: Russia's military capabilities and lack of powerful allies.

Simhony 2022 ("NATO Intervention in Ukraine Won't Spark World War III," Limor Simhony, a policy advisor and researcher based in London. She was previously the director of counterextremism at the political consultancy firm TRD Policy and a research fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies. She holds a doctorate from the Department of War Studies at King's College London. April 1, 2022, [A NATO-Russia Conflict Over Ukraine Won't Spark World War III](#), VY)

However, Russia's indiscriminate attacks against Ukrainian civilians—including bombing hospitals and schools as well as the use of horrific weapons, such as cluster bombs and white phosphorus—should drive the West to reevaluate its war engagement policy and take a more active role by implementing a no-fly zone or securing evacuation corridors—perhaps even actively fighting Russian forces. **The main concern is any such escalation could lead to World War III. There are two reasons that this is unlikely. The first is that Russia's military capabilities are poor relative to those of Western armies. Their forces are not sufficiently trained; their equipment and weapons are dated and inferior; they experience major logistical, operational, and tactical difficulties; and their soldiers have low morale. Damaging economic sanctions also mean that Russia may not be able to fund a wider war. The expectation that Moscow will be able to escalate the war** into other theaters in an effective way, especially by conventional means, **is unrealistic.** It is possible that if the Russian military continues to struggle, Russian President Vladimir Putin will deploy chemical or even nuclear weapons to increase gains and deter the West from interfering—but that is unlikely. **The second is that Russia has become isolated. To fight a world war, Russia needs powerful allies, which it does not have.** Its strongest ally, China, has largely remained on the sidelines since the war started. It abstained from voting against the U.N. resolution demanding that Russia ends its offensive, and it is worried about secondary sanctions if it aids Russia. The only countries besides Russia that voted to reject the resolution were Belarus, North Korea, Eritrea, and Syria—hardly a winning alliance. **Both world wars saw blocks of powerful allies fight one another. Currently, such a bloc does not exist on Russia's side. These factors mean that there is not a high risk of substantial escalation into total global war.** This should be enough to convince Western nations to change their engagement policy and help Ukraine win the war by repulsing an opponent that is considerably inferior militarily to their own forces. It is unlikely to happen for two main reasons: fear of Russian nukes and the West's aversion to casualties.

2NC/1NR Proliferation Advantage Answers Extensions

Turn: China is building up their military AI capabilities to compete with the U.S. The U.S. needs to build up their AI capabilities, not limit them.

Noon and Bassler 2021 (“How Chinese Strategists Think AI Will Power a Military Leap Ahead,” Ben Noon, research assistant at the American Enterprise Institute and former research assistant at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, and Dr. Chris Bassler, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments and formerly served as a civilian in the Department of Defense, September 17, 2021, [How Chinese Strategists Think AI Will Power a Military Leap Ahead – Defense One](#), VY)

The People’s Liberation Army has yet to adopt a definition, let alone a formal plan, for “intelligentization (智能化),” a Chinese vision for the transformation of warfare through artificial intelligence and automation. But **Chinese military theorists see it as a rare opportunity for “leapfrog development” over adversaries.** One author suggests that Star Wars will “become a reality”; another says the fantasies from “mythological fiction” will come true. Their writings, while not authoritative, have coalesced around several key themes that offer a crucial glimpse into potential PLA thinking and ambitions. The PLA internalized lessons on “mechanization” and “platform-centric warfare” from the Second World War, and on “informationization” and networked operations from U.S. operations in the 1991 Gulf War. Whereas these earlier eras of warfare turned on “mechanization” in the “physical space” and “informationization” in the “information space,” PLA theorists argue that intelligentization will center upon a “cognitive space” that privileges complex thinking and effective decision-making. **On battlefields where advanced AI technology enables better decisions, they write, the side that can better integrate human creativity and robotic calculating capacity will hold the crucial edge.** Chinese theorists often describe warfare that depends on humans and machines to collaborate as “algorithmic warfare,” an interesting parallel to the phrasing used by Robert Work, former deputy defense secretary. They also write about how “human-machine collaboration” can “realize human self-transcendence” and immeasurably improve the PLA’s centralized decision-making capability. **A crucial use of artificial intelligence, they believe, will be in “battlefield perception systems,” a system that translates high-quality targeting data into ideal target sets for operational commanders. PLA strategists also believe that ever-more-advanced autonomous systems will gradually replace human frontline combatants.** These theorists believe the air domain has the highest potential for autonomy, with drones being integrated into air combat in two major ways. The first is unmanned-manned cooperation, wherein manned “mothership” fighters will direct autonomous drones during battle. The second is swarm warfare, which aims to overwhelm the enemy with masses of intelligent drones. The arrival of intelligent drones is expected to accelerate the OODA loop in unimaginable ways and to rewrite the “rules of the game” of air warfare. Indeed, the military value of these systems will be more than their ability to destroy enemy forces, the strategists write. Above all, intelligentization will aim to achieve advantages in psychological warfare. Theorists describe a “cognitive confrontation,” in which PLA leaders will psychologically dominate opposing commanders through better and faster decisions. The PLA plans to employ all available tools to the overarching objective of reducing an enemy’s will to resist. The United States military should work to better understand Chinese conceptions of intelligentization and the PLA’s efforts to integrate it into its model of future warfare. **Taking advantage of some of the possible weaknesses of the**

PLA's approach should be a top priority and would also help the United States military to shore up some of the weaknesses in its own vision and efforts. We recommend several key initiatives.

China wants to take the lead in military AI now. They have no incentive to follow NATO regulations.

Robitzski 2019 ("China Thinks AI Could Make Its Military As Powerful as America's," Dan Robitzski, 2/8/19, [China Thinks AI Could Make Its Military As Powerful as America's](#), VY)

SMART BOMBS **China's military is working to adopt artificial intelligence and autonomous technology as quickly as it can. That's because Chinese President Xi Jinping believes that AI and other cutting-edge technologies, especially when applied to military systems, are the key to keeping up and leveling the playing field between China and countries like the U.S.** that had a head start on its industrial development, according to a new report published Wednesday by a think tank called the Center for a New American Security.

WORLD POWERS **The push for advanced Chinese AI is focused on more than military might — the new report highlights how China is taking steps to move away from importing foreign technology.** In October, **Xi was quoted as saying that China should strive to "achieve world-leading levels" in artificial intelligence tech while also eliminating its "external dependence for key technologies and advanced equipment,"** according to the report. In short, **China is positioning itself to take a global leadership role in AI development and wants to make sure it can do so without the help of any other nation.**

ALL HANDS ON DECK The think tank's report goes on to clarify that many Chinese leaders are concerned that they may be fostering a sort of arms race between China and the West as both push to develop and weaponized autonomous technology like AI. Still, though, the report says that those same leaders believe that AI will inevitably become more prevalent in combat. And when that happens, **China is poised to take the lead,** according to MIT Technology Review, because Chinese tech corporations work hand-in-hand with the government while American companies like Google, Microsoft, and Amazon are subject to worker protests over military contracts.

No impact to proliferation of killer robots. As countries develop these technologies, countermeasures will also be developed. History proves.

Marks and Huizinga 2022 ("Robert J. Marks: Straight Talk About Killer Robots," Dr. Robert Marks, Walter Bradley Center director and the author of *Killer Robots*, shares his expertise with Gretchen Huizinga of the Beatrice Institute, interviewed by Gretchen Huizinga, March 15, 2022, [Robert J. Marks: Straight Talk About Killer Robots | Mind Matters](#), VY)

Robert Marks: **I think that we only need to look at history to see the foolishness in not developing everything that we can technologically. Technical superiority in nations wins conflict. Even in the absence of hot conflict, it gives pause to people who would do us harm.** There is, for example, a Stop the Killer Robots movement, trying to diminish the development of autonomous killer robots as they call them...

Robert Marks: If you have a swarm drone of, say, 1000 drones attacking you, you can take out 90% of them and that drone swarm still completes its mission. And that to me is very scary. So swarms are very resilient to attack. That gave me pause for a long time. **But the beauty of the technology in the United States, as long as it's supported, is that it will come up with ways of countering that.** How do you take out a swarm of drones? Israel came up with the idea of shooting a laser and maybe taking out a drone swarm one at a time. Well, that would just take too long. And then Russia has come out with an EMP cannon...

Gretchen Huizinga: I'm not sure that we are all familiar with that. Robert Marks: EMP is electromagnetic pulses. If they put up a thermonuclear bomb sufficiently high above the United States, above Kansas, it could disable our entire power grid. EMPs fry your electronics. Why is that? Because if you think of your cell phone, the phone receives these very, very small signals, microwave signal and turns them into audio and video and everything of that sort. So, it takes microwave signals from the air, converts it to electricity, and does its magic. Imagine though that the signal is increased a billion times. That energy which is going to be introduced to the little wires in your cell phone literally fries your cell phone. And that's the problem with the EMPs. So, EMPs give me pause, especially with China's new launch of this supersonic missile. A push of the button, they could take out our entire power grid. But getting back to swarms and our resilience towards swarms, **Russia came out with this EMP cannon, which is a big antenna that generates an EMP pulse. Imagine this EMP pulse going into an attacking drone swarm. This EMP pulse would just be like spraying bug spray into a swarm of gnats attacking you and all the gnats would fall down.** So the swarm idea bugged me for a long time until I heard of Russia's solution. **All of a sudden, I feel a lot better and hope that the United States is pursuing a similar sort of technology. This is the problem with the arms race. People come up with different devices, including AI, but then there need to be countermeasures.** This is terrible. I wish it didn't exist, but it's existed throughout history and will exist forever because of man's fallen nature. That's reason that I support the development of so-called killer robots.

2NC/1NR Solvency Contentions Extensions

NATO policies MUST be agreed upon by every single member of the alliance. This means that a dissenting voice can change the outcome of the regulations.

NATO 2022 ("Consensus decision-making at NATO," 14 Jun. 2022, [Consensus decision-making at NATO](#), VY)

All NATO decisions are made by consensus, after discussion and consultation among member countries. A decision reached by consensus is an agreement reached by common consent. When a "NATO decision" is announced, it is therefore the expression of the collective will of all the sovereign states that are members of the Alliance. This principle of consensus is applied at every committee level, which implies that all NATO decisions are collective decisions made by its member countries. Applying the principle of consensus decision-making **Consensus decision-making is a fundamental principle which has been accepted as the sole basis for decision-making** in NATO since the creation of the Alliance in 1949. **Consensus decision-making means that there is no voting at NATO. Consultations take place until a decision that is acceptable to all is reached.** Sometimes member countries agree to disagree on an issue. In general, this negotiation process is rapid since members consult each other on a regular basis and therefore often know and understand each other's positions in advance. Facilitating the process of consultation and consensus decision-making is one of the NATO Secretary General's main tasks. The principle of consensus decision-making applies throughout NATO.

Turkey has started using LAWS in conflict. This makes Turkey likely to block the affirmative.

BNE 2021 ("Turkey 'possibly behind world's first battlefield killing by autonomous combat drone,'" By bne IntelliNews June 3, 2021, [bne IntelliNews - Turkey 'possibly behind world's first battlefield killing by autonomous combat drone'](#), VY)

Turkey may have been behind the battlefield deployment of a military-grade autonomous drone that may have marked an historic and chilling first if its artificial intelligence-based weapons system, essentially operating with a mind of its own, was used to kill. That's the disturbing conclusion of Zachary Kallenborn, writing for the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, following the publication of a United Nations report about a March 2020 skirmish in the military conflict in Libya in which **a 'killer robot' drone, known as a lethal autonomous weapons system—or LAWS—made its wartime debut.** The report, however, does not explicitly determine if **the LAWS, a Kargu-2 attack drone made by Turkish company STM,** killed anyone or establish if it was operating in autonomous or manual mode. "If anyone was killed in an autonomous attack, it would likely represent an historic first known case of artificial intelligence-based autonomous weapons being used to kill," wrote Kallenborn. Military-grade autonomous drones can pick their own targets and kill without the assistance or direction of a remote human operator. Such weapons are known to be in development, but there have been no confirmed cases of autonomous drones killing fighters on the battlefield. **The Kargu-2 was reportedly used during fighting between the UN-recognised Government of National Accord (GNA) backed by Turkey** and forces aligned with General Khalifa Haftar, backed by Russia. A report that examined the incident was prepared by the UN Panel of Experts on Libya.

2NC/1NR Artificial Intelligence Turn Extensions

Restrictions on LAWs have the potential to harm other AI advancements.

Burri and Robillard 2017 (“Why banning autonomous killer robots wouldn’t solve anything, Susanne Burri, an assistant professor in the Department of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method at the London School of Economics and Political Science, and Michael Robillard, a research fellow at the Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics, Dec 19, 2017, [Why banning autonomous killer robots wouldn’t solve anything | Aeon Ideas](#), VY)

Autonomous weapons – killer robots that can attack without a human operator – are dangerous tools. There is no doubt about this fact. As tech entrepreneurs such as Elon Musk, Mustafa Suleyman and other signatories to a recent open letter to the United Nations have put it, autonomous weapons ‘can be weapons of terror, weapons that despots and terrorists use against innocent populations, and weapons [that can be] hacked to behave in undesirable ways’. **But this does not mean that the UN should implement a preventive ban on the further development of these weapons,** as the signatories of the open letter seem to urge. For one thing, **it sometimes takes dangerous tools to achieve worthy ends.** Think of the Rwandan genocide, where the world simply stood by and did nothing. Had autonomous weapons been available in 1994, maybe we would not have looked away. It seems plausible that if the costs of humanitarian interventions were purely monetary, then it would be easier to gain widespread support for such interventions. For another thing, **it is naive to assume that we can enjoy the benefits of the recent advances in artificial intelligence (AI) without being exposed to at least some downsides as well. Suppose the UN were to implement a preventive ban on the further development of all autonomous weapons technology.** Further suppose – quite optimistically, already – that all armies around the world were to respect the ban, and abort their autonomous-weapons research programmes. Even with both of these assumptions in place, we would still have to worry about autonomous weapons. A self-driving car can be easily re-programmed into an autonomous weapons system: instead of instructing it to swerve when it sees a pedestrian, just teach it to run over the pedestrian. To put the point more generally, **AI technology is tremendously useful, and it already permeates our lives in ways we don’t always notice,** and aren’t always able to comprehend fully. Given its pervasive presence, **it is shortsighted to think that the technology’s abuse can be prevented if only the further development of autonomous weapons is halted. In fact, it might well take the sophisticated and discriminate autonomous-weapons systems that armies around the world are currently in the process of developing if we are to effectively counter the much cruder autonomous weapons** that are quite easily constructed through the reprogramming of seemingly benign AI technology such as the self-driving car.

AI can be used to fight climate change.

Neslen 2021 ("Here's how AI can help fight climate change," Arthur Neslen, Writer, Thomson Reuters Foundation, Aug 11, 2021, [Here's how AI can help fight climate change](#). vY)

Artificial intelligence could help in the fight against climate change. AI applications could help design more energy-efficient buildings, improve power storage and optimise renewable energy deployment by feeding solar and wind power into the electricity grid as needed. **By 2030, the tech could help cut global greenhouse gas emissions by 4%,** according to a recent study by accounting firm PricewaterhouseCoopers for Microsoft. But there are energy consumption concerns around AI, algorithms and the processing of large amounts of data. **As climate change intensifies the devastation from storms, wildfires and droughts, artificial intelligence (AI) and digital tools are increasingly being seen as a way to predict and limit its impacts. Governments, tech firms and investors are showing growing interest in machine-based learning systems that use algorithms to identify patterns in data sets and make predictions,** recommendations or decisions in real or virtual settings. In June, the Rise Fund, an impact investing arm of private equity firm TPG, invested \$100 million in a data and AI-driven "nowcasting" system devised by Kentucky-based startup Climavision to predict weather patterns with granular accuracy. **And an intergovernmental roadmap on AI's role in fighting global warming is due to launch at November's COP26 climate summit in Scotland.** But AI can also be highly energy-intensive and environmentally damaging, say critics who warn that the tech could be a costly distraction from more effective ways of tackling climate change. How can AI help combat climate change? **The technology is already being used to send natural disaster alerts in Japan, monitor deforestation in the Amazon, and design greener smart cities in China. AI applications could also help design more energy-efficient buildings, improve power storage and optimise renewable energy deployment by feeding solar and wind power into the electricity grid as needed. On a smaller scale, it could help households minimize their energy use** - automatically switching off lights not in use or sending power from electric vehicles back into the grid to meet anticipated demand. By 2030, the tech could help cut global greenhouse gas emissions by 4%, according to a recent study by accounting firm PricewaterhouseCoopers for Microsoft, which is developing machine learning products for the climate change market. Peter Clutton-Brock, co-founder of the Centre for AI and Climate (CAIC), a Britain-based think tank, said **the technology was "pushing back boundaries" for climate modelling. AI can process huge amounts of unstructured data like pictures, graphs and maps, opening "huge possibilities for understanding the dynamics around sea level rise and ice sheets,"** he told the Thomson Reuters Foundation.

Climate change is the greatest threat to human survival. We must act now or risk catastrophic collapse of society and human extinction.

Specktor 2019 ("Human Civilization Will Crumble by 2050 If We Don't Stop Climate Change Now, New Paper Claims," Brandon Specktor, June 04, 2019, [Human Civilization Will Crumble by 2050 If We Don't Stop Climate Change Now, New Paper Claims | Live Science](#))

It seems every week there's a scary new report about how man-made climate change is going to cause the collapse of the world's ice sheets, result in the extinction of up to 1 million animal species and — if that wasn't bad enough — make our beer very, very expensive. This week, a new policy paper from an Australian think tank claims that those other reports are slightly off; **the risks of climate change are actually much, much worse than anyone can imagine.** According to the paper, **climate change poses a "near- to mid-term existential threat to human civilization," and there's a good chance society could collapse as soon as 2050 if serious mitigation actions aren't taken in the next decade.** Published by the Breakthrough National Centre for Climate Restoration in Melbourne (an independent think tank focused on climate policy) and authored by a climate researcher and a former fossil fuel executive, the paper's central thesis is that **climate scientists are too restrained in their predictions of how climate change will affect the planet in the near future.** [Top 9 Ways the World Could End] **The current climate crisis,** they say, **is larger and more complex than any humans have ever dealt with before. General climate models — like the one that the United Nations' Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) used in 2018 to predict that a global temperature increase of 3.6 degrees Fahrenheit (2 degrees Celsius) could put hundreds of millions of people at risk — fail to account for the sheer complexity of Earth's many interlinked geological processes;** as such, **they fail to adequately predict the scale of the potential consequences. The truth,** the authors wrote, **is probably far worse than any models can fathom.** How the world ends What might an accurate worst-case picture of the planet's climate-addled future actually look like, then? The authors provide one particularly grim scenario that begins with world governments "politely ignoring" the advice of scientists and the will of the public to decarbonize the economy (finding alternative energy sources), resulting in a global temperature increase 5.4 F (3 C) by the year 2050. **At this point, the world's ice sheets vanish; brutal droughts kill many of the trees in the Amazon rainforest (removing one of the world's largest carbon offsets); and the planet plunges into a feedback loop of ever-hotter, ever-deadlier conditions. "Thirty-five percent of the global land area, and 55 percent of the global population, are subject to more than 20 days a year of lethal heat conditions, beyond the threshold of human survivability,"** the authors hypothesized. Meanwhile, **droughts, floods and wildfires regularly ravage the land. Nearly one-third of the world's land surface turns to desert. Entire ecosystems collapse, beginning with the planet's coral reefs, the rainforest and the Arctic ice sheets.** The world's tropics are hit hardest by these new climate extremes, destroying the region's agriculture **and turning more than 1 billion people into refugees. This mass movement of refugees — coupled with shrinking coastlines and severe drops in food and water availability — begin to stress the fabric of the world's largest nations,** including the United States. **Armed conflicts over resources, perhaps culminating in nuclear war, are likely.** The result, according to the new paper, is "outright chaos" and perhaps **"the end of human global civilization as we know it."** **How can this catastrophic vision of the future be prevented? Only with the people of the world accepting climate change for the emergency it is and getting to work — immediately. According to the paper's authors, the human race has about one decade left to mount a global movement to transition the world economy to a zero-carbon-emissions system.** (Achieving zero-carbon emissions requires either not emitting carbon or balancing carbon emissions with carbon removal.) The effort required to do so "would be akin in scale to the World War II emergency mobilization," the authors

wrote. The new policy paper was endorsed with a foreword by Adm. Chris Barrie, a retired Australian defense chief and senior royal navy commander who has testified before the Australian Senate about the devastating possibilities climate change poses to national security and overall human well-being. "I told the [Senate] Inquiry that, after nuclear war, **human-induced global warming is the greatest threat to human life on the planet.**" Barrie wrote in the new paper. **"Human life on Earth may be on the way to extinction, in the most horrible way."**

Russia Aggression DA

Negative

1NC Shell–Cyber Warfare AFF

A. Uniqueness: Putin is pushing back against increasing NATO’s imperial ambitions now. He will respond to increases in NATO’s power and control by force.

Al Jazeera on June 29, 2022 (“Putin condemns NATO’s ‘imperial ambitions’, warns Finland, Sweden,” Al Jazeera, 29 Jun 2022, [Putin condemns NATO’s ‘imperial ambitions’, warns Finland, Sweden | News | Al Jazeera](#), VY)

Russian President Vladimir Putin has condemned NATO’s “imperial ambitions”, accusing the military alliance of seeking to assert its “supremacy” through the Ukraine conflict. The Russian leader also said on Wednesday that he would respond in kind if NATO deployed troops and infrastructure in Finland and Sweden after the two Nordic countries join the military alliance. Putin made his comment a day after NATO member Turkey lifted its veto over the bid by Finland and Sweden to join the alliance when the three nations agreed to protect each other’s security. Helsinki and Stockholm joining NATO marks one of the biggest shifts in European security in decades. “With Sweden and Finland, we don’t have the problems that we have with Ukraine. They want to join NATO, go ahead,” Putin told Russian state television after talks with regional leaders in the central Asian ex-Soviet state of Turkmenistan. “But they must understand there was no threat before, while now, if military contingents and infrastructure are deployed there, we will have to respond in kind and create the same threats for the territories from which threats towards us are created,” he said. Moscow’s relations with Helsinki and Stockholm would inevitably sour over their NATO membership, he added. **“Everything was fine between us, but now there might be some tensions, there certainly will,”** Putin said. “It’s inevitable if there is a threat to us.” ‘Shattered peace in Europe’ Putin also denied that Moscow’s forces were responsible for a missile raid on a crowded shopping centre in the Ukrainian town of Kremenchuk earlier this week, in which at least 18 people were killed and many remain missing in the rubble. “Our army does not attack any civilian infrastructure sites. We have every capability of knowing what is situated where,” Putin told a news conference in the Turkmenistan capital of Ashgabat. “I am convinced that this time, everything was done in this exact manner,” Putin said. Ukraine accuses Russia of targeting the shopping centre and civilian shoppers. **Putin made his comment as NATO on Wednesday branded Russia the biggest “direct threat” to Western security after its invasion of Ukraine.** The military alliance also agreed on plans to modernise Kyiv’s beleaguered armed forces, saying it stood fully behind Ukrainians’ “heroic defence of their country”. “President Putin’s war against Ukraine has shattered peace in Europe and has created the biggest security crisis in Europe since the Second World War,” NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg told a news conference. **“NATO has responded with strength and unity,”** he said.

B. Link: If United States increases cyber protections, Russia will attack.

Melendez 2022 ("What a Russian cyberattack on the U.S. could look like and how it could affect you," Steven Melendez, Fast Company February 25, 2022, [What a Russian cyberattack on the U.S. could look like and how it could affect you](#), NAUDL)

As President Biden intensifies sanctions against Russia in response to the invasion of Ukraine, experts warn that cyberattacks against public and private targets in the United States are a possibility. The Department of Homeland Security this week warned U.S. organizations to be prepared for a cyberattack. though DHS Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas said there is no "specific credible cyber threat" against the U.S. homeland. **Officials in the U.K. issued a similar warning.** Government and banking sites in Ukraine are believed to have already been hit by Russian digital attacks. Exactly what form any hacks in the U.S. may take remains to be seen: CNN reports that the **FBI warned local governments and companies to be on the watch for ransomware. Ransomware attacks, like the one that crippled the Colonial Pipeline last year—causing sporadic gasoline shortages—are typically launched by independent hackers in Russia trying to make money, not by government agents. But ransomware groups typically operate with some tacit approval from the regime of Vladimir Putin, and the Russian government may be more tolerant of hacks on major Western targets if tensions continue to ramp up.** Since so much infrastructure is tied to networked computers that can be deliberately or unintentionally targeted by ransomware, such attacks in the past have disrupted everything from the fuel pipeline to shipping to schools and hospitals. **Even attacks on Ukrainian targets could unintentionally spread malware to computers in the U.S. and other countries as happened with the NotPetya ransomware attack in 2017, which chiefly targeted Ukrainian computers but caused havoc around the world.**

C. Internal Link and Impact: Fears of increasing NATO's pushback on any front will escalate the Ukrainian conflict. Russian nuclear weapons are already on high-alert. Brinkmanship ends in disaster.

Hill 2022 ("Is Russia increasingly likely to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine?," Alexander Hill, Professor of Military History, University of Calgary, May 9, 2022, [Is Russia increasingly likely to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine?, VY](#))

At the beginning of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Vladimir Putin reminded the West that Russia had nuclear weapons by putting them on "special combat readiness." Putin's actions suggested that Russia was considering their use, even though actually launching them was a remote possibility. In precisely what circumstances Russia might use nuclear weapons was left vague — Putin's intent was presumably to frighten NATO and discourage its intervention on behalf of Ukraine. Since then, much has changed — and not for the better in terms of the risk of nuclear war. Although NATO hasn't sent troops to fight in Ukraine, the West has implemented increasingly tough economic sanctions against Russia and provided Ukraine with military equipment like tanks. **NATO is now involved in what is, in essence, a full-fledged proxy war against Russia.** Not only have NATO nations — particularly the United States — provided Ukraine with an array of different weapons, but they are clearly helping Ukraine with other elements of its war effort, including intelligence — some of which has been used to target Russian generals. Ukraine emboldened From the failure to take Kyiv to the plodding pace of Soviet gains in the Donbas region in eastern Ukraine, the war has not gone according to plan. Russia has taken heavy losses due to the intense Ukrainian resistance. Russian troops will likely dig in and seek to consolidate their gains in the east. Reasserting independence from Ukraine for the separatist regions — backed up by troops on the ground — could be presented by Putin as a Russian win. He could then declare his "special military operation" over. Ukraine could subsequently reach some sort of peace agreement with Russia involving loss of territory — one that probably wouldn't be much different from the sort of agreement that could be negotiated today. Currently there is no sign of Ukrainian inclination to negotiate over the Donbas region. Nor is Ukraine willing to formally give up Crimea, seized by Russia in 2014 after the pro-western and anti-Russian Euromaidan revolution in Ukraine. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has made clear his war aim is to liberate all Ukrainian territory in Russian hands, including Crimea. His NATO backers — most vocally the U.S., the U.K. and Canada — are willing to provide Ukraine with the means to do so. These countries hope to see Russia come out of this war significantly weakened as a regional power. The Russian nuclear threat While committing NATO forces directly to Ukraine is unlikely, some hawkish western commentators have suggested NATO could do so without Russia retaliating with nuclear weapons. Even though Russia raised the spectre of nuclear weapons at the beginning of the war, as it progressed, Russian sources suggested that nuclear weapons would only be used in the event of an existential threat to Russia. Recent Russian nuclear sabre-rattling — such as the testing and deployment of more advanced missiles or Russian TV segments showing the impact of a nuclear attack on the U.K. — is undoubtedly cause for concern, but it doesn't make the use of nuclear weapons significantly more likely in the short term. What would? If the war was to turn in Ukraine's favour and Ukrainian forces started not only to recapture swaths of territory in the east, but to threaten the separatist regions — or Crimea. **Some western observers have suggested that Russia might employ an "escalate to de-escalate" strategy in such circumstances, using tactical nuclear weapons.** Launching them in territory likely to be held by the enemy, instead of where Russia hopes to retain control, makes a lot more sense. **If the war escalates to the point where a western-backed Ukraine threatens territory Putin considers to be Russian, then the chances of nuclear weapons being employed**

would increase dramatically. The problem of Crimea Zelenskyy has suggested that Ukraine will not stop fighting until Crimea is in Ukrainian hands. But for Putin and many Russians, Crimea is Russian. Crimea's incorporation into Ukraine in 1954 is often seen as a historical accident, rather than an expression of Crimea being ethnically Ukrainian. Crimea's Tatar population was largely displaced by ethnic Russians — not Ukrainians — and it has a long history as Russian. From Leo Tolstoy's Sevastopol Sketches, for example, to Vasily Aksyonov's 1970s novel The Island of Crimea, Crimea is widely represented in Russian literature. A credible western-backed threat to Crimea would undoubtedly constitute the sort of existential threat to Russian territory that would dramatically increase the risk of nuclear weapons being used. A distant but increased nuclear threat **Putin's frustration over Ukrainian resilience and western support is clearly increasing — recent nuclear posturing is evidence of that. The nuclear threat has been increasing** since February, even if the use of nuclear weapons probably isn't imminent. **Even the use of low-yield tactical nuclear weapons by Russia would likely provoke some sort of western response. Such a response would then increase the likelihood of further escalation. Informed estimates suggest Russia has more than 1,900 non-strategic or tactical nuclear weapons. The threshold for their use is lower than for larger nuclear weapons. The sort of scenarios that might lead to the use of nuclear weapons are outside the immediate confines Putin's war in Ukraine.** It would require a significant deterioration in Russian fortunes — and greater western involvement in the conflict. Nonetheless, **not since the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 or nuclear tensions in the early 1980s has the spectre of potential nuclear war loomed so large in the future.** Back in 1962, politicians on all sides ultimately showed their statesman-like qualities and stepped back from their threat to employ nuclear weapons. We can only hope that their successors will do the same over Ukraine.

1NC Shell–Baltics AFF

A. Uniqueness: Putin is pushing back against increasing NATO’s imperial ambitions now. He will respond to increases in NATO’s power and control by force.

Al Jazeera 2022 (“Putin condemns NATO’s ‘imperial ambitions’, warns Finland, Sweden,” Al Jazeera, 29 Jun 2022, [Putin condemns NATO’s ‘imperial ambitions’, warns Finland, Sweden | News | Al Jazeera](#), VY)

Russian President Vladimir Putin has condemned NATO’s “imperial ambitions”, accusing the military alliance of seeking to assert its “supremacy” through the Ukraine conflict. The Russian leader also said on Wednesday that he would respond in kind if NATO deployed troops and infrastructure in Finland and Sweden after the two Nordic countries join the military alliance. Putin made his comment a day after NATO member Turkey lifted its veto over the bid by Finland and Sweden to join the alliance when the three nations agreed to protect each other’s security. Helsinki and Stockholm joining NATO marks one of the biggest shifts in European security in decades. “With Sweden and Finland, we don’t have the problems that we have with Ukraine. They want to join NATO, go ahead,” Putin told Russian state television after talks with regional leaders in the central Asian ex-Soviet state of Turkmenistan. “But they must understand there was no threat before, while now, if military contingents and infrastructure are deployed there, we will have to respond in kind and create the same threats for the territories from which threats towards us are created,” he said. Moscow’s relations with Helsinki and Stockholm would inevitably sour over their NATO membership, he added. **“Everything was fine between us, but now there might be some tensions, there certainly will,”** Putin said. “It’s inevitable if there is a threat to us.” ‘Shattered peace in Europe’ Putin also denied that Moscow’s forces were responsible for a missile raid on a crowded shopping centre in the Ukrainian town of Kremenchuk earlier this week, in which at least 18 people were killed and many remain missing in the rubble. “Our army does not attack any civilian infrastructure sites. We have every capability of knowing what is situated where,” Putin told a news conference in the Turkmenistan capital of Ashgabat. “I am convinced that this time, everything was done in this exact manner,” Putin said. Ukraine accuses Russia of targeting the shopping centre and civilian shoppers. **Putin made his comment as NATO on Wednesday branded Russia the biggest “direct threat” to Western security after its invasion of Ukraine.** The military alliance also agreed on plans to modernise Kyiv’s beleaguered armed forces, saying it stood fully behind Ukrainians’ “heroic defence of their country”. “President Putin’s war against Ukraine has shattered peace in Europe and has created the biggest security crisis in Europe since the Second World War,” NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg told a news conference. **“NATO has responded with strength and unity,”** he said.

B. Link: Ukraine proves that NATO expansion on Russia's border will be met with Russian aggression and conflict.

Carpenter 2022 ("Many predicted Nato expansion would lead to war. Those warnings were ignored," Ted Galen Carpenter, senior fellow for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute. Carpenter served as Cato's director of foreign policy studies from 1986 to 1995 and as vice-president for defense and foreign policy studies from 1995 to 2011, 28 Feb 2022, [Many predicted Nato expansion would lead to war. Those warnings were ignored | Ted Galen Carpenter | The Guardian](#), VY, *2 page card*)

Russia's military offensive against Ukraine is an act of aggression that will make already worrisome tensions between Nato and Moscow even more dangerous. The west's new cold war with Russia has turned hot.

Vladimir Putin bears primary responsibility for this latest development, but Nato's arrogant, tone-deaf policy toward Russia over the past quarter-century deserves a large share as well. Analysts committed to a US foreign policy of realism and restraint have warned for more than a quarter-century that continuing to expand the most powerful military alliance in history toward another major power would not end well. The war in Ukraine provides definitive confirmation that it did not. Thinking through the Ukraine crisis – the causes **"It would be extraordinarily difficult to expand**

Nato eastward without that action's being viewed by Russia as unfriendly. Even the most modest schemes would bring the alliance to the borders of the old Soviet Union.

Some of the more ambitious versions would have the alliance virtually surround the Russian Federation itself." I wrote those words in 1994, in my book *Beyond Nato: Staying Out of Europe's Wars*, at a time when expansion proposals merely constituted occasional speculation in foreign policy seminars in New York and Washington. I added that expansion "would constitute a needless provocation of Russia". What was not publicly known at the time was that Bill Clinton's administration had already made the fateful decision the previous year to push for including some former Warsaw Pact countries in Nato. The administration would soon propose inviting Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary to become members, and the US Senate approved adding those countries to the North Atlantic Treaty in 1998. It would be the first of several waves of membership expansion. **Even that first stage provoked Russian opposition and anger.**

In her memoir, Madeleine Albright, Clinton's secretary of state, concedes that **"[Russian president Boris] Yeltsin and his countrymen were strongly opposed to enlargement, seeing it as a strategy for exploiting their vulnerability and moving**

Europe's dividing line to the east, leaving them isolated."

Strobe Talbott, deputy secretary of state, similarly described the Russian attitude. "Many Russians see Nato as a vestige of the cold war, inherently directed against their country. They point out that they have disbanded the Warsaw Pact, their military alliance, and ask why the west should not do the same." It was an excellent question, and neither the Clinton administration nor its successors provided even a remotely convincing answer. George Kennan, the intellectual father of America's containment policy during the cold war, perceptively warned in a May 1998 New York Times interview about what the Senate's ratification of Nato's first round of expansion would set in motion. "I think it is the beginning of a new cold war," Kennan stated. "I think the Russians will gradually react quite adversely and it will affect their policies. I think it is a tragic mistake. There was no reason for this whatsoever. No one was threatening anybody else." **He was right, but US and**

Nato leaders proceeded with new rounds of expansion, including the provocative step of adding the three

Baltic republics. Those countries not only had been part of the Soviet Union, but they had also been part of Russia's empire during the Czarist era.

That wave of expansion now had Nato perched on the border of the Russian Federation. Moscow's patience with Nato's ever more intrusive behavior was wearing thin. The last reasonably friendly warning from Russia that the alliance needed to back off came in March 2007, when Putin addressed the annual Munich security conference. "Nato has put its frontline forces on our borders," Putin complained. Nato expansion "represents a serious provocation that reduces the level of mutual trust. And we have the right to ask: against whom is this expansion intended? And what happened to the assurances our western partners made after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact?" In his memoir, *Duty*, Robert M Gates, who served as secretary of defense in the administrations of both George W Bush and Barack Obama, stated his belief that "the relationship with Russia had been badly mismanaged after [George HW] Bush left office in 1993". Among other missteps, "US agreements with the Romanian and Bulgarian governments to rotate troops through bases in those countries was a needless provocation." In an implicit rebuke to the younger Bush, Gates asserted that "trying to bring Georgia and Ukraine into Nato was truly overreaching". That move, he contended, was a case of "recklessly ignoring what the Russians considered their own vital national interests". The following year, the Kremlin demonstrated that its discontent with Nato's continuing incursions into Russia's security zone had moved beyond verbal objections. Moscow exploited a foolish provocation by Georgia's pro-western government to launch a military offensive that brought Russian troops to the outskirts of the capital. Thereafter, Russia permanently detached two secessionist-minded Georgian regions and put them under effective Russian control. Western (especially US) leaders continued to blow through red warning light after a red

warning light, however. The Obama administration's shockingly arrogant meddling in Ukraine's internal political affairs in 2013 and 2014 to help demonstrators overthrow Ukraine's elected, pro-Russia president was the single most brazen provocation, and it caused tensions to spike. Moscow immediately responded by seizing and annexing Crimea, and a new cold war was underway with a vengeance. Could the Ukraine crisis have been avoided? Events during the past few months constituted the last chance to avoid a hot war in eastern Europe. Putin demanded that Nato provide guarantees on several security issues. Specifically, the Kremlin wanted binding assurances that the alliance would reduce the scope of its growing military presence in eastern Europe and would never offer membership to Ukraine. He backed up those demands with a massive military buildup on Ukraine's borders. **The Biden administration's response to Russia's quest for meaningful western concessions and security guarantees was tepid and evasive. Putin then clearly decided to escalate matters.** Washington's attempt to make Ukraine a Nato political and military pawn (even absent the country's formal membership in the alliance) may end up costing the Ukrainian people dearly. The Ukraine tragedy History will show that Washington's treatment of Russia in the decades following the demise of the Soviet Union was a policy blunder of epic proportions. **It was entirely predictable that Nato expansion would ultimately lead to a tragic, perhaps violent, breach of relations with Moscow. Perceptive analysts warned of the likely consequences, but those warnings went unheeded. We are now paying the price for the US foreign policy establishment's myopia and arrogance.**

C. Internal Link and Impact: Escalation in Ukraine leads to nuclear war between NATO and Russia. Russia nuclear weapons are already on high-alert and would lead to escalation by NATO countries.

Hill 2022 (“Is Russia increasingly likely to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine?,” Alexander Hill, Professor of Military History, University of Calgary, May 9, 2022, [Is Russia increasingly likely to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine?](#), VY)

At the beginning of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Vladimir Putin reminded the West that Russia had nuclear weapons by putting them on “special combat readiness.” Putin’s actions suggested that Russia was considering their use, even though actually launching them was a remote possibility. In precisely what circumstances Russia might use nuclear weapons was left vague — Putin’s intent was presumably to frighten NATO and discourage its intervention on behalf of Ukraine. Since then, much has changed — and not for the better in terms of the risk of nuclear war. Although NATO hasn’t sent troops to fight in Ukraine, the West has implemented increasingly tough economic sanctions against Russia and provided Ukraine with military equipment like tanks. **NATO is now involved in what is, in essence, a full-fledged proxy war against Russia.** Not only have NATO nations — particularly the United States — provided Ukraine with an array of different weapons, but they are clearly helping Ukraine with other elements of its war effort, including intelligence — some of which has been used to target Russian generals. Ukraine emboldened From the failure to take Kyiv to the plodding pace of Soviet gains in the Donbas region in eastern Ukraine, the war has not gone according to plan. Russia has taken heavy losses due to the intense Ukrainian resistance. Russian troops will likely dig in and seek to consolidate their gains in the east. Reasserting independence from Ukraine for the separatist regions — backed up by troops on the ground — could be presented by Putin as a Russian win. He could then declare his “special military operation” over. Ukraine could subsequently reach some sort of peace agreement with Russia involving loss of territory — one that probably wouldn’t be much different from the sort of agreement that could be negotiated today. Currently there is no sign of Ukrainian inclination to negotiate over the Donbas region. Nor is Ukraine willing to formally give up Crimea, seized by Russia in 2014 after the pro-western and anti-Russian Euromaidan revolution in Ukraine. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has made clear his war aim is to liberate all Ukrainian territory in Russian hands, including Crimea. His NATO backers — most vocally the U.S., the U.K. and Canada — are willing to provide Ukraine with the means to do so. These countries hope to see Russia come out of this war significantly weakened as a regional power. The Russian nuclear threat While committing NATO forces directly to Ukraine is unlikely, some hawkish western commentators have suggested NATO could do so without Russia retaliating with nuclear weapons. Even though Russia raised the spectre of nuclear weapons at the beginning of the war, as it progressed, Russian sources suggested that nuclear weapons would only be used in the event of an existential threat to Russia. Recent Russian nuclear sabre-rattling — such as the testing and deployment of more advanced missiles or Russian TV segments showing the impact of a nuclear attack on the U.K. — is undoubtedly cause for concern, but it doesn’t make the use of nuclear weapons significantly more likely in the short term. What would? If the war was to turn in Ukraine’s favour and Ukrainian forces started not only to recapture swaths of territory in the east, but to threaten the separatist regions — or Crimea. **Some western observers have suggested that Russia might employ an “escalate to de-escalate” strategy in such circumstances, using tactical nuclear weapons.** Launching them in territory likely to be held by the enemy, instead of where Russia hopes to retain control, makes a lot more sense. **If the war escalates to the point where a western-backed Ukraine threatens territory Putin considers to be Russian, then the chances of nuclear weapons being employed would increase dramatically.** The problem of Crimea Zelenskyy has suggested that Ukraine will not stop fighting until Crimea is in Ukrainian hands. But for Putin and many Russians, Crimea is Russian. Crimea’s incorporation into Ukraine in 1954 is often seen as a historical accident, rather than an expression of Crimea being ethnically Ukrainian. Crimea’s Tatar population was largely displaced by ethnic Russians — not Ukrainians — and it has a long history as Russian. From Leo Tolstoy’s Sevastopol Sketches, for example, to Vasily Aksyonov’s 1970s novel The Island of Crimea, Crimea is widely represented in Russian literature. A credible western-backed threat to Crimea would undoubtedly constitute the sort of existential threat to Russian territory that would dramatically increase the risk of nuclear weapons being used. A distant but increased nuclear threat **Putin’s frustration over Ukrainian resilience and western support is clearly increasing — recent nuclear posturing is evidence of that. The nuclear threat has been increasing** since February, even if the use of nuclear weapons probably isn’t imminent. **Even the use of low-yield tactical nuclear weapons by Russia would likely provoke some sort of western response. Such a response would then increase the likelihood of further escalation. Informed estimates suggest Russia has more than 1,900 non-strategic or tactical nuclear weapons. The threshold for their use is lower than for larger nuclear weapons. The sort of scenarios that might lead to the use of nuclear weapons are outside the immediate confines Putin’s war in Ukraine.** It would require a significant deterioration in Russian fortunes — and greater western involvement in the conflict. Nonetheless, **not since the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 or nuclear**

tensions in the early 1980s has the spectre of potential nuclear war loomed so large in the future. Back in 1962, politicians on all sides ultimately showed their statesman-like qualities and stepped back from their threat to employ nuclear weapons. We can only hope that their successors will do the same over Ukraine.

1NC Shell-LAWs AFF

A. Uniqueness: Putin is pushing back against increasing NATO's imperial ambitions now. He will respond to increases in NATO's power and control by force.

Al Jazeera 2022 ("Putin condemns NATO's 'imperial ambitions', warns Finland, Sweden," Al Jazeera, 29 Jun 2022, [Putin condemns NATO's 'imperial ambitions', warns Finland, Sweden | News | Al Jazeera](#), VY)

Russian President Vladimir Putin has condemned NATO's "imperial ambitions", accusing the military alliance of seeking to assert its "supremacy" through the Ukraine conflict. The Russian leader also said on Wednesday that he would respond in kind if NATO deployed troops and infrastructure in Finland and Sweden after the two Nordic countries join the military alliance. Putin made his comment a day after NATO member Turkey lifted its veto over the bid by Finland and Sweden to join the alliance when the three nations agreed to protect each other's security. Helsinki and Stockholm joining NATO marks one of the biggest shifts in European security in decades. "With Sweden and Finland, we don't have the problems that we have with Ukraine. They want to join NATO, go ahead," Putin told Russian state television after talks with regional leaders in the central Asian ex-Soviet state of Turkmenistan. "But they must understand there was no threat before, while now, if military contingents and infrastructure are deployed there, we will have to respond in kind and create the same threats for the territories from which threats towards us are created," he said. Moscow's relations with Helsinki and Stockholm would inevitably sour over their NATO membership, he added. **"Everything was fine between us, but now there might be some tensions, there certainly will,"** Putin said. "It's inevitable if there is a threat to us." 'Shattered peace in Europe' Putin also denied that Moscow's forces were responsible for a missile raid on a crowded shopping centre in the Ukrainian town of Kremenchuk earlier this week, in which at least 18 people were killed and many remain missing in the rubble. "Our army does not attack any civilian infrastructure sites. We have every capability of knowing what is situated where," Putin told a news conference in the Turkmenistan capital of Ashgabat. "I am convinced that this time, everything was done in this exact manner," Putin said. Ukraine accuses Russia of targeting the shopping centre and civilian shoppers. **Putin made his comment as NATO on Wednesday branded Russia the biggest "direct threat" to Western security after its invasion of Ukraine.** The military alliance also agreed on plans to modernise Kyiv's beleaguered armed forces, saying it stood fully behind Ukrainians' "heroic defence of their country". "President Putin's war against Ukraine has shattered peace in Europe and has created the biggest security crisis in Europe since the Second World War," NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg told a news conference. **"NATO has responded with strength and unity,"** he said.

B. Link: The affirmative leads to more NATO cohesion which triggers the link.

Michelson 2021 (“Why NATO Needs Lethal Autonomous Weapon Standards,” Colonel (Retired) Brian M. Michelson is a Nonresident Senior Fellow with CEPA’s Transatlantic Defense Tech Initiative and previously served as a Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council, February 23, 2021, [Why NATO Needs Lethal Autonomous Weapon Standards | CEPA](#), VY)

Lethal autonomous weapon systems will come to dominate warfare in the coming years. NATO needs to harmonize its approach to their development and use, or risk being left behind. The rapid weaponization of artificial intelligence, “big data,” social media, robotics, and a host of other technologies presents a clear competitive challenge to NATO, an alliance with members that exist on a wide spectrum of military-technological capabilities. The future effectiveness of NATO will be driven in large part by how it handles these challenges from hobbling its ability both to act in unison and to prevail in a contest of wills. While there are numerous potential technology gaps, one that will likely only increase is partner nations’ ability and willingness to employ lethal autonomous weapon systems. These systems will inevitably grow more capable, and more necessary, in the coming decade. Technological gaps are inevitable considering the disparities in GDP and military budgets. The United States accounts for over 70 percent of NATO’s overall military spending, while the next three largest contributors (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) provide approximately half of the remaining 30 percent. And with most NATO nations continuing to fund their militaries at under the 2 percent GDP goal, **technological gaps will continue to grow.** For perspective, the 2021 United States Department of Defense research and development budget is approximately equal to the entire defense outlay of France and Germany combined. With such a large differential, what can be done to help enable effective investments in autonomous weapons by smaller nations? Even more specifically, how can smaller nations provide capabilities that can integrate into, and contribute to the alliance? To better invest limited funds, **now is the time to look at a NATO standard for lethal autonomous weapons and their ethical use.** While there is no agreed-upon international definition of lethal autonomous weapons systems, the U.S. Department of Defense defines them as “weapon system[s] that, once activated, can select and engage targets without further intervention by a human operator.” While these are not Schwarzenegger-style Terminators and still have a degree of human control over them, the technology enabling these systems is maturing rapidly, and military necessity will increasingly demand that these systems gain broader parameters of autonomous action. Yet despite the complexity of these systems and the inevitability of their proliferation, NATO does not currently have a common standard for their use or development. In fact, some NATO countries even have opposing views of how to handle them. NATO standards are designed to ensure compatibility among weapon systems, communication architecture, and a host of other warfighting systems. The 7.62mm small arms round is a good example of this. But what is the 7.62mm equivalent standard for the development and employment of autonomous weapon systems? This opens a host of related questions regarding the employment of these systems: What Identification – Friend – Foe (IFF) capability should ground and air units require to prevent fratricide? What degree of certainty does a lethal autonomous weapon system require before final engagement? What level of collateral damage is acceptable? What degree of compatibility between systems is required? Should all these parameters (and others) be adjustable, and if so, at what command level? The attendant ethics also need to be addressed. NATO’s experience in Afghanistan was a case study in the challenges of coalition warfare. Differing risk tolerances, legal requirements, ethical views, domestic political concerns, and at times simply combat capability, all combined into to complex policy cocktail that impeded the effectiveness of combat operations. While modern militaries have accountability, legal, and ethical systems incorporated into their command structures, they are not uniform and leaders in differing militaries have varying degrees of

authority. The key questions hinge on two issues: Who gets to decide to employ an autonomous weapon, and who is responsible should things go wrong? The Kunduz hospital strike in October of 2015 was driven primarily by human error. Responsibility was fixed on the chain of command and 16 leaders were disciplined. Who will be responsible if a member nation conducts a NATO-authorized strike and it goes terribly wrong? If this framework is not thoroughly established ahead of time, not only is it likely that commanders may hesitate to use this capability, the risk-aversion inherent in bureaucracies may limit the development of autonomous weapons that will be needed in future conflicts. **In the emerging field of lethal autonomous weapons, establishing a common NATO standard for the development and use of autonomous weapons will help address the gap in capabilities among NATO member nations. By establishing these standards, nations can ensure that their defense expenditures on autonomous weapons will create systems that are interoperable, able to contribute to NATO's capability, and can be employed within defensible ethical guidelines.**

C. Internal Link and Impact: Fears of increasing NATO's pushback on any front will escalate the Ukrainian conflict. Russian nuclear weapons are already on high-alert. Brinkmanship ends in disaster.

Hill 2022 ("Is Russia increasingly likely to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine?," Alexander Hill, Professor of Military History, University of Calgary, May 9, 2022, [Is Russia increasingly likely to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine?, VY](#))

At the beginning of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Vladimir Putin reminded the West that Russia had nuclear weapons by putting them on "special combat readiness." Putin's actions suggested that Russia was considering their use, even though actually launching them was a remote possibility. In precisely what circumstances Russia might use nuclear weapons was left vague — Putin's intent was presumably to frighten NATO and discourage its intervention on behalf of Ukraine. Since then, much has changed — and not for the better in terms of the risk of nuclear war. Although NATO hasn't sent troops to fight in Ukraine, the West has implemented increasingly tough economic sanctions against Russia and provided Ukraine with military equipment like tanks. **NATO is now involved in what is, in essence, a full-fledged proxy war against Russia.** Not only have NATO nations — particularly the United States — provided Ukraine with an array of different weapons, but they are clearly helping Ukraine with other elements of its war effort, including intelligence — some of which has been used to target Russian generals. Ukraine emboldened From the failure to take Kyiv to the plodding pace of Soviet gains in the Donbas region in eastern Ukraine, the war has not gone according to plan. Russia has taken heavy losses due to the intense Ukrainian resistance. Russian troops will likely dig in and seek to consolidate their gains in the east. Reasserting independence from Ukraine for the separatist regions — backed up by troops on the ground — could be presented by Putin as a Russian win. He could then declare his "special military operation" over. Ukraine could subsequently reach some sort of peace agreement with Russia involving loss of territory — one that probably wouldn't be much different from the sort of agreement that could be negotiated today. Currently there is no sign of Ukrainian inclination to negotiate over the Donbas region. Nor is Ukraine willing to formally give up Crimea, seized by Russia in 2014 after the pro-western and anti-Russian Euromaidan revolution in Ukraine. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has made clear his war aim is to liberate all Ukrainian territory in Russian hands, including Crimea. His NATO backers — most vocally the U.S., the U.K. and Canada — are willing to provide Ukraine with the means to do so. These countries hope to see Russia come out of this war significantly weakened as a regional power. The Russian nuclear threat While committing NATO forces directly to Ukraine is unlikely, some hawkish western commentators have suggested NATO could do so without Russia retaliating with nuclear weapons. Even though Russia raised the spectre of nuclear weapons at the beginning of the war, as it progressed, Russian sources suggested that nuclear weapons would only be used in the event of an existential threat to Russia. Recent Russian nuclear sabre-rattling — such as the testing and deployment of more advanced missiles or Russian TV segments showing the impact of a nuclear attack on the U.K. — is undoubtedly cause for concern, but it doesn't make the use of nuclear weapons significantly more likely in the short term. What would? If the war was to turn in Ukraine's favour and Ukrainian forces started not only to recapture swaths of territory in the east, but to threaten the separatist regions — or Crimea. **Some western observers have suggested that Russia might employ an "escalate to de-escalate" strategy in such circumstances, using tactical nuclear weapons.** Launching them in territory likely to be held by the enemy, instead of where Russia hopes to retain control, makes a lot more sense. **If the war escalates to the point where a western-backed Ukraine threatens territory Putin considers to be Russian, then the chances of nuclear weapons being employed**

would increase dramatically. The problem of Crimea Zelenskyy has suggested that Ukraine will not stop fighting until Crimea is in Ukrainian hands. But for Putin and many Russians, Crimea is Russian. Crimea's incorporation into Ukraine in 1954 is often seen as a historical accident, rather than an expression of Crimea being ethnically Ukrainian. Crimea's Tatar population was largely displaced by ethnic Russians — not Ukrainians — and it has a long history as Russian. From Leo Tolstoy's Sevastopol Sketches, for example, to Vasily Aksyonov's 1970s novel The Island of Crimea, Crimea is widely represented in Russian literature. A credible western-backed threat to Crimea would undoubtedly constitute the sort of existential threat to Russian territory that would dramatically increase the risk of nuclear weapons being used. A distant but increased nuclear threat **Putin's frustration over Ukrainian resilience and western support is clearly increasing — recent nuclear posturing is evidence of that. The nuclear threat has been increasing** since February, even if the use of nuclear weapons probably isn't imminent. **Even the use of low-yield tactical nuclear weapons by Russia would likely provoke some sort of western response. Such a response would then increase the likelihood of further escalation. Informed estimates suggest Russia has more than 1,900 non-strategic or tactical nuclear weapons. The threshold for their use is lower than for larger nuclear weapons. The sort of scenarios that might lead to the use of nuclear weapons are outside the immediate confines Putin's war in Ukraine.** It would require a significant deterioration in Russian fortunes — and greater western involvement in the conflict. Nonetheless, **not since the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 or nuclear tensions in the early 1980s has the spectre of potential nuclear war loomed so large in the future.** Back in 1962, politicians on all sides ultimately showed their statesman-like qualities and stepped back from their threat to employ nuclear weapons. We can only hope that their successors will do the same over Ukraine.

2NC/1NR Uniqueness Extension

Putin is warning against increased NATO forces now. He will respond with force.

Smith 2022 ("Defiant Putin goes to war in Ukraine with a warning for U.S., NATO," Alexander Smith, Feb. 24, 2022, <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/russia-ukraine-invasion-putin-war-warning-us-nato-rcna17497> , VY)

When war came to Europe on Thursday, it was delivered with terrifying force and a blunt warning. **After months of military buildup, thinly veiled threats and frenzied speculation, the scale of Russian President Vladimir Putin's plans was finally made clear.** In a pre-dawn address on Russian television, Putin announced that he was attacking Ukraine, a sovereign democracy on his doorstep. The barrage started minutes later — a moment the United States and its have allies have predicted for weeks, but which nonetheless reverberated throughout the international order. Putin's speech contained a chilling warning to any countries thinking of leaping to Ukraine's defense in the face of a Russian invasion: Intervene and you will face the full force of the Kremlin's nuclear arsenal. **"I decided to conduct a special military operation," Putin said,** wearing a suit and a red tie and sitting behind his now-familiar desk, flanked by two Russian flags and a cluster of retro-looking telephones. **Russia "is today one of the most powerful nuclear powers in the world," he added, as if Washington, London and Paris needed reminding of his world-largest arsenal. "No one should have any doubts that a direct attack on our country will lead to defeat and dire consequences for any potential aggressor."**

2NC/1NR Generic Link Extension

The expansion of NATO risks destabilizing Russia, not taming them.

Ellyatt and Macias 2022 ("Russia calls NATO expansion deal 'destabilizing'; Ukraine releases footage of deadly mall strike," Holly Ellyatt and Amanda Macias, Jun 29, 2022, [Russia calls NATO expansion deal 'destabilizing'; Ukraine releases footage of deadly mall strike](#), VY)

The Western military organization NATO has officially invited Sweden and Finland to join the alliance in a historic move on Wednesday. The development comes after the alliance reached a deal with Turkey to accept the membership bids from both countries after initial objections from Ankara. **The summit** — arguably the most important meeting of the alliance in recent months, and perhaps years — **has also seen the alliance reiterate its condemnation of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, pledge to beef up its defenses in Europe, and slam China as posing a "challenge" to its interests.** NATO's Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg announced earlier in the week that the Western military organization would increase the number of troops within its rapid response force — which comprises land, air, sea and special forces units that are capable of being deployed quickly — to 300,000 from about 40,000 personnel. **Russia has issued an initial reaction to the NATO deal that allows its expansion to go ahead, roughly doubling the land border Russia will have to share with NATO members, with one official calling it "a purely destabilizing factor."**

An increase in NATO cooperation is what causes escalation in Ukraine.

O'Connor and Jamali 2022 ("Russia Could Launch Cyber Attacks Against U.S. if Biden Sends Wrong Signals, Intel Warns," Tom O'Connor And Naveed Jamali, 1/24/22, [Russia Could Launch Cyber Attacks Against U.S. if Biden Sends Wrong Signals, Intel Warns](#), VY, *2 page card*)

In a new memo obtained by Newsweek, **the Department of Homeland Security has warned of Russia's potential to launch cyberattacks against the United States in response to a possible escalation of the crisis unfolding at the border with Ukraine. "We assess that Russia would consider initiating a cyber attack against the Homeland if it perceived a US or NATO response to a possible Russian invasion of Ukraine threatened its long-term national security."** the memo, dated January 23 and attributed to the Office of Intelligence and Analysis, reads in bold text. The warning came as President Joe Biden sent additional weapons to Ukrainian forces and reportedly weighed the option of sending thousands of U.S. troops to the Baltic states bordering Russia over concerns that Moscow was planning imminent military action against Ukraine. Kyiv has defied the Kremlin's protests by seeking membership in the NATO Western military alliance, something that Russian officials have said threatened their country's national security. The bloc has expanded eastward since the fall of the Soviet Union three decades ago and has refused to rule out including Ukraine as well. **The memo detailed a range of ways in which Russia may choose to unleash its cyber arsenal in the event of a flare-up** while noting such an action would be unprecedented. "Russia maintains a range of offensive cyber tools that it could employ against US networks — from low-level denials-of-service to destructive attacks targeting critical infrastructure," the memo read. "However, we assess that Russia's threshold for conducting disruptive or destructive cyber attacks in the Homeland probably remains very high

and we have not observed Moscow directly employ these types of cyber attacks against US critical infrastructure — notwithstanding cyber espionage and potential prepositioning operations in the past." Reached for comment, a spokesperson for the Department of Homeland Security told Newsweek said it "regularly shares information with federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial officials and the private sector to ensure the safety and security of all communities across the country." "We have increased operational partnerships between private sector companies and the federal government to strengthen our nation's cyber defenses, including through CISA's newly established Joint Cyber Defense Collaborative (JCDC)," the spokesperson said. "The JCDC brings these partners together to help us understand the full threat landscape and enable real-time collaboration to empower our private sector partners to gain information and take action against the most significant threats to the nation." The memo, which was first reported on by CNN, has already generated reactions from experts and former officials, some of whom expressed concern that a wider conflagration could erupt. Alexander Vindman, a retired U.S. Army lieutenant colonel who served as director for European Affairs at the National Security Council under former President Donald Trump, said the Biden administration has tried to "keep the U.S. out of bilateral confrontation" with Russia, and "that's why they kind of took this approach limited to diplomacy" as the U.S. leader ruled out the deployment of U.S. soldiers to Ukraine itself. "Already we see that's eroding," Vindman, who was reassigned from his position in early 2020 following his testimony to lawmakers regarding a controversial call between Trump and Ukrainian counterpart Volodymyr Zelensky, told Newsweek. "Already we see the risks in a full-spectrum type of scenario, starting out kind of low-end with regards to cyber operations, those risks are increasing." **And if these risks turn kinetic, he warned such an escalation could pass the point of no return.** "Once the shots are fired, there is no putting the genie back in the bottle," Vindman said. One former U.S. intelligence analyst said Russian President Vladimir Putin was likely calculating these risks as he planned his next moves vis-à-vis the situation in Ukraine and deterring U.S. actions. "Russia certainly has the ability to carry out cyber attacks against U.S. systems, but also very much wants to avoid direct confrontation with the United States through deliberate acts that might result in their loss of 'escalation control,'" the former intelligence analyst told Newsweek. "Attacks targeting U.S. critical infrastructure systems would almost certainly prompt more serious reprisals from the Biden administration, something Putin wants to avoid, as he'll likely seek to keep conflict confined to Ukraine." Given past cyber attacks Washington has attributed to Moscow and the current level of escalation, however, others emphasized a need to reinforce digital defenses. "Russia has telegraphed that they are willing to attack critical infrastructure here in the U.S.," Brian Harrell, who served as former Department of Homeland Security Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection before his resignation in August 2020, told Newsweek. "The private sector should work to understand enemy tactics, including spear-phishing and brute force attacks while conducting proactive threat hunting efforts," he added. "We have absolutely entered a heightened period of awareness given the threats that have been made and the demonstrated attacks we've seen from the Russian GRU and Foreign Intelligence Service." Mike McNerney, who serves as senior vice president of security at Resilience Insurance, a San Francisco-based firm that offers cybersecurity and insurance services, commended the Department of Homeland Security's Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency for having set out to prepare the private sector for such attacks, regardless of their origin. "CISA is absolutely doing the right thing by telling US companies to be prepared against cyber threats," McNerney told Newsweek. "While Russia is unlikely to escalate tensions with the U.S. right now by launching cyber attacks here, there is also the possibility of opportunistic attacks from criminal groups." Kyiv has already accused Moscow of employing covert cyber tactics throughout the course of the current dispute, which first began to grab global attention in March of last year and then again in November as up to 100,000 Russian troops amassed near the country's restive border

with Ukraine, where Russia-aligned separatists have been active since 2014. An apparent cyber attack gripped the post-Soviet Eastern European state earlier this month, but Russian officials have dismissed any allegations their government was behind the incident. "We are nearly accustomed to the fact that Ukrainians are blaming everything on Russia, even their bad weather," Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov told reporters last week, according to the state-run Tass Russian News Agency. As Washington and Moscow struggle to find common ground in talks, the Biden administration has also publicly the likelihood of Russia waging cyberwarfare, though often in the context of actions that would target Ukraine itself. In an interview with NBC News on Sunday, Secretary of State Antony Blinken warned that "in the event that there is a renewed Russian incursion, Russian forces going into Ukraine, there is going to be a swift, a severe, and united response" and also threatened such a reaction in response to other things "Russia could do short of sending forces into Ukraine again to try to destabilize or topple the government – cyber attacks, hybrid means, et cetera." In Ukraine, officials have sought to downplay the threat of any major escalation on the horizon, even as three embassies in Kyiv, those of Australia, the United Kingdom and the U.S., sent diplomats out of the country. On Monday, Ukrainian National Security Council Secretary Alexey Danilov called on those in the media "to turn down the heat." That same day, Peskov too criticized what he called "information hysteria" when it came to the situation between Russia and Ukraine. **He placed the blame on the U.S. and NATO, however, and said Western powers were also responsible for real-world provocations as well. "As for concrete actions, we see the statements published by NATO about the increase of the contingent and relocations of forces and means to the eastern flank,"** Peskov said. **"All this leads to an escalation of tensions."**

2NC/1NR Impact Extensions

Escalation in Russia's invasion of Ukraine goes nuclear. The risk of nuclear war over Ukraine is the biggest risk since the Cold War.

Bender 2022 ("How the Ukraine war could go nuclear," Bryan Bender, senior national correspondent for POLITICO and adjunct professor at the Walter Cronkite School of Journalism at Arizona State University, 3/24/2022, [How the Ukraine war could go nuclear - POLITICO](#), VY, *2 page card*)

Not since the Cold War has the specter of nuclear war hung so heavily over a president's crisis diplomacy. As President Joe Biden meets with fellow NATO leaders, calls for a ceasefire in Ukraine are growing more urgent than ever — to alleviate the widespread human suffering but also to dial back what **veterans of nuclear planning consider an alarming potential for it to spiral into a clash of atomic superpowers. The nuclear brinkmanship from Russian President Vladimir Putin in recent weeks is unprecedented:** He ordered a snap nuclear war game before the invasion and days later put his nuclear forces on high alert. And **the Kremlin has repeatedly signaled it could resort to nuclear weapons — an option explicitly reserved in Russian military doctrine — if it determines the West's intervention in the conflict goes too far.** Again on Tuesday, in an interview with CNN, Putin's chief spokesperson refused to rule out the use of nuclear arms in the conflict. So far, Biden has sought to dial down the tensions. The Pentagon has not changed the alert status of U.S. nuclear forces and military leaders have publicly said they have not detected Russian actions suggesting they are preparing to use nuclear weapons. The Pentagon also took the unusual step early in the conflict of putting off a regularly scheduled test of an intercontinental ballistic missile to avoid fueling nuclear tensions. Yet as the conflict drags on, and Russia's conventional forces suffer surprisingly heavy losses while its economy reels, the prospect that Putin might resort to using weapons of mass destruction is increasing. Moscow has already demonstrated that it's willing to use hypersonic missiles for the first time in a war. With limited contact between the Kremlin and Western capitals, **the risk that Moscow's intentions could be misread with catastrophic consequences will only grow more acute,** according to numerous specialists. **"There has always been a chance of mistakes, but I think the chances are much higher,"** said former Sen. Sam Nunn, the longtime chair of the Armed Services Committee and now co-chair of the nonprofit Nuclear Threat Initiative. **"I think we are in a different era in terms of blunders."** It is a high-wire act confronting Biden as he tries to stiffen the spines of NATO countries for what is expected to be a long struggle. Allies are helping Ukraine fend off its bigger aggressor — including sending more arms and U.S. troops to defend NATO's eastern borders — while not pushing Putin over the edge. **Russia invaded Ukraine as cooperation between Washington and Moscow on nuclear arms control has been unraveling in recent years.** The two countries have walked away from several treaties to control the deadliest weapons, including one that outlawed intermediate-range nuclear missiles that could threaten Europe. The only remaining nuclear pact between the two sides is the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, which limits deployed strategic weapons to 1,550 each. Biden and Putin agreed last year to extend it until 2026. But the treaty does not cover any of the thousands of smaller, or "battlefield," nuclear weapons in their respective arsenals, including at least 2,000 in Russian stockpiles,

according to public estimates. Two Defense Department officials, who spoke on condition of anonymity, say they are vigilantly gathering intelligence on Russian military moves for any sign that it might be taking such weapons out of storage or preparing for deployment units trained in nuclear or chemical warfare. ‘Raising the ante’ Longtime observers of Russian nuclear policy have been startled at how reckless the Putin regime has been with its nuclear threats compared to leaders in Moscow during the Cold War. “The communist party of the Soviet Union was incredibly disciplined about this,” said Rose Gottemoeller, a former undersecretary of state for arms control who has negotiated treaties with Russians and served as NATO deputy secretary general from 2016 to 2019. “There were only a few Soviet leaders who were allowed to speak about nuclear doctrine and strategy, and they did so in a very carefully scripted way. “We are in a more difficult crisis than anyone could have predicted with this constant nuclear saber-rattling that has been going on,” she added. “We have to take what [Putin’s] people say seriously, because he was serious about invading Ukraine when many of us hoped he would turn away at the last minute.” The dearth of diplomacy and growing distrust only fuels the risk of “mushroom clouds appearing on the battlefield,” Izumi Nakamitsu, United Nations high representative for disarmament affairs, warned on Tuesday. She hearkened back to the numerous instances during the decades-long standoff between the United States and then-Soviet Union when the two sides nearly came to nuclear blows. But diplomacy — and a good bit of luck — prevailed. “We are all aware of the close calls and near-misses,” she said at an event hosted by The Stimson Center. “Unfortunately, I fear we have forgotten many of those difficult lessons. A simple glance at a headline today can point to how acute nuclear risks have become.” Those concerns are shared across the spectrum by advocates for nuclear disarmament and those who believe a more robust U.S. nuclear arsenal is needed to deter adversaries. “I really am worried here that the war is going so badly for Putin ... it raises the possibility of Putin feeling like he needs to escalate to win his way out of this conflict,” said Tim Morrison, a former Trump White House nuclear policy adviser who is now a researcher at the Hudson Institute, a hawkish think tank. That, he continued, “is right in the wheelhouse of Russian [military] doctrine for a low-yield nuclear or even chemical [weapons] use.” Morrison added that he fears the situation could unravel to the point where Putin is “raising the ante, climbing the rungs of the escalation ladder to make the point to NATO ‘hey, you guys really need to knock it off with arming the Ukrainians, I will no longer tolerate this.’” Russia has already ratcheted up the war with its hypersonic missile launch in Ukraine last week, and it has also been accused of dropping phosphorus bombs, which are banned under the Geneva Convention (though using the chemical to obscure troop movements or illuminate targets is not). NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said on Wednesday the alliance will be assisting Ukraine with specialized equipment in the event of a Russian attack with chemical, biological or nuclear weapons. Gottemoeller said she fears that Moscow’s use of a tactical nuclear weapon is a serious possibility. “Putin is capable of anything,” she said. “He could declare there is an existential threat from a NATO ally resupplying the Ukrainians.” ‘You’re not going to necessarily know’ Others worry less about Putin ordering a nuclear attack and more about a miscalculation leading to the use of nuclear weapons. **Nunn has been sounding the alarm about the threat of an accidental nuclear exchange as a result of a cyber attack on nuclear command-and-control systems — including by malign actors not directly involved in the conflict who could be confused for a nuclear adversary.** “Third parties, third countries, might interfere in terms of command-and-control or warning systems,” he said of potential hackers. “Interference in command-and-control could be taken in this kind of atmosphere as probably a deliberate act.” Nunn successfully lobbied Congress last year to require the Pentagon to conduct a “failsafe review” of the U.S. nuclear arsenal “to prevent cyber-related and other risks that could lead to the unauthorized or inadvertent use of nuclear weapons as the result of an accident, misinterpretation, miscalculation, terrorism, unexpected

technological breakthrough, or deliberate act.” Further complicating the task of U.S. and allied commanders to decipher Russian intentions, said Morrison, is the fact that so many Russian battlefield systems are also designed to unleash both conventional and nuclear or chemical warheads. In other words, **it could be exceedingly difficult to know when the Russian military has decided to pursue a nuclear option.** “One of the problems with Russian nuclear forces is how many of their systems are dual-capable,” Morrison said. “So you’re not going to necessarily know if the S-300 or that long-range [missile or artillery] battery is packing a conventional warhead or a nuclear one.” If U.S. military leaders detected Russian nuclear maneuvers, Nunn said, **Biden may have no choice but to act more aggressively to deter Moscow, including putting American nuclear forces on alert.** “If you’d seen bombers in the air, all sorts of activities in the nuclear forces, it would have been a different proposition,” Nunn said. “The risk of nuclear use is in my view higher through a mistake or blunder than through intent. But nevertheless blunders get more likely when nuclear weapons are put on alert.” **The Nuclear Threat Initiative last week outlined a hypothetical but horrific scenario to underscore how the war in Ukraine could go wrong.** In a simulation based on historical examples, **the current conflict escalated with the detonation of a nuclear weapon in Ukraine and quickly spiraled into a nuclear** holocaust. **The scenario lays out a chain of events — the downing of an American spy plane by accident, the misreading of counter actions, cyber attacks that further sow confusion, and leaders with very little time to react — that result in the unthinkable: an all-out nuclear war between the United States and Russia.** “Over the course of the next hour,” it chillingly details, “82 million Americans are killed with allied countries faring similarly. Most die instantly, while more will die of radiation poisoning over the coming days and weeks.”

NATO-Russia escalation would “leap-frog” into nuclear war.

Kulesa 2018 (“Envisioning a Russia-NATO Conflict: Implications for Deterrence Stability,” Lukasz Kulesa, European Leadership Network, February 2018, <http://www.jstor.com/stable/resrep17437>, VY)

Escalation: **Can a NATO - Russia conflict be managed? Once a conflict was under way, the “fog of war” and rising unpredictability would inevitably set in, complicating the implementation of any predetermined theories of escalation,** deescalation and inter-conflict management. The actual dynamics of a conflict and the perceptions of the stakes involved are extremely difficult to predict. Simulations and table-top exercises can give only limited insights into the actual decisionmaking processes and interactions. Still, Russian military theorists and practitioners seem to assume that a conflict with NATO can be managed and controlled in a way that would bring it to a swift end consistent with Russian aims. The Russian theory of victory would seek to exploit weak points in an Alliance war effort. Based on the conviction that democracies are weak and their leaders and populations are risk-averse, **Russia may assume that its threats of horizontal or vertical escalation could be particularly effective. It would also try to bring home the notion that it has much higher stakes in the conflict (regime survival) than a majority of the NATO members involved, and thus will be ready to push the boundaries of the conflict further.** It would most likely try to test and exploit potential divisions within the Alliance, combining selective diplomacy and activation of its intelligence assets in some NATO states with a degree of selectivity in terms of targets of particular attacks. **Any NATO-Russia conflict would inevitably have a nuclear dimension. The role of nuclear weapons as a tool for escalation control for Russia has been thoroughly debated by experts,** but when and how Russia might use (and not merely showcase or activate) nuclear weapons in a conflict remains an open question. Beyond catch phrases such as “escalate to de-escalate” or “escalate to win” there are a wider range of options for Russian nuclear weapon use. For example, a single nuclear warning shot could be lethal or non-lethal. It could be directed against a purely military target or a military-civilian one. Detonation could be configured for an EMP effect. A “false flag” attack is also conceivable. These options might be used to signal escalation and could significantly complicate NATO’s responses. Neither NATO nor its member states have developed a similar theory of victory. Public NATO documents stipulate the general goals for the Alliance: defend against any armed attack and, as needed, restore the full sovereignty and territorial integrity of member states. **It is less clear how far the Alliance would be willing to escalate the conflict to achieve these goals, and what mechanisms and means it would use while trying to maintain some degree of control over the conflict.** The goals and methods of waging a conflict with Russia would probably have to be limited in order to avoid a massive nuclear exchange. Such limitations would also involve restrictions on striking back against targets on Russian territory. But too narrow an approach could put too much restraint on NATO’s operations: **the Russian regime’s stability may ultimately need to be threatened in order to force the leadership into terminating the conflict. NATO would thus need to establish what a proportional self-defence response to Russian actions would involve,** and to what extent cyber operations or attacks against military targets in quite different parts of Russia would be useful as tools of escalation to signal NATO’s resolve. Moreover, **individual NATO Allies, especially those directly affected by Russia’s actions, might pursue their individual strategies of escalation.** With regards to the nuclear dimension in NATO escalation plans, given the stakes involved, this element would most likely be handled by the three nuclear-weapon members of the Alliance, with the US taking the lead. The existence of three independent centres of nuclear decision-making could be exploited to complicate Russian planning and introduce uncertainty into the Russian strategic calculus, but some degree of “P3” dialogue and coordination would be beneficial. This coordination would not necessarily focus on nuclear

targeting, but rather on designing coordinated operations to demonstrate resolve in order to keep the conflict below the nuclear threshold, or bring it back under the threshold after first use. Relying on concepts of escalation control and on lessons from the Cold War confrontation might be misleading. The circumstances in which a Russia -NATO conflict would play out would be radically different from the 20th century screenplay. Moreover, **instead of gradual (linear) escalation or salami tactics escalation, it is possible to imagine surprizing “leap frog” escalation,** possibly connected with actions in different domains (e.g. a cyberattack against critical infrastructure). Flexibility, good intelligence and inventiveness in responding to such developments would be crucial.

China Focus Disadvantage

Negative

1NC Shell

A. Uniqueness – NATO is focusing on China’s growing influence now.

Gallo 2022 (“Why NATO’s China Focus May Endure,” William Gallo, June 24, 2022, [Why NATO’s China Focus May Endure](#), VY)

The engagement underscores a profound shift in the scope and priorities of NATO, which was meant to focus on the collective defense of its North American and European member states. But **China’s growing global presence, as well as its expanding military cooperation with Russia, has made it much harder for NATO to ignore.** While there is no talk of NATO accepting Asian countries as members, **the alliance’s new Asia focus will likely endure,** according to many observers. “I do not expect that NATO will now expand into the Indo-Pacific and create a new Asian NATO kind of organization,” said Zsuzsa Anna Ferenczy, a former political adviser in the European Parliament. **“I do expect, though, that cooperation with [Asian] countries that face the growing threat of China’s economic coercion and aggressive behavior ... will converge more and more with European democracies as well as the United States,”** said Ferenczy, assistant professor at National Dong Hwa University in Taiwan. Europe sours on China **NATO’s eastward shift reflects not only an intensified U.S.-China rivalry, but also changing European attitudes toward Beijing.**

B. Link – NATO focusing on new tasks that it is not well-equipped for, overstretch happens and causes NATO to falter in other areas.

Larsen 2022 (“NATO Must Get Resilience Right to Withstand Russia and China,” Henrik Larsen, a senior researcher at the Center for Security Studies at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich, May 22, 2022, [NATO Must Get Resilience Right to Withstand Russia and China – Lawfare](#), VY)

Conversely, **NATO needs to navigate its adaptation to its illiberal challenge while avoiding functional over-extension. The alliance is at risk of maladaptation, whereby it extends its own activities unnecessarily into civilian areas of security in which it lacks necessary expertise and legacy.** Strong voices in the expert community call for NATO to specify resilience as a core task in the forthcoming Strategic Concept, in principle elevating it to a task of equal importance to collective defense. An influential report commissioned by Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg to inspire the Strategic Concept recommends that NATO reinvent itself as a “liberal bulwark” against Russia and China and extend the alliance’s responsibilities into the realm of democratic resilience. **NATO must steer clear of the temptation to take on too many tasks and instead enhance resilience only in areas that can be reconciled with its mandate as a security and defense alliance.** The encounter with illiberal powers strengthens NATO’s unity, but that does not necessarily mean that NATO is the right institution to meet the illiberal challenges that Russia and China pose. So far, the alliance’s record of responding to these threats has been uneven, and the perspectives about its role have diverged at times between the United States and its European partners. **But there is a way forward, if NATO can clearly delineate what should and should not fall within its remit, be clear-eyed about its strategic environment, and prioritize international partners that share NATO’s interests and values.**

C. Internal Link – The focus on China is necessary to check China’s growing influence and rise across the globe and maintain stability.

Le Corre 2022 (“NATO looking East: the case of China,” Philippe Le Corre, Associate Fellow, January 5, 2022, [NATO looking East: the case of China](#), VY, *2 page card*)

The past year will be remembered as a turning point for NATO in its approach to the China question. In their June 2021 communiqué, NATO leaders mentioned China very directly: **China’s “growing influence and international policies can present challenges that we need to address together as an alliance”** (paragraph 3). The statement raised eyebrows in Asia –including in Tokyo, Seoul and of course Beijing- where governments are not used to deal with an alliance which greatest responsibility, as it self-defined, is “to protect and defend (our) territories and (our) populations against attack, and will address all threats and challenges which affect Euro-Atlantic security”. Could the People’s Republic of China be such a threat? On paragraph 55 of the communiqué, China is mentioned again. **According to NATO leaders China is presenting challenges “by rapidly expanding its nuclear arsenal and being opaque in implementing its military modernization”.** In addition, **China “is also cooperating militarily with Russia, including through participation in Russian exercises in the Euro-Atlantic area”.** Unlike China, Russia – an on-going concern within NATO – is mentioned very frequently in the communiqué. Insiders say that NATO has in fact been watching various aspects of Chinese policies for several years. After all, it does make sense for the organization’s policy planners and analysts to monitor Chinese strategic, diplomatic and military activities which have been rising at various degrees across all the five continents. China now runs the world’s largest diplomatic service and is a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) – not to mention an impressive presence in the senior management of many UN-led agencies. It has established new international organizations such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the Silk Road Fund. Economically, its “go global” policy originally set in the 1990s, was upgraded in the last decade under the banner of President Xi Jinping’s “Belt and Road Initiative”, a network of regional infrastructure projects which has continued to expand and includes enhanced policy coordination across the Asian continent, financial integration, trade and digital connectivity. China’s efforts to implement this initiative (often successfully) has had an important effect on the region’s economic architecture – and in turn has strategic implications for NATO. As a direct concern to several major powers part of the Alliance, China’s defense budget ranks second after the United States (\$209 billion or 1.7 percent of China’s GDP), following a steady increase since the early 1990s. In 2021, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) expenses rose by 6.8 percent. **The Alliance calls on China to “uphold its international commitments and to act responsibly in the international system, including in the space, cyber, and maritime domains, in keeping with its role as a major power”.** At the London NATO leaders’ summit back in 2019, China got one mention as HQ staff had been asked to look at technological competition in particular. But last year confirmed a new step in NATO’s approach, which now looks at China across three directions: first, as a nation that is trying to set standard setting in technology. While China remains behind the more established players, China is also focusing on strategic sectors. For example, companies like Huawei Technologies or ZTE had invested massively in 5G standards for at least a decade before its launch, and are now looking at the next generation of telecommunication standards . According to a survey, China already accounts for 40 percent of patents for sixth generation communication network applications, expected to be rolled out commercially as soon as 2030. New technologies yet to be standardized -- drones, lithium batteries, data security, artificial intelligence (AI) are also key targets of the Chinese leadership. A new report by the EU Chamber of Commerce in China , entitled

The Shape of Things to Come: The Race to Control Technical Standardisation, revealed the stakes of Chinese policy of standardization and identifies technical standard setting as a battleground on which states are fighting to gain dominance in strategic technologies, such as 5G, AI and new electric vehicles. The report is based on extensive interviews with corporate members of the EU chamber. Soon or later, the new standardization process will affect international bidding processes in many parts of the world. As part of its Belt and Road Initiative, China signed 98 bilateral and multilateral agreements on standardization with 55 countries and international organizations (many of them signatories of the BRI). What impact does it have on the global security situation, on the Alliance's members and the organization's strategy? This will soon become a key question for NATO, which has not yet taken a stand on BRI. Only a few NATO members have signed MoUs on the BRI. Second, **NATO looks at how China is projecting its power in countries very close geographically to the alliance,** such as in the Black Sea region or the Indo-Pacific. **Respect of international norms, especially freedom of navigation principles, are essential to NATO.** Eurasia is home to partnership countries some of which share core values with members of the Alliance, and not necessarily with China (nor Russia), hence the need for an enhanced dialogue on norms and the rule of law. **Third, China has raised its influence in countries belonging to NATO.** For example, naval or energy infrastructures are related to the national sovereignty of many European NATO countries which have ceded some state assets to China following the 2008 financial crisis. The harbor of Piraeus in Greece (which is now run by China Ocean Shipping Group) or the National Grid of Portugal (partly owned by China Three Gorges, another state-owned corporation) both belong to this category. **Reactions to China's growing presence has produced mixed results.** In many cases, peer pressure has led countries to limit new foreign investments in sensitive areas. Member-states such as Romania and Bulgaria, for instance, have favored their relationships to NATO (and the EU) including a military presence rather than Chinese investments. Despite strong views, and sometimes strong pressures on fellow members when it comes to China, it is unlikely that the United States will call upon NATO to intervene in the Indo-Pacific region. President Emmanuel Macron of France, in particular, insisted that **the relationship with China is "broader than the military topic. It's economic, strategic, about values and technological."** He insisted **that the Alliance should not "scatter our efforts and not to have biases in the relationship to China"**. Discrepancies remain on the approach towards China within the Alliance, and within the Atlantic community as a whole.

D. Impact – China’s rise will not be peaceful if it fears increased rivalry with the US. That leads to armed conflict.

Lyons 2022 (“China’s Rise and U.S. Defense Implications,” Marco Lyons, Nation Security Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, Jan. 14, 2022, [China’s Rise and U.S. Defense Implications | Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs](#), VY, *2 page card*)

What are the international implications of China’s rise? What developments may be expected, and what should U.S. national defense leaders do about the likely effects of these developments? China is a rising power but even if that cannot be said to translate into a security threat to the United States directly, there is little reason to believe that Beijing will not take action to get out from under what it perceives as unfriendly U.S.-led global diplomatic, economic, and security orders. In very broad terms, U.S. defense policy makers will need to address the change from military capabilities for enforcing a liberal international order, to capabilities for both advancing and protecting friendly regional or even sub-regional orders. **China’s potential power is sizable and increasing based on a large population and growing national wealth and this potential power makes its neighbors fear that it will become the regional hegemon.** Since other states in the region cannot predict if or when Beijing will make a bid for hegemony, relations are beset with uncertainty. Weaker neighbors, like Vietnam and Laos in Southeast Asia, can be expected to accommodate Beijing more while trying to benefit from Chinese economic growth when and where possible.¹ The U.S. security allies can be expected to cooperate more with each other while calling for more visible displays of U.S. commitment (including more military force presence).² India will become more important to U.S. strategy as a link between Australia and Thailand, and the Middle East and Central Asia, and the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Beijing will likely respond to these increased U.S. defense commitments with accusations of hostile containment. But China has already used overt economic incentives to try and encourage U.S. regional allies to deal with Beijing bilaterally, leading with economic engagement, and has used punishment when such states have organized against Chinese interests.³ **By one account, China seeks three strategic aims: a secure periphery; a favorable security environment; and successful resolution of the Taiwan issue—and Beijing sees the United States, and even more specifically, the U.S.-led security order in the region, as a threat to all three.**⁴ **Avoiding armed conflict will become more difficult.** China faces strong incentives, especially economic, to try and assure neighboring states of its benign intentions, but as China becomes more powerful, this will be harder to accomplish—unless there is some dramatic change in the regional security order. **China’s dramatic rise in power and international influence, especially since around 2000, has created a mounting ‘rise dilemma’—or the more it tries to accumulate comprehensive power, the more it must deal with external pressure against its rise from other states—and as long as the United States relies on alliances and security partnerships in the region, the more Beijing will seek to cultivate state-by-state relationships.**⁵ According to Weifeng Zhou and Mario Esteban, of the Autonomous University of Madrid, Spain, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) represents a grand strategic move to begin remaking the international diplomatic and economic orders, or in other words, to take **Beijing from a rules-taking to a rules-making position.**⁶ **China’s preferences for bilateral relations and for promoting the BRI as a competing global power order will probably cause leaders in Beijing to increase their confrontational stance vis-à-vis Washington.** From the early 2000s, China accepted that it must operate under American prominence in a unipolar system, but it hedged by trying to deepen ties to multiple countries around the world, to help if Washington is uncooperative—while aiming for a future concert of powers style arrangement.⁷ **Unipolarity matters little today in understanding what China’s continuing rise will do to the American position in the geopolitical landscape, it is still unclear exactly what kind of polarity is emerging, and it seems that the ability of states to translate economic power into advanced military**

power is becoming more difficult.⁸ China was engaging in hedging behavior, improving military capabilities while avoiding direct confrontation with the U.S. military, pursuing better ties with Southeast Asian states, as power was transferring away from the United States to multiple other players—this all up until about 2016.⁹ Although future Chinese foreign policy is hard to predict, especially as it relates to the United States, Chinese policy makers and analysts have been increasingly arguing for America’s loss of power status, or at least highlighting what they claim is Washington’s inability to handle the primary world power position.¹⁰ Where Chinese hedging against the system leader is going now is less clear but Beijing behaves like it is cultivating options that allow it to sidestep U.S. policy preferences. It is becoming increasingly important for U.S. defense policy makers to come to grips with whether the bilateral security relationships with important regional actors, like India, are durable enough to balance against China. India should prove to be a key player for U.S. security interests, but there are also risks in the U.S.-India alignment against China.¹¹ Containing China through greater mobilization of partner states in the region figures prominently in the security strategies of both the United States and India.¹² Having some alignment in strategic approaches will help both countries see and interpret security challenges in similar ways. In realist terms, India is pursuing a network of friendly security partners through Southeast Asia, to parts of the Pacific Rim, and including the United States—to push back against Chinese involvement in countries around India and to counterbalance Chinese assertiveness.¹³ At the same time that India is trying to balance China it is also trying to assure Beijing that it is not containing China’s rise.¹⁴ This balancing act will be increasingly difficult as long as border violence continues between the two major powers (such as recurrences of the vicious skirmish at Ladakh in June 2020). Also key to how geopolitics unfolds over the next few decades will be the degree and manner in which the United States chooses to either reconfigure global engagement or pull back substantially to the western hemisphere. The Indo-Pacific is emerging as the pivot around which major powers are maneuvering, major powers will drive the most important security aspects of the region, and the pivot is a geostrategic opportunity for the United States.¹⁵ For some scholars, the divergent views between Washington and Beijing are too far apart and a more strategic approach would be to forgo cooperation and move to managing rivalry.¹⁶ The rise of China has been portrayed as the geopolitical event of the post-1945 world, and that the U.S.-China rivalry is the dominant power relationship to shape all others.¹⁷ If the United States decides to pull military forces from many parts of the world to focus more on defending only core interests, more narrowly defined, then U.S. defense policy makers should ensure that minimal outposts remain (or are quickly acquired) in terrain key to the Indo-Pacific security construct as a whole, including north and south India, north and south Thailand, Vietnam, Singapore, Indonesia, the Philippines, along with South Korea, Japan, and Australia. The idea of “minimal outposts” here refers to what might be termed cold-start and warm-start military sites.¹⁸ **There may be circumstances and options for major powers to control their ambitions and cooperate for stability and peaceful development, but the drivers for conflict point to even more intense competitive rivalry. Significant drivers for war include: diminishing arms control; weakening international institutions; persistent competition between democracies and autocratic states; increasing nationalism; advancements in long-range strike, and in nontraditional ways of warfare;** and a possible explosion in mis- and disinformation.¹⁹ U.S. China scholars and policy experts have been starting to refer to decisive turning points in Washington-Beijing relations, such as the March 2021 meeting in Alaska between senior officials, and this may reflect a growing sense **that the stakes involved are significantly higher than in any recent period.**²⁰ China will continue working for a dominant regional position, as a major power may be expected to do, but it is also maneuvering for global power, and these advances to the global stage may surprise American strategists if Beijing does not follow expected paths.²¹ **While power shifts alone should not spell future armed conflict, the U.S.-China rivalry**

has multiple dimensions, including technological, security-defense, and ideological, and that suggests that the drivers for conflict will be hard to manage for both sides. If security relations with China worsen in the region, then it can be assumed that there will be more requests for U.S. military presence but of the more reversible kinds such as maritime patrols and air shows of force. But these will not communicate the same level of U.S. commitment as land forces and may contribute to misunderstood deterrence signaling. **At some point in the conflict escalation, regional states will no longer weigh the benefits of economic activity with China over their security and they will want more permanent demonstrations of U.S. commitment to regional stability. It will be important for the U.S. Joint Force to be able to demonstrate capability to extend conventional military force to the Chinese mainland, as well as conventional-nuclear integration, to counter People's Liberation Army force projection.** The U.S. military end will be to prevent war, if possible, and advance U.S. interests by strengthening friendly coalition deterrence of Chinese aggression.

2NC/1NR Uniqueness Extensions

NATO is shifting its focus to China now as part of a geostrategic pivot to Asia.

Khalaf and Foy 2021 (“Nato to expand focus to counter rising China,” Roula Khalaf, Editor of the Financial Times, and Henry Foy, FT’s European Diplomatic Correspondent, October 18, 2021, [Nato to expand focus to counter rising China | Financial Times](#), VY)

Countering the security threat from the rise of China will be an important part of Nato’s future rationale, the alliance’s head has said, marking a significant rethink of the western group’s objectives that reflects the US’s geostrategic pivot to Asia. In an interview with the Financial Times, Nato secretary-general Jens Stoltenberg said that while **China was not an “adversary”, it was having an impact on European security through its cyber capabilities, new technologies and long-range missiles.** How to defend Nato allies from those threats will be “thoroughly” addressed in the alliance’s new doctrine for the coming decade, he said. The military alliance has spent decades focused on countering Russia and, since 2001, terrorism. **The new focus on China comes amid a determined shift in the US’s geopolitical orientation away from Europe to a hegemonic conflict with Beijing.** “Nato is an alliance of North America and Europe. **But this region faces global challenges: terrorism, cyber but also the rise of China.** So when it comes to strengthening our collective defence, that’s also about how to address the rise of China,” Stoltenberg said. “What we can predict is that the rise of China will impact our security. It already has.”

NATO is focusing on China now – representing a broader pivot towards Asia in its core agenda.

Ortega 2022 (“China’s stance on Ukraine: preventing NATO from interfering in the Indo-Pacific,” Andrés Ortega, 08 Feb 2022, [China’s stance on Ukraine: preventing NATO from interfering in the Indo-Pacific – Real Instituto Elcano](#), VY)

Whether NATO, in addition to the US, should turn its focus not only towards China but also towards the Indo-Pacific region as a whole is one of the essential issues for the renewal of the Alliance at the Madrid summit in June. **If there is a shift of global power towards Asia, the Alliance wants to counterbalance and participate in it,** despite the fact that its initials (North Atlantic) do not reflect this. **China has entered NATO’s core agenda.** For now, there is no general agreement among the 29 allies about NATO’s role in the Indo-Pacific, the most reluctant being France, still smarting from the informal English-speaking AUKUS alliance (Australia, the UK and the US, which is also critical of the Sino-Russian communiqué) and the scuppering of its nuclear-powered submarine contract with Canberra. Meanwhile, all this is dividing Europe –the EU and Europe more broadly– at least as long as the tension and non-invasion of Ukraine persists. This is convenient for both Russia and China, which is making inroads into Eastern Europe and Central Asia thanks to its Belt and Road Initiative, to disapproval in Moscow. **As well as seeking to thwart NATO, China wants to prevent the US, which is also an Asiatic power in military terms, from constructing a network of alliances against it in Asia.** At the UN Security Council’s recent meeting on Ukraine, the Chinese Ambassador, Zhang Jun, toeing the official line, argued for ‘Russia’s legitimate security concerns to be taken seriously and addressed’. China does not normally talk publicly about the European security order. But this time, in the joint statement, it declares that

'the Chinese side is sympathetic to and supports the proposals put forward by the Russian Federation to create long-term legally binding security guarantees in Europe'. And it opposes the expansion of NATO. **China supports Russia**, but not an armed Russian invasion of Ukraine. In fact, **China abstained in the Security Council in 2014 when there was an attempt to condemn the invasion and subsequent annexation of Crimea by Russia**, which Beijing has never formally recognised. Indeed, it has strengthened its trade ties with Ukraine, especially in terms of grain imports, but also in the area of infrastructure. A direct link by train and ferry between China and the Ukrainian port of Chornomorsk (formerly Illichivsk), on the Black Sea[HM1] , was opened in 2016, bypassing Russia. China has also invested in a new metro line in Kiev. In other words, ties between China and Ukraine are strengthening, with the goal of increasing bilateral trade by 50%, and an annual total of US\$20 billion envisaged for 2025.

2NC/1NR Uniqueness Extension– AT:Ukraine

The conflict in Ukraine is part of the reason for the shift towards China. In light of Russia invading Ukraine, NATO has focused on China.

Standish on May 11, 2022 ("China Takes Aim At NATO," Reid Standish, May 11, 2022, [China Takes Aim At NATO](#), VY)

China increasingly sees the war in Ukraine -- and the roles of the United States and its NATO allies in backing Kyiv against Moscow -- as a reflection of future tensions to come between the military bloc and Beijing in the Indo-Pacific. Ever since Russian tanks first crossed into Ukraine on February 24, Beijing has walked an awkward line between not giving outright support to Moscow's invasion while accusing the United States and other NATO countries of provoking the war by allowing the security alliance to expand eastward despite protests from the Kremlin. **Now, as the war continues to grind on with the Russian military suffering major setbacks on the battlefield, China has ramped up its rhetoric to warn about NATO and the United States' footprint in Asia. "NATO, a military organization in the North Atlantic, has in recent years come to the Asia-Pacific region to throw its weight around and stir up conflicts,"** Wang Wenbin, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman, said in late April. "NATO has messed up Europe. Is it now trying to mess up the Asia-Pacific and even the world?" Wang's comments were in response to earlier remarks from U.K. Foreign Secretary Liz Truss, who called for boosting NATO in the wake of the Ukraine war and warned China that it should "play by the rules." **The added focus on NATO from Beijing comes as both China and the United States see Russia's invasion as a foil for future tensions between the two countries in Asia. NATO said last year that it intended to focus more on China and Beijing is expected to play a large role in the bloc's strategy moving forward.** Likewise, Washington is increasingly convinced that the conflict provides it with an unexpected advantage in the long term, with Bloomberg reporting on May 10 that **U.S. officials believe that bolstered European defense spending and a weakened Russia could allow it to accelerate a security shift toward China.**

2NC/1NR Link Extension-AT: No Tradeoff

Yes, there would be a tradeoff. NATO needs to focus to counter China as a geopolitical threat.

Moller 2021 ("China's rise is exactly the kind of threat NATO exists to stop," Sara Bjerg Moller, an assistant professor in the School of Diplomacy and International Relations at Seton Hall University, March 12, 2021, [China's rise is exactly the kind of threat NATO exists to stop - The Washington Post](#), VY)

By necessity, refocusing on China would involve curtailing NATO's other sprawling activities — beneficial in itself. Beyond ending the training and advising missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, **pausing NATO expansion would make sense,** since it would be inadvisable to add new members — such as Ukraine and Georgia, thereby provoking Russia — as it works out its identity crisis. Russia is already pretty much contained; admitting Ukraine and Georgia, a move for which many Europeans have little appetite anyway, would doom arms-control and other negotiations with Moscow. Regrettably, as with Russia, Europe is divided over how to deal with China. Many European allies are wary of picking sides in the struggle for influence between the United States and its Asian rival. Some, like Germany, even appear outright resentful at the suggestion that they must choose. German Chancellor Angela Merkel rushed last year to conclude the E.U.-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment — even though the incoming U.S. national security adviser, Jake Sullivan, had strongly signaled that Europe should wait till Biden's inauguration. **China's rise is indisputably the most significant geopolitical development of the 21st century. It would be strange for an alliance as potent as NATO to ignore the challenge. A Europe that continues to downplay the danger posed by China's growing influence in the North Atlantic area could lead Xi to succeed where Trump and Putin failed: He could splinter the alliance. International organizations like NATO move slowly, and it will take time to lay the groundwork for tackling the security implications of China's ascendance. By beginning that shift now, the alliance may avoid a greater challenge later.**

2NC/1NR Link Extension-General Emerging Technology

Any new emerging technology adaptation and regulation from NATO takes a lot of focus and time because all members must agree.

Gojowsky et al. 2018 (“Resistance to Innovation in NATO,” Torsten Gojowsky, a U.S. Army officer; Ben Haspels, a Royal Netherlands Army officer; Flemming Haar, a Danish Navy officer; Sebastian Koegle, a German officer; Sverre Wetteland, Norwegian officer. All are students at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, August 16, 2018, [Resistance to Innovation in NATO](#), VY, *2 page card*)

Military leaders need to understand the symbiotic relationship between risk-taking and innovative progress. **It may be commonly assumed that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)—one of the most durable and best-funded multinational defense organizations in history—has sufficient communication systems in order to operate effectively as an alliance of many disparate forces.** One might then also assume that NATO-member special operations forces—the elite units of the alliance—have the best and most effective communication systems to coordinate and react to crises rapidly. **However, this is not the case.** If a crisis were to occur today, communication across the partner forces would be difficult. Technological solutions to these problems do exist and could be implemented with relative ease. Why are they unlikely to be adopted? **The authors argue that institutional resistance to innovation at NATO is driven by the inherent characteristics of managing and maintaining a large, heterogeneous alliance among sovereign entities.** This resistance can only be overcome if decisive, flexible, and adaptive military leaders are bold enough to allow an organization to accommodate new, sophisticated technologies. **Otherwise innovation in the military grinds to a halt. Solving problems like this will not be easy, but it is necessary for NATO to adapt to the rapidly changing strategic environment and technological landscape in which it finds itself.** Innovative technologies that can effectively connect multiple NATO special operations forces, such as multilateral online and offline mapping, military radio controlling, text messaging, targeting, calling for fire, etc. already exist. Currently, the Tactical Assault Kit application for Android and Windows allows for all of these capabilities. The Tactical Assault Kit platform permits for a wide range of methods for establishing connectivity, even blending military satellite communication and commercial equipment. The Tactical Assault Kit communication system has been field tested by U.S., Norwegian, and Danish special operations forces in support of operations against ISIS. NATO special operations forces partners were initially restricted from accompanying Iraqi or Syrian partner forces on the battlefield, but they were allowed to support them with close air support. The communication chain, however, was too slow and led to some delayed direct support for the counter-ISIS forces on the battlefield. All this changed when a couple of bright minds saw the potential in Tactical Assault Kit and managed to put together tactical field kits, using the existing mapping tool as the technical medium to speed up coordination and target acquisition between counter-ISIS forces and NATO special operations forces elements. It thus became a success story, and the system is being actively used in the Middle East and Southeast Asia. For a comprehensive employment of Tactical Assault Kit within NATO special operations forces, every allied country will have to change the way they look at military communication. In order to best explain the concept of scalable connectivity in this context, one needs to consider how military missions are planned. The military mission consists of three fundamental parts: shoot, move, and communicate. Ahead of a mission,

how to shoot and move are thoroughly analyzed in order to utilize the best tools in the toolbox. For instance, if a unit is planning an urban special reconnaissance mission, there are several tools to choose from. A civilian car can be chosen over a tactical vehicle to maintain a low profile when inserting the special reconnaissance team into the target area. To maximize the freedom of movement without being compromised, the team might select civilian clothes and easily concealed weapons. Using this approach, the likelihood of being detected is minimized, whereas the chance of success is maximized. In short, it comes down to the calculation of risk versus gain. Communications deserve as much attention and investment as the weapon components for the mission to be effective, but this is not currently the case. Only a few tools are available as communication options, which restrict military elements to primarily utilize encrypted push-to-talk radios. The typical military communication plan, the so-called PACE (primary, alternate, contingency, emergency) plan, is mainly composed of different frequencies, predetermined satellite or VHF/HF communication channels, and regular cellphone use as emergency backup. However, current and near future peer adversaries all have electronic warfare capabilities. This means that the choice of NATO communication equipment and its integration into the planning phase of battle determines mission success or failure. Scalable connectivity can be an effective tool when the area of operations' frequency spectrum is analyzed and appropriate communication tools are utilized. Despite the aforementioned benefits, **NATO has been slow, if not resistant, to leveraging communication solutions that can connect its respective special operations forces.** Furthermore, NATO members are prone to purchase equipment from large military communication corporations. This industrial base supply chain problem stems from corporations that offer rigid, comprehensive solutions that offer little to no flexibility by having proprietary software and hardware. It also leads to transmitting a large military fingerprint easily detectable by adversaries. To move past the problem of inflexible military communication equipment, NATO needs to rethink the concepts of what is secure and classified and how this will impact the risk to a mission and force. **NATO special operations forces have been slow to adopt innovative solutions** such as Tactical Assault Kit, despite its attractive and innovative features. What explains this resistance? **Resistance to innovation is at once puzzling, intellectually intriguing, and a commercially interesting phenomenon.** In the 1940s, the German psychologist Kurt Lewin was the first to introduce a systemic understanding of the resistance phenomenon. The cause, according to Lewin, is not found in the mind of the individual employee, but in the dynamics of opposing forces, including the behavior of leadership. According to the political economist Josef Schumpeter, "Innovation is the creation of new combinations that represent a departure from established practices." In other words, a technological tension between the need to innovate and the desire to maintain order and stability will always exist. Wendell Wallach nicely defines the problem as **"the pacing gap" between the introduction of a new technology and the establishment of laws, regulations, and oversight mechanisms for shaping its safe development.** Wallach believes that modern technological innovation is occurring at an unprecedented pace, making it harder than ever to govern using traditional legal and regulatory mechanisms. **NATO as a whole suffers severely from the pacing gap, due to the fact that it consists of 29-member countries. If a new communication technology is proven highly successful by one country, the product still has to be vetted by each country's security and intelligence services. A process like this takes time and consumes resources, forcing poorer nations to evaluate the importance of a new technology versus the old.** This process exacerbates the pacing gap within NATO as standardization becomes a protracted process of having to generate consensus among the member states.

2NC/1NR Link Extension – Baltics/Cyber Warfare

2NC/1NR Link Extension–Baltics/Cyber Warfare

Focusing on Russia takes away the focus from China.

Gould 2021 (“Russia fears complicate NATO’s new China focus,” Joe Gould, senior Pentagon reporter for Defense News, Oct 22, 2021, [Russia fears complicate NATO’s new China focus](#), VY)

BRUSSELS — **One of U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin’s top jobs at the NATO ministerial conference this week was to keep steering the 30-member alliance’s focus to China, but some Eastern European allies say the U.S.-China rivalry must not overshadow concerns about Russia.** The two-day meeting between defense chiefs yielded new agreements on tech investments and policies, mirroring the Pentagon’s focus on technological competition with China. When asked by reporters about China, Austin made clear the U.S. sees NATO as its ace. “Regarding China, let me just say that ... alliances like NATO are one of our greatest strengths. No other country enjoys the kinds of alliances and partnerships like we do,” Austin said Friday, adding, **“We see an increasing interest in our allies and partners [in the Indo-Pacific] to ensure the region remains free and open,** and the rules-based international order remains in place.” **But far from going away, the West’s problems with Russia are intensifying. Among other flash points in the relationship, Russia massed troops on Ukraine’s border in the spring,** and Russia claimed it fired warning shots at a UK destroyer in an incident this summer. Russia ended diplomatic ties with NATO after it expelled eight accused Russian spies, prompting NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg to say this week the relationship has “not been more difficult since the end of the Cold War.” Rattled, some Eastern European allies want the United States to deploy more troops on their soil, fearing the Pentagon could cut its military presence on NATO’s eastern flank. **“Russia, of course, wants that the U.S. attention is somewhere away, in the Pacific, and not in our region.”** Estonian Defense Minister Kalle Laanet said at the Warsaw Security Forum in Poland a week before the ministerial. “We have to talk about what kind of message we are sending [to Russia] and our message should be common and strong, united.”

2NC/1NR Link Extension–LAWs

NATO regulating LAWs would take a lot of focus due to the disagreements between member states.

Heikkila 2021 (“NATO wants to set AI standards. If only its members agreed on the basics.” Melissa Heikkilä, March 29, 2021, [NATO wants to set AI standards. If only its members agreed on the basics.](#), vY)

On paper, NATO is the ideal organization to go about setting standards for military applications of artificial intelligence. But **the widely divergent priorities and budgets of its 30 members could get in the way. The Western military alliance has identified artificial intelligence as a key technology needed to maintain an edge over adversaries, and it wants to lead the way in establishing common ground rules for its use.** “We need each other more than ever. No country alone or no continent alone can compete in this era of great power competition,” NATO Deputy Secretary-General Mircea Geoană, the alliance’s second in command, said in an interview with POLITICO. The standard-setting effort comes as China is pressing ahead with AI applications in the military largely free of democratic oversight. David van Weel, NATO’s assistant secretary general for emerging security challenges, said Beijing’s lack of concern with the tech’s ethical implications has sped along the integration of AI into the military apparatus. “I’m ... not sure that they’re having the same debates on principles of responsible use or they’re definitely not applying our democratic values to these technologies,” he said. **Meanwhile, the EU — which has pledged to roll out the world’s first binding rules on AI in coming weeks — is seeking closer collaboration with Washington to oversee emerging technologies, including artificial intelligence. But those efforts have been slow in getting off the ground.** For Geoană, that collaboration will happen at NATO, which is working closely with the European Union as it prepares AI regulation focusing on “high risk” applications. The pitch NATO does not regulate, but **once NATO sets a standard, it becomes in terms of defensive security the gold standard in that respective field.** Geoană said. The alliance’s own AI strategy, to be released before the summer, will identify ways to operate AI systems responsibly, identify military applications for the technology, and provide a “platform for allies to test their AI to see whether it’s up to NATO standards,” van Weel said. The strategy will also set ethical guidelines around how to govern AI systems, for example by ensuring systems can be shut down by a human at all times, and to maintain accountability by ensuring a human is responsible for the actions of AI systems. “If an adversary would use autonomous AI powered systems in a way that is not compatible with our values and morals, it would still have defense implications because we would need to defend and deter against those systems,” van Weel said. “We need to be aware of that and we need to flag legislators when we feel that our restrictions are coming into the realm of [being detrimental to] our defense and deterrence,” he continued. Mission impossible? **The problem is that NATO’s members are at very different stages when it comes to thinking about AI in the military context. The U.S., the world’s biggest military spender, has prioritized the use of AI in the defense realm. But in Europe, most countries — France and the Netherlands excepting — barely mention the technology’s defense and military implications in their national AI strategies.** “It’s absolutely no surprise that the U.S. had a military AI strategy before it has a national AI strategy,” but the Europeans “did it exactly the other way around,” said Ulrike Franke, a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign

Relations, said: **That echoes familiar transatlantic differences** — **and** previous U.S. President Donald Trump's complaints — over defense spending, but also **highlights the different approaches to AI regulation more broadly.** The EU's AI strategy takes a cautious line, touting itself as "human-centric," focused on taming corporate excesses and keeping citizens' data safe. The U.S., which tends to be light on regulation and keen on defense, sees things differently. **There are also divergences over what technologies the alliance ought to develop, including lethal autonomous weapons systems** — often dubbed “killer robots” — programmed to identify and destroy targets without human control.

2NC/1NR Internal Link Extensions

NATO focus on China is critical to counterbalance China's influence.

Ford and Goldgeier 2021 ("Retooling America's alliances to manage the China challenge," Lindsey W. Ford, former Brookings expert, and James Goldgeier, Visiting Fellow - Foreign Policy, Center on the United States and Europe, Monday, January 25, 2021, [Retooling America's alliances to manage the China challenge](#), VY)

Does NATO have a role to play in dealing with China? Because no other military institution provides the same degree of multinational interoperability and capacity, **NATO has become a first responder on the global stage many times since the end of the Cold War**; delivering humanitarian and medical assistance after the 2004 Indonesian tsunami and during the current COVID-19 pandemic; conducting counterterrorism operations in the Mediterranean and counterpiracy operations in the Indian Ocean; using military force to protect civilian populations in the Balkans in the 1990s and in Libya in 2011; overseeing post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction activities in Afghanistan; and deterring Russian aggression against Eastern Europe. **The plethora of missions is in large part due to the lack of alternatives globally. It has also led to concerns, however, that NATO is stretched too thin. China has now been added to the alliance's ever-expanding agenda, providing a surprising point of agreement** in an otherwise contentious December 2019 NATO summit, at which NATO members committed the alliance for the first time to deal with China's "growing influence and international policies." In April 2020, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg charged an independent "Reflection Group" with preparing a report eyeing the future; released in November, the "NATO 2030" document put the challenge in stark terms: **"China is... best understood as a full-spectrum systemic rival, rather than a purely economic player or an only Asia-focused security actor." Obvious questions remain about the precise role NATO should play vis-à-vis China. There are certainly a host of global security concerns** — ranging from China's presence in Africa and South Asia to its influence in space and cyberspace — **where NATO coordination would be valuable. It is unclear, however, what role NATO could, or would, play in an Asian military crisis with Beijing. NATO allies have limited military capabilities they could bring to bear in the Pacific**, and few European partners would be eager to be pulled into a conflict in places like Taiwan or the South China Sea. Given that Article V of the 1949 Washington Treaty refers to "an armed attack against one or more [NATO members] in Europe or North America," a Pacific conflict, even involving U.S. forces, would technically fall outside NATO's scope. **But in a spiralling crisis that would implicate Europe's strategic and economic interests, could NATO afford to remain on the sidelines? At a minimum, Europe could play a valuable role in the political, economic, or even cyberspace arenas.** As European allies seek a bigger role in the Indo-Pacific, the U.S. needs to engage them in more frank discussions about these types of scenarios, creating clearer expectations about how different parties might respond before any such conflict appears on the horizon, rather than after one has erupted.

NATO focusing on China is necessary to check China's rise and global ambitions.

Shalal and Pamuk on June 27, 2022 ("Systemic challenge' or worse? NATO members wrangle over how to treat China," By Andrea Shalal and Humeyra Pamuk, June 27, 2022, ['Systemic challenge' or worse? NATO members wrangle over how to treat China | Reuters](#), VY)

CHINA'S 'GLOBAL AMBITIONS' NATO officials are racing to complete the new strategic concept in time for the Madrid summit, where the Russian invasion of Ukraine will take centre stage. Britain recently adopted language describing Russia as an "acute, direct threat" and China as a "strategic challenge." **The Pentagon's latest annual report to the U.S. Congress underscored the importance of "meeting the pacing challenge presented by the People's Republic of China's increasingly capable military and its global ambitions". U.S. officials stressed the importance of including China in NATO's updated strategic concept,** and Australia, New Zealand, Japan and South Korea were therefore invited to the NATO summit for the first time. **The point was to signal that NATO is not "taking our eye off the ball in China" even as it focuses** on strengthening Ukraine's defences, one of the officials said. "It's firmed up the democratic world on both Russia and China." **"NATO can't afford to ignore China,"** agreed a European official. "Europe was a bit behind in recognising this, but views have definitely shifted in light of Hong Kong," referring to Beijing's security crackdown on the Asian financial hub.

2NC/1NR China Rise Impact Extension

China's rise leads to a conflict with the US.

Beckley and Brands 2021 ("What Will Drive China to War?," Michael Beckley, Visiting Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and associate professor at Tufts University. Hal Brands, a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, November 1, 2021, [What Will Drive China to War?](#), VY)

Get ready for the “terrible 2020s”: a period in which China has strong incentives to grab “lost” land and break up coalitions seeking to check its advance. Beijing possesses grandiose territorial aims as well as a strategic culture that emphasizes hitting first and hitting hard when it perceives gathering dangers. It has a host of wasting assets in the form of military advantages that may not endure beyond this decade. **Such dynamics have driven China to war in the past and could do so again today. If conflict does break out, U.S. officials should not be sanguine about how it would end. Tamping or reversing Chinese aggression in the Western Pacific could require a massive use of force.** An authoritarian CCP, always mindful of its precarious domestic legitimacy, would not want to concede defeat even if it failed to achieve its initial objectives. And historically, **modern wars between great powers have more typically gone long than stayed short. All of this implies that a U.S.-China war could be incredibly dangerous, offering few plausible off-ramps and severe pressures for escalation.** The U.S. and its friends can take steps to deter the PRC, such as drastically speeding the acquisition of weaponry and repositioning military assets in the Taiwan Strait and East and South China Seas, among other efforts, to showcase its hard power and ensure that China can't easily knock out U.S. combat power in a surprise attack. At the same time, calmly firming up multilateral plans, involving Japan, Australia, and potentially India and Britain, for responding to Chinese aggression could make Beijing realize how costly such aggression might be. If Beijing understands that it cannot easily or cheaply win a conflict, it may be more cautious about starting one. Most of these steps are not technologically difficult: They exploit capabilities that are available today. Yet they require an intellectual shift—a realization that **the United States and its allies need to rapidly shut China's windows of military opportunity, which means preparing for a war that could well start in 2025 rather than in 2035.** And that, in turn, requires a degree of political will and urgency that has so far been lacking. **China's historical warning signs are already flashing red. Indeed, taking the long view of why and under which circumstances China fights is the key to understanding just how short time has become for America and the other countries in Beijing's path.**

2NC/1NR Taiwan Impact Module

Western allies are necessary to deter a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.

Gramm and Wicker 2022 (“Deter China by Turning Taiwan Into a Porcupine,” By Phil Gramm, nonresident senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, and Roger Wicker, May 4, 2022, [Deter China by Turning Taiwan Into a Porcupine - WSJ](#), VY)

The paramount lesson from **the Russian invasion of Ukraine** is that repeated threats of economic sanctions didn't deter Vladimir Putin from launching an all-out invasion. This **offers a warning for Taiwan, the U.S. and their allies as threats from China loom.** The long history of sanctions, embargoes and economic blockades strongly suggests they are difficult to enforce, entail significant costs to the nations imposing them, and trigger market forces that eventually override them. Benefits flow to countries that don't enforce the sanctions. The enforcement challenges grow significantly if the economy of the targeted nation is large, and as the size of the target country increases, the deterrent effect of threatening sanctions loses credibility. **Since the Chinese economy**—one-sixth of the world's economy—**is 10 times as large as the Russian economy, effective sanctions would be virtually impossible to enforce. Relying on threatened sanctions to deter a Chinese attack on Taiwan could therefore entice aggression that could pull the U.S. into a war with China, an event that would alter the course of world history. Thankfully, there is a far more effective deterrent.** Taiwan is an island roughly 100 miles off the coast of mainland China. **Unlike Ukraine, a large land army can't be massed along its border.** But because it is an island, supplies also can't be delivered to an adjacent neighbor and clandestinely driven across the border. Any supplies delivered after an attack would have to be flown in or delivered by ship, putting the supplier directly in harm's way. Supplying Taiwan on anything like the scale we have supplied Ukraine during a Chinese attack would be a logistical nightmare. When China was an economic basket case, 100 miles of ocean was more than enough deterrent. **But with China now an economic and military powerhouse, Taiwan's lack of preparedness is increasingly dangerous.** Taiwan's economy is two-thirds larger than Israel's, but Taiwan spends almost two-thirds less as a percentage of gross domestic product on defense. **U.S. support can't be allowed to abet Taiwan's neglect of its own defense.** As Machiavelli observed, “nothing is so weak and unsustainable as a reputation for power which is not based on one's own strength.” **The good news is that modern technology makes it relatively easy for Taiwan to afford weapons that would make the cost of invasion exceed any reasonable benefit.** Ukraine's valiant resistance has shown how highly motivated defenders with high-tech weapons can scramble the calculus of military power. Like David's smooth stone that slew Goliath, two Ukrainian Neptune missiles sank the flagship of the Russian navy in the Black Sea. With 400 U.S. Harpoon missiles, costing only 0.3% of its GDP, Taiwan could imperil any Chinese warship in the Taiwan Strait. Modern sea mines are even less expensive, and Turkish Bayraktar drones, which have been so effective in Ukraine, cost less than \$2 million each. Two hundred fifty million dollars would buy 5,000 Switchblade drones, which could devastate landing craft, armored vehicles, and small assault ships. Taiwan already has two Patriot missile battalions and for \$3 billion could double its air and missile defense. Stinger missiles, used to great effect in Ukraine, cost only \$400 million for 1,000 missiles. Taiwan will have more than 200 F-16 fighter jets by 2026, including almost 70 of the newest Block 70 aircraft. With additional F-16s and other aircraft being retired from the U.S. Air Force, more aircraft could be made available at their depreciated value. **If the U.S. and its allies are willing to accelerate the sale of these and**

other force-multiplier weapons at cost. Taiwan could totally upgrade and harden its defenses by simply raising its defense budget from 2% to 3% of GDP. At that level, Taiwan could fund all these weapon purchases over a five-year period. Sustaining its defense outlays at 3% of GDP would allow Taiwan to continue modernizing its defenses while spending at a level roughly equal to Israel's defense expenditures in real dollar terms. With these investments, Taiwan should focus heavily on training for new weapons systems. It should also consider transforming its army from the current conscript system into a smaller voluntary force that would better accommodate a defense system based on the power of modern technology. Citizens who would have otherwise been drafted could be trained in high-end weaponry and kept in reserve or home-guard forces that could be activated in emergencies. **The primary objective of the U.S., its allies and Taiwan isn't to repel a Chinese attack but to prevent it from ever occurring. Effective deterrence is the key to national security.**

A Chinese invasion of Taiwan escalates and goes nuclear.

Wasser and Pettyjohn on May 20, 2022 (“A Fight Over Taiwan Could Go Nuclear,” By Becca Wasser, Fellow for the Defense Program, and Stacie Pettyjohn, Senior Fellow and Director of the Defense Program at CNAS, May 20, 2022, [A Fight Over Taiwan Could Go Nuclear | Center for a New American Security \(en-US\)](#), VY)

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has raised the specter of nuclear war, as Russian President Vladimir Putin has placed his nuclear forces at an elevated state of alert and has warned that any effort by outside parties to interfere in the war would result in “consequences you have never seen.” Such saber-rattling has understandably made headlines and drawn notice in Washington. **But if China attempted to forcibly invade Taiwan and the United States came to Taipei’s aid, the threat of escalation could outstrip even the current nerve-wracking situation in Europe. A recent war game**, conducted by the Center for a New American Security in conjunction with the NBC program “Meet the Press,” **demonstrated just how quickly such a conflict could escalate**. The game posited a fictional crisis set in 2027, with the aim of examining how the United States and China might act under a certain set of conditions. **The game demonstrated that China’s military modernization and expansion of its nuclear arsenal – not to mention the importance Beijing places on unification with Taiwan – mean that, in the real world, a fight between China and the United States could very well go nuclear. Beijing views Taiwan as a breakaway republic. If the Chinese Communist Party decides to invade the island, its leaders may not be able to accept failure without seriously harming the regime’s legitimacy. Thus, the CCP might be willing to take significant risks to ensure that the conflict ends on terms that it finds acceptable**. That would mean convincing the United States and its allies that the costs of defending Taiwan are so high that it is not worth contesting the invasion. While China has several ways to achieve that goal, from Beijing’s perspective, **using nuclear weapons may be the most effective means to keep the United States out of the conflict**.

2NC/1NR Turns Case

NATO focus on China will include focusing on emerging technology to counter China's military rise, which means the status quo and avoiding taking focus from counterbalancing China solves the affirmative.

Larsen 2017 ("NATO Shouldn't Try to Do Too Much on China," Henrik Larsen, Ph.D., is a senior researcher at the Center for Security Studies at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich, July 16, 2021, [NATO Shouldn't Try to Do Too Much on China - The Diplomat](#), VY)

Allied leaders at the NATO Summit in Brussels in June began to lay the ground for adapting to the great power competition with China. To that end, they tasked NATO to develop a new strategic concept to be endorsed at the summit next year in Spain. The next concept will be authoritative for alliance strategy until 2030. However, **NATO must be clear about the role it can play in adapting to its new challenger from the east.** On one hand, China's rise combined with the persistent threat from Russia gives increased prominence to NATO as a protector of free societies. China and Russia are both illiberal challengers seeking to undermine Western unity. An influential "NATO 2030" group of experts appointed by Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg last year recommended that the alliance assume the role of a "democratic bulwark" by beefing up its defense of the liberal order. On the other hand, NATO cannot veer too much off in that direction and needs to make sure that it stays within its core mandate of ensuring the security and defense of its members – the chief reason why the alliance was created and has endured more than 72 years. In short, NATO must respond to illiberal challenges posed by China to the extent they endanger allied security. The alliance must get this balance straight by focusing on three areas. First, as NATO is pulling out of Afghanistan, it must resist renewed temptations to "go global," simply because it is ill-suited and cannot agree to project power beyond the Euro-Atlantic area. NATO should, however, explore the meaningfulness in strengthening its existing partnerships in the Asia-Pacific. Australia, New Zealand, Japan, South Korea are further ahead in their adaptation to China in terms of resilience and supply-chain security and thus may prove useful for the development of joint resilience capacity. Conversely, NATO is hardly the right forum to gather worldwide counter-coalitions against China on, for instance, human rights issues. Instead, **NATO should concentrate on high-tech with military implications, which is an aspect of China's global rise where the alliance enjoys a clear comparative advantage. As China is pressing ahead with the application of artificial intelligence in its military, NATO has a natural role in the definition of gold standards for interoperability between defense systems of its allies and its partners in the Asia-Pacific.** Second, NATO should clarify the meaning of "resilience" by linking it as closely as possible to collective defense and national security. **China is not a territorial threat to NATO, but its acquisition of transportation hubs in Europe and future capacity to neutralize space-based navigation systems (like GPS) present vulnerabilities to NATO force mobility in a crisis situation.** Moreover, **it should not be forgotten that Chinese 5G networks threaten continued NATO intelligence sharing.**

NATO's focus on China must include focusing on new technologies which turns the Aff. The disad allows NATO to be more focused on counterbalancing and emerging technologies which prevents the impacts of the aff.

Erlanger and Shear 2021 ("Shifting Focus, NATO Views China as a Global Security Challenge," Steven Erlanger, chief diplomatic correspondent in Europe, based in Brussels, and Michael D. Shear, veteran White House correspondent and two-time Pulitzer Prize winner, June 14, 2021, [Shifting Focus, NATO Views China as a Global Security Challenge - The New York Times](#), VY)

China's army has hacked computers to steal industrial and military secrets all over the globe and engaged in disinformation in NATO societies. And with its effort to deploy 5G networks across Africa, the Middle East and Europe, Huawei, the Chinese telecommunications giant, has created new anxiety that it could control the communications infrastructure needed by NATO. In a discussion of "multifaceted threats" and "systemic competition from assertive and authoritarian powers" in the communiqué, NATO says that "Russia's aggressive actions constitute a threat to Euro-Atlantic security." While China is not called a threat, **NATO states that "China's growing influence and international policies can present challenges that we need to address together as an alliance."** NATO promised to "engage China with a view to defending the security interests of the alliance" and said it planned to increase partnerships with more countries in the Indo-Pacific. Much further into the document, China comes up again, described as presenting "systemic challenges" to the "rules-based international order." In a gesture toward diplomacy and engagement, the alliance vows to maintain "a constructive dialogue with China where possible," including on the issue of climate change, and calls for China to become more transparent about its military and especially its "nuclear capabilities and doctrine." Chinese officials reacted sharply to the NATO communiqué, as they have to other statements from G7 leaders made in the previous days. The alliance's characterization of the challenges posed by China was "a slander of China's peaceful development, a misjudgment of the international situation and its own role, and a continuation of the Cold War mentality," the country's mission to the European Union in Brussels said in a post on Weibo. NATO leaders on Monday also agreed to spend next year updating the alliance's 2010 strategic concept, which 11 years ago viewed Russia as a potential partner and never mentioned China. **New challenges from cyberwarfare, artificial intelligence and disinformation, as well as new missile and warhead technologies, must be considered to preserve deterrence, the alliance said. And Article 5 of its founding treaty – an attack on one is an attack on all – will be "clarified" to include threats to satellites in space and coordinated cyberattacks.**

Nuclear Modernization Disadvantage

1NC Shell-LAWs

A. Uniqueness: The DOD budget for nuclear modernization is stable now

Bender 2022 [Bryan Bender, staff at Politico, January 12, 2022. "Biden team weighs killing Trump's new nuclear weapons: Officials are considering canceling weapons that were backed by the last administration." Politico, [Biden team weighs killing Trump's new nuclear weapons - POLITICO](#)]

But national security **officials are debating whether to jettison a new nuclear-armed cruise missile now in the research phase, retire a Cold War-era thermonuclear bomb, and possibly even remove a new "low-yield" warhead** that the previous administration deployed on submarines, the current and former officials said. Most spoke on condition they not be identified in order to discuss internal deliberations and private conversations. Such changes would fall short of the overhaul of nuclear policy and programs that President Joe Biden has long argued would help blunt a nuclear arms race, namely a declaration that the United States would not be the first to strike an adversary using atomic weapons. Yet **halting** the Trump-era "**add-ons**," as they are called, **are** considered **the most likely cuts** if Biden wants to reverse the previous administration's elevation of nuclear weapons in U.S. strategy, due to resistance from military leaders to big changes as Russia and China build up their arsenals. "The Biden administration's problem or challenge, of course, is how can it show that it is doing something on reductions or reforms without **undercutting the modernization program** that was set in motion by [former President Barack] Obama," said Hans Kristensen, director of the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists. He said some of the newer weapons approved by former President Donald Trump are "the **low-hanging fruit**," particularly a new nuclear-armed cruise missile for the Navy. "The good news for [Biden] is that the Trump administration hasn't progressed very far," he said. "Not a lot of money has [been] sunk into it yet." Much attention has been given to whether Biden's review, which is led by the Pentagon, will lead to changes in what is known as nuclear declaratory policy. Nonproliferation advocates and progressives have argued the administration should adopt a less ambiguous stance on the conditions under which atomic weapons might be used in war. They have argued that the U.S. should declare a "no first use" policy, or at least declare that the "sole purpose" of the arsenal is to deter only nuclear weapons, not conventional or other threats. Biden, as a senator and vice president, had expressed support for considering both policy changes. But the proposals are unpopular among allies who rely on the U.S. nuclear umbrella for their own defense, according to two people privy to the review's deliberations. The Biden team is reportedly considering tweaking some of the language in the Trump-era stance to assert that the role of nuclear weapons is "fundamentally" to deter the use of other nuclear weapons. That would be a departure from the 2018 Trump review, which stated explicitly that "deterring nuclear attack is not the sole purpose of nuclear weapons," citing that they could be used to defend against a "non-nuclear attack." Such a change would be more in line with the review completed in 2010 under the Obama administration, when Biden was vice president. The Pentagon declined to comment on what is being considered in the nuclear review or when it will be completed. The White House also declined to address specific questions about the review. A White House official said the administration "is committed to renewing American leadership in nonproliferation and addressing the existential threat posed by nuclear weapons." The official added the review will "look at these issues" and "take account of the current security environment and will assess U.S. strategy, posture, and policy." But the **final** deliberations are **coming** into view. "I think we'll probably see, certainly, a shift back towards the tone and tenor of the 2010 NPR," said retired Air Force Lt. Gen. Frank Klotz, who co-authored a new study on the nuclear triad

for the government-funded RAND Corp. But that also likely means sticking to the major overhaul of the nuclear triad that was underwritten in the Obama administration and is estimated to cost \$634 billion over the next decade. The Trump administration added to that **modernization** push by authorizing at least three new weapon systems and upgraded warheads, including a cruise missile and a smaller warhead for subs. Critics argue such less destructive weapons are more destabilizing because they are more likely to be used in a conflict than weapons that can obliterate entire cities. Biden, however, has been under pressure from some Democrats in Congress to reconsider the development of the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent, which is set to replace the Minuteman III ICBMs that are located in underground silos across five Western states. The administration decided to forgo a request from the offices of Sens. Jeff Merkley (D-Ore.) and Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.) to study whether the current missiles could be operated longer, according to a pair of congressional staffers. A Pentagon-ordered unclassified study on the future of the ICBM force commissioned by the Pentagon last month isn't expected to recommend major changes to the missile replacement program, which was awarded to Northrop Grumman in 2020. "I don't think it's going to be Earth-shattering in any way," said George Perkovich, vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the lead author of the study. The **Biden** nuclear review **is also not expected to propose changes** to the development of a new fleet of Columbia-class ballistic missile submarines under construction by General Dynamics, or the B-21 stealth bomber also being built by Northrop Grumman. "Many of the same programs, many of the same policies will remain the same," predicted Klotz, who ran the National Nuclear Security Administration at the Department of Energy, which builds the nuclear warheads, from 2014 to 2018. He said he expects "some changes on the **margin** to indicate they have looked seriously at [potential reforms], but I expect the fundamental tenets of the nuclear modernization program to continue pretty much as they have since they were first conceived in the Obama administration." But that doesn't mean Biden, who has long advocated for reducing the role of nuclear weapons, **doesn't have options**. He doubled down on the theme in March 2021 in his Interim National Security Strategic Guidance. "We will take steps to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy, while ensuring our strategic deterrent remains safe, secure, and effective and that our extended deterrence commitments to our allies remain strong and credible," he wrote. One option under consideration is to remove the W76-2 nuclear warhead, a lower yield, or less explosive, bomb that the Trump administration called for in the 2018 review and was deployed on submarines the following year, officials said. But many see that as one of the more difficult decisions by Trump to reverse. "I don't think anybody's arguing that by its existence, it is posing stability problems," said Jon Wolfsthal, a former nuclear adviser to Biden who is in touch with current administration officials. "I don't know that there's a lot of energy in the Pentagon to remove them or go through the logistical challenge of having to deal with that." Kristensen agreed: "Since that boat has already sailed, so to speak, they may focus on the others." Another component of the arsenal that advocates consider more ripe for reversal is the Trump decision to keep the B83, the last megaton bomb that was developed in the 1970s but the Obama administration slated for retirement. Kristensen also pointed out that the B61-12 warhead, which had been designed to replace the B83, is now coming on line. "There is no need for it," he said of the latter. "The military has been pretty clear about that. I've heard the bomber crews don't even practice with it anymore." "There really isn't a very strong rationale for the B83," added Wolfsthal, who is now a senior adviser at Global Zero, a disarmament group. "It no longer has a role so we can get rid of it. We were happy to dump it." Also on the table is halting development of the Nuclear Sea-Launched Cruise Missile, a class of weapon that was retired after the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review but revived by Trump. More than \$15 million in **research funding was included in Biden's first defense budget, but the administration has since shown tepid support for the program.**

B. Link: The European Union proves Artificial Intelligence regulations are extremely expensive

Mueller 2021 [Benjamin Mueller, Senior Policy Analyst at the Center for Data Innovation, focusing on AI and technology governance, July 26, 2021, "AI Act Would Cost the EU Economy €31 Billion Over 5 Years, and Reduce AI Investments by Almost 20 Percent, New Report Finds," [AI Act Would Cost the EU Economy €31 Billion Over 5 Years, and Reduce AI Investments by Almost 20 Percent, New Report Finds](#)]

BRUSSELS— **The European Commission’s proposed Artificial Intelligence Act (AIA) would impose** the world’s most restrictive **regulations on the development and use of AI, costing the EU economy €31 billion over the next five years,** according to a new report from the Center for Data Innovation. **A typical small or mid-sized enterprise that deploys an AI system** deemed “high-risk” **would face compliance costs of up to €400,000.** The Commission has stated it wants 75 percent of European businesses to use AI by the end of this decade—a nearly tenfold increase from current levels—but working from the Commission’s own impact assessment, the Center finds that the deterrent effect of the AIA’s compliance costs would reduce AI investments by almost 20 percent. “The Commission has repeatedly asserted that the draft AI legislation will support growth and innovation in Europe’s digital economy, but a realistic economic analysis suggests that argument is disingenuous at best,” said Ben Mueller, senior policy analyst at the Center for Data Innovation and author of the report. “The rosy outlook is largely based on opinions and shibboleths rather than logic and market data.” The AIA is a horizontal law that would apply to any product that uses AI. It sorts AI systems into three categories: prohibited, high-risk, and limited risk. Any system that could affect people’s fundamental rights or safety is considered “high-risk.” That designation sweeps in a broad swath of potential applications—from critical infrastructure to educational and vocational training—subjecting them to a battery of requirements before companies can bring them to market. Using the Commission’s impact assessment as a starting point, the Center calculates that these **compliance burdens will cost European businesses €10.9 billion per year by 2025, adding up to €31 billion over the next five years**—and **this excludes opportunity costs of foregone investment into AI,** such as lower productivity growth and a likely brain drain as start-up innovators find it easier to set up shop elsewhere. The Center notes that only about 7 percent of non-financial businesses in Europe currently use AI. Yet the AI Act will designate more than one-third of the economy’s non-financial sectors (by value) as “high risk,” making it more costly and complicated for those businesses to invest in AI. Indeed, a small business with an annual asset turnover of €10 million would face up to €400,000 in compliance costs for a high-risk AI product, which would eat about 40 percent of its profits. **The AIA will damage Europe’s digital transformation** before it is properly under way, clearing the way for foreign competitors to take market share from European businesses in a variety of sectors,” said Mueller. “The EU’s regulatory environment continues to let down European entrepreneurs who want to make risky investments to innovate. However well-intended, **the AIA will extract a heavy price from an increasingly uncompetitive EU economy.**”

C. Internal Link: Nuclear modernization will be cut in the event of a tradeoff such as the Plan

Insinna 2022 [Valerie Insinna covers the air warfare beat for Breaking Defense while also serving as point person for major Pentagon policy and strategy developments. Valerie has extensive national security reporting expertise, having served as the air warfare beat reporter for Defense News for five years. During that time her work was recognized by numerous awards, including the prestigious National Press Club Michael A. Dornheim Award for defense journalism. She previously worked at Defense Daily, National Defense Magazine, and spent two years as the Washington correspondent for the Tokyo Chunichi Shimbun. A graduate of the renowned University of Missouri-Columbia journalism program. February 7th 2022. [Trump-era nukes, Army programs likeliest FY23 budget cuts: Experts - Breaking Defense](#) BurgerTime]

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D. Impact: Nuclear modernization prevents nuclear war

Kroenig 2021 [Matthew Kroenig, Deputy Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, September 23, 2021. "The special role of US nuclear weapons," The Atlantic Council, [The special role of US nuclear weapons - Atlantic Council](#)]

US nuclear weapons play a special role in underpinning international peace, global security, and the US-led, rules-based international system. The nuclear threat to the United States and its democratic allies is growing: nuclear-armed, revisionist, autocratic powers (Russia, China, and North Korea) are relying more on nuclear weapons in their strategies, and they are modernizing and expanding their arsenals. In this new issue brief, the Scowcroft Center's Matthew Kroenig explains why **the United States needs to retain a robust, flexible, and modernized nuclear force to meet its national security objectives.** US nuclear weapons are special for three reasons US nuclear weapons are unique for three reasons. First, **the United States extends nuclear deterrence to more than thirty formal treaty allies** in Europe and the Indo-Pacific, a central pillar of US alliances and the rules-based international system. Second, **US counterforce targeting keeps the United States in compliance with the Law of Armed Conflict and potentially allows the United States to limit the damage from nuclear war and save millions of lives.** Finally, the United States has enjoyed the economic capacity to field a robust nuclear force at a reasonable cost. In sum, **the United States demands more of its nuclear weapons than other countries and requires a more robust force.**

1NC Shell–Cyber Warfare

A. Uniqueness: The DOD budget for nuclear modernization is stable now

Bender 2022 [Bryan Bender, staff at Politico, January 12, 2022. “Biden team weighs killing Trump’s new nuclear weapons: Officials are considering canceling weapons that were backed by the last administration.” Politico, [Biden team weighs killing Trump’s new nuclear weapons - POLITICO](#)]

But national security **officials are debating whether to jettison a new nuclear-armed cruise missile now in the research phase, retire a Cold War-era thermonuclear bomb, and possibly even remove a new “low-yield” warhead** that the previous administration deployed on submarines, the current and former officials said. Most spoke on condition they not be identified in order to discuss internal deliberations and private conversations. Such changes would fall short of the overhaul of nuclear policy and programs that President Joe Biden has long argued would help blunt a nuclear arms race, namely a declaration that the United States would not be the first to strike an adversary using atomic weapons. Yet **halting** the Trump-era “**add-ons**,” as they are called, **are** considered **the most likely cuts** if Biden wants to reverse the previous administration’s elevation of nuclear weapons in U.S. strategy, due to resistance from military leaders to big changes as Russia and China build up their arsenals. “The Biden administration’s problem or challenge, of course, is how can it show that it is doing something on reductions or reforms without **undercutting the modernization program** that was set in motion by [former President Barack] Obama,” said Hans Kristensen, director of the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists. He said some of the newer weapons approved by former President Donald Trump are “the **low-hanging fruit**,” particularly a new nuclear-armed cruise missile for the Navy. “The good news for [Biden] is that the Trump administration hasn’t progressed very far,” he said. “Not a lot of money has [been] sunk into it yet.” Much attention has been given to whether Biden’s review, which is led by the Pentagon, will lead to changes in what is known as nuclear declaratory policy. Nonproliferation advocates and progressives have argued the administration should adopt a less ambiguous stance on the conditions under which atomic weapons might be used in war. They have argued that the U.S. should declare a “no first use” policy, or at least declare that the “sole purpose” of the arsenal is to deter only nuclear weapons, not conventional or other threats. Biden, as a senator and vice president, had expressed support for considering both policy changes. But the proposals are unpopular among allies who rely on the U.S. nuclear umbrella for their own defense, according to two people privy to the review’s deliberations. The Biden team is reportedly considering tweaking some of the language in the Trump-era stance to assert that the role of nuclear weapons is “fundamentally” to deter the use of other nuclear weapons. That would be a departure from the 2018 Trump review, which stated explicitly that “deterring nuclear attack is not the sole purpose of nuclear weapons,” citing that they could be used to defend against a “non-nuclear attack.” Such a change would be more in line with the review completed in 2010 under the Obama administration, when Biden was vice president. The Pentagon declined to comment on what is being considered in the nuclear review or when it will be completed. The White House also declined to address specific questions about the review. A White House official said the administration “is committed to renewing American leadership in nonproliferation and addressing the existential threat posed by nuclear weapons.” The official added the review will “look at these issues” and “take account of the current security environment and will assess U.S. strategy, posture, and policy.” But the **final** deliberations are **coming** into view. “I think we’ll probably see, certainly, a shift back towards the tone and tenor of the 2010 NPR,” said retired Air Force Lt. Gen. Frank Klotz, who co-authored a new study on the nuclear triad for the government-funded RAND Corp. But that also likely means sticking to the major overhaul of the nuclear triad that was underwritten in the Obama administration and is estimated to cost \$634 billion over the next decade. The Trump administration added to that **modernization** push by authorizing at least three new weapon

systems and upgraded warheads, including a cruise missile and a smaller warhead for subs. Critics argue such less destructive weapons are more destabilizing because they are more likely to be used in a conflict than weapons that can obliterate entire cities. Biden, however, has been under pressure from some Democrats in Congress to reconsider the development of the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent, which is set to replace the Minuteman III ICBMs that are located in underground silos across five Western states. The administration decided to forgo a request from the offices of Sens. Jeff Merkley (D-Ore.) and Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.) to study whether the current missiles could be operated longer, according to a pair of congressional staffers. A Pentagon-ordered unclassified study on the future of the ICBM force commissioned by the Pentagon last month isn't expected to recommend major changes to the missile replacement program, which was awarded to Northrop Grumman in 2020. "I don't think it's going to be Earth-shattering in any way," said George Perkovich, vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the lead author of the study. The **Biden** nuclear review **is also not expected to propose changes** to the development of a new fleet of Columbia-class ballistic missile submarines under construction by General Dynamics, or the B-21 stealth bomber also being built by Northrop Grumman. "Many of the same programs, many of the same policies will remain the same," predicted Klotz, who ran the National Nuclear Security Administration at the Department of Energy, which builds the nuclear warheads, from 2014 to 2018. He said he expects "some changes on the **margin** to indicate they have looked seriously at [potential reforms], but I expect the fundamental tenets of the nuclear modernization program to continue pretty much as they have since they were first conceived in the Obama administration." But that doesn't mean Biden, who has long advocated for reducing the role of nuclear weapons, **doesn't have options**. He doubled down on the theme in March 2021 in his Interim National Security Strategic Guidance. "We will take steps to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy, while ensuring our strategic deterrent remains safe, secure, and effective and that our extended deterrence commitments to our allies remain strong and credible," he wrote. One option under consideration is to remove the W76-2 nuclear warhead, a lower yield, or less explosive, bomb that the Trump administration called for in the 2018 review and was deployed on submarines the following year, officials said. But many see that as one of the more difficult decisions by Trump to reverse. "I don't think anybody's arguing that by its existence, it is posing stability problems," said Jon Wolfsthal, a former nuclear adviser to Biden who is in touch with current administration officials. "I don't know that there's a lot of energy in the Pentagon to remove them or go through the logistical challenge of having to deal with that." Kristensen agreed: "Since that boat has already sailed, so to speak, they may focus on the others." Another component of the arsenal that advocates consider more ripe for reversal is the Trump decision to keep the B83, the last megaton bomb that was developed in the 1970s but the Obama administration slated for retirement. Kristensen also pointed out that the B61-12 warhead, which had been designed to replace the B83, is now coming on line. "There is no need for it," he said of the latter. "The military has been pretty clear about that. I've heard the bomber crews don't even practice with it anymore." "There really isn't a very strong rationale for the B83," added Wolfsthal, who is now a senior adviser at Global Zero, a disarmament group. "It no longer has a role so we can get rid of it. We were happy to dump it." Also on the table is halting development of the Nuclear Sea-Launched Cruise Missile, a class of weapon that was retired after the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review but revived by Trump. More than \$15 million in **research funding was included in Biden's first defense budget, but the administration has since shown tepid support for the program.**

B. Link: NATO cyber operations have incredibly high costs that are borne by member nations

Blessing 2021 [Jason Blessing is a Jeane Kirkpatrick Visiting Research Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. During the 2020-2021 academic year, he served as a DAAD Post-Doctoral Fellow in the Program on “The United States, Europe, and World Order” at the Foreign Policy Institute of Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). Blessing has previously worked as a Consulting Fellow for the Cyber, Space and Future Conflict Programme at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) and was a USIP-Minerva Peace and Security Scholar with the United States Institute of Peace. He holds a PhD in Political Science from the Maxwell School of Citizenship & Public Affairs at Syracuse University, an MA in Political Science from Virginia Tech, and a BA in Government from The College of William & Mary. “Fail-Deadly, Fail-Safe, and Safe-to-Fail: The Strategic Necessity of Resilience in the Cyber Domain,” NATO 2030: Towards a New Strategic Concept and Beyond, (172-191) 2021. <https://play.google.com/books/reader?id=4oBaEAAA0BAI&pg=GBS.PT171&hl=en>]

There are, however, several **dynamics** that **reveal the limits of the fail-deadly and fail-safe logics underlying NATO’s collective defense initiatives**. In short, these strategic logics only apply to a narrow set of threats; they will not apply to the full spectrum of threats presented by the cyber domain. Fail-deadly deterrence is only likely to succeed in preventing state-level adversaries from undertaking resource-intensive cyber operations that reach the threshold of armed conflict with physical, destructive effects and that are quickly attributable.³⁸ Fail-safe defensive measures also face several political and technical challenges, all of which point to a role for cyber resilience. Three main complications limit the applicability of the fail-deadly logics underpinning collective defense efforts in cyberspace. The first is deciding which actors are to be deterred. Compared to traditional warfighting domains, there are relatively low entry costs for conducting operations in the cyber domain.³⁹ As such, both state and non-state actors can target the Alliance. There are also asymmetric operational costs—actors are faced with multiple avenues for potential gains and few risks. This means that it will be near-impossible to change the decision calculus of a malicious actor deploying low-cost, low-risk techniques such as distributed denials of service. Conversely, sophisticated **cyber operations that can produce strategic effects** equivalent to those of conventional military attacks **will have** both **significant and costly intelligence requirements that can only be borne by state actors. These higher ‘start-up’ costs** mean it may be possible to **change the decision calculus of actors seeking to conduct highly sophisticated cyber operations**. Due to this asymmetry, only state actors undertaking costly cyber operations are likely to be deterred. In all other circumstances, deterrence will be more prone to failure.⁴⁰

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1NC Shell—Biotechnology

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Bender 2022

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He said some of the newer weapons approved by former President Donald Trump are “the **low-hanging fruit**,” particularly a new nuclear-armed cruise missile for the Navy. “The good news for [Biden] is that the Trump administration hasn’t progressed very far,” he said. “Not a lot of money has [been] sunk into it yet.” Much attention has been given to whether Biden’s review, which is led by the Pentagon, will lead to changes in what is known as nuclear declaratory policy. Nonproliferation advocates and progressives have argued the administration should adopt a less ambiguous stance on the conditions under which atomic weapons might be used in war. They have argued that the U.S. should declare a “no first use” policy, or at least declare that the “sole purpose” of the arsenal is to deter only nuclear weapons, not conventional or other threats. Biden, as a senator and vice president, had expressed support for considering both policy changes. 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B. Link: The security cooperation within the Plan trades off with the DOD budget Blum et al 2018

[Ilana Blum, Angela (Angel) O'Mahony, Gabriela Armenta, Nicholas Burger, Joshua Mendelsohn, Michael J. McNerney, Steven W. Popper, Jefferson P. Marquis, Thomas S. Szayna. "Assessing, Monitoring, and Evaluating Army Security Cooperation."
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR2100/RR2165/RAND_RR2165.pdf]

AM&E for Army security cooperation activities is key to understanding and maximizing impact. The framework for assessing, monitoring, and evaluating Army security cooperation presented in Chapter Six develops an AM&E process for understanding individual security cooperation activities. However, Army **security cooperation planners are faced with the challenging task of prioritizing security cooperation activities across strategic objectives**—that is, of how to craft effective security cooperation portfolios. In particular, **there are three main factors that make security cooperation portfolio planning difficult. There is the problem of determining the relative priority** of theater objectives **while seeking also to balance the requirements** of the short-term against the long-term interest. **This problem** often **results not from lax practice but** rather **genuine trade-offs difficult to resolve definitively across government departments, across services, and among DoD civilian leadership**. Further, it is difficult to ascribe direct causal relationships between security cooperation activities and the outcomes they produce. Finally, **there is the problem of uncertainty** itself. **Planners neither possess full information** of sufficiently consistent quality on all relevant factors **nor can they fully anticipate future trends and occurrences** that could profoundly affect security cooperation outcomes. **The problem becomes even more complicated if we recognize that any single security cooperation activity is rarely pursued in isolation** from other activities within a partner country. Even within the Army's security cooperation plan for a partner **there will usually be a number of activities** being conducted **simultaneously**. As a result, Army security cooperation activities are better thought of as components within an integrated security cooperation portfolio designed to achieve broader strategic objectives.

C. Internal Link: Nuclear modernization will be cut in the event of a tradeoff such as the Plan Insinna 2022

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D. Impact: US nuclear modernization prevents nuclear war Kroenig 2021

[Matthew Kroenig, Deputy Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, September 23, 2021. "The special role of US nuclear weapons," The Atlantic Council, <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/the-special-role-of-us-nuclear-weapons/>]

US nuclear weapons play a special role in underpinning international peace, global security, and the US-led, rules-based **international system. The nuclear threat** to the United States and its democratic allies **is growing: nuclear-armed, revisionist, autocratic powers** (Russia, China, and North Korea) **are relying more on nuclear weapons in their strategies, and they are modernizing and expanding their arsenals.** In this new issue brief, the Scowcroft Center's Matthew Kroenig explains why **the United States needs to retain a robust, flexible, and modernized nuclear force to meet its national security objectives.** US nuclear weapons are special for three reasons US nuclear weapons are unique for three reasons. First, **the United States extends nuclear deterrence to more than thirty formal treaty allies** in Europe and the Indo-Pacific, a central pillar of US alliances and the rules-based international system. Second, **US counterforce targeting keeps the United States in compliance with the Law of Armed Conflict and potentially allows the United States to limit the damage from nuclear war and save millions of lives.** Finally, the United States has enjoyed the economic capacity to field a robust nuclear force at a reasonable cost. In sum, **the United States demands more of its nuclear weapons than other countries and requires a more robust force.**

2NC/1NR Uniqueness Extensions

The DOD will preserve modernization programs now, but it's low-hanging fruit

Mount 2022 [Adam; January/February 2022; Senior Fellow @ Federation of American Scientists; Arms Control Association, "The Biden Nuclear Posture Review: Obstacles to Reducing Reliance on Nuclear Weapons"; [The Biden Nuclear Posture Review: Obstacles to Reducing Reliance on Nuclear Weapons | Arms Control Association](#); AS]

Biden's first **budget** request, submitted in April, was an early opportunity to build leverage and set the tone of the review. **Rather than** pause or **cancel** questionable **programs to preserve** decision **space**, **the request** fully **supported Trump's** accelerated **schedule to procure new** air-launched cruise **missiles** and continue developing a new sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM) and the low-yield submarine-launched warhead that Biden had called "a bad idea" during the campaign. **The budget request is 28 percent higher than** projected two years ago.¹³ These decisions guaranteed that the default position in the NPR would be to retain the existing policy, ensuring that **debate would center around low-hanging fruit such as the SLCM** that had been carefully positioned by the previous administration **to divert attention from other policies**.

2NC/1NR Link Extensions-Generic

NATO initiatives in emerging technologies is expensive

Chollet 2020 [Derek Chollet, executive vice president and senior advisor for security and defense policy at The German Marshall Fund of the United States, former US assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs; Steven Keil, fellow at GMF; and Christopher Skaluba, director of the Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council's Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, former principal director for European and NATO Policy in the Office of the Secretary of Defense; "Rethink and replace two percent," NATO 20/2020, The Atlantic Council, 10-14-2020, [Rethink and replace two percent - Atlantic Council](#)]

To be clear, **NATO's effectiveness requires capable militaries, and this will be expensive. Tough decisions will always be required. Real work needs to be done to expand defense investment in** equipment, readiness, **emerging technologies**, digitalization, and research and development. **Substantial and targeted spending** to create effective deterrence, particularly by large European countries like Germany, must remain a priority. We need to do all this in a way that avoids the pitfalls of oversimplification and acrimony that have too often defined the two-percent debate over the last decade.

Every security cooperation initiative within NATO generates significant financial costs, especially for large members

Gold 2021 [Zack Gold, researcher at CAN. "A Better Way to Measure Returns on U.S. Security Cooperation Investments," *Defense One News*, <https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2021/06/better-way-measure-returns-us-security-cooperation-investments/174742/>]

Second, **even if the returns were quantifiable, the real costs of security cooperation for the U.S. military are often unmeasurable.** For example, past analysis indicates that **the structure of the Navy's cost accounting system makes it impossible to know the full, exact cost of any security cooperation deployment or activity.** Additionally, **there is opportunity cost in every decision about security cooperation.** In Washington, **the focus in recent years has been on realigning resources for great power competition.** However, each geographic combatant command has dozens of partners. How, for example, can one accurately calculate the real and opportunity costs of conducting a bilateral exercise with Brazil as opposed to Colombia; or even with the UAE navy versus the UAE armed forces?

DOD security cooperation requires diverting resources from competing priorities

Grant 2018 [Heidi H. Grant, a member of the Senior Executive Service, is the Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force, International Affairs, Washington, D.C. She provides oversight and guidance for international policy and programs supporting national security objectives through politico-military affairs; security assistance programs; technology and information disclosure; education and training; cooperative research and development; management of the Air Force Foreign Liaison Office and attaché affairs. "Security Cooperation (SC) And Security Assistance (SA) Management" Air Force Manual https://static.e-publishing.af.mil/production/1/saf_ia/publication/afman16-101/afman16-101.pdf]

14.2.1. **Consistent with** the Secretary of the Air Force guidance and standardized Department of Defense (DoD) **methodology and processes, the USAF allocation process for** available and **limited resources is aligned to** the **DoD planning, programming, and budgeting** policy and procedures. SAF/IAPR responds to the DoD planning guidance with a Security Assistance Programming Budget Review (SAPBR) as a feeder to Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) **to accurately determine the SC and Security Assistance (SA) requirements and process them** successfully **with the other competing** USAF, military departments, and **DoD funding priorities.**

2NC/1NR Internal Link Extensions

DoD will spend on nuclear modernization now, but tight budget priorities mean new projects tradeoff.

Bugos 2022 [Shannon; January 2022; Senior Policy Analyst @ Arms Control Association; Arms Control Association, "U.S. Nuclear Modernization Programs"; [U.S. Nuclear Modernization Programs | Arms Control Association](#) ; AS]

The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated in May 2021 that the **United States will spend** a total of **\$634 billion** over the next 10 years **to sustain and modernize its nuclear arsenal, which is 28 percent higher than the previous** 10-year **projection** released in 2019. This estimate in planned spending in fiscal years 2021–2030 is projected to consume 6.0–8.5 percent of projected total spending on national defense during those years. Over the next 30 years, the total sustainment and modernization costs of U.S. nuclear forces could reach \$2 trillion.

The CBO estimate captures spending on the triad of nuclear delivery systems and command and control systems **at the Defense Department** and on nuclear warheads and their supporting infrastructure at the Energy Department's semi-autonomous National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). **Nearly every element of the U.S. nuclear arsenal is slated to be upgraded** over the next 20 years. Most of these efforts are in the early stages, and a few others have yet to begin.

Other nuclear-armed states, notably Russia and China, are upgrading and may be posed to increase the size of **their arsenals** and have tested, produced, and deployed more **notably** brand new systems than the United States over the past decade. But the U.S. military has upgraded and refurbished nearly all of its existing strategic and tactical delivery systems and the warheads they carry to last well beyond their originally planned service life and is now in the early stages of replacing many of these aging systems with new systems. Though decades old, these modernized forces are more capable than the originals, and the new systems will include additional capability upgrades. The current and planned U.S. financial investment in nuclear forces is unrivaled by any other nuclear power.

Gen. Paul Selva, then vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, noted in testimony to the House Armed Services Committee in March 2017 that while Russia and China continue to modernize their nuclear forces, **the United States maintains "a qualitative advantage."**

Former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. John Hyten, acknowledged in January 2019 that the United States still leads in most capabilities. However, he argued that **the Defense Department must move quickly in order to keep up with "the speed" at which Russia and China** are moving.

The Trump administration, as outlined in its 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) released on Feb. 2, 2018, continued the modernization plan laid out by the Obama administration, as well as developed **several new nuclear weapons capabilities** that **will add to the price tag for nuclear forces. This included the new low-yield nuclear warhead** (the W76-2, which was deployed in 2019) for some submarine-launched ballistic missiles (**SLBMs**) **and** the longer-term development of a new nuclear submarine-launched cruise missile (**SLCM**).

2NC/1NR Impact Extensions

Nuclear modernization deters great power war – budget cuts are unworkable

Geller 2021 [March 25th, 2021, Patty-Jane is a senior policy analyst for nuclear deterrence and missile defense at The Heritage Foundation. Nuclear Modernization Is Our Top Defense Priority, and America Can Afford It, [Nuclear Modernization Is Our Top Defense Priority, and America Can Afford It | The Heritage Foundation](#) RVP]

After years of deferring nuclear modernization, **the United States is now forced to take on multiple modernization projects all at once. This includes modernizing the three legs of the nuclear triad**—land-, air-, and sea-based systems—as well as all nuclear warheads in the U.S. stockpile and their supporting infrastructure. The U.S. will simultaneously be sustaining its current nuclear forces, which were built during the Cold War, until their replacements are ready. Unsurprisingly, this effort is not expected to be cheap. The Ground Based Strategic Deterrent program, the replacement for our Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile fleet, alone could cost around \$95 billion. The Congressional Budget Office put the 10-year cost of both nuclear modernization and sustainment of current forces at almost \$500 billion. Naturally, critics pounce on these costs to make their case for why the United States should unilaterally disarm. **If that were not enough**, ever since the national elections, **the Department of Defense has been bracing itself for the increasing likelihood of a flat budget for fiscal year 2022. So how can the Defense Department afford expensive nuclear modernization programs under a constrained budget?** Fischer, the top Republican on the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, made the answer seem obvious. She pointed out that the five most recently confirmed secretaries of defense, including current secretary, Gen. Lloyd Austin, have affirmed nuclear deterrence as the Defense Department’s No. 1 mission for national security. As she told the audience on Monday, “That means when you’re putting together a budget, it’s the first thing ... that goes in.” **She rebuked arguments that suggest funding for nuclear weapons should be cut in order to fund other capabilities like cyber or artificial intelligence, explaining, “That’s exactly the opposite of what it means to prioritize. If you prioritize something, that’s the first thing you fund.” A safe, secure, and reliable nuclear force is so critical because the threat of nuclear retaliation can deter great power war**, as it has done for the past 75 years. Even in the early stages of the Manhattan Project, the atomic bomb was referred to as “the bomb to end all wars” by lab director J. Robert Oppenheimer. Today, **the combination of the land-, air-, and sea-based nuclear weapons that compose the nuclear triad continues to keep the American people safe by deterring adversary attack. So of course the department can afford to fund modernization programs for this No. 1 priority.** As former Secretary of Defense James Mattis has stated, **“America can afford survival.”** However, this argument is not to say that nuclear modernization should be exempt from efforts to minimize costs. Fortunately, this has not been the case. For instance, a 2014 analysis estimated that maintaining the current Minuteman III missiles would actually be more expensive than building a new missile through the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent program. It is puzzling, then, that those who decry the costs of nuclear modernization also propose extending the Minuteman III missile. The Air Force is also working to reduce costs of the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent program by utilizing digital engineering and a modular design. In fact, once the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent program is fielded, the ICBM forces will be the least expensive to maintain compared to the land and sea legs of the triad. **Those who support cutting funding for nuclear modernization programs argue for saving costs in the near-term, but deferring costs does not avoid them.** As Fischer referenced, the 2012 decision to delay the Columbia-class submarine resulted in lower costs in that five-year window. But, the Navy estimated this actually increased the total program costs by billions of

dollars. Plus, now the program no longer has room for delay in its development schedule. To both avoid long-term costs and further delay in schedule, Congress must discard the failed strategy of paring back nuclear modernization programs at the lowest levels of funding possible before their schedules become in jeopardy. Last year, for example, Congress cut funding for the Long-Range Standoff Weapon, the replacement program for the nuclear air-launched cruise missile, after the Air Force awarded its contract early and moved ahead of schedule. With this cut, Congress missed an opportunity to reduce risk in the program and lowered the chances the program can deliver on time. **Congress should** instead **seek to advance nuclear modernization programs as quickly as possible to avoid deferred long-term costs as well as delays.**

US Unilateral Counter plan

Negative

1NC Shell – Cyber Warfare Aff

1NC Shell-Cyber Warfare AFF

Text: The United States federal government should increase its cybersecurity.

The U.S. government has the tools and capacity to unilaterally increase cybersecurity.

Purdy 2021 (“The US Needs A Stronger Commitment To Cybersecurity,” Andy Purdy, CSO for Huawei Technologies USA, overseeing Huawei’s US cyber assurance program, Jul 30, 2021, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2021/07/30/the-us-needs-a-stronger-commitment-to-cybersecurity/2sh=4b27f9845daf , VY>)

Last month, President Joe Biden issued an executive order to begin developing mandatory baseline security requirements for government agencies and the companies that do business with them. The order states that the federal government must collaborate with the private sector and with the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to develop and implement a zero-trust model that “eliminates implicit trust in any one element, node, or service and instead requires continuous verification” from multiple sources. For example, **federal agencies will now have to implement multi-factor authentication and encrypt data “at rest or in transit” to guard against unauthorized access.** These are important steps, but they really represent the bare minimum that companies should be doing. Some aspects of the executive order are quite promising. For example, the government plans to launch pilot programs to educate the public about the security of software sold to the government. It’s a bit like Yelp for government software, providing information about whether a product is worthy of trust. **This is something that many of us have been advocating for years, not just for government contractors but for all companies. Given the sophistication of malicious cyber actors, we need an objective, transparent way of seeing whether networks and third-party products are as resilient and secure as possible.** Just as there are generally accepted principles of accounting, there should be a similar framework for cybersecurity. **We should move toward making cybersecurity and data-protection audits the norm for government, critical infrastructure and publicly traded companies.** For critical products and components, we need independent conformance and testing programs that cover the landscape of cyber threats to make sure that requirements are met. **The zero-trust approach being promoted by the U.S. government is a step toward continuous supplier and product verification.** For example, it continuously checks activity for red flags, such as whether information is being accessed from an unknown IP address. This is definitely moving in the right direction. But those requirements

apply only to federal agencies and companies that do business with them. For companies that don't do business with the government, they're simply guidelines. Unless they are incorporated into procurement or other contractual requirements, they're unenforceable. Ideally, every organization should strive to transparently meet applicable standards and industry best practices. For example, every organization should use a risk-analytic tool like the Cybersecurity Framework developed by NIST. This would help them understand their risk posture and help guide their path to a more appropriate risk situation, given their business objectives and environment. **It would be great if the SEC would require publicly traded companies to adopt this practice. The U.S. government is also trying to promote better information sharing among private companies and federal agencies.** Any company that contracts with the government will now have to disclose significant cyber incidents. "Our government got hacked last year, and we didn't know about it for months," explained Homeland Security Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas after the SolarWinds incident. He went on to explain, "It wasn't until one of the world's best cybersecurity companies got hacked itself and alerted the government, that we found out. **This incident is one of many that underscores a need for the federal government to modernize cybersecurity defenses and deepen our partnerships.**" With better and more timely information sharing about cyber incidents, **the U.S. government and other experts may be better able to detect and thwart malicious activity.** For example, with more awareness of what was happening to the various departments that had downloaded SolarWinds' software updates, authorities might have been able to identify irregular patterns of activity, determine that they were probably malicious and take pre-emptive steps to minimize harm.

The Counterplan is distinct from the affirmative because it does NOT include security cooperation with NATO. The counterplan has the U.S. government do cybersecurity alone.

1NC Shell–Baltics AFF

Text: The United States federal government should increase military presence in the Baltic states.

The U.S. military can and should increase its defense support to the Baltic states without NATO.

Abromaitis 2021 (“The U.S. does not rely on NATO in the Baltic States, Adomas Abromaitis, February 17, 2021, [The U.S. does not rely on NATO in the Baltic States – Modern Diplomacy](#), VY)

It is not a secret, that the U.S. has developed a complex system of defending its interests in Europe. This system is composed of mechanisms which allow to support its influence by different means, including economic and military tools. From the military point of view, this system is based on the U.S. military presence in Europe and in the Baltic States and Poland in particular. In order to strengthen its power in Europe, Washington uses capabilities of international organization, such as NATO (NATO enhanced Forward Presence Battle Groups). But while the U.S. doesn't often show it, but it is obviously that Washington does feel nerves about the common NATO military capabilities in the region. **Firstly, the U.S. in parallel conducts its own military mission dubbed “Operation Atlantic Resolve” in the Baltic States. Thus, even this fact shows uncertainty about NATO common defence capabilities.** The facts about Atlantic Resolve as of: Nov. 20, 2020: Since April 2014, U.S. Army Europe and Africa has led the Department of Defense's Atlantic Resolve land efforts by rotating units based in the U.S. to Europe. There are approximately 6,000 regionally allocated Soldiers participating in nine-month Atlantic Resolve rotations at any given time. There are four types of U.S. Army Atlantic Resolve rotations – armored, aviation, sustainment task force and division forward headquarters. **Secondly, the U.S. not only acts independently, but also tries to influence all NATO military activity in the region.** Thus, NATO's enhanced Forward Presence was in focus at OSCE Forum for Security Co-operation meeting under United States Chairpersonship at the end of January. The discussion on eFP was the first Security Dialogue organized by the US FSC Chairpersonship. **Here are only some quotes and sayings of the speakers which show Washington's concern over other countries' ability to run the military mission in the Baltic region to the extent that the United States would like.** By means of such meeting, Washington wanted to encourage NATO to take more action in the Baltic States and Poland.

The Counterplan is distinct from the affirmative because it does NOT include security cooperation with NATO. The counterplan has the U.S. government increase protection of the Baltic States alone, under the U.S. military, NOT as a NATO mission.

1NC Shell-LAWs AFF

A. Text: The United States federal government should restrict the development and use of Lethal Autonomous Weapons.

B. The U.S. Department of Defense has been the leader on AWS regulating for the past decade and has the institutions to be adaptive. The counterplan solidifies U.S. leadership on the question.

Kahn on June 8, 2022 (“A Refreshed Autonomous Weapons Policy Will Be Critical for U.S. Global Leadership Moving Forward,” Lauren Kahn, research fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, June 8, 2022, [A Refreshed Autonomous Weapons Policy Will Be Critical for U.S. Global Leadership Moving Forward](#), VY)

The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) has announced its intention to update its keystone directive on autonomous weapons systems (AWS). The directive “establishes DoD policy and assigns responsibilities for the development and use of autonomous and semi-autonomous functions in weapon systems” with the aim to reduce the possibility of accidents from the use of these weapons, including those that might lead to unintended conflict or inadvertent escalation. First published in 2012, the directive remains **“one of the only publicly available national policies” on weapon systems that present higher degrees of autonomy.** With the directive coming up on its tenth anniversary, the directive must either be updated or canceled—in keeping with the Department’s issuance policy—and it is perfect timing. **Given advances in artificial intelligence and autonomy technologies, as well as changes within the Department, DoD has an opportunity to update the policy and sustain responsible U.S. global leadership.** A Great Time to Modernize When the autonomous weapons directive was written a decade ago, researchers at Stanford and Google were just solving how to create an artificial intelligence (AI) algorithm that could identify pictures of cats without needing to be trained on labeled data. Just a few weeks ago, DeepMind unveiled Gato—a single “generalist” AI agent that can complete a variety of tasks that have constituted some of the hallmark AI milestones in the past decade, including playing Atari, captioning images, chatting, and even stacking physical blocks with the aid of a robot arm. In just ten years, it is clear that the landscape of the field has altered dramatically, with expectations changing every few months. While AI and autonomy are not one and the same, **AI technology** facilitates autonomy, and as a result, has **become a driving force in reducing the need for direct human intervention in systems, from computers to vehicles to weapons.** Since the directive was introduced, no autonomous system has been developed or proposed to the Department that fell under the purview of the directive. The directive currently applies to autonomous weapon systems, defined as systems that “once activated, can select and engage in targets without further intervention by a human operator.” The key differentiator here is the independent target selection and pursuit—it does not apply to weapon systems like “fire-and-forget” smart bombs, uncrewed platforms such as drones, or even loitering munitions that can “wait” for the opportune moment before engaging a pre-selected target designated by a person. Recent developments in both the technology and in the national security world—with the rise of China and its focus on

increasingly AI-based and autonomous military systems, and with weapons and systems presenting higher degrees of autonomy proving themselves on the battlefield in Ukraine—**the United States will need an updated directive that is sharper and more primed to guide these technologies when they mature.** Not only will the updated policy need to reflect advances in the technology, but developments within DoD itself and established norms and values when it comes to AI and autonomy. The directive predates many of the initiatives the department has instituted in order to promote defense innovation and safe and ethical uses for emerging capabilities like AI, quantum, and cyber. For example, the directive was published before the creation of the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center (JAIC), before the DoD had any set ethical principles for AI, and before the Department’s Defense Innovation Unit (DIU) efforts to operationalize those principles. It predates the recent organizational overhaul of the Department’s entire approach to emerging technologies and data with the creation of the Emerging Capabilities Policy Office and the Chief Data and AI Officer (CDAO). **To ensure that DoD is capable of adopting and implementing these types of systems with responsible speed if senior leaders decide a particular system is necessary, an updated directive should directly reference these ethical principles, especially in its guidelines for testing and evaluation and training of operators, as well as ensuring transparency of systems and positive human control.** It should also outline how these new offices play a role in the review process. Ensuring Future U.S. Leadership **The DoD Directive on Autonomy in Weapon Systems is not simply a statement of principles, but establishes policy, delegates authority, and assigns responsibilities.**

The Counterplan is distinct from the affirmative because it does NOT include security cooperation with NATO. The counterplan has the U.S. government restrict the use of LAWS without NATO’s involvement. Countries look to the U.S. for military technology, so other countries will follow.

2NC/1NR General Solvency Extension

NATO no longer serves American interests and the US should act independently rather than through NATO.

Bandow 2019 (“NATO No Longer Serves American Interests,” Doug Bandow, Senior Fellow, Cato Institute, December 5, 2019, [NATO No Longer Serves American Interests | Cato Institute](#), VY)

Quite simply, it makes no sense for U.S. taxpayers to subsidize the defense of nations capable of defending themselves. After the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union dissolved NATO’s survival seemed uncertain. So officials suggested that the transatlantic organization shift to, in former Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick’s words, “new missions that will fit the new era.” For instance, Robert Hormats, another lengthy public official, proposed that NATO shift to promoting “student exchanges, to fighting the drug trade, to resisting terrorism, to countering threats to the environment.” David Abshire, onetime U.S. ambassador to NATO, suggested coordinating “the transfer of environmental-control technology to the East.” Ultimately the alliance decided to expand its membership, even though the enemy had disappeared. Doing so violated multiple assurances given to Moscow. NATO also initiated “out-of-area” activities, which meant defending other than member states. This ironically turned the pact into an offensive instrument, first used to dismember Serbia in 1999. **In essence, NATO had gone from a means to an end, with war the new means.** Said Sen. Richard Lugar, then chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the organization would “go out of area or out of business.” And, as public choice economists would predict, no one involved in the alliance wanted the latter. **The Soviet Union’s collapse triggered European disarmament, which in turn intensified American demands for greater burden-sharing,** which the Europeans continued to ignore. The process continued for years, demonstrating, perversely, that the less Europe did the more America would. Hence the bizarrely named “European Reassurance Initiative” after Russia’s intervention in Ukraine: the Europeans were essentially promised that even if they did nothing Washington would remain at their side—though whining all the way. U.S. policymakers appeared to accept the need to subsidize the Europeans in order to keep them dependent. Washington opposed any proposals for independent spending and action, preferring that Europe do more, but only under America’s direction. The alliance continued to add members. Most recently it accepted Montenegro, with North Macedonia awaiting treaty approval by the 29 current members. Next up, the Duchy of Grand Fenwick, featured in the novel *The Mouse that Roared!* The latest out-of-area wars have been distant, unconventional conflicts: Afghanistan, Libya, and Syria, of which the latter triggered French President Emmanuel Macron’s complaint about a lack of allied coordination. **Some NATO fans call the organization a “global alliance,” presumably ready to act as global cop. In every case, of course, the heavy lifting inevitably falls on Washington.** Every recent president criticized Europeans for failing to make sufficient contributions for the common defense. Defense Secretary Robert Gates suggested that the alliance itself was at risk, since **“there will be dwindling appetite and patience in the U.S. Congress, and in the American body politic writ large, to expend increasingly precious funds on behalf of nations that are apparently unwilling to devote the necessary resources ... in their own defense.”** President Trump expressed similar sentiments, though more crudely. **Alas, the burden-sharing debate is unproductive. The issue should be**

burden-shedding. Even when President Trump does the right thing, he does so badly. So it is with NATO. But the alliance's "brain death" reflects its inherent problems, not his dreadful management. **Quite simply, it makes no sense for U.S. taxpayers to subsidize the defense of nations capable of defending themselves.** **Shared interests will continue to justify military cooperation. However, the alliance as today constituted no longer serves American interests.**

The United States should reject increasing involvement in NATO and act unilaterally.

Carpenter 2022 (“NATO Security Dependents Are Not Useful Allies,” Ted Galen Carpenter, Senior Fellow, January 8, 2022, [NATO Security Dependents Are Not Useful Allies | Cato Institute](#), VY)

SINCE THE end of World War II, U.S. officials have had an unduly expansive concept of what constitutes worthwhile strategic allies for the United States. In too many cases, the “allies” that Washington touts are small, weak, often militarily useless dependents. Worse, some of them are on bad terms with more powerful neighboring states. Under those circumstances, **the so-called allies are major liabilities rather than assets to the United States.** Indeed, they are potential snares, ones that can entangle America in unnecessary military confrontations. Washington would do well to become far more selective about which nations it includes in its roster of allies, and U.S. leaders should stop elevating security dependents to the status of allies. When U.S. officials described the regimes that Washington installed through military force in Afghanistan and Iraq as allies, it became clear that they had lost even minimal understanding of the concept. That point became abundantly evident when their Afghan client collapsed almost overnight in the face of the Taliban military offensive. **It’s time for U.S. policymakers to do better.** TROUBLING PROMISCUITY about acquiring weak U.S. security partners was evident even during the Cold War, and the tendency has become even more pronounced in the post-Cold War era. As the fiasco in Afghanistan (and its ugly predecessor in South Vietnam) confirmed, that problem with U.S. foreign policy has existed in multiple regions. However, the defect has become most acute with respect to Washington’s campaign to expand NATO into Eastern Europe. Since the mid-1990s, U.S. administrations have worked to add a menagerie of new NATO members, and it has done so with even less selectivity and good judgment than some people use to acquire Facebook friends. Many of America’s so-called allies are major liabilities rather than assets to U.S. foreign policy. Indeed, they are potential snares, ones that can entangle America in unnecessary military confrontations. Many of those new members have very little to offer to the United States as security partners. Indeed, some are mini-states, bordering on being micro-states. Such lightly armed Lilliputians would add little or nothing to Washington’s own capabilities—especially in a showdown with another major power. **As economic assets, their importance is decidedly limited, and militarily, they are even less valuable. It’s hard to see how new NATO allies** such as Albania, Slovenia, Montenegro, and North Macedonia **enhance America’s power and security.** That point should be apparent based on size of population alone. Albania’s 2.87 million, North Macedonia’s 2.1 million, and Slovenia’s 2.07 million people put those countries squarely in the mini-state category, while Montenegro’s 628,000 barely deserves even that label. It doesn’t get much better with respect to either annual gross domestic product or size of military forces. Even Slovenia’s \$52.8 billion GDP puts that country only eighty-sixth in the global rankings. Albania’s \$15.2 billion (125th), North Macedonia’s \$12.26 billion (135th) and Montenegro’s \$4.78 billion (159th) are even less impressive. The military forces that our new NATO allies can field are not likely to strike fear into Russia or any other would-be aggressor. Albania’s armed forces consist of 8,500 active-duty personnel, Slovenia’s consist of 8,500, and North Macedonia has 9,000 available. Montenegro’s active-duty force totals 2,400. In comparison, the Austin, Texas, police department has 2,422 people in its ranks. Granted, the Cold War edition of NATO also had some mini-states as members, most notably Luxembourg and Iceland. However, those members were located within a stable, democratic Western

Europe. Their defense also was geographically inseparable from Washington's mission of protecting important military and economic players, such as West Germany, France, Italy, Spain, and Great Britain, from what appeared to be a totalitarian superpower with expansionist ambitions. That situation was qualitatively different from Washington's gratuitous post-Cold War decision to manage the security of quarrelsome mini-states in the chronically volatile Balkans. Since the mid-1990s, **the United States has entangled itself in the region's parochial spats, but giving some of the countries NATO membership intensified America's exposure to needless risks and burdens.**

2NC/1NR General Tech-Solvency Extensions

Disagreements on NATO's role in emerging technologies doom the affirmative. Only the counterplan of unilateral action can be successful.

Ellehuus 2021 ("NATO Futures: Three Trajectories," Rachel Ellehuus, deputy director and senior fellow with the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C., July 21, 2021, Center for Strategic & International Studies, [NATO Futures: Three Trajectories](#), [Center for Strategic and International Studies](#), VY)

NATO endures and remains relevant in many areas, but it fails to make the investments and reforms needed to make it fit for purpose in the future. Most crucially, **allies agree to enhance NATO's collective defense capabilities to include integrating multidomain tools into its deterrence and defense posture.** Crisis management and cooperative security remain its core tasks, but it fails to secure the political support and resources needed to execute them effectively, and they increasingly take place through coalitions of the willing or under EU and UN auspices. **Allies increase political coordination at NATO on issues ranging from China to emerging and disruptive technologies, but this results in little more than a "talk shop" that produces statements lamenting the state of the world and condemning adversaries' actions. The United States and European allies become increasingly frustrated with one another**—the United States with allies' failure to assume more responsibility in and around Europe or to contribute more decisively to managing China, and allies with the United States' seemingly myopic focus on China and unwillingness (despite statements to the contrary) to allow Europeans autonomy in their own affairs. **Efforts to increase investment in innovation falter as allies pursue projects that benefit their own defense industrial bases but do not necessarily enhance NATO's defense and security. Still others fail to invest in innovation at all, widening the technology gap among allies and harming interoperability.** THREAT AND OPPORTUNITY ENVIRONMENT NATO's external threat environment stays at a low simmer. Russian and Chinese military buildup convinces allies of the need to maintain a strong deterrence and defense posture. At the same time, periodic incidents of military and below-the-threshold aggression by Russia, China, and other actors remain measured or deniable enough that they do not elicit an Article 5 response or spur a significant jump in investment in NATO. **In terms of opportunities, several allies continue to resist the idea that NATO should play a role in** non-military security challenges such as building resilience, mitigating climate change, or **managing the consequences of emerging and disruptive technologies.** While such allies agree to official statements noting a NATO role in these areas, in practice, **they limit progress by failing to provide the resources to follow through on them.** In Afghanistan, the current government is fragile, but it retains the loyalty of the Afghan National Security Forces thanks to continued support from NATO and its individual members; however, intermittent terror attacks by the Taliban in both Afghanistan and Europe force NATO to shift toward counterterrorism operations.

The aff fails and the counterplan solve better in the area of new technologies. Countries in NATO have incentive to not come to a consensus.

Bazin and Kunertova 2018 ("An Alliance Divided? Five Factors That Could Fracture NATO," Lt. Col. Aaron Bazin, PsyD, U.S. Army and Dominika Kunertova, PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science at the Université de Montréal, January-February 2018, [An Alliance Divided? Five Factors That Could Fracture NATO](#), VY)

Technology advances. **The participants agreed that technology advances are important for NATO's continued cohesion. Technology will constitute a significant intervening factor in how NATO nations maintain their cohesion in the future for three reasons. First, ever-evolving communication technology can facilitate the spread of risks coming from outside of the Alliance and exacerbate their negative effect.** The examples that resonated the most during focus group sessions are information warfare and targeted propaganda against NATO nations. Internet communications technology creates infinite room for alternative media that distort reality, contribute to the emergence of populist and radical movements, and increase the danger of miscommunication among nations. Second, **NATO risks losing the innovation game** to the commercial defense industrial sector. In the future, private companies will continue to stay ahead of NATO in designing specifications and setting standards for platforms. **This can have a major impact on readiness and interoperability among NATO nations if their innovation efforts** (e.g., the U.S. Third Offset Strategy) do not materialize.³¹ Third, **some nations may become reluctant to share their latest technology acquisitions,** especially if they put private gains above the collective endeavor. This would pose a challenge "for anyone to share information they own without gaining any profit for themselves." **The political unwillingness may feed distrust, which can result in a deepening interoperability gap between allies on the battlefield, and ultimately, a less cohesive Alliance.** Core values. **The participants acknowledged that shared values and identity mean that allies do not represent a threat to each other.** NATO's core liberal-democratic values, defined in the Preamble and Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty, further frame the nonadversarial culture of the Alliance's internal relational dynamics.³² Yet, although core values scored high in the survey, the discussions revealed the disagreement about whether they are more crucial for cohesion than national interests are. The findings indicated that the general problem with core values relates to the intangibility of the common good that NATO produces. If the Alliance is successful, "nothing happens," which leads nations to take peace, security, and stability for granted. This can affect the overall understanding of NATO's purpose among domestic populations. Due to an unknown or unclear purpose of NATO, this "we-feeling" can disappear. **Moreover, the rise of populism and radical nationalism with authoritarian inclinations, further fueled by hybrid, cyber, or information warfare coming from Russia, appears threatening to NATO's core values and will create frictions within NATO.** Arguably, the Islamic State also uses a "strategy of chaos" intended to divide the NATO nations and to destroy the cohesion within and among their societies. Further regarding authoritarian regimes, the participants mentioned that the Alliance should think twice before establishing a partnership with yet another country.

2NC/1NR Baltics Solvency Extension

The U.S. can fill in and expand security cooperation with the Baltic States unilaterally.

Bureau Of Political-Military Affairs 2022 ("U.S. Security Cooperation With the Baltic States," Fact Sheet, Bureau Of Political-Military Affairs, February 2, 2022, [U.S. Security Cooperation With the Baltic States - United States Department of State](#), VY)

The United States fosters a robust and enduring security partnership with the three Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Since 2016, we convened the U.S.-Baltic Dialogue to broaden and deepen our range of security cooperation activities and address Baltic-wide security gaps. Security assistance programs like Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and International Military Education and Training (IMET) enhanced territorial defense capabilities and promoted interoperability with the United States and NATO. **Since the beginning of FY 2015, the United States sold approximately \$503.9 million worth of U.S-origin defense articles and services to the Baltic states under the Foreign Military Sales program,** using partner national funds and FMF through the Department of State. **Since January 2015, the United States authorized more than \$346.3 million in defense articles to the Baltic states via the Direct Commercial Sales process.** **Since 2015, the United States' FMF contribution to the Baltic states exceeded \$250 million.** This contribution is due in part to the resurgence of Russian aggression over the past few years. **U.S. support through FMF developed defensive capabilities, such as electronic and hybrid warfare, border security, and maritime and air domain awareness. It also increased the Baltic states' interoperability with NATO armed forces and contributes to NATO's defense and integrated deterrence posture in the region.** These three NATO Allies are among the most committed to improving and enhancing their military capabilities; Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania fully meet their 2014 Wales Pledge for 2% defense spending as a share of GDP and 20% major equipment purchases as a share of defense spending. In early 2022, the Department approved Third Party Transfer requests from Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania to transfer U.S.-origin equipment to Ukraine to bolster its defenses in the face of growing Russian aggression. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania also each received about \$1.2 million annually in IMET assistance between 2015 and 2018 and approximately \$2 million in 2019 to support professional military education for approximately 150 mid-level and senior military officers at Department of Defense (DoD) schools in the United States. **Further, since 2015, DoD provided approximately \$290 million in Title 10-funded train and equip programs for the Baltic states.** This includes approximately \$83.1 million in FY 2019 funds alone. In 2017, the United States signed Defense Cooperation Agreements with Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. These foundational agreements established the framework for enhanced partnership and defense and security cooperation between the United States and our NATO Allies. Together with the NATO Status of Forces Agreement, these agreements provide the full necessary legal framework for U.S. forces operating in the Baltic states. In 2019, the United States signed Security Cooperation Roadmaps with Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. These agreements identify agreed-upon security cooperation priorities for 2019-2024. For more than 25 years, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania collaborated with the Maryland, Michigan, and Pennsylvania National Guard units, respectively, through the State Partnership Program, which brings together military personnel for training, education, and related activities.

2NC/1NR Answers to Permutation

The counterplan and plan are distinct. NATO policies MUST be agreed upon by every single member of the alliance. This means that the affirmative and the counterplan result in different policies.

NATO 2022 (“Consensus decision-making at NATO,” 14 Jun. 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49178.htm, VY)

All NATO decisions are made by consensus, after discussion and consultation among member countries. A decision reached by consensus is an agreement reached by common consent. When a “NATO decision” is announced, it is therefore the expression of the collective will of all the sovereign states that are members of the Alliance. This principle of consensus is applied at every committee level, which implies that all NATO decisions are collective decisions made by its member countries. Applying the principle of consensus decision-making **Consensus decision-making is a fundamental principle which has been accepted as the sole basis for decision-making** in NATO since the creation of the Alliance in 1949. **Consensus decision-making means that there is no voting at NATO. Consultations take place until a decision that is acceptable to all is reached.** Sometimes member countries agree to disagree on an issue. In general, this negotiation process is rapid since members consult each other on a regular basis and therefore often know and understand each other's positions in advance. Facilitating the process of consultation and consensus decision-making is one of the NATO Secretary General's main tasks. The principle of consensus decision-making applies throughout NATO.

NATO lacks cohesion, which dooms the affirmative and means the counterplan solves better.

Morcos and Ellehuus 2021 (“Lifting Up Our Values at Home: How to Revitalize NATO's Political Cohesion,” Pierre Morcos, Visiting Fellow, Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program, and Rachel Ellehuus, deputy director and senior fellow with the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C., Center for Strategic & International Studies, March 12, 2021, [‘Lifting Up Our Values at Home’: How to Revitalize NATO's Political Cohesion](#), VY)

Any of these points of disunity could be used by strategic competitors as venues to destabilize individual allies or NATO as a whole. As highlighted by the 2020 NATO Experts Group report, **“a drift toward NATO disunity must be seen as a strategic rather than merely tactical or optical problem.”** Despite the importance of preserving NATO's values base and, in turn, its political cohesion, **allies have nonetheless lacked the political will or legal instruments to effectively address in-house tensions and divergences.** In contrast to the European Union, which is arguably in a better position to address democratic backsliding through its rule of law mechanism, NATO has no legal provisions for suspending or expelling an ally who violates the alliance's founding principles. Also, **the fact that NATO operates by consensus means that any punitive action against the offending ally risks incurring retaliatory action on other NATO business.** Yet

however difficult, NATO can no longer afford to turn a blind eye on these internal strains. From its founding, it has been more than just a military alliance. NATO has embraced a political role built on a shared democratic identity. As the alliance seeks to exercise more fully the power of this political dimension, shoring up its values is vital to realizing the full benefits of collective security. A lack of response from NATO on these issues would ultimately undermine its reputation and credibility, most notably toward accession candidates and partners.

With **NATO in the midst of an adaptation process and a new U.S. administration committed to defending democratic values and restoring the transatlantic alliance**, the time is right for tackling this issue.

Washington has the political sway to act as a “first among equals” within NATO and push allies to seriously address this challenge. **However, a mere declaration of good intentions is not enough. If allies want to uplift NATO’s political cohesion, they will need to be ambitious.** We recommend the following graduated approach:

2NC/1NR Timeframe

The counterplan is quicker than the affirmative because it is not hindered by the slow processes of NATO.

Harper 2020 (“‘Game out’ decision making,” AM Sir Christopher Harper, KBE, RAF (Ret.), Nonresident Senior Fellow Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Transatlantic Security Initiative, October 14, 2020, [‘Game out’ decision making - Atlantic Council](#), VY)

As the world reenters an era of great power competition, many of the geopolitical and ideological certainties that lend NATO its sense of purpose are dissolving. However, the Western democratic values on which the Alliance was founded, on which its success has been built, and from which it continues to derive its moral authority, endure. The principles of consensus and mutually assured security are as important as ever. **As challenges proliferate, one of the greatest threats to NATO could be a lack of confidence**—not in the organization’s central purpose or relevance, but **in its ability to succeed in an increasingly fluid, fast-moving, and ambiguous world. NATO faces a diverse array of challenges** ranging from conventional defense and security threats, to climate change, migration, political polarization, and a global pandemic. From an operational standpoint, the corresponding intricacies of subthreshold and hybrid warfare present NATO’s most urgent challenge. Actions and reactions are spilling over from the traditional domains of land, sea, and air into the realms of space, cyber, and information, and vice versa. The lines between competition and conflict, between adversaries and enemies, are blurring—and so are ethical and legal boundaries. **The need for swift, well-informed consensus building and fast, effective decision making** Potential adversaries such as **Russia, China, and Iran have a crucial advantage. They are unencumbered by the need for consensus. Their decision making is centralized and they are, as a result, quicker and more agile. They can thus act with greater confidence,** however ill-placed that confidence may be. **NATO, by comparison, is institutionally sclerotic. It’s slow to react and slow to act. The moral and legal authority conferred by operating through consensus** has always been one of the organization’s greatest strengths, yet in a fast-moving world it **has the potential to be a serious vulnerability.**

Topicality

1NC Shell–Cyber Warfare AFF

A. Interpretation: Security cooperation refers exclusively to mil-to-mil coop authorized explicitly by US Code---diplomatic and economic activities are security assistance.

Tankel 2020

(Stephen and Tommy; October 28; associate professor at American University, an adjunct senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security, has served on the House Foreign Affairs Committee and in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; non-resident senior associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, served as deputy assistant secretary of defense for security cooperation and was the senior defense and intelligence adviser to Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid; War on the Rocks, "Retooling U.S. Security Sector Assistance," <https://warontherocks.com/2020/10/reforming-u-s-security-sector-assistance-for-great-power-competition>)

The United States provides security sector assistance to foreign civilian and military forces, agencies, and institutions ranging from local law enforcement and judicial systems to standing militaries. This assistance is intended to strengthen U.S. access to key territories and facilities, shape partners' national security decision-making and governance, and build their capacity and capabilities for use against shared threats and adversaries. **It also promotes the U.S. defense industry via arms transfers, supports the infrastructure and operations of multilateral organizations such as NATO, and increases military interoperability. The State Department implements assistance across the entire security sector, including organizations responsible for defense, law enforcement, and security of key assets like ports and borders. The Department of Defense has a narrower mandate, and provides assistance to partner militaries under the umbrella of security cooperation. The Pentagon also engages in a range of other activities — combined exercises, staff talks, port visits, and officer exchanges — that fall under security cooperation as well.** We use the term security sector assistance for simplicity, and distinguish where these additional security cooperation activities are relevant. The U.S. government does not typically define Foreign Military Sales as assistance, but we believe it should, and that it ought to factor Direct Commercial Sales into its assistance planning as well. Both types of sales can lead to sustained U.S. engagement with a partner in the form of training, maintenance, and sustainment for the purchased items.

B. Violation: The affirmative is not military-to-military cooperation. It is a NATO regulation which is distinct from security cooperation.

C. Standards:

1. Limits – including NATO regulations that are not military-to-military explodes the limits and moves away from security cooperation. There are unlimited things for NATO to regulate.

2. Ground – creating new NATO regulations destroy stable negative links

D. Voters:

1. Education – Without limits on the topic and adequate neg ground, we cannot have in-depth discussions and learn about the topic. Debate is valuable for the education we gain. This is a voting issue.

2. Fairness – for the affirmative to win, they must play by the rules. One of the burdens of the affirmative is to be under the topic. The negative team is prepared for the topic, anything else is unfair and is a voting issue.

1NC Shell–Biotechnology AFF

A. Interpretation: “Security cooperation” is DOD action – the plan is not the DOD.

Kerr 2018

[Alexandra Kerr, Visiting Research Fellow at the National Defense University in the Center for Complex Operations, “Defense Institution Building in the U.S. Context,” *Connections*, Vol. 17, No. 3, [Italics in original]]

Finally, **in the U.S. government, “security cooperation” and “security assistance”**—which are the chief lines of effort in the U.S. toolkit to help partners bolster their security and work with the United States to support common security objectives—**are** overlapping but **not necessarily interchangeable. The distinction** between “security cooperation” and “security assistance” activities **has to do with the agency administering the program**: in simplest terms, **it is either an activity of the Department of Defense (security cooperation) or the Department of State (security assistance).**

DOD and the Department of State (DOS) have shared responsibility for engaging with foreign partner militaries since the mid-twentieth century, with the bulk of congressional security assistance funding allocated to DOS. **Any security assistance administered by DOD—whether funded under Title 10 (Armed Services) or Title 22 (Foreign Affairs) of the U.S. Code—is a “security cooperation” activity.**²¹ After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the legal framework for the funding and administration of such activities evolved in response to emerging threats. Congress increasingly granted funding and authorities directly to DOD under Title 10 for security cooperation.²² Therefore, while DOS security assistance programs can include DIB components, the majority of DIB-specific programming is currently funded under and implemented by the Department of Defense and is thus considered security cooperation.

B. Violation: The FDA regulates animal biotechnology, proving the Aff will not be DOD action FDA no date

[US Food and Drug Administration, Accessed 9/5/22, “FDA’s Regulation of Plant and Animal Biotechnology Products”, <https://www.fda.gov/safety/fdas-regulation-plant-and-animal-biotechnology-products#:~:text=The%20FDA%20regulates%20plant%20and,for%20the%20Regulation%20of%20Biotechnology.>]

The FDA regulates plant and animal biotechnology products in coordination with the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), consistent with the U.S. Coordinated Framework for the Regulation of Biotechnology. Each of these regulatory agencies have **developed regulations and guidance documents** to implement its authority under existing laws to help ensure the safety and, where applicable, the effectiveness of biotechnology products.

C. Standards:

1. Limits – including NATO regulations that are not security cooperation explodes the limits and moves away from the topic. There are unlimited things for NATO to regulate that are not security cooperation.

2. Ground – creating NATO regulations that are not security cooperation destroy stable negative links.

D. Voters:

1. Education – Without limits on the topic and adequate neg ground, we cannot have in-depth discussions and learn about the topic. Debate is valuable for the education we gain. This is a voting issue.

2. Fairness – for the affirmative to win, they must play by the rules. One of the burdens of the affirmative is to be under the topic. The negative team is prepared for the topic, anything else is unfair and is a voting issue.

1NC Shell-LAWs AFF

A. Interpretation: “Increase” means “to make something greater.” There must be an existing premium for there to be an “increase”.

Buckley 2006

[Jeremiah, Attorney, Amicus Curiae Brief, Safeco Ins. Co. of America et al v. Charles Burr et al, http://supreme.lp.findlaw.com/supreme_court/briefs/06-84/06-84.mer.ami.mica.pdf]

First, the court said that **the ordinary meaning of the word “increase” is “to make something greater,”** which it believed should not “be limited to cases in which a company raises the rate that an individual has previously been charged.” 435 F.3d at 1091. Yet the definition offered by the Ninth Circuit compels the opposite conclusion. **Because “increase” means “to make something greater,” there must necessarily have been an existing premium,** to which Edo’s actual premium may be compared, **to determine whether an “increase” occurred. Congress** could have provided that “ad-verse action” in the insurance context means charging an amount greater than the optimal premium, but instead **chose to define adverse action in terms of an “increase.” That definitional choice must be respected, not ignored.** See Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 392-93 n.10 (1979) (“[a] definition which declares what a term ‘means’ . . . excludes any meaning that is not stated”). Next, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that because the Insurance Prong includes the words “existing or applied for,” Congress intended that an “increase in any charge” for insurance must “apply to all insurance transactions – from an initial policy of insurance to a renewal of a long-held policy.” 435 F.3d at 1091. This interpretation reads the words “exist-ing or applied for” in isolation. Other types of adverse action described in the Insurance Prong apply only to situations where a consumer had an existing policy of insurance, such as a “cancellation,” “reduction,” or “change” in insurance. Each of these forms of adverse action presupposes an already-existing policy, and **under usual canons of statutory construction the term “increase” also should be construed to apply to increases of an already-existing policy.** See Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 101 (2004) (“a phrase gathers meaning from the words around it”) (citation omitted).

B. Violation: The plan is not an increase because there are no existing regulations on LAWs.

C. Standards:

1. Limits – including NATO regulations that are not increasing an existing regulation explodes the limits and moves away from the topic. There are unlimited things for NATO to increase if there is no existing premium required..

2. Ground – creating new NATO regulations destroy stable negative links.

D. Voters:

1. Education – Without limits on the topic and adequate neg ground, we cannot have in-depth discussions and learn about the topic. Debate is valuable for the education we gain. This is a voting issue.

2. Fairness – for the affirmative to win, they must play by the rules. One of the burdens of the affirmative is to be under the topic. The negative team is prepared for the topic, anything else is unfair and is a voting issue.

2NC/1NR Extensions–LAWs AFF

“Increase” implies pre-existence

Brown 2003 US Federal Judge – District Court of Oregon (Elena Mark and Paul Gustafson, Plaintiffs, v. Valley Insurance Company and Valley Property and Casualty, Defendants, 7-17, Lexis

FCRA does not define the term "increase." **The plain and ordinary meaning of the verb "to increase" is to make something greater** or larger. 4 Merriam-Webster's [**22] Collegiate Dictionary 589 (10th ed. 1998). The "something" that is increased in the statute is the "charge for any insurance." The plain and common meaning of the noun "charge" is "the price demanded for something." Id. at 192. Thus, the statute plainly means an insurer takes adverse action if the insurer makes greater (i.e., larger) the price demanded for insurance.

An insurer cannot "make greater" something that did not exist previously. The statutory definition of adverse action, therefore, clearly anticipates an insurer must have made an initial charge or demand for payment before the insurer can increase that charge. In other words, an insurer cannot increase the charge for insurance unless the insurer previously set and demanded payment of the premium for that insured's insurance [**23] coverage at a lower price.

<Prefer our evidence - we have definitions from Congress and court cases. Our author credibility is greater than the Affirmative's.>

Biotechnology AFF

Contention 1: Inherency

While there are restrictions, neither the US nor EU allies ban genome-editing of the human germline.

Ashok and Karsten 2019 ("Is there a responsible way forward for gene editing?" Bhaargavi Ashok and Jack Karsten, October 29, 2019, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2019/10/29/is-there-a-responsible-way-forward-for-gene-editing/>, VY)

GENE EDITING REGULATIONS IN THE U.S. AND ABROAD **Although the U.S. has no outright ban on editing the genes of human embryos, a restrictive regulatory landscape and a lack of federal support has imposed significant restrictions on researchers.** Earlier this year, House Democrats reluctantly restored a rider to a 2020 spending bill that bars the FDA from considering requests to approve any clinical trial "in which a human embryo is intentionally created or modified to include a heritable genetic modification." Additionally, **Congress has banned NIH funding for research involving live human embryos,** forcing researchers to either abandon these projects entirely or seek private funding with fewer restrictions. Additionally, **a patchwork of international regulations further impede attempts at creating a comprehensive framework for regulating CRISPR and other gene editing technologies. While Sweden, Belgium, and the UK allow the creation of human embryos for research purposes, the complex regulatory landscape is murkier in other countries, comprising of** legally binding bans, **ambiguous rules,** or unenforceable guidelines.

Thus the plan: The United States federal government should substantially increase its security cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the area of biotechnology by banning the use of germline genetic engineering in humans.

Contention 2: Ethical Responsibility

Definition: Human germline genetic engineering refers to genetic changes made in every cell that will be passed onto future generations.

Regan, et al 2018 Helen Regan, Rebecca Wright and Alexandra Field, CNN The scientist, the twins and the experiment that geneticists say went too far
Updated 7:04 AM EST, Sat December 1, 2018 [The scientist, the twins and the experiment that geneticists say went too far | CNN](#)

Germline gene-editing refers to genetic changes in every cell, that will be passed on to future generations. This is different to somatic (body) cell gene-editing, whereby only existing cells are targeted and the changes made are not passed on to future offspring.

Human germline genetic engineering is fundamentally unethical. Long-lasting effects on humanity violate bio-ethical standards.

Rivera 2020 Krizia Rivera 2020 Genetic Engineering, Lack of Regulation in the United States of America and its Potentially Problematic Applications
https://scholarship.shu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2092&context=student_scholarship

The ethical concerns would probably be best understood under bioethical standards. Central to the practice of medicine and biological sciences are “The Four Principles of Bioethics, 75 ” also known as the four-principles approach. 76 This approach was developed by two American philosophers, Tom Beauchamp⁷⁷ and James Childress. 78 **This approach has long held that at the root of biomedical ethics are the following four principles: respect for autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence and justice.** These principles will lay the fundamental groundwork for each foreseeable potential human rights violation I state below. **Personal autonomy means the right to make his or her own choice. This principle will be violated if germline editing is allowed, mainly because it affects future generations as discussed above, given their obvious lack of consent as to inherited modified genes. The creation of a heritable modified genes has unpredictable implications on humankind and evolution.** In a 2018 commentary article authored by professors and research scholars noted **there may be unintended consequences to editing out harmful mutations in humans:** Here we simply emphasize to express that it may have effect **modification of mutations in germ cell will ultimately eliminate that mutation in the next generation, which will deter the on-going human evolution. Mutations are an essential part of evolution, whose pros and cons cannot be judged instantly. The mutations, which seem deleterious today, may have inclusive fitness tomorrow. Mutations, which seem harmful today, may be the nature’s preparation for tomorrow.** The somatic cell modifications in humans whereas provide answer to many ailments, the **germ line changes until outcomes of such modifications are uncontrolled would continue to raise ethical concerns.** Thus, the researchers need to be doubly cautious and some stringent regulations should be framed regarding the various aspects of germ line gene modifications and any potential conflict with nature for future outcome. Moreover, **the elimination of a gene or modification of a gene could affect the genetic diversity of the human population.** The United Nations has defined genetic diversity as, “[t]he variation in the amount of genetic information within and among individuals of a population, a species, an assemblage, or a community.” **Genetic diversity is our inherited toolkit, and the more varied the genes are in our toolkit as a population, the higher our survivability will and continue to be. “Genetic diversity has a direct relation to the fitness and survivability of various species and populations;** as genetic diversity decreases within a population, so does the fitness and survivability of that population.” **Notably, we do not understand the far-reaching potential of a gene, whether it is consider a harmful mutation today or not, it may serve a purpose tomorrow. Employing such a germline edit that would be inherited by future generations without their consent. The lack of medical consent of future generations is a contravention of human rights as it breaches their physical integrity, their ability to make choices as to their own bodies.** Foreseeable issues as to consent have been posed by several scientists. Per legal standards and clinical ethics, it’s long been established that parents are the best and most appropriate decisionmakers over their children until they have reach adulthood. But this presumption is not perfect as individuals who have disagreed with the medical decisions of their parents is well-documented. For example, “wrongful life” suits or individuals who have disagreed with their parent’s

surgical decisions about sexual assignment or craniofacial disorders.” **There are also groups of people who resist the idea of having their medical status defined as a “disability,” and published cases of patients who are documented as stating they would not want to correct their medical condition if given the choice.** The two principles, beneficence and non-maleficence, derives from the well-known Hippocratic Oath, “to help and do no harm.” This age-old oath was established in the 4th century BCE by Hippocrates, a physician-philosopher. As with any new scientific discovery, the true long-term effects of CRISPR cannot be realistically gasped. **Currently, the known possible negative effects of genetic engineering are off-target mutagenesis and mosaicism.** Applying a benefit-burden analysis, **we must rely on alternative safer methods, such as, preimplantation genetic diagnosis, until we can reasonably and reliably predict the true effects of CRISPR.** Lastly justice, is a concept concerning fairness and equality. The more pragmatic concern involves a lack of accessibility, where “therapies,” may be developed using this technology, but may only be accessible to the wealthy would add to the already great wedge between socioeconomic classes.

Modified Genes can propagate through humanity, bringing changes to the entire human race

Chen 2019 WESLEY W. CHEN June 30 2019 HUMAN GERMLINE GENE EDITING: ENGINEERING AN UNSTOPPABLE TRAIN
<https://mylaw2.usc.edu/why/students/orgs/ilj/assets/docs/28-2-Chen.pdf>

One practical application of gene editing in eugenics is the idea of the gene drive. **The gene drive is a genetic phenomenon whereby certain genes with “selfish’ genetic elements”** – which provide hereditary advantages – increase the inheritance of the gene in subsequent generations within a population. **The idea is that by using gene drives** for advantageous characteristics, **scientists can** utilize a longitudinal system to **address “major biological problems related to public and environmental health.”** **In practice, a gene drive involves engineering specific genetic traits in a few individuals and propagating the traits throughout the local population through generations of reproduction.** Due to difficulties surrounding engineering an effective gene drive system, gene drives have only been used in a handful of organisms, including yeast,¹²³ fruitflies,¹²⁴ and mosquitoes.¹²⁵ **With the evolution of CRISPR-Cas9 technology, however, development of gene drives are becoming increasingly viable.** For example, historically it has been extremely difficult to create transgenes in mosquitoes that would be passed on to subsequent generations. But in November 2015, scientists reported that they had successfully engineered a gene drive in mosquitoes using CRISPR-Cas9, which resulted in inheritance of the mutant gene in 99% of all offspring. CRISPR-Cas9 technology has been subsequently used to engineer other mosquito gene drives to combat the spread of malaria. While the idea of using gene drives to eliminate malaria in wild mosquito populations seems promising, the application of gene drives in humans is not so straightforward. **One of the gene drive’s greatest advantages is also one of its greatest weaknesses – its power to change an entire ecosystem** **Theoretically, once a dominant gene drive has been introduced to favorably bias its inheritance, it will inevitably spread throughout the population** unless an accessible off switch is programmed into the gene drive. In mosquitoes, an organism much simpler and more laboratory-tested than humans, **such a dramatic genetic change would still have unforeseeable impacts on the ecosystem** and the mosquito’s long-term survival in the wild. **This illustrates both the causal uncertainties and the moral-conceptual “is this a benefit or risk” uncertainties in this field. Even the causal uncertainties aren’t purely empirical but have value components (as in proximate cause). In humans, these issues are further complicated in that it would be impossible to test the effects of gene drives on human adults in a laboratory setting.** In a perfect scenario, a gene drive without any adverse or off-target effects could be introduced into the human population to battle disease and ubiquitously enhance the human race. Even in such cases, however, would it really be a good idea to drive the same genetic characteristic throughout society? **One of nature’s best survival tools is genetic diversity.** An advantageous trait one day may be a weakness another day when there are new diseases or different environments. **The tug-and-pull between whether a genetic modification is helpful in the short-term or detrimental in the unforeseeable future highlights the blurred “line between diversity and disability.”**

Framing: Using the Precautionary Principle is the only way to proceed – We have an obligation to not risk the future of humanity over the urge to solve problems now

Edwald 2000 Francois Ewald, Director of Research and Strategy, Federation Francaise des Societes d'Assurances., 2000 "Risk in contemporary society", Connecticut Insurance Law Journal, 6 Conn. Ins. L.J. 47, 1999/2000, Hein Online

The **powers of modern man confer** upon him an **infinite responsibility**. His nature is revealed in fear, a feeling that makes man aware of the power of his new capacities. On one hand temporality, within which is situated his action, dilates to encompass the whole history of humanity, past and future, but **it must be acknowledged that his powers are such that they threaten the existence of life itself**. Contemporary **man is** becoming **aware of** himself in the feeling of anguish before **the possibilities of annihilation that he bears in himself**: for the first time, he is discovering in himself **the power to commit suicide as a species**. Faced with this possibility, and in order to [*71] overcome his anguish, modern man is on a quest to find the rules of a morality that will limit his powers: **the ethics of responsibility**. His **enormous power needs holding**. **The ethics of responsibility contain the risk and uncertainty** to the extent that modern man must take account in his actions, **both their long term consequences and their possibility of sweeping along with them**, at least in certain cases, **the worst, the catastrophe**. Instead of the categorical Kantian imperative, there should be substituted an imperative adapted to the new type of human action: "Act so that the effects of your action are compatible with the permanence of an authentically humane life on earth."
For while we have the right to risk our own lives, we do not have the right to risk that of humanity. This imperative is the basis of the precautionary principle: it invites us to measure each of our actions against the principle of the worst scenario. Morality becomes a sort of negative morality: it is not so much turned towards the positive quest for the best as towards the avoidance of the worst. The uncertainty of long term prognostics confers the nature of a wager on human action, which leads to questions such as: do I have the right to endanger the interests of others in my wager?

Contention 3: Eugenics and Economics

Editing the human germline labels certain traits more worthy of being passed on , birthing a neo-eugenics movement. These technologies reduce society's tolerance of disabled bodies and creates a market for engineering.

Conti 2017 ("Drawing the Line: Disability, Genetic Intervention and Bioethics," Adam Conti, Graduate student, Melbourne Law School, University of Melbourne, 2 June 2017, <https://www.mdpi.com/2075-471X/6/3/9> , VY, *2 page card*)

Nevertheless, **as with any disruptive technology, this unprecedented advance in genetic engineering holds great promise for generational therapeutics, but has sparked a large social and ethical debate. That debate will be further explored through the lens of bioethics and disability human rights** in Section 3. Suffice it to say for now that what is especially concerning is that edits can be made not only in adult somatic cells, but also in germline cells, such as those in embryos and gametes. The crucial difference between somatic and germline cells is that the former is idiosyncratic and any effects of an edit are limited to a single individual, whilst genome changes to the latter can be inherited by offspring, thus impacting future individuals' bodies and minds (Ishii 2015, p. 19). To that end, the National Academies of Sciences and Medicine released a consensus statement of the Committee for the International Summit of Gene Editing, which emphasises that **the alteration of germline cells** is irresponsible and **could have far-reaching, unintended, or adverse consequences for** human evolution; genetically, culturally and, in terms of **disability human rights, socially as well** (National Academies of Sciences and Medicine 2015). Furthermore, many scientists, including Jennifer Doudna, one of the inventors of CRISPR, have urged a worldwide moratorium on clinical application of CRISPR to human germline modification until the full implications of the technology 'are discussed among scientific and governmental organisations . . . and interest groups' (Baltimore et al. 2015; Lanphier et al. 2015). **To take a step back and examine what such developments might mean for persons with disabilities is a difficult and controversial task.** In October 2015, the UN International Bioethics Committee stated that the ethical problems of human genetic engineering should not be confused with the ethical problems of 20th Century eugenics movements; however, **it is still problematic because it challenges the idea of human equality and opens up new forms of discrimination and stigmatisation for those with disabilities.** It is true that the ethos of the current technological phenomenon contrasts with that of classical eugenics, given that to some extent it has been accepted that 'it makes no evolutionary sense to drive our species through a man-made bottleneck of genetic uniformity' (Brosius and Kreitman 2000, p. 253). Nevertheless, **there are strong parallels to be drawn between the eugenics era and the growing role of human genetic modification following the Human Genome Project.** As already noted, classical eugenics was concerned with selecting certain people through forced sterilisation, restrictive reproduction laws and secret killings (Fischer 2012, p. 1097). **The growing concern is that a neo-eugenics movement may be instead focused on the selection of certain genes** (King 2001, pp. 171–72). There are fears that the allure of the doctrine of social advancement that the Council for Responsible Genetics has termed **'biological perfectibility' will result in organised neo-eugenics programs that slowly but surely aim to eradicate genes that cause disability, whilst inserting inheritable**

'better' genes (Council for Responsible Genetics 2005). Though, at least in Australia, the idea of such government-sanctioned programs appears too remote a possibility, in the past legitimate concerns have been expressed by the President of the American Association of People with Disabilities: One would hope that reactions to the Holocaust and the advent of the disability rights and independent living movements in the U.S. and around the world would have put an end to the eugenic efforts to eliminate disabled people . . . Unfortunately, if we examine the rhetoric of some influential modern scientists and ethicists, **we can see the emergence of a new eugenics tied to the rapid advances in scientific understanding of the human genome** (Imparato 2004). Similar statements have been echoed by Disabled Peoples International (DPI), which highlights that: **Human genetics poses a threat to us because while cures and palliatives are promised, what is actually being offered are genetic tests for characteristics perceived as undesirable . . . These technologies are, therefore, opening the door to a new eugenics which directly threatens our human rights** ((Disabled Peoples International DPI, p. 3)). **These techniques may be aimed to eliminate disabling traits that are deemed 'abnormal', 'defective' or even 'cruel'. If disabling features in a foetus were to be seen as features that would render its life not worth living, then the same view would likely be taken for existing people already living with those same conditions** (Jones 2011b, p. 103). **Misapplication of genetic practice under such a pretence could quite clearly amount to eugenics.** Notwithstanding that genetic disability does not account for all types of disability, such as those that are acquired through accident, injury and armed conflict, initiatives like the Human Genome Project could contribute to the creation of the notion of disability as deviance and people with disabilities, whether living or embryonic, as a different species whose lives are intrinsically less valuable than others (Turmusani 2004). If so, neo-eugenics would not be a retrospective regulation of living people, but rather a pre-emptive strike on unborn future generations (Witzany 2016, p. 281). Furthermore, **there are fears that human germline genetic modification will adversely affect human dignity and wider societal attitudes towards those living with disabilities, casting people as 'problems' that could have been avoided, and putting pressure on families to have genetically 'perfect' children** (Baruch et al. 2005, p. 7). It is argued by Pollack that the negative end game of human germline modification is that those who have not had their genes modified, or who acquire disabilities or otherwise inherit them, will be born into a world 'with a complexity of genome different from what . . . technology will be able to define as "normal' (Pollack 2015, p. 871). Neo-eugenics may therefore reduce persons with disabilities merely to their genetic makeup or origins, rather than as people of equal standing (Jones 2011b, p. 103; Iles 1996, p. 47). In a world where people with disabilities may already be considered by some as 'lesser', **such a development would only serve to widen the gap that disability rights advocates must bridge.** That sentiment is echoed by Baruch et al., who assert that **the normalisation of genetic enhancement might 'decrease society's tolerance for and willingness to support and treat those living with disabilities'**(Baruch et al. 2005, pp. 7, 27). Lander similarly highlighted the 'moral grayness' and eugenic practices that are inherent in genetic modification of human life (Lander 2015, p. 7). Ultimately, they conclude that CRISPR practice on human germlines can only proceed if there is a strong ethical argument to do so, or if necessity dictates it so. Otherwise, clinical practice should be banned.

Eugenics and Economics will become linked.

Sherman 2017, Erik Sherman Senior Contributor Genetic Engineering Will Make Income Inequality Much Worse Aug 20, 2017, 08:06am EDT
<https://www.forbes.com/sites/eriksherman/2017/08/20/genetic-engineering-will-make-income-inequality-much-worse/?sh=2fdb4ed93d75>

Early this month, scientists announced that they had edited genes in a human embryo to remove a disease-causing mutation. The work was astounding and the answer to prayers of many parents. Who wouldn't want a chance to prevent what would now be needless suffering by their children? But that wouldn't be the end of it. Many parents would want to ensure their children had the best of advantages through genetic improvement. Those with means could obtain them. With the ability comes ethical questions beyond the ultimate safety of such techniques. Expense of procedures will produce scarcity and aggravate income inequality that already continues to grow. Such improvements would certainly include physical characteristics because they can affect success. For example, taller people tend to be more financially successful in life, with one study showing that over a 30-year career, a six-foot tall person would make \$166,000 more than someone five-foot five-inches. Almost all Fortune 500 CEOs are at least six-foot two-inches tall, even though that is true of only 3.9% of the population. Studies have shown that physical beauty translates into higher earnings than people who are less attractive by cultural norms. The gap is as large as those due to gender or racial factors. People wrongly assume that physical attractiveness has a strong correlation with competence and ability. Intelligence could also become an engineered trait in time. Intelligence is more than genetics, but what you inherit is an enormous part of what you can eventually develop. So, you could, in theory, make it easier for kids to whip through school, standardized tests, and the other hurdles that surround academic achievement. However, intelligence may not strongly correlate with lifetime income. (The question brings to mind an old Dilbert comic in which Dilbert asks a genius co-worker why he is also at the backward corporate employer. The genius questions whether intelligence is a Darwinian survival trait.) Genetic engineering of humans will happen as certainly as the atomic bomb would be developed once physics proved that such a device was possible in theory. Parents who can afford to already run children through enrichment programs and get them tutoring in how to take important standardized tests. What separates such kids from the majority is that their parents can afford these paths to a higher percentage of achievement. Genetic engineering will be no different, particularly in who benefits from it. Undoubtedly someone will make the claim that the technology will free everyone. That will not happen anymore than early automation and the replacement of human workers led to more leisure time to learn and be creative. Families far from the upper cast are unlikely to have the funds to indulge in such treatments. It will be the wealthiest who do, just as they already do. And be sure that some scientists and technicians who could perform such services will do so when enough money is offered. The result could become a Huxley-like dystopia with a class structure even more rigid than today. In Brave New World, is was the intentional reduction in mental and physical abilities that created the alpha, beta, gamma, delta, and epsilon categories of humans. We already countenance wide disparities in educational and cultural resources based on income, which makes it more difficult for people to move out of a lower economic background. Manipulating the innate abilities of those with the most would additionally extend the differentiation and the advantage.

The race and discourse around creating the genetically perfect human makes society view disabled bodies as less valuable. This marginalizes disabled bodies and reinforces violence and inequality faced by disabled bodies.

Sufian and Garland-Thomson 2021 ("The Dark Side of CRISPR," Sandy Sufian, an associate professor of health humanities and history in the Department of Medical Education at UIC School of Medicine and associate professor of Disability Studies in the UIC Department of Disability and Human Development, and Rosemarie Garland-Thomson, Rosemarie Garland-Thomson is a professor of English and co-director of the Disability Studies Initiative at Emory University, February 16, 2021, <https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/the-dark-side-of-crispr> , VY, *2 page card*)

As disability studies scholars and women with genetic differences who are experts in thinking about the consequences this technology will have for actual human beings, we have grave worries that the use of these “genetic scissors” will, in the future, cut people like us out of existence without others even noticing. Scientists who use CRISPR could see editing genes such as ours out of the gene pool as entirely uncontroversial. **This attitude, in fact, would be consistent with wider societal views. The idea that ridding society of genetic differences that count as disease or defect is an undeniable “good” continues to be pervasive in our society.** Americans generally see no problem with editing genes linked to broad swaths of people like us; after all, supporters of this view may argue, editing out a gene-linked condition is different from editing out a person, and curing disease is an indisputably good thing. But our genetic conditions are not simply entities that can be clipped away from us as if they were some kind of a misspelled word or an awkward sentence in a document. We are whole beings, with our genetic conditions forming a fundamental part of who we are. Still, many Americans—including medical providers and even some people with genetic differences—consider lives such as ours as not worth living as they are. **Further, the common belief that ridding disease and anomaly from society is an incontrovertible good can lead very quickly from the actual possibilities of science to fantasies of “improving” humanity where we would all become some aspirational version of personhood that is somehow better, stronger, smarter, and healthier.** But CRISPR’s tantalizing offer to achieve the supposedly “best” kind of people at the genetic level is an uneasy alert to those who are often judged to be biologically inferior—one we know all too well. **People like us whose being is inseparable from our genetic condition would be the first to go.** We both have genetic conditions that many people consider serious enough to eliminate from the human gene pool: one of us lives with cystic fibrosis (CF), and the other a form of syndactyly. Both of these conditions have shaped our bodies and our lives. Sandy’s affected lungs require several hours of treatments each day, and Rosemarie’s affected hands limit her manual dexterity. We are among the one billion people in the world (15 percent of the population) and 61 million people in the United States (26 percent of all adults) who are considered disabled. We are among the 10 percent of all adults who have a genetic condition. Because we were born with our conditions, we have benefited from learning early on how to live with the characteristics of our particular genetic distinctiveness. Our supportive families saw to it that we accessed good health care and received educations suitable to our talents and interests. Improved medical treatments, social progress, and political equality movements raised our quality of life in ways that people like us in generations prior to ours could not have imagined. When Sandy was born in 1967, people with CF had an average life expectancy of 15, but during 1970–1990, life expectancy doubled due to new medical therapies. Today’s average life expectancy is 44, but with novel medicines called cystic fibrosis transmembrane conductance regulator (CFTR) modulators, people with CF are expected to live even longer with fewer hospitalizations. These transformations in life expectancy attest to the changing nature of prognosis, one for which CRISPR’s editing cannot account. When Rosemarie was born, in the late 1940s, people with

physical disabilities like hers were often institutionalized and led limited lives far from the support of their families. At that time, only one in five children with disabilities were educated in public schools with nondisabled children. Physically disabled children were most often sent to segregated schools where they received inferior education. With the Education for All Act of 1975 (now the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), however, the federal government guaranteed public education and services for all children with disabilities, thus changing their life trajectories. We learned to thrive with the bodies we have and possess identities and lives that include our genetic diagnostic categories but also go beyond them. Yet stubborn beliefs about “good” genes and “bad” genes nonetheless persist in discriminatory attitudes that affect us both. When Rosemarie was pregnant with her first child, the obstetrician assumed that her major concern was that the baby would have hands and arms like its mother, even though Rosemarie’s biggest concern was finding a good childcare situation that would complement her job responsibilities. When Sandy considered having a biological child, friends and medical providers questioned her decision to consider pregnancy because that meant passing on one copy of her cystic fibrosis gene to a future child. This imagined child would not have had the disease since her husband is not a carrier for CF (CF is an autosomal recessive disease). But some of those in Sandy’s circle still believed pregnancy inadvisable because, to them, producing a child who would carry the CF gene was equally undesirable. Sandy called out their assumption: that her condition was inherently inferior—a point they took as self-evident despite the fact that an estimated 24 percent of people worldwide are carriers for genetic conditions. **These stories also reveal an enduring ideology about the inextricable, cultural link among disability, reproduction, and suffering. They illustrate the subtle, yet insidious, idea that some genes are inherently bad and contaminate the human gene pool; as such, people who carry them should not propagate and pass those genes on to their progeny so as to make those children either carriers or affected. These ideas also expose an even deeper, ableist assumption: that people with supposedly “bad genes” fundamentally suffer and hold a less valuable place in society than others.** This isn’t to say that people with genetic conditions don’t suffer, but we don’t necessarily suffer all the time and we don’t necessarily suffer any more than other people without such conditions. **Yet the cultural impulse to assume that people with genetic variations are in a constant state of suffering, and that it blights our lives, is so pervasive that it is even internalized by some with genetic conditions themselves.** Such genetic determinism is a new form of eugenic thinking grounded in what the communications studies scholar James L. Cherney calls “common sense” ableism, a belief system that allows people to simultaneously deny any commitment to distasteful eugenic principles while also holding them up. Common sense ableism permits, even encourages, such injurious attitudes. **Utilizing genome manipulation tools and performing genetic selection is tantamount to engaging in what Rosemarie calls “velvet eugenics.”** Enforced by laissez-faire commercialism, rather than by the state, **velvet eugenics seems like common sense, yet it hides its violence and inequality behind claims of patient autonomy and under a veil of voluntary consent.** Ultimately, market-driven velvet eugenics embodies a similar goal of purging unacceptable human variations that campaigns to eliminate the supposedly unfit and inferior have held in the past. Both enact a mandate to exclude people with disabilities from coming into the world. **People like us shouldn’t be edited out of existence in some version of a utopian future. This vision of a future without people like us limits our ability to live in the present.** Evaluating the quality of life of another person is a complex, highly subjective, and context-dependent task that is morally questionable in a society based on the concept that all people are of equal value regardless of their individual differences. The limitations of human imagination make it questionable, if not unethical, for a person to grasp another person’s (or group of people’s) quality of life fully.

Economic inequality spurs political gridlock- manifests every extinction scenario

Cribb 2017 Julian Cribb, 2017 -- Australian National University Emeritus Faculty Surviving The 21st Century: Humanity's Ten Great Challenges and How We Can Overcome Them, Switzerland: Springer International, 2017, p. 166-167

The argument that **income inequality leads to legislative stalemate and government indecision** was advanced by Mian and colleagues in a study of the political outcomes of the 2008–2009 Global Economic Recession (Mian et al. 2012), stating “...politically **countries become more polarized and fractionalized** following financial crises. This results in legislative stalemate, making it less likely that crises lead to meaningful macroeconomic reforms.” It also affects intergenerational cohesion, explains Nobel economics laureate Joseph Stiglitz: “These three realities – **social injustice on an unprecedented scale, massive inequities, and a loss of trust in elites** – define our political moment, and rightly so.... **But we won’t be able to fix the problem if we don’t recognize it. Our young do. They perceive the absence of intergenerational justice, and they are right to be angry**” (Stiglitz 2016). **From the perspective of the survival of civilization and the human species,** financial inequality does not represent a direct threat—indeed most societies have long managed with varying degrees of income disparity. Where it is of concern to a human race, whose numbers and demands have already exceeded the finite boundaries of its shared planet, is in **the capacity of inequality to wreck social cohesion and hence, to undermine the prospects for a collaborative effort by the whole of humanity to tackle the multiple existential threats we face.** Rich-against-poor is a good way to divert the argument and so de-rail climate action, disarmament, planetary clean-up or food security, for instance. Disunity spells electoral loss in politics, rifts between commanders and their troops breed military defeat, lack of team spirit yields failure in sport, disharmony means a poor orchestra or business performance, family disagreements often lead to dysfunction and violence. These lessons are well-known and attested, from every walk of life. **Yet humans persistently overlook the cost of socioeconomic disunity and grievances when it comes to dealing with our common perils as a species. For civilisation and our species to survive** and prosper sustainably in the long run, common understandings and **co-operation are essential,** across all the gulfs that divide us—political, ethnic, religious and economic. **A sustainable world, and a viable human species, will not be possible unless** the poverty and **inequity gaps can be reduced,** if not closed. This is not a matter of politics or ideology, as many may argue: it is the same lesson in collective wisdom and collaboration which those earliest humans first learned on the African savannah a million and a half years ago: together we stand, divided we fall. It is purely an issue of co-existence and co-survival. Neither rich nor poor are advantaged by a state of civilisation in collapse. **An unsustainable world will kill the affluent as surely as the deprived.**

Contention 4: Solvency

Genetic engineering will be available over the next 20 years and is of great importance to NATO. Acting now is key.

NATO S&T Organization 2020 ("Science & Technology Trends 2020-2040," NATO Science & Technology Organization, March 2020, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2020/4/pdf/190422-ST_Tech_Trends_Report_2020-2040.pdf, VY)

Manipulation of our biological environment and human enhancement goes back to the earliest days of humankind when our ancestors employed skins, stones and agriculture to create an evolutionary advantage. However, bio- and human enhancement technologies (BHET) are expected to be available over the next 20 years that change our very definition of what it means to be a soldier, sailor or aviator. These technologies span the spectrum of biological sciences: Genetic manipulation (e.g. CRISPR) to develop novel pathogens or medical countermeasures; Manufacturing methods exploiting biological processes; Human enhancement via integrated robotics (e.g. exoskeletons or replacement parts); Neural interfaces; Enhanced vision; Socio-technical symbiosis with AI and autonomous systems; Pharmacological approaches to cognitive and physical enhancement; Increased virtualisation of the socio-cognitive environment supporting the development of new social, information and organisational structures; and, New bio-sensors and bio-informatics, which will increase our understanding of socio-cognitive, physiological, economic and neurological behaviours to improve operational performance and resilience, as well as increase the effectiveness of non-kinetic targeting. **Disruptive BHET research areas of potential interest to NATO are: Bioinformatics and Biosensors:** The collection, classification, storage, retrieval and analysis of biological and biochemical data. **Human Augmentation: The use of genetic modifications, pharmacological agents, electro-mechanical devices, or neurological interfaces to increase human physiological and neurological performance beyond normal limits. Medical Countermeasures and Technologies:** The development of new diagnostics, therapeutics and vaccines (employing bioinformatics, genetic engineering and biosensors) to support predictive diagnostics, CBRN threat identification and treatments. Synthetic Biology: The deliberate design, engineering and creation of novel synthetic or modified biological components or systems. **These changes will and already are presenting significant societal, legal and policy issues.** Appendix G provides a more comprehensive review of this EDT. The following table presents the assessed potential impact, state and rate of development, as well as identified areas for focused research.

Only a ban, not governance, would solve the ethical problems of human germline genetic engineering.

GM Watch 2021 ("We need a global ban on human genetic engineering, not "governance", GM Watch, 14 July 2021, <https://www.gmwatch.org/en/106-news/latest-news/19839-we-need-a-global-ban-on-human-genetic-engineering-not-governance>, VY)

Dr David King[2], a member of Stop Designer Babies, said of the reports: "This is an abdication of the WHO's responsibility. **It is obvious that the only practical solution to the risks of rogue scientists and profit-minded IVF clinics starting a new free market eugenics is a comprehensive global ban treaty.** That is why over 70 countries have already effectively banned it. **The mealy-mouthed call for 'governance' is a technocratic strategy, which we have already seen from other scientific establishment bodies, for eventual normalisation of human genetic engineering.**" Stuart A. Newman, PhD, Professor of Cell Biology and Anatomy at New York Medical College, commented, "**Leaving the door open to GM humans,** as WHO does in these reports, **flies in the face of science that demonstrates that embryos cannot be reliably engineered.** Every attempt to do so, now or in the future, will be an uncontrolled experiment on a prospective person. There are justified uses of genetic modification to cure diseases in desperately ill patients. **CRISPR-modified babies,** however, **is an unethical technology.**" GMWatch takes no issue with somatic gene therapy, which is a contained use medical treatment for a given disease. Somatic gene therapy targets only the patient and does not affect future generations. But **we stand with Stop Designer Babies and Professor Newman in opposing human germline genetic engineering. This would undoubtedly** be used, despite the inevitable risks of real and enduring harm, to "enhance" desired characteristics, such as height, athletic performance, and intelligence, **marking the start of a new age of eugenics.**

2AC Inherency Extensions

The UN falls short on generic engineering. NATO must lead by example.

UN 21. United Nations News. "UN Reports 'leap forward' in Regulating DNA-altering technology to benefit all." United Nations. July 12, 2021.

<https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/07/1095682>

"Human genome editing has the potential to advance our ability to treat and cure disease, but the full impact will only be realized if we deploy it for the benefit of all people, instead of fuelling more health inequity between and within countries", said Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, Director-General of the World Health Organization (WHO).

A representative report

The total complement of genes in any organism or cell, is known as its genome.

WHO said in a news release **that** the forward-looking reports are the result of broad, global consultations on the different types of gene therapies, which involve modifying a patient's DNA to treat or cure diseases. These include **germline and heritable human genome editing** which involves making changes to the genetic material, that can include developing human embryos.

WHO's two-year analysis studied the diverse perspectives of hundreds of scientists, patients, faith leaders, indigenous peoples and others.

"These new reports from WHO's Expert Advisory Committee **represent a leap forward for** this area of rapidly emerging science", said WHO's Chief Scientist, Soumya Swaminathan.

Pros and cons

Potential benefits of human genome editing include faster and more accurate diagnosis, more **targeted treatments** and the ability to prevent genetic disorders.

Somatic gene therapies have successfully addressed HIV and sickle-cell disease, and the technique has the potential to vastly improve treatment for a variety of cancers.

Safe, effective and ethical

The reports recommend the governance and oversight of human genome editing in nine discrete areas, including in registries; international studies; and illegal, unregistered, unethical research.

They focus on the system-level improvements needed to build capacity in all countries to ensure that human genome editing is used safely, effectively and ethically.

"As global research delves deeper into the human genome, we must minimize risks and leverage ways that science can drive better health for everyone, everywhere", said Dr. Swaminathan.

2AC Ethical Responsibility Extensions

Genetic engineering of humans is against human dignity.

Calo 2012 ("Human Dignity and Health Law: Personhood in Recent Bioethical Debate," Zachary R. Calo, Associate Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law, Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics and Public Policy 26 (2012): 473-499, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1918401, VY)

Human dignity continues to maintain a significant role within human rights, but it is within bioethics that human dignity has acquired a particular prominence. No issue has raised more fundamental questions about the character of human personhood than developments in genetic engineering. As such, **the category of human dignity has become one of the basic conceptual devices for examining the ethical challenges of biotechnology and clarifying our understanding of the human person.** Whereas **human dignity** has served a largely symbolic and pragmatic role within the human rights movement, it **serves a more constructive and foundational role in bioethical debate.** If the human rights movement drew the language of dignity into the mainstream of political discourse, bioethical issues have drawn dignity into the center of a sustained scholarly debate. A significant byproduct of this development has been that human dignity is now a deeply contested category. Human dignity proved largely uncontroversial in the human rights context, because it served as an unexamined background assumption that undergirded the established values of the human rights movement. The situation has proven far more contentious in the bioethics context, where the language of human dignity has not remained in the background, but rather has emerged as a central topic of debate. In the process, common ground has given way to division over the meaning and coherence of appeals to human dignity. As Roger Brownsword notes in summarizing the situation, "[t]here is less common ground and ethical conflicts are more complex than they were."⁶ **Rather than providing a warrant for shared objectives, human dignity has instead accentuated deep and fundamental ethical cleavages concerning the nature of personhood.** The consensus that defined human dignity within human rights has given way to fragmentation. As one commentator summarily notes, the "nature and importance [of human dignity] as a philosophical concept are intensely controversial."⁷

Be skeptical of their long linear chains because each step greatly reduces net risk – the aff outweighs even seemingly probable disads

Conetta 98 [Carl, Director of the Project on Defense Alternatives, Research Fellow of the Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies, researcher and awarded author at the Pentagon, US State Department, US House Armed Services Committee, Army War College, National Defense University, and UNIDIR, "Dueling with Uncertainty: The New Logic of American Military Planning," March 1998,]

Cards Without doubt, simulations -- including nonstandard ones -- can aid planning. The question is: To what end? And to what effect? Exploring "wild cards" in order to identify warning signs or to define limits is one thing; using them to establish force structure or modernization requirements, quite another. Especially suspect would be using scenarios that are detached from declared US interests to define current requirements; this would put the military "cart" before the political "horse." Another, broader concern is how the effusion of improbable conflict scenarios affects public policy discourse overall. **Conflict scenarios**, both wild and tame, can gain more credibility in the telling than they deserve. Cognitive researcher Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini calls this the "Othello effect," referring to the trail of **plausible but false suppositions** that led Othello to murder his wife, Desdemona. **Even the most farfetched scenarios comprise a number of** steps or **links** each of **which may seem** plausible or even **probable given the one** that came **before**. **Although the likelihood of the scenario dwindles with each step, the residual impression is one of plausibility. Omitted are the many branches at each step that would lead to a neutral** or even positive **outcome**. The resulting snapshots, although numerous, offer a highly-selective view of what the future may hold. And **the fact that only the negative outcomes are articulated** and exercised **can distort the** general public **impression of risk**. Living with Uncertainty There is no escape from uncertainty, but there is relief from uncertainty hysteria. It begins with recognizing that instability has boundaries -- just as turbulence in physical systems has discernable onset points and parameters. The turbulence of a river, for instance, corresponds to flow and to the contours of the river's bed and banks. It occurs in patches and not randomly. The weather also is a chaotic system that resists precise long-range forecasting, but allows useful prediction of broader trends and limits. Despite uncertainty, **statements of probability matter**. They indicate the weight of evidence -- or whether there is any evidence at all. The uncertainty hawks would flood our concern with a horde of dangers that pass their permissive test of "non-zero probability." However, **by lowering the threshold** of alarm, **they establish an impossible standard** of defense sufficiency: absolute and certain military security. Given finite resources and competing ends, something less will have to do. Strategic wisdom begins with the setting of priorities -- and priorities demand strict attention to what appears likely and what does not.

Gene editing deprives future generations of their humanity and entrenches social inequality

Darnovsky, Lowthorp and Hasson, 2018 Marcy Darnovsky is the executive director of the Centre for Genetics and Society (CGS).

• Leah Lowthorp is a program manager at the Centre for Genetics and Society (CGS). • Katie Hasson directs the Genetic Justice program at the Centre for Genetics and Society (CGS). Reproductive gene editing imperils universal human rights ORIGINALLY PUBLISHED: February 15, 2018

<https://www.openglobalrights.org/reproductive-gene-editing-imperils-universal-human-rights/>

What do recent advances in molecular genetics have to do with human rights? Quite a lot, it turns out. And key human rights documents have recognized this for some time. Over the past few years, new “gene editing” tools that are cheaper, easier to use, and more accurate than previous ways to change living organisms’ DNA have rapidly spread to labs around the world. Scenarios that previously seemed far-fetched or far off now confront us, including the prospect of directly controlling the genes and traits that are passed down to future children and generations. Since 2015, a half dozen research teams, in China, the UK, and the United States, have separately reported efforts to modify specific genes in human embryos. These developments have brought us to a critical juncture: human reproductive gene editing now poses a threat to the human rights of future generations. Gene editing for human reproduction carries huge social risks. It has the potential to threaten the health and autonomy of future generations, to exacerbate existing social disparities, and to lay the basis for a new market-based eugenics that would fuel discrimination and conflict. A debate about whether to risk these outcomes is now raging, though mostly in the publications and meetings of scientific and professional organizations, far away from public view and civil society attention. It is essential that human rights advocates make their voices heard in this debate. Imagine a world where wealthy parents could purchase genetic enhancements to give their children real or alleged advantages, where children’s futures were thought to be determined by their genes, and where babies were labeled at birth as “good” or “bad” based on their DNA. What would be the implications for human rights, and for the right of children to decide their own futures? Gene editing for human reproduction, also known as human inheritable or germline modification, involves making changes to the DNA of human sperm, eggs, or embryos. It is distinct from efforts to use gene editing as a medical treatment, which target the somatic or non-reproductive cells of existing patients. While somatic gene editing, or “gene therapy,” aims to treat or cure disease in living people, reproductive gene editing is not a medical treatment. It would create a new person with a pre-determined genetic make-up that would be inherited by all of their descendants. Gene therapy, if it can be made safe, effective, and broadly affordable, will be a welcome addition to modern medicine. Germline gene editing, by contrast, doesn’t treat anyone. It creates future children, and deprives them and future generations of the choice to consent to modifications made to their DNA. And if the goal is to avoid the transmission of inheritable disease, it is unnecessary. Where there is risk of passing on a serious genetic mutation, an existing embryo screening technique (pre-implantation genetic diagnosis or PGD), can in almost all cases eliminate the unwanted gene variant from the family’s lineage. To be sure, embryo screening for PGD raises challenging ethical questions about what conditions are considered “unworthy of life.” But it is far safer and less socially and ethically fraught than manipulating the human germline. Around twenty years ago, an earlier wave of concern about human germline modification swept through scientific and policy circles, and popular culture. The 1997 dystopian film *GATTACA* depicted a brutal society that privileged the genetically enhanced over the unenhanced. Similarly, Princeton University molecular biologist Lee Silver made news with his vision of a genetically stratified society, predicting that “the already wide gap between wealthy and poor nations could widen further and further with each generation until all

common heritage is gone.” During the same period, concerns about safety, human rights, and the potential for a high-tech, market-based eugenics prompted more than 40 countries—including nearly every nation with a significant biotech sector—to prohibit the modification of genes passed down to subsequent generations. Several important international human rights instruments also concluded that human germline modification would violate human dignity, a concept at the core of human rights. One of these, the Council of Europe’s 1997 European Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine (also known as the Oviedo Convention), is a binding international treaty. Its Article 13 explicitly prohibits interventions “seeking to introduce any modification in the genome of any descendants.” Another, UNESCO’s 1997 Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights, asserts that “the human genome underlies the fundamental unity of all members of the human family, as well as the recognition of their inherent dignity and diversity,” concluding in Article 24 that “germ-line interventions” could be “contrary to human dignity.” In fact, an important motivation for the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was an abhorrence of the eugenic abuses perpetrated by Nazis during World War II. The same logic provides the foundation for the consumer-based eugenics that would result if germline modification were allowed, where people’s life chances would be limited if their unmodified genes were considered from birth to be inferior.

Its unethical because it risks mosaicism and off target effects

Melanie Hess -2020 A Call for an International Governance Framework for Human Germline Gene Editing 95 Notre Dame Law Review 1369
<https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4899&context=ndlr>

Legal professor and bioethicist Katherine Drabiak describes the rhetoric around gene editing “intentionally misleading,” stating that the current state of technology is not as efficient as it is believed to be in terms of its potential benefits, and that, in fact, there is significant risk involved.⁴⁷ The medical risks associated with germline gene editing include mosaicism, meaning some genes contain the intended modification and others do not. This can lead to serious health risks in later stages of development⁴⁸ and other off target effects. Off-target effects “refer to a range of unintended outcomes” that can have serious health impacts on the child, including advanced aging or the development of tumors.⁴⁹ Problematically, preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD), a process used to test the health of an embryo prior to implantation for pregnancy,⁵⁰ often fails to accurately assess the effects of gene editing on an embryo. The inability to use PGD to test the health of an edited embryo would make it difficult to ascertain the germline editing procedure’s effectiveness prior to the embryo’s implantation. In other words, PGD cannot be used as a safeguard to indicate whether the editing has worked correctly prior to implantation.⁵¹ PGD can, however, be used to assess whether a defective gene is present in an unedited embryo, which is why Drabiak points to this as a better alternative to germline editing.⁵² Finally, there are a range of unpredictable effects that may emerge at any point in the future person’s life as a result of tampering with their initial germline cells. Drabiak notes that current research touting effectiveness incorrectly presumes that, following a gene editing procedure, “embryo survival equates to health.”⁵³ In other words, a test subject embryo’s surviving the trial is not necessarily an indication of how the fetus will fare in the next nine months, or the years and decades following its birth. Some scholars believe that “germline modification will never be safe . . . because interactions between genes are highly integrated, designed to achieve stability and balance, and manipulation of one location risks disrupting the biological equilibrium.”⁵⁴ Of course, this poses a serious obstacle to any research: with the current expert consensus on a moratorium on any applications that would result in a pregnancy,⁵⁵ it is not possible to observe effects of germline editing on later stages of development of a child. Drabiak proposes that these risks are severe enough that they easily outweigh any benefits that germline gene editing could ever theoretically provide.⁵⁶

Germline genetic engineering is proven to create a range of mutations – its not safe

Ledford 20

Ledford, Heidi. Heidi Ledford, Senior Reporter, London Heidi writes about biology and medicine, and has a PhD from the University of California, Berkeley. Heidi has written for The Oregonian, edited for the Berkeley Science Review, and freelanced for a few other publications. ““CRISPR Babies” Are Still Too Risky, Says Influential Panel.” Nature, 3 Sept. 2020, www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-02538-4, 10.1038/d41586-020-02538-4. Accessed 28 June 2022. //DRE

Editing genes in human embryos could one day prevent some serious genetic disorders from being passed down from parents to their children – but, for now, the technique is too risky to be used in embryos destined for implantation, according to a high-profile international commission. And even when the technology is mature, its use should initially be permitted in only a narrow set of circumstances, the panel says. The recommendations, released in a report on 3 September, were produced by experts in ten countries convened by the US National Academy of Medicine, the US National Academy of Sciences and the UK Royal Society. The document joins a wealth of reports compiled in recent years that have argued against using gene editing in the clinic until researchers are able to address safety worries, and the public has had a chance to comment on ethical and societal concerns. “The technology is not presently ready for clinical application,” says Richard Lifton, president of the Rockefeller University in New York City and co-chair of the commission. The report – which reviewed the scientific and technical state of heritable gene editing, rather than ethical questions – advocates the formation of an international committee to evaluate developments in the technology and advise national advisory groups and regulators on its safety and utility. The commission was formed after Chinese biophysicist He Jiankui shocked the world in 2018 by announcing that he had edited human embryos that were then implanted, in an effort to make the resulting children resistant to HIV infection. The work, which was widely condemned by scientists and yielded prison sentences for He and two of his colleagues, led to the birth of two children with edited genomes. Unwanted changes Although genome-editing technologies such as CRISPR–Cas9 offer a fairly precise way to edit the genome, they have been shown to generate some unwanted changes to genes, and can produce a range of different outcomes even among cells in the same embryo. It could be years before researchers are able to iron out these difficulties, says Haoyi Wang, a developmental biologist at the Chinese Academy of Sciences’ Institute of Zoology in Beijing, and a commission member. In addition, Wang says, scientists need to develop better methods for thoroughly sequencing a human genome from single cells, so that an edited embryo can be screened in detail for unwanted genetic changes. The report also recommends that if, after thorough discussion with the public, individual nations decide that they are ready to move forwards with heritable genome editing, the practice should initially be limited to serious genetic disorders that are caused by DNA variants in a single gene. Even then, it should be used only when the alternatives for having a biologically related child that is unaffected by the genetic disorder are poor. “The report lays out very, very well just how rare it’s going to be that people actually need to access heritable human-genome editing,” says Jackie Leach Scully, a bioethicist at the University of New South Wales in Sydney, Australia. For example, in some cases people will instead be able to screen out embryos that carry a disease-causing genetic mutation. “We understand that not many couples would fall into these categories,” says Kay Davies, a geneticist at the University of Oxford, UK, and co-chair of the commission. “There would be a need for international cooperation in doing these first cases because there would be so few worldwide.

Its unethical – too much uncertainty – the complications might not surface for years.

Lanphier, et.al. 2015 Edward Lanphier, Fyodor Urnov, Sarah Ehlen Haecker, Michael Werner & Joanna Smolenski Published: 12 March 2015 Don't edit the human germ line Nature volume 519, pages410–411 (2015)Ci <https://www.nature.com/articles/519410a>

The CRISPR technique has dramatically expanded research on genome editing. But we cannot imagine a situation in which its use in human embryos would offer a therapeutic benefit over existing and developing methods. It would be difficult to control exactly how many cells are modified. Increasing the dose of nuclease used would increase the likelihood that the mutated gene will be corrected, but also raise the risk of cuts being made elsewhere in the genome. In an embryo, a nuclease may not necessarily cut both copies of the target gene, or the cell may start dividing before the corrections are complete, resulting in a genetic mosaic. Studies using gene-editing in animals such as rats⁵, cattle⁶, sheep⁷ and pigs⁸, indicate that it is possible to delete or disable genes in an embryo – a simpler process than actually correcting DNA sequences – in only some of the cells. The current ability to perform quality controls on only a subset of cells means that the precise effects of genetic modification to an embryo may be impossible to know until after birth. Even then, potential problems may not surface for years. Established methods, such as standard prenatal genetic diagnostics or in vitro fertilization (IVF) with the genetic profiling of embryos before implantation, are much better options for parents who both carry the same mutation for a disease.

2AC Eugenics and Economics Extensions

Critical disability voices are missing from the discourse about human genome editing. This marginalizes disabled bodies.

Devandas 2020 ("New eugenics: UN disability expert warns against 'ableism' in medical practice," Catalina Devandas (Costa Rica) was designated as the first Special Rapporteur on the rights of persons with disabilities in June 2014 by the UN Human Rights Council, 28 February 2020, <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2020/02/new-eugenics-un-disability-expert-warns-against-ableism-medical-practice>, VY)

GENEVA (28 February 2020) – "**Current developments in medical research and practice may revive eugenic ideas if safeguards for those affected are not ensured.**" today said the UN Special Rapporteur on the rights of persons with disabilities, Catalina Devandas, during the presentation of her latest report to the UN Human Rights Council. **The UN expert explained that developments in gene therapy, genetic engineering and prenatal screening experienced enormous growth, increasing our power to repair the body and prevent disease, but cautioned about "eliminating" human characteristics deemed undesirable. "People with disabilities are genuinely concerned that these developments could result in new eugenic practices and further undermine social acceptance and solidarity towards disability - and more broadly, towards human diversity."** she said. In her report, Devandas also expressed her concerns on the impact of euthanasia and assisted suicide for persons with disabilities. "If assisted dying is made available for persons with health conditions or impairments, but who are not terminally ill, a social assumption could be made that it is better to be dead than to live with a disability," the expert warned. "People have the right to live and to die with dignity, but we cannot accept that people choose to end their lives because of social stigma, isolation or lack of access to personal assistance or disability-related services." **Another major concern, Devandas stressed, is the absence of persons with disabilities in crucial debates on medical research and practice. "Without their experiences directly informing those debates, narratives suggesting that living with disabilities should be prevented become reinforced and socially validated."** The Special Rapporteur explained that "ableism" is at the root of the problem. "If the life experiences of people with disabilities continue to be undervalued, no progress will be made." "What we need is a profound cultural transformation on the way society relates to the difference. That is a commitment to embrace disability as a positive aspect of human diversity. States must combat all forms of discrimination based on disability," the human rights expert concluded.

Its eugenics – deliberately discriminatory and fundamentally unethical.

Friedmann 2019, Professor at School of Medicine, University of California San Diego, "Genetic therapies, human genetic enhancement, and ... eugenics?", Nature, <https://www.nature.com/articles/s41434-019-0088-1>, 6-25-2022. //ms

In the blazingly rapid period of only a few decades, these tools have already progressed from curiosities of somatic cell genetics in the laboratory to early-stage clinical application in individual human patients. Genome editing studies have reached this clinical stage for applications toward preventing and correcting genetic and even infectious diseases, including HIV AIDS [1], forms of leukemia [2], mucopolysaccharidoses I (<https://clinicaltrials.gov/ct2/show/NCT02702115>) and II (<https://clinicaltrials.gov/ct2/show/NCT03041324>), sickle cell disease [3], and others. Such genetic manipulation has been extended to genome editing studies in the human embryo identified to be at risk for a potentially dangerous or lethal disease. Proof of that concept has been provided for CRISPR-Cas9 genome editing correction in a preimplantation human embryo of a mutation responsible for the potentially lethal disease hypertrophic cardiomyopathy [4]. With unsettling speed, the door has now clearly been cracked even further open for human embryonic genetic modification by a recent announcement from China of purported HIV prevention in a subsequent generation by genome editing knockout of the CCR5 HIV co-receptor followed by birth of potentially HIV-resistant human infants [5]. As reported, the manipulation was widely regarded to be scientifically premature, technically flawed, and ethically indefensible, but the embryo genetic modification genie is probably already out of the bottle. The technical and ethical hazards of such applications have been discussed and will continue to be of major concern, even in the case of disease prevention and treatment. From therapy to genetic enhancement When aimed at aberrant functions causing disease, genetic manipulations such as “traditional” gene therapy and, more recently, genome editing, constitute legitimate therapy and are medically and ethically justifiable. But the potential applications for genetic modification do not stop with prevention and treatment of human disease. Gene-based therapies are one thing, but the intentional modification of the human genome to “improve” individuals, i.e., genetic enhancement, is quite another and beset with different sets of ethical and policy dilemmas. The rapidly developing tools of gene therapy and genome editing are potentially just as pertinent to understanding the mechanisms underlying human development and behavior, cognitive, and intellectual traits as to the formation and function of the human personality. It would probably require no great technical innovation to leap from disease prevention and therapy to attempts to modify and “enhance” human physical and intellectual traits. The temptation to do so is and will continue to be great. The tools of biotechnology, neuroscience, and genetics will increasingly identify many of the mechanisms underlying the development and regulation of human traits, not only of physical properties but also of cognitive, intellectual, and social traits, and make them tempting targets for genetic manipulation. What will be the consequences of modifying and genetically manipulating human functions intended to improve on the “natural”? When will merely “natural” not be good enough? From genetic enhancement to eugenics? Deliberate application of the concept and tools of genetic enhancement of individual human beings and of the human species flows directly into the highly troubling potential for spill-over into programs for design and preferential reproduction of “more desirable” and “better” kinds of human beings – i.e., eugenics. Are we prepared to pursue, accept, and regulate applications of genetic enhancement toward eugenic goals? Humanity has a very fraught relationship with the unsettling concept and the misguided practice of eugenics. The late nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century witnessed the emergence and the flourishing of the concept of eugenics—the attempt to direct human heredity and evolution to ensure

procreative advantage to more “desirable” human beings and to discourage or limit reproduction by the less desirables. Such programs relied on efforts to identify and provide advantage to the “favored” and to define methods to disadvantage the “unfavored”. Inspired by concepts born at the Genetics Record Office at Cold Spring Harbor, New York, criteria of social undesirability and social ills came to include the undesirable and purportedly genetic traits of poverty, criminality, mental disorders, laziness and homosexuality, and thalassophilia (love of the sea) among others [6]. There was obviously little or no truly rigorous scientific evidence of a genetic basis for these presumed genetic components. There were, instead, prejudiced and fact-free presumptions of the causes of social human ills based on imaginary pseudoscience meant to justify restricted immigration of “undesirable” populations to the US mainly from central Europe and Asia. Out of those misguided eugenic concepts emerged racist immigration policies and the disastrous US Supreme Court decision in *Buck v. Bell* that upheld the legality and ethical justification for implementing involuntary sterilization programs in the United States and other countries that were designed to prevent the birth of human beings identified, no matter how incorrectly, to be deficient and inferior [6]. This movement, particularly the one in the United States, was a major incubator of even harsher social programs and, in their extreme forms, to the genocidal programs of Nazi Germany. The eugenic landscape in the context of modern science However, the poor scientific bases for these early attempts at eugenics have given way to the proven scientific and manipulative strengths of modern human genetics that make genetic manipulation for the purposes of therapy, enhancement, and even possibly eugenic goals increasingly technically feasible. With time and with scientific advances made over the ensuing many decades, the inadequacy and the folly of such ethically and scientifically indefensible eugenic thinking of the early twentieth century became clear and rightly broadly rejected. Our understanding at that time of the possible long-term multi-generational and population effects of selective manipulations of mechanisms underlying human reproduction and evolution was seriously deficient. Even now, the possible deleterious long-term adverse genetic effects of non-therapeutic genetic enhancement and even “precision” targeted genome editing are not predictable or targeted exquisitely enough to justify their application in non-therapeutic experimental settings. We are justified, and possibly even compelled, by all current codes of ethical principles governing medical practice and biomedical research to use many of these new tools in the name of healing. But if we apply them for whimsical or even well-intentioned genetic enhancement purposes, we should be aware of our inadequate understanding of their potential for long-term and irretrievable harm, and of the likelihood that they can lead us down the path toward unwise eugenic goals. We should heed the warning attributed by some to the great American baseball player and folk philosopher Yogi Berra—“If you don’t know where you’re going, you’ll probably end up someplace else”. At the moment, we do not know where this path of human genetic enhancement and its potential extension to eugenic goals leads. If we wander in that direction, we may wind up in unexpected and societally detrimental and even disastrous places. We should be sure to tread down that road only if and when scientific, ethical, and public policy justifications are more evident than they are now.

Germline genetic editing justifies eugenics in the guise of improving the health of our future children

Neal Baer 2020 Quals: Neal Baer is an award-winning showrunner, television writer/producer, physician, author, and a public health advocate and expert."Commentary: Code Dread?" Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 63, no. 1: 14-27. doi:10.1353/pbm.2020.0001. /nfs

Doxzen and Halpern review a number of potential outcomes using GGE. They reflect on public access to medically necessary treatments and whether enhancements for one's prospective children should ever be allowed, and they raise deep concerns about eugenics that can be conflated with our quest to improve our health and that of our future children. As national and international scientific bodies meet to develop guidelines and regulations for using GGE, Doxzen and Halpern argue that a human rights-based approach, rather than a utilitarian one, ought to "ensure that this socially disruptive technology minimizes further marginalization of people with disabilities and does not create a new form of social injustice."

Unethical – intensifies genetic discrimination and social inequality – foundation of eugenics

Neal Baer 2020 Quals: Neal Baer is an award-winning showrunner, television writer/producer, physician, author, and a public health advocate and expert."Commentary: Code Dread?" Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 63, no. 1: 14-27. doi:10.1353/pbm.2020.0001. /nfs

Many scientists contend that the driving question CRISPR poses is whether it fulfills an unmet medical need and can be made clinically safe. Garland-Thomson, along with many of our other contributors, cautions that we must look further to "what the existence of CRISPR technology suggests about the limits of being human." Garland-Thomson worries that GGE approaches a "new eugenics." Using germline editing to enhance or improve future persons, she says, may lead to "morally unacceptable consequences, ranging from producing medical harm to abrogating consent, intensifying genetic discrimination, increasing social inequality, promoting conditional parental acceptance, turning people into products, fostering a commercial medical industrial complex, and encouraging rogue scientific and medical practice."

Human germline gene editing stigmatizes imperfection and drives toward eugenics

Padden and Humphries, 2020, Carol Padden works at the Department of Communication, University of California, San Diego. Jacqueline Humphries works at Amyris, Inc., Emeryville, CA, "Who Goes First? Deaf People and CRISPR Germline Editing", Johns Hopkins University Press, <https://muse-jhu-edu.eu1.proxy.openathens.net/article/748050,6-27-2022, //ms>

The surprise announcement in November 2018 that a Chinese researcher had implanted and brought to term two gene-edited embryos, resulting in the birth of twin girls, had the effect of galvanizing a debate that goes back decades (Begley 2018; Evans 2002; Kevles 1985). Should we make heritable changes in our children's DNA? Until recently, this was hypothetical only, and the easy response was to say it is too uncertain and too unnecessary to be tolerated. Suddenly, however, the possibility that there might be real uses for mitochondrial DNA replacement or for germline editing has led to a more nuanced debate, ranging from calls to double-down on prohibiting this technology to discussions of how to permit it for a limited range of conditions, under strict oversight (Baltimore et al. 2015; NAS 2017; UNESCO 2015). Often lacking in this debate has been an effort to look back at debates surrounding earlier advances in reproductive technologies, most of which have been accompanied by fears of eugenics, the loss of human dignity, and the disruption of parent-child relationships. While these advances have each had pockets of abusive uses, they have been integrated into modern life without bringing about wholesale destruction of society. A true prohibition of germline editing already exists in a number of countries, by virtue of their signatures to an international instrument. A number of international efforts focus on human rights, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and the European Social Charter. But it is the 1997 Council of Europe's Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with Regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine, better known as the Oviedo Convention, that was written specifically to address the intersection of human rights and biomedical developments, and aimed to protect the "dignity and identity of all human beings" (Council of Europe 1997). Article 13 reads: "An intervention seeking to modify the human genome may only be undertaken for preventive, diagnostic or therapeutic purposes and only if its aim is not to introduce any modification in the genome of any descendants" (emphasis added). In other words, even if done with the best of intentions, to ward off devastating—even lethal—conditions, the Convention admits of no alterations that are meant to affect descendants, though this position has not been without its critics (Council of Europe 2017; Cyngell, Douglas, and Savulescu 2017; De Wert et al. 2018; Hasson 2018). Debates around germline editing focus on multiple concerns. With regard to physical harm to individuals living in the future, this involves a risk-benefit analysis that is complicated by the multigenerational potential of the change (Baylis 2018; Rubeis and Steger 2018). This alone introduces questions about the stability and durability of the alteration, its effect under future (presumably different) environments, and the ever-increasing number of generations between the person affected and the person initially giving consent. A different objection goes directly to how we understand autonomy. As noted in the July 2018 report by the UK Nuffield Council, one might argue that "choosing someone else's genetic endowment . . . offends against the essential dignity and nature of the person as a free and independent human being." In essence, this argument is that germline editing interferes with a child's "right to an open future" (Feinberg 1980, 1992). But one response has been not only that parents make many momentous decisions affecting their children's lives, but that the acceptability of parental choices rests on whether they serve to expand or narrow a child's prospects, and whether the changes were made for the

welfare of the future child, such as preventing serious disease and disability (NAS 2017; Nuffield Council 2018). Of course, it should be noted that many in the deaf community and the community of little people would not define those conditions as disabilities, but rather as varieties of the human community. But this is the exception, and other groups with shared disabilities have not refused the designation, although they often argue the degree of impairment is as much a function of social and physical context as it is anything intrinsic to the body. Other concerns about germline editing revolve around fear that it will lead to intolerance of imperfection, turning children into commodities rather than the subjects of parental love, and that it will result in stigmatization of those who are disabled (Thiessen 2018).

Precautionary Principle

Caring for the future of human kind is an overwhelming duty in a technological civilization.

Andorno 2022 Human Dignity, Life Sciences Technologies and the Renewed Imperative to Preserve Human Freedom

https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Roberto-Andorno/publication/360729946_Human_Dignity_Life_Sciences_Technologies_and_the_Renewed_Imperative_to_Preserve_Human_Freedom/links/628cecf0d4e5243d9b9624f7/Human-Dignity-Life-Sciences-Technologies-and-the-Renewed-Imperative-to-Preserve-Human-Freedom.pdf

The notion that we have duties towards future generations has been supported by several scholars, following very different approaches.³⁶ However, few authors have explored this notion in such depth and more engagingly than Hans Jonas. In his influential Imperative of Responsibility, he proposed a new “categorical imperative” for our technological civilization that runs, “Act so that the effects of your action are compatible with the permanence of genuine human life: or expressed negatively: Act so that the effects of your action are not destructive of the future possibility of such life.”³⁷ In other words, “caring for the future of humankind is the overruling duty of collective human action in the age of a technological civilization that has become ‘almighty,’ if not in its productive then at least in its destructive potential.”³⁸ This is why, according to Jonas, the present generation has a “metaphysical responsibility” of preserving nature and the human species.³⁹

Germline genetic engineering increases economic inequality

Schweikart 2021, Global Regulation of Germline Genome Editing: Ethical Considerations and Application of International Human Rights Law, 43 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 279 (2021). Available at: <https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/ilr/vol43/iss3/6>

The ethical principle of justice is derived from concepts of what is fair and equitable.⁴⁵ Issues of justice are of concern for both somatic and germline genome editing. Consider the example of germline genome editing that would confer a benefit (such as a modification to help confer immunity):⁴⁶ if such an “enhancement is available only to the upper classes, it can further widen the already existing gap between the more advantaged and less advantaged members of society and thus exacerbate injustices.”⁴⁷ Ethically, the “benefits of heritable genome editing should not preferentially accrue only to the affluent individuals.”⁴⁸ Indeed, there is a human rights aspect with regard to social justice, as “[t]he potential for discrimination against genetic groups increases dramatically as genetic testing and [germline manipulation] techniques become less expensive, more reliable, and more widely available.”⁴⁹ Maha Munayyer explains that “[germline manipulation] provoke[s] discrimination based on genetic status while simultaneously providing the means to alter that status.”⁵⁰ An additional concern is that the price of the technology is yet another way that inequality may spread, as “editing is likely to be expensive” and “[g]enetic disease, once a universal common denominator, could instead become an artifact of class, geographic location, and culture.”

Germline gene editing further entrenches economic inequality

CBC Radio 2021 · Posted: Mar 23, 2021 4:56 PM ET | Last Updated: March 23, 2021 [Gene editing could make social inequalities worse if misused, warns author | CBC Radio](#)

The rich would be buying better genes for their children, which would be a nightmare,' says Walter Isaacson. An American author and professor says he believes gene editing will be the most consequential ethical issue humans face in the coming decades — and that it could become problematic if we start using the technology to edit out our diversity. "These [technologies] are going to be totally transformative," he told The Current's Matt Galloway. "Where it crosses a line is when we start not just editing for diseases in a living patient, but we try to make enhancements in children and in reproductive cells." Last October, American biochemist Jennifer Doudna and French microbiologist Emmanuelle Charpentier shared the Nobel Prize in Chemistry for developing the CRISPR gene editing tool. The technology allows scientists to edit specific genes to remove errors that lead to disease. CRISPR has been hailed by the scientific community as a revolutionary tool, and is currently being used to try treating cancer and other diseases, such as sickle cell anemia. But some experts have also warned against using it to solve all our social problems, saying not enough is known about the risks it poses or its long-term effects. In 2018, Chinese scientist He Jiankui claimed to have made the world's first gene-edited babies. The move drew widespread criticism, and He was later imprisoned in China for his research. Deploying gene editing technology in such a way also worries Isaacson. If we start using gene editing to enhance our children, we could end up entrenching the inequalities that already exist in society, he said. "The rich would be buying better genes for their children, which would be a nightmare," Isaacson said. "If every individual gets to say, alright, [I want my kid to be] tall or short, or muscular or not muscular, or any type of traits a human could have, I think that would be bad to do." What we should be open to is "medically necessary" gene editing that could prevent people from inheriting ailments such as Huntington's or sickle cell disease, he said. However, deciding what is actually medically necessary is "a blurry line." Isaacson cited famous creative minds like Miles Davis, Van Gogh and Hemingway, who lived with a disease or mental illness. Despite that, they produced incredible works of art. "We don't want our kids to suffer from psychological ailments," Isaacson said. "On the other hand, if we wipe our species clean," it could lead us to become a "very placid species without diversity, and perhaps without edge." Some people have already pushed back against the idea of using gene editing to prevent certain conditions. In 2019, Canadian bioethicist Françoise Baylis denounced a Russian molecular biologist's plan to edit human embryos to prevent deafness. Baylis told *As It Happens* at the time that it was unclear if the science to do so was safe, and that modifying genes could have unintended consequences. She added that many people in the deaf community also don't see deafness as a disability, but rather as diversity. These kinds of moral and ethical debates call for international consensus, said Isaacson. And experts are already trying to come up with answers. Doudna herself has been calling for international regulations to control the use of CRISPR, while others have raised alarm bells about making genetically altered babies. Isaacson hopes his own insights can help as well. "I wrote this book so we can start thinking about those questions," he said.

Germline engineering locks in inequalities and freezes social mobility

Sam Pizzigati, 8-2-19 Sam Pizzigati spent two decades directing the publishing program at America's largest union, the 2.8-million-member National Education Association, and before that edited the national publications of three other U.S. trade unions. "Can the Wealthy Hardwire Inequality into Our DNA?" <https://inequality.org/great-divide/can-inequality-be-hardwired-into-our-dna/> Accessed 6/30/22 T.T

But what if wealthy parents had the ability to give their kids that athletic talent? What if our nation's rich could use emerging 21st-century "gene-enhancement technology" to make their kids physically bigger, stronger, or faster? What if they could even use that same technology to make their kids smarter? Would they? The answer the college admissions scandal makes plain: Many of the richest among us will stop at nothing to perpetuate their privilege. Spend a fortune to make their kids genetically superior? Of course they would. Should we be aghast at this prospect? Of course we should. What used to be pure science fiction — the ability to edit our DNA — has now become science reality. A generation ago our hippest young programming hotshots were working in computer code. Now the high-tech hip are busy working to reprogram our genes. Worried senior scientists, notes historian Walter Isaacson, have begun talking "about the need for a moratorium on making edits that can be inherited." They have plenty of reason to worry. In our deeply unequal world, grand private fortunes have much more of a capacity to shape how gene-enhancement technologies evolve than our scientists and ethicists. "Look at what parents are willing to do to get kids in college," observes MIT neuroscientist Feng Zhang. "Some people will surely pay for genetic enhancement." Should these super rich, asks Erik Sontheimer, a University of Massachusetts expert in molecular medicine, simply "be allowed to buy the best genes they can afford?" The genetic pioneer Zhang certainly doesn't think so. Think of what that would do, he urges, "to our species." Think about our societies, too. A "free market" for genetic enhancement, suggests historian Isaacson, might well encode our world's current inequities on a permanent basis.

2AC Solvency Extensions

A ban on the use of germline genetic engineering in humans is needed now.

Park 2019 (“Experts Are Calling for a Ban on Gene Editing of Human Embryos. Here’s Why They’re Worried,” Alice Park, March 13, 2019, <https://time.com/5550654/crispr-gene-editing-human-embryos-ban/>, VY)

Now, in the journal *Nature*, a group of 18 scientists from seven countries (Canada, China, France, Germany, Italy, New Zealand and the U.S.) have called for a voluntary moratorium on all studies involving gene editing of human eggs, sperm or embryos — so-called germline cells. Scientists proposed a similar moratorium in 2015, a few years after CRISPR was first described. But in the newer version, **the scientists go further, asking not just individual researchers to agree to stop work on gene editing human germline cells, but calling on nations to create explicit laws or regulations to prevent such studies for now**, and to develop a framework for allowing the studies when they deem they are safe and acceptable. “Our question is, how should nations make decisions about technologies like gene editing going forward?” says Eric Lander, president and founding director of the Broad Institute of MIT and Harvard and one of the authors of the *Nature* comment. “What is a sensible, ongoing framework for nations to work together with each other to discuss important decisions that affect the human population, where each nation might choose to make different decisions, but where we need transparency and consultation to evaluate the societal consensus? We don’t have a lot of such things in place.” **The ban applies only to a select set of studies that involve genetic changes to germline cells: studies that involve altering the genes in eggs, sperm or embryos that would then be transferred for pregnancy. The vast majority of genetic experts believe it’s too early for any technique, including CRISPR, to be used in this way, because the safety of the technology hasn’t been established yet.** Although CRISPR, for example, gives scientists the most precise molecular scissors possible to snip human DNA exactly where disease-causing genes or mutations might reside — or to even replace portions of the genome with healthy DNA — studies in animals and cells in a lab dish show that sometimes the scissors splice where they aren’t supposed to. **It’s also not clear what effect manipulating the human genome by removing or replacing fragments of DNA might have on people’s health — now, or for future generations.**

<Even if a ban cannot solve all possible germline engineering, the affirmative bans germline engineering within NATO countries. This gives us sufficient solvency. Our solvency is about human dignity, not superhumans, so we don’t need to solve every instance of human engineering to solve.>

NATO defines biotechnology and human enhancement as part of emerging and disruptive technology, its focus for the next 2 decades*. (Also in Russia DA)

Jankowski 2021 ("NATO and the Emerging and Disruptive Technologies Challenge," Dominik P. Jankowski, Political Adviser and Head of the Political Section at the Permanent Delegation of the Republic of Poland to NATO, 2021, https://ies.lublin.pl/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/nato-in-the-era-of-unpeace_calosc-2.pdf, VY)

Moreover, according to Jim Thomas, four broad inter-related trends will impact our understanding of EDTs in the coming years: The continued adoption of precision-strike warfare; The intensification of the battle network competitions; The expansion of military activities in frontier domains (e.g. space or cyberspace); The supplanting of human forces by highly autonomous machines.⁸ **To properly understand the impact of EDTs, one also needs a solid theoretical framework. The NATO Science and Technology Organization defines technologies as emerging, disruptive, or convergent. Emerging technologies are expected to reach maturity in the period 2020-2040.** They are currently not in wide use, and their effects on defence and security are not entirely clear.⁹ Disruptive technologies are expected to have a major effect on defence and security in the period 2020-2040.¹⁰ Finally, convergent technologies are based on novel combinations to create a disruptive effect.¹¹ For Philip Breedlove and Margaret E. Kosal, "to be disruptive, technologies do need not be radical or novel from an engineering or technical perspective. In fact, another class of disruptive technology is important to acknowledge – innovative use of existing technology. Using a combination of existing technologies in ways that are novel can result in a capability that is disruptive."¹² Not all emerging technologies will be disruptive and not all disruptive technologies are emergent. In fact, technological development is distinctly cyclical. As the NATO Science and Technology Organization suggests, "the most well-known of these cycles is the Gartner Hype Cycle."¹³ Yet, technologies do not always follow the sequence of such a cycle. In fact, most technologies fail. Numerous technologies disappear from public or even expert consciousness after initial hype when they prove unproductive. At the same time, when the limitations of technology become clear and one has a better understanding of what is practical and where such a technology can be best applied, the next generation of products starts to occur. **The Alliance currently concentrates on eight EDTs that are considered to be major disruptors until 2040:** Data Artificial intelligence Autonomy Space Hypersonics Quantum technologies **Biotechnology and human enhancement** Novel material and manufacturing They are all in some shape or form intelligent, interconnected, distributed, and digital (I2D2) in nature. **What is important for NATO is that each of the above identified technology characteristics combine to drive a specific military trend:** Intelligent + distributed = autonomous system and agents Interconnected + digital = battle networks Interconnected + distributed = expanding domains Intelligent + digital = precision warfare¹⁴ **Preparing for the future security of NATO requires anticipating the types of threats that may emerge as technology advances, the potential consequences of those threats, the probability that new and more disperse types of enemies will obtain or pursue them, and the impact they will have on the future of armed conflict.**

A ban on human germline genetic engineering is the only option

Darnovsky, Lowthorp and Hasson, 2018 Marcy Darnovsky is the executive director of the Centre for Genetics and Society (CGS).

• Leah Lowthorp is a program manager at the Centre for Genetics and Society (CGS). • Katie Hasson directs the Genetic Justice program at the Centre for Genetics and Society (CGS). Reproductive gene editing imperils universal human rights ORIGINALLY PUBLISHED: February 15, 2018

<https://www.openglobalrights.org/reproductive-gene-editing-imperils-universal-human-rights/>

This prospect should make recent attempts to back-pedal on the widespread and longstanding international opposition to human germline modification particularly worrying to human rights advocates. For example, a 2017 report by a committee of the US National Academies of Sciences and Medicine recommended that gene editing for human reproduction be permitted in certain circumstances, leaving open the possibility of expanding those circumstances in the future. But in the real world of commercial pressures and regulatory inadequacy, such limits would simply not hold. If the door to the use of human germline modification is cracked open, it will be impossible to limit its spread and applications. At this critical juncture, it's important to remind ourselves why key human rights documents specifically prohibited these practices, long before they were technically feasible. The medical justifications for human germline modification fall short, and the temptation to "enhance" future generations is profoundly dangerous. Down that road, our scientific achievements would all too likely become not instruments of enlightenment and emancipation, but mechanisms for exacerbating inequality. And our desire to improve the human condition would lead us away from the realization of the human rights that we know are needed for individuals, societies, and humanity to thrive. The rapid pace of these developments creates an urgent need for the global community — perhaps gathering under UN auspices — to reaffirm existing agreements and clearly prohibit the dangerous and unethical use of reproductive gene-editing.

NATO will say yes, they support a ban and acknowledge the need to continue to improve awareness and response to emerging biological threats.

Iftimie 2020 COVID-19: NATO in the Age of Pandemics NATO Defense College Research Paper No. 9 May 2020 [NDC - News- New RD Publication - COVID-19: NATO in the Age of Pandemics](#)

As part of its forward-looking reflection process, NATO would be well-advised to pay particular attention to the growing bioterrorist threat in the post-COVID-19 security environment. This implies to continue to improve NATO's situational awareness of the bioterrorist threat, its capabilities to address it and its international engagements, in line with the 2012 Chicago Summit decisions. As seen above, NATO can complement national situational awareness through surveillance, intelligence-sharing and risk assessments that are vital for NATO biodefence. Initial dysfunctional and uncoordinated responses of the Allies to the COVID-19 pandemic highlighted, however, that much more can be done in the areas of cooperation, information sharing and identification of emerging biological threats.

We don't even know how to safely edit human germlines, so we shouldn't do it

CHEN 2019 June 30 2019 HUMAN GERMLINE GENE EDITING: ENGINEERING AN UNSTOPPABLE TRAIN [human germline gene editing: engineering an unstoppable train](#)

Regardless of the potential impact of gene editing on diversity or inequality, society is not yet equipped with the technology to safely edit human germlines. Since 2003 and the completion of Human Genome Project, we have fully mapped the DNA of human beings.¹³² However, the knowledge of a human's nucleotide sequence is a far cry from knowing how genes interact within one another and affect the human physiology. If germline gene modification is likely to have significant medical benefits, is it nevertheless justified if there are still unknown chances that it could have other unintended, adverse consequences as well? Perhaps with some fatal diseases, such as Huntington's Disease, where a single point mutation causes all symptoms, the benefits of the potential cure may outweigh the safety risks of germline gene editing. In fact, just this year, the U.S. National Academy of Science and the National Academy of Medicine released a report suggesting that such gene editing clinical trials “‘might be permitted, but only following much more research’ on the risks and benefits, and ‘only for compelling reasons and under strict oversight.’”¹³³ Although clinical germline gene editing may be technologically possible in the near future, the state of current gene editing technology does not yet justify the start of clinical applications. The potential benefits of germline gene editing notwithstanding, society has a responsibility to consider the best interests of the potential human life if gene editing still poses significant adverse risks. Currently, there are still too many issues with off-target gene editing (undesired typos in gene editing) and too many questions regarding what unforeseen consequences gene editing may have on future generations.¹³⁴ Gene editing technology and our understanding of genetics will develop in time, but until we can definitively engineer an embryo without significant detrimental effects, there will remain significant questions surrounding medical applications of germline gene editing. Therefore, it is imperative that we support basic science research in human embryos if clinical gene editing treatments are ever to see the light of day.

Answers to Off-Case

2AC Frontline-Russia Aggression DA

1. Non-unique: NATO expansion to include Sweden and Finland thumps or overwhelms the disadvantage. This means the disadvantage should have already happened.

Siebold and Emmott on June 29, 2022 ("NATO invites Finland, Sweden to join, says Russia is a 'direct threat,'" Sabine Siebold and Robin Emmott, June 29, 2022, <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/sweden-finland-course-join-nato-russia-china-focus-allies-2022-06-29/>, VY)

MADRID, June 29 (Reuters) - **NATO invited Sweden and Finland on Wednesday to join the military alliance in one of the biggest shifts in European security in decades after Russia's invasion of Ukraine** pushed Helsinki and Stockholm to drop their traditional of neutrality. **NATO's 30 allies took the decision** at their summit in Madrid **and also agreed to formally treat Russia as the "most significant and direct threat to the allies' security"**, according to a summit statement. **"Today, we have decided to invite Finland and Sweden to become members of NATO,"** NATO leaders said in their declaration, **after Turkey lifted a veto on Finland and Sweden joining.** Ratification in allied parliaments is likely to take up to a year, but once it is done, **Finland and Sweden will be covered by NATO's Article 5 collective defence clause, putting them under the United States' protective nuclear umbrella.** "We will make sure we are able to protect all allies, including Finland and Sweden," Stoltenberg said. **In the meantime, the allies are set to increase their troop presence in the Nordic region, holding more military exercises and naval patrols in the Baltic Sea to reassure Sweden and Finland.** After four hours of talks in Madrid on Tuesday, Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan agreed with his Finnish and Swedish counterparts a series of security measures to allow the two Nordic countries to overcome the Turkish veto that Ankara imposed in May due to its concerns about terrorism. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation was founded in 1949 to defend against the Soviet threat. Russia's Feb. 24 invasion of Ukraine gave the organisation a new impetus after failures in Afghanistan and internal discord during the era of former U.S. President Donald Trump. "We are sending a strong message to (Russian President Vladimir) Putin: 'you will not win'," Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez said in a speech. **Allies also agreed on NATO's first new strategic concept - its master planning document - in a decade. Russia, previously classed as a strategic partner of NATO, is now identified as NATO's main threat.** Russia's invasion of Ukraine is "a direct threat to our Western way of life," Belgian Prime Minister Alexander de Croo added, citing the wider impact of the war, such as rising energy and food prices. The planning document also cited China as a challenge for the first time, setting the stage for the 30 allies to plan to handle Beijing's transformation from a benign trading partner to a fast-growing competitor from the Arctic to cyberspace. Unlike Russia, whose war in Ukraine has raised serious concerns in the Baltics of an attack on NATO territory, China is not an adversary, NATO leaders said. But Stoltenberg has repeatedly called on Beijing to condemn Russia's invasion of Ukraine, which Moscow says is a "special operation". 'MORE NATO' At the summit, NATO agreed a longer-term support package for Ukraine, in addition to the billions of dollars already pledged in weapons and financial support. German

Chancellor Olaf Scholz said that arms would continue to be supplied to Kyiv, which seeks help to overpower Russian artillery, particularly in eastern Ukraine, where Russia is slowly advancing in a grinding war of attrition. "The message is: We will continue to do so - and to do this intensively - for as long as it is necessary to enable Ukraine to defend itself," Scholz said. The Western alliance is also in agreement that big allies such as the United States, Germany, Britain and Canada pre-assign troops, weapons and equipment to the Baltics and intensify training exercises. **NATO is also aiming to have as many as 300,000 troops ready for deployment in case of conflict, part of an enlarged NATO response force.** read more Russia is achieving the opposite of what Putin sought when he launched his war in Ukraine in part to counter the expansion of NATO, Western leaders say. Both Finland, which has a 1,300 km (810 mile) border with Russia, and Sweden, home of the founder of the Nobel Peace Prize, are now set to bring well-trained militaries into the NATO, aimed at giving the alliance Baltic Sea superiority. "One of the most important messages from President **Putin** ... was that he was against any further NATO enlargement," Stoltenberg said on Tuesday evening. "He **wanted less NATO. Now President Putin is getting more NATO on his borders.**"

2. No Link: Russia has been pushing ahead in genetic engineering despite public outcry. NATO banning germline engineering will not affect Russia.

Cohen 2019 Cohen, Jon. "Embattled Russian Scientist Sharpens Plans to Create Gene-Edited Babies." October 21, 2019. Science.

<https://www.science.org/content/article/embattled-russian-scientist-sharpens-plans-create-gene-edited-babies>

Earlier this month, Denis Rebrikov went to an old mansion in Moscow that now houses **the Russian Academy of Sciences's (RAS's) Institute of Philosophy to confront his critics and set the record straight.** **Rebrikov was a** well-regarded but little-known **geneticist** across town at the Pirogov Russian National Research Medical University **when a June news article in Nature revealed his controversial plan to alter the DNA in human embryos with CRISPR, the powerful genome editor, and then implant them so they could develop into babies.** He has subsequently become the focus of worldwide attention—and widespread condemnation in Russia and elsewhere as a reckless self-promoter.

At the opening of the meeting, attended by bioethicists, geneticists, and clinicians, Rebrikov lamented that the group wanted to debate the merits of his proposed experiment before he had a chance to describe it in detail. "People are discussing my thoughts and my intentions as if I'm not here," Rebrikov said. "In Russia, we have a saying, 'I have not read [Boris] Pasternak, but I have my opinions about him,'" he added, referring to the author of Doctor Zhivago. "That's my case."

The fury that Rebrikov has faced builds on the outrage surrounding He Jiankui, the Chinese scientist who startled the world in November 2018 when news broke that he had stealthily used CRISPR to edit human embryos in an attempt to make them resistant to HIV and then implanted them, leading to the birth of twin girls. Not only had He proceeded with flimsy regulatory review, but the girls were not facing any immediate risk that could outweigh the potential harm the editing could cause. As a result, He lost his university job, got booted from a biotech he started, and is subject to ongoing government investigations. He's experiment also sparked new calls for a moratorium on any further germline editing—making DNA changes that can be passed to future generations, which is what He did and what Rebrikov's embryo edits would do as well. **Two high-level panels were formed with representatives from several countries—but not Russia—to examine the ethics of such work and how to regulate it.**

Yet unlike He, **Rebrikov has been open about his intentions. He plans to seek rigorous ethical and regulatory review.** He would use the technology to treat inherited deafness, addressing a medical need that is arguably more compelling than the theoretical one He chose. Rebrikov says he has a detailed research plan to assess the risks of altering embryos with CRISPR before he makes any attempt to implant them. And whereas He had no expertise in reproductive medicine, Rebrikov works as the chief geneticist at the country's largest government-run in vitro fertilization (IVF) clinic.

Rebrikov's critics have made a bevy of assertions about his motivations, suggesting he wants fame and glory, grants for his institution, wider acknowledgement that Russian scientists do cutting-edge research, or to prod the country's strict regulators to loosen up control on many fronts. A stocky 43-year-old who is a former champion in sambo, a Russian martial art that combines judo and wrestling, Rebrikov deftly ducks those charges and counter punches; he calls them speculations and dismisses the claims with a "ha ha" or a shrug. **Rebrikov stresses his belief that germline editing has great promise to help people. "When I see a new technology come forward, I want to see how it works and how I can improve it. I am doing research at the speed that natural biological factors allow."**

Some highly respected scientists in Russia who know Rebrikov well openly support his efforts. Sergey Lukyanov, a molecular biologist who heads the Pirogov medical school—and is Rebrikov's former Ph.D. adviser and frequent collaborator—agrees that germline editing is premature for now. But he supports Rebrikov's step-by-step approach. "[Rebrikov] is one of these people who takes action towards any imperfection of the universe that can, from his point of view, be corrected. For him, this is an opportunity to give happiness to parents to have healthy children."

3. No internal link: Increased NATO presence does not lead to more conflict in Ukraine. The Ukraine conflict is not about NATO presence but Russia's power ambitions.

Cornell 2022 ("No, the war in Ukraine is not about NATO," Svante Cornell, director of the American Foreign Policy Council's Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, 03/09/2022, <https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/597503-no-the-war-in-ukraine-is-not-about-nato/>, VY)

Russia's invasion of Ukraine has led to widespread condemnation and an unparalleled outpouring of support for Ukraine. At the same time, a motley crew, including some academics and former U.S. officials, has essentially blamed the war on the West, and in particular NATO enlargement. **The argument is basically that Russia would not have become so aggressive if Western powers had been more accommodating. This line of thinking, however, is simply incorrect.** That's because Russia rediscovered its imperial vocation before NATO enlargement, and **the war in Ukraine is, in fact, about Putin's great power ambitions.** Russian leaders have emphatically argued that NATO countries, led by the United States, violated assurances made to Moscow at the end of the Cold War that the alliance would not expand to the east. This claim, however, has been debunked as a myth. Even the last Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, has denied that the issue of NATO enlargement was even discussed at the time. Russian President Vladimir Putin himself did not have much to say about NATO enlargement until his infamous speech at the 2007 Munich Security Conference. NATO's enlargement began in the mid-1990s, at a time when the alliance was embarking on a strategic shift, focusing on out-of-area operations instead territorial defense. NATO urged new member states to focus on specific cutting-edge expertise, and programs for partner countries like Georgia were mostly about training for peacekeeping operations in places like Afghanistan. NATO's shift is perhaps best illustrated by the fact that the alliance lacked a workable plan to defend the Baltic states when Russia invaded Georgia in 2008. It is really only after that war, and in particular after Moscow's annexation of Crimea in 2014, that NATO returned to its original focus on collective defense. **The real reason for the deteriorating security situation in Europe — and most blatantly the Russian invasion of Ukraine — can be found in changes that have taken place within Russia itself, and most directly the increasingly imperialist worldview of the Russian leadership.** This change began as early as 1994 and accelerated after Putin came to power. The war in the Russian breakaway republic of Chechnya from 1994 to 1996 was in many ways the starting point. Russia's defeat there showed how far the country had fallen, leading many former Soviet republics to part ways with Russia. Moscow responded by systematically undermining neighboring states like Moldova, Georgia and Azerbaijan through the incitement of ethnic conflicts on their territories — a classic divide-and-rule tactic. It is largely forgotten today that Putin built his political career on regaining control of Chechnya, something he did by starting a bloody war on the basis of a lie. It is generally well established today that the explosions in apartment buildings in Moscow in the summer of 1999 that Putin blamed on Chechen rebels were in fact carried out by the Russian security service under Putin's own leadership — the purpose being to create popular support for Putin's war, and by extension his leadership. **Putin's view of the world, in turn, is closely linked to his own hold on power — and that explains Russia's increasingly aggressive actions.** The "color revolutions" in Georgia and Ukraine in 2003-4 had the potential to show that democratic change could happen in former Soviet countries, something that would undermine Putin's pursuit of authoritarian rule (what he called a "vertical of power"). Democratic rule in neighboring countries therefore had to fail. Ukraine, in particular, was central to Putin. If a kindred Slavic and Orthodox country like Ukraine developed into a functioning democracy, this could pull the rug out from under Putin's project. If Ukraine showed that something better was possible, why should Russians be content with

living under an authoritarian and corrupt regime? For a time, Moscow tried other tactics. Pro-Russian politician Viktor Yanukovich managed to get elected as president of Ukraine in 2010, but his misrule led to the popular uprising of 2013. That event, in turn, showed that the Ukrainian people saw Europe, rather than Russia, as their future. Putin responded by annexing Crimea and starting a war in eastern Ukraine. At home, Putin's rhetoric became increasingly nationalistic, and now focused on concepts such as the "Russian world" in order to foment a divide between Russia and an allegedly decadent West. **For this to succeed, however, Putin needs to bring Belarus and Ukraine into the "Russian world," by force if necessary. This, rather than NATO enlargement, is what the war in Ukraine is about.**

4. No impact: The conflict in Ukraine won't escalate, Russia won't use nuclear weapons, and there will be no draw-in. History proves.

Rose 2022 ("Why the War in Ukraine Won't Go Nuclear," Gideon Rose, Distinguished Fellow in U.S. Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations and the author of How Wars End, April 25, 2022, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2022-04-25/why-war-ukraine-wont-go-nuclear>, VY)

As the fighting grinds on, however, **the war is looking more familiar and increasingly resembles many other conflicts over the last seven decades. This suggests that general, structural features of the situation are imposing themselves on the belligerents, guiding their choices into surprisingly well-worn grooves.** **Ukraine, in short, is following the pattern of limited war in the nuclear age,** echoing a script written in Korea and copied many times since. **This is not a new era, only a new phase in the old one. And even the new phase is playing by the same old rules—with significant implications for the remainder of the war and beyond.** IT FEELS LIKE THE FIRST TIME In the late 1940s, U.S. policymakers faced an unprecedented problem: what do you do with weapons that can destroy the world? Throughout history, states had settled their biggest differences through war. But over time, the wars had gotten more and more destructive, culminating in the total war just ended—which had itself culminated in the dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, destroying entire cities in a single blast. Nobody knew what would come next. Breaking the cycle of war seemed impossible. Continuing it seemed unthinkable. Tensions ratcheted up further when the Soviet Union got the bomb in 1949. And then, in June 1950, North Korean forces invaded South Korea. Washington and its allies quickly jumped in on Seoul's side, facing off against Moscow, which along with Beijing was backing Pyongyang. How would war play out in the nuclear age? Now the question would be answered. For three years, as brutal fighting raged up and down the Korean peninsula, the two sides gradually felt each other out and tacitly settled on rules of the road for the new epoch. Neither of the nuclear powers wanted another total war, so both put strict limits on the conflict's means, ends, and scope. They chose not to use nuclear weapons. They chose not to attack each other's territory or regime, keeping the fighting to the Koreas. And beyond that, the war was allowed to proceed conventionally, as viciously as the belligerents wanted. These rules weren't read out of a book or arrived at through negotiations. They weren't followed out of faith, or hope, or charity. They were rooted in practicality. Policymakers in Moscow and Washington had to make crucial decisions in real time about how to pursue their objectives during the war, and the logic inherent in the situation made some courses of action much more attractive than others. Nuclear weapons, for all their power—because of all their power—turned out to be surprisingly powerless. Using them would carry many costs and bring few benefits. It would create more problems than it solved. And so neither superpower did it. A decade later, the Cuban missile crisis reinforced the growing taboo against nuclear use and left the parties still more risk averse. Then Vietnam followed the same pattern as Korea. None of the nuclear powers, now including China, used nuclear weapons. None attacked another nuclear power's territory or regime. And beyond that, anything went. The same rules held in the Gulf War, the Iraq War, and the Soviet and American wars in Afghanistan. They held for conflicts involving nuclear powers elsewhere (apart from some minor skirmishing). And they are holding now in Ukraine. HOW THIS ENDS **Russia's plan A was to conquer Ukraine quickly,** install a friendly government, and present the world with a fait accompli. **When that was blocked by determined military resistance,** **Moscow turned to plan B, pounding cities from a distance and trying to crush Ukrainian morale.** When that didn't work either, the Kremlin turned to plan C, abandoning the attempt to seize the whole country and refocusing on trying to capture and hold a swath of territory in the east and south. The coming battles in the Donbas will be crucial in shaping the outcome, but already much can be said about how this war will end. **The**

struggle will either conclude with a negotiated settlement involving a territorial status quo ante, or it will subside into a frozen conflict along the armies' stalemated line of contact in the east. That is, the war's end will resemble those in the Korean and Gulf Wars or the situation in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transnistria. Either way, as in Korea, the shock of the initial aggression has galvanized a broader balancing coalition that will remain even when the fighting stops. **Russia chose a hot war and will get a cold one in the bargain.** Whatever some interpretations of Russian military doctrine might suggest, Moscow **will not use nuclear weapons during the conflict.** Since 1945, every leader of a nuclear power, from homespun politicians such as U.S. Presidents Harry Truman and Lyndon Johnson to mass-murdering sociopaths such as Joseph Stalin and Mao Zedong, has rejected the use of nuclear weapons in battle for excellent reasons. Putin will be no exception, acting not from a soft heart but a hard head. **He knows that extraordinary retaliation and universal opprobrium would follow, with no remotely comparable strategic upsides to justify them—not to mention the fact that the radioactive fallout from such use might easily blow back onto Russia itself.** **For related reasons, NATO will not attack Russia or try to decapitate the Russian regime so as to avoid making Putin desperate. There will be no introduction of NATO troops, no no-fly zone, and no hot pursuit of Russian forces should they withdraw back into home territory.** All these actions would carry major risks of escalation, which NATO wants to avoid as much as Moscow. Conversely, NATO will feel compelled to deny Moscow a significant victory, not just for Ukraine's sake but to avoid setting the dangerous precedent that nuclear weapons are useful for protecting the ill-gotten gains of conventional aggression.

China Focus DA

1. Non-unique: NATO's focus is on Russia, not on counterbalancing China now. China has taken a backseat for NATO.

Fitch Solutions 2021 ("NATO Unlikely To Focus On Countering China, As Russia Will Remain Priority," Fitch Solutions, 15 Jun, 2021, <https://www.fitchsolutions.com/defence-security/nato-unlikely-focus-countering-china-russia-will-remain-priority-15-06-2021, VY>)

Despite the inclusion of China in its communique, NATO is unlikely to prioritise counterbalancing Beijing's growing power in the near term. Of the 79 points in NATO's communique, China was the focus of only points 55 and 56, and was mentioned only 10 times, compared to 63 mentions of Russia, 25 of Ukraine, 23 of terror or terrorism, 18 of Georgia, 10 of Afghanistan, and three of Iran. In our view, **the US will continue to counterbalance China's growing military power in the Indo-Pacific region** by means of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue ('the Quad'), which also includes Japan, India, and Australia, and through Washington's bilateral defence pacts with Japan, South Korea, and other regional allies, **rather than through NATO, whose main focus will remain the Euro-Atlantic area and western Eurasia.** European NATO members, most notably the United Kingdom and France, are likely to increase their participation in **US-led military activities in Asia**, but this **will be limited and not be under the auspices of NATO.** Biden Keen To Reaffirm US' Alliance Network That said, many European NATO states are hardening their attitudes towards China, and the alliance may increasingly be used to step up diplomatic criticism of Beijing on issues such as Indo-Pacific security and China's alleged human rights abuses. For its part, China will view these developments – correctly in our view – as part of an effort by the US Biden administration to build a multilateral front to pressure China. The deterioration of EU-China relations was most visibly underscored on May 20, when the European Parliament suspended the ratification of the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) after China imposed sanctions on 10 EU officials in response to Western sanctions against Chinese officials accused of mass detentions of ethnic Uighurs in China's Xinjiang province. The CAI was only finalised in December 2020 after seven years of negotiations. Meanwhile, President Joe Biden is seeking to improve US relations with the EU, which became very strained over trade and climate change issues during the presidency of Donald Trump (2017-2021). Biden is holding a summit with EU leaders on June 15. One area of cooperation is likely to be a new EU-US Trade and Technology Council (TTC) to set standards for emerging technology, strengthen and diversify supply chains, and rein in the growing power of 'Big Tech'. Although NATO and the EU are completely separate organisations, their close overlap in membership means that there is a broad 'Western coalition' emerging to challenge China. Russia Will Remain NATO's Focus **Russia will remain NATO's overwhelming security challenge, amid ongoing tensions in Ukraine and Belarus, as well as NATO and Russian military activities in Eastern Europe.** Although European NATO and EU leaders are increasingly cognisant of the challenges posed by China, they will continue to focus on Russia, given that Moscow poses much more geographically closer and more immediate security risks. In particular, the governments of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland remain very concerned about recurring Russian military pressure on Ukraine, and Russia's support for Belarus' embattled President Alexander Lukashenko. Meanwhile, Western European

leaders will remain concerned about potential Russian interference in their domestic affairs, cyber attacks, and Russia's harsh treatment of opposition figures such as Alexei Navalny. Indeed, the NATO summit also announced a new Comprehensive Cyber Defence Policy, aimed at deterring and defending against cyber attacks. Although President Biden is scheduled to hold a summit with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Switzerland on June 16, the wide range of issues that divide their two countries implies that there is no clear path to a rapprochement.

2. No link: NATO can focus on both China and Russia's invasion of Ukraine, which means that NATO can focus on both China AND the affirmative.

Sprenger and Gould 2022 ("US military readies to 'walk and chew gum' as multiple crises loom," Sebastian Sprenger is Europe editor for Defense News, and Joe Gould, senior Pentagon reporter for Defense News, Jan 28, 2022, <https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2022/01/28/us-military-readies-to-walk-and-chew-gum-as-multiple-crises-loom/>, VY)

WASHINGTON — **As roughly 100,000 Russian troops amass around Ukraine, a series of emerging crises around the world — the Middle East, China, North Korea — are demanding the full attention of NATO,** and particularly its most powerful member, the United States. **Now, there's a growing sense among national security experts that the crisis in Ukraine is just one of many conflicts on the precipice, putting pressure on the alliance and its member countries to address this threat and at the same time brace for the next one.** Indeed, China this week flew 39 warplanes toward Taiwan. And consider the United Arab Emirates reported this week it had intercepted multiple ballistic missiles aimed at Abu Dhabi. Julianne Smith, the U.S. ambassador to NATO, described the ongoing dispute between Russia and Ukraine as a "microcosm" of the types of threats Western analysts were expecting all along. "All of this is becoming very real," she said this week at a panel in Brussels sponsored by the German Marshall Fund of the United States. At the same time, "something could happen on China and Taiwan next week," said Ian Lesser, vice president at the think tank, referring to the possibility of China attacking the U.S.-backed island nation that Beijing sees as a renegade province to be eventually united with the mainland. Asked about that possibility on Thursday, Defense Department spokesman John Kirby said the military remains watchful of other theaters. **"I think the gist of your question is, why can't we walk and chew gum at the same time,"** he told reporters at the Pentagon. **"We can, and we are. ... Just because we're focused on bolstering our allies because of the worrisome accumulation of combat-credible power by the Russians in and around Ukraine doesn't mean that we aren't focused on the pacing challenge that China represents to the department."**

<3. No Link: The affirmative is part of the NATO Strategy against China. It fights back against the chance of China editing human genomics for military purposes..>

4. Internal-link turn: The NATO focus and threat construction of China is what causes China to be a threat.

Lonas 2021 ("China warns NATO to stop 'hyping up' threat posed by Beijing," Lexi Lonas, 06/15/21, <https://thehill.com/policy/international/china/558484-china-warns-nato-to-stop-hyping-up-threat-posed-by-beijing/>, VY)

China on Tuesday issued a warning to NATO, saying the group needs to stop going after Beijing. The statement accused the group of a "Cold War mentality," and said it needs to stop "hyping up" the threat posed by Beijing, a spokesperson of China's mission to the European Union said, according to NBC News. **NATO is "slandering China's peaceful development and misjudging the international situation and its own role,"** the spokesperson said. China's statement comes after NATO said on Monday that the country poses "systemic challenges to the rules-based international order," according to the outlet. China rebuked the statement, saying it won't "sit by and do nothing if 'systemic challenges' come closer to us." "I think there is a growing recognition over the last couple years that we have new challenges," President Biden said on Monday. "We have Russia that is not acting in a way that is consistent with what we had hoped, as well as China." **The back and forth between NATO and China comes after G-7 leaders met to discuss how to compete with China, and called for the country to engage in a transparent investigation into the origins of COVID-19. "The days when global decisions were dictated by a small group of countries are long gone," a spokesman for the Chinese Embassy responded.**

5. No Impact: No US-China war. 4 warrants: mutually assured destruction, weak Chinese military, China's focus on soft-power, and economic interdependence.

Krulak and Friedman 2021 ("The US and China are not destined for war," Charles C. Krulak, a retired four-star general, is a former commandant of the US Marine Corps and former president of Birmingham-Southern College, and Alex Friedman is a former chief financial officer of the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, 24 Aug 2021, <https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/the-us-and-china-are-not-destined-for-war/>, VY)

True, throughout history, when a rising power has challenged a ruling one, war has often been the result. But there are notable exceptions. A war between the US and China today is no more inevitable than was war between the rising US and the declining United Kingdom a century ago. And in today's context, there are four compelling reasons to believe that war between the US and China can be avoided. First and foremost, any military conflict between the two would quickly turn nuclear. The US thus finds itself in the same situation that it was in vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Taiwan could easily become this century's tripwire, just as the 'Fulda Gap' in Germany was during the Cold War. **But the same dynamic of 'mutually assured destruction' that limited US-Soviet conflict applies to the US and China.** And the international community would do everything in its power to ensure that **a potential nuclear conflict did not materialise**, given that the consequences would be fundamentally transnational and—unlike climate change—immediate. A US-China conflict would almost certainly take the form of a proxy war, rather than a major-power confrontation. Each superpower might take a different side in a domestic conflict in a country such as Pakistan, Venezuela, Iran or North Korea, and deploy some combination of economic, cyber and diplomatic instruments. We have seen this type of conflict many times before: from Vietnam to Bosnia, the US faced surrogates rather than its principal foe. **Second, it's important to remember that, historically, China plays a long game.** Although **Chinese** military power has grown dramatically, it **still lags behind the US on almost every measure that matters.** And while China is investing heavily in asymmetric equalisers (long-range anti-ship and hypersonic missiles, military applications of cyber, and more), it will not match the US in conventional means such as aircraft and large ships for decades, if ever. **A head-to-head conflict with the US would thus be too dangerous for China to countenance at its current stage of development.** If such a conflict did occur, China would have few options but to let the nuclear genie out of the bottle. In thinking about baseline scenarios, therefore, we should give less weight to any scenario in which the Chinese consciously precipitate a military confrontation with America. The US military, however, tends to plan for worst-case scenarios and is currently focused on a potential direct conflict with China—a fixation with overtones of the US-Soviet dynamic. This raises the risk of being blindsided by other threats. Time and again since the Korean War, asymmetric threats have proven the most problematic to national security. Building a force that can handle the worst-case scenario does not guarantee success across the spectrum of warfare. **The third reason to think that a Sino-American conflict can be avoided is that China is already chalking up victories in the global soft-power war.** Notwithstanding accusations that Covid-19 escaped from a virology lab in Wuhan, China has emerged from the pandemic looking much better than the US. And with its Belt and Road Initiative to finance infrastructure development around the world, it has aggressively stepped into the void left by US retrenchment during Donald Trump's four years as president. **China's leaders may very well look at the current status quo and conclude that they are on the right strategic path. Finally, China and the US are deeply intertwined economically.** Despite Trump's trade war, **Sino-American bilateral trade in 2020 was around US\$650 billion, and China was America's largest trade partner. The two countries' supply-chain linkages are vast, and China holds**

more than US\$1 trillion in US Treasuries, most of which it can't easily unload, lest it reduce their value and incur massive losses

2AC Frontline-Nuclear Modernization DA

1. Non-unique: Ukraine disproves – the US has already committed billions in security cooperation this year alone with more to come

Arabia et al 2022 [Arabia: Analyst in Security Assistance, Security Cooperation and the Global Arms Trade; Bowen: Analyst in Russian and European Affairs; Welt: Specialist in Russian and European Affairs. "U.S. Security Assistance to Ukraine" Congressional Research Service. 6-6-22. <https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IE/IE12040>]

The United States has been a leading provider of security assistance to Ukraine, both before and after Russia renewed its invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022. From 2014, when Russia first invaded Ukraine, through June 1, 2022, the **United States has provided more than \$7.3 billion** in security assistance **“to help Ukraine** preserve its territorial integrity, secure its borders, and improve interoperability with NATO.” **Since the start of the 2022 war, the Biden Administration has committed** a total of **more than \$4.6 billion** in security assistance to “provide Ukraine the equipment it needs to defend itself.” FY2022 security assistance **packages are being funded via more than \$23 billion in regular and supplemental appropriations**, including the Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2022 (P.L. 117-103, Division N), and the Additional Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2022 (P.L. 117-128). In total, **FY2022 appropriations include \$12.55 billion to replenish Department of Defense (DOD) equipment stocks sent to Ukraine** via presidential drawdown authority; **\$6.3 billion for DOD’s Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI); and \$4.65 billion in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) for Ukraine and “countries impacted** by the situation in Ukraine.” FY2022 **supplemental appropriations also have included funds for additional U.S. troop deployments to Europe.** Overview of Programs Since 2014The United States has used a variety of security assistance programs and authorities to help build the defensive capacity of the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) through train, equip, and advise efforts across multiple spending accounts. Prior to the 2022 war, the two primary accounts were the State Department’s FMF (22 U.S.C. §2763) and DOD’s USAI (P.L. 114-92, §1250) (see Table 2). USAI packages have included **training, equipment, and advisory efforts** to enhance Ukraine’s defensive capabilities. FY2022 appropriations also directed that USAI funds be provided for logistics support, supplies, and services; salaries and stipends; sustainment; weapons replacement; and intelligence support. Prior to FY2022, a portion of annual USAI funds was contingent on DOD and State certifying Ukraine’s progress on key defense reforms. The United States also has been providing defense items to Ukraine via Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA), by which the President can authorize the immediate transfer of articles and services from U.S. stocks without congressional approval in response to an “unforeseen emergency” (22 U.S.C. §2318(a)(1)). **Since August 2021, the Biden Administration has authorized 11 drawdowns valued at \$4.26 billion** (see Table 1). **Ukraine also has received** assistance pursuant to DOD’s **security cooperation** authorities, notably Building Partner Capacity (10 U.S.C. §333) and Defense Institution Building (10 U.S.C. §332), and International Military Education and Training (IMET), which has provided professional military education at U.S. defense institutions for Ukrainian military officers. Other State Department- and DOD-funded security assistance has supported conventional weapons destruction, border security, law enforcement training, and counterweapons of mass destruction capabilities.

2. No link: NATO is extremely cheap, and security cooperation makes things cheaper

Díaz-Plaja 2017 [Rubén Díaz-Plaja. Senior Policy Advisor at NATO. "What does NATO need to 'project stability' in its neighbourhood?" Real Instituto Elcano. 5-18-17. <https://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/en/analyses/what-does-nato-need-to-project-stability-in-its-neighbourhood/>]

NATO's partnerships and capacity-building programmes are not resource intensive. This resource use is not likely to change in the near future. In an era of tight budgets, and increased pressure for defence spending, making a case for resource increases is not easy; but at the same time, there is a case to be made for some funding increases will probably be necessary, especially if NATO is to complement its mature support and capacity-building programmes for Eastern European and Balkan nations with increasing attention towards the Middle East and North Africa. NATO's integrated command structure is one of its unique assets. Already, a large part of the day-to-day advisory and training work with partners is conducted by teams of military officers operating out of NATO's commands. As 'projecting stability' is taken forward as an approach, it will be important to think about how this Command Structure's role in 'projecting stability' can evolve. Already, in February 2017, NATO Defence Ministers agreed a new 'Hub for the South', to be based in Naples, which will support NATO's deeper engagement with its Southern flank. Future work on the NATO Command Structure will no doubt provide other opportunities for adjustment. Finally, two key tests for this approach will lie in NATO's ability to work well with others- in particular with national programmes and the programmes of the EU. **There are significant cost savings and synergies that could be generated by aligning NATO programmes more effectively** with bilateral capacity-building and defence assistance programmes offered by Allies and some partners. Some of these programmes might plug well into NATO programmes. **NATO already has a very well developed network** of national education, training and research centres. A **good use of new NATO structures** and human resources **would be to invest them into** managing clearing houses and networks of **cooperation,** thus **acting as multipliers for national efforts.**

3. No link: There will be no tradeoff - the DoD is flexible and can accommodate the budget item

Bergmann & Schmitt 2021 [Max Bergmann, senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, focuses on European security and U.S.-Russia policy, formerly served in the U.S. Department of State as senior adviser to the assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs and special assistant to the undersecretary for arms control and international security, MA comparative politics, London School of Economics; and Alexandra Schmitt, senior policy analyst on the National Security and International Policy team at the Center for American Progress, MPP Harvard Kennedy School; "A Plan To Reform U.S. Security Assistance," Center For American Progress, 3-9-2021, <https://www.americanprogress.org/article/plan-reform-u-s-security-assistance/>]

DOD officials can work around the State Department's diplomats. In part due to restrictions from the Budget Control Act and **with new programs at the DOD, Pentagon officials had more flexibility on security assistance programs** than their State Department counterparts. **The DOD had budgetary space to reallocate significant funds from the substantial Pentagon budget to respond to sudden emergencies or new crises**, something that is virtually impossible for the State Department, making the DOD often the lead actor in a crisis.⁴⁴ Regional combatant commands aggressively sought more resources from Congress to conduct their own security assistance programs, giving them added flexibility to work with partners in the field that their State Department counterparts lacked.⁴⁵ A Government Accountability Office report found that 56 DOD security assistance programs do not require any involvement from the State Department.⁴⁶

4. No internal link: Modernization fails – it is unnecessary and useless against emerging tech.

Bajema 2021 [Natasha Bajema; July 2; Director of the Converging Risks Lab at the Council on Strategic Risks; IEEE Spectrum.

<https://spectrum.ieee.org/2022-united-states-budget-funds-new-icbms-reckless-diversion>; AS]

With the Biden administration’s 2022 defense budget coming in at US \$753 billion, **it’s easy to get diverted by the megaton-sized sum that the United States plans to spend on modernizing its nuclear forces** over the coming decades. But a bigger question about the future of nuclear deterrence arguably looms—namely, **how might intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) affect national security in an era of emerging tech threats?** Some of those tech threats are not even typically associated with warfare: social media, deepfakes, cyber weapons, machine learning, commercial satellites, and autonomous systems, to name a few. To the surprise of many, President Biden decided in May 2021 to push ahead with a strategic-weapons modernization proposed by past administrations. The centerpiece is a planned replacement for the aging Minuteman III ICBMs called the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD), for which a whopping \$2.6 billion has been pledged to begin development. Given Biden’s promise to take a closer look at reducing the size of the U.S. nuclear arsenal during his campaign, many arms control advocates were stunned by the administration’s full endorsement of the GBSD in the budget. The new land-based missiles are scheduled to replace the 400 Minuteman III missiles deployed under the New Start Treaty in the states of Colorado, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, and Wyoming over the next sixteen years; they will be in active service until sometime in the 2080s, at least. In the lead up to the budget request, experts on both sides of the issue engaged in a spirited debate about the necessity, or lack thereof, for maintaining all three legs of the U.S. nuclear triad—nuclear-armed bombers, land-based ICBMs, and submarine-launched missiles. A recurring theme in these arguments revolves around the role that ICBMs might play in the deterrence equation in the 21st century. And yet, **conspicuously missing from the discussion was sufficient consideration of the dangerous, destabilizing implications for ICBMs and other strategic weapons created by the categories of emerging technologies** indicated above: **cyber weapons, autonomous systems, and so on.** Proponents view ICBMs as a key component of a sound U.S. nuclear deterrent in the future, raising the threshold for nuclear war—and thereby reducing any likelihood of a nuclear attack by an adversary. In an interview, Dr. Brad Roberts, Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy, suggests two scenarios, one without any ICBMs and the other with the current stockpile: “In one, the adversary has the means to eliminate most of the U.S. nuclear force with preemptive attacks on a few submarine and bomber bases, reserving the bulk of its nuclear force for punishment of the U.S. if it retaliates. In the other, the adversary must launch hundreds of nuclear weapons into the American heartland, depleting its arsenal while killing millions. In which scenario can U.S. leaders be expected by enemy leaders to have the political will to retaliate? The latter. The ICBM force helps adversaries to understand that the U.S. will defend its interests if attacked—and thereby to avoid a serious miscalculation.” Other experts vehemently disagree. Former Secretary of Defense Bill Perry has argued that **ICBMs** in particular **are highly unstable, increasing the risk of miscalculation, accidental launch, and thus nuclear war.** As such, an **enormous program to make new ICBMs is a dangerous enterprise.** In Perry’s view it’s also an unnecessary expense, especially when the lifetime of existing Minutemen III can be extended until 2030, allowing for these missiles to be phased out in the course of future arms treaties or other weapons-reduction initiatives. However, it still remains unclear whether such life extension would result in any cost savings.

Meanwhile, the total costs for the new land-based missiles could reach more than \$264 billion over the course of their development and eventual deployment.

5. No impact: COVID made cuts inevitable, but there's no impact because US deterrence can be maintained at a lower level of funding

Hartung 2020 [April 21, 2020, William D. is the director of the Arms and Security Project at the Center for International Policy. "Now isn't the time to push for nuclear modernization", [Now isn't the time to push for nuclear modernization](#) RVP]

If the new coronavirus pandemic has taught us one thing, it is that **we need to rethink what we need to do to keep America safe**. That's why Secretary of Defense Mark Esper's recent tweet **calling modernization of U.S. nuclear forces a "top priority ... to protect the American people and our allies" seemed so tone deaf**. **COVID-19 has already killed more** Americans than died in the 9/11 attacks and the Iraq and Afghan wars combined, with projections of many more to come. **The pandemic underscores the need for a systematic, sustainable, long-term investment in public health resources, from protective equipment, to ventilators and hospital beds, to research and planning resources needed to deal with future outbreaks of disease**. As Kori Schake, the director of foreign and defense policy studies at the American Enterprise Institute, has noted: **"We're going to see enormous downward pressure on defense spending because of other urgent American national needs like health care."** And **that's as it should be**, given the relative dangers posed by outbreaks of disease and climate change relative to traditional military challenges. The U.S. nuclear arsenal is particularly ripe for a fresh look. Organizations such as the Arms Control Association and Global Zero have crafted plans that could save hundreds of billions of dollars over the next three decades while maintaining a robust nuclear deterrent. The Global Zero plan is particularly notable in that it calls for the elimination of the intercontinental ballistic missile leg of the nuclear triad, which former Secretary of Defense William Perry has described as "some of the most dangerous weapons in the world." ICBMs are dangerous because of the short decision time a president would have to decide whether to launch them in a crisis to avoid having them wiped out in a perceived first strike — a matter of minutes. This reality greatly increases the prospect of an accidental nuclear war based on a false warning of attack. **This is a completely unnecessary risk given that the other two legs of the nuclear triad — ballistic missile submarines and nuclear-armed bombers — are more than sufficient to deter a nuclear attack, or to retaliate, should the unlikely scenario of a nuclear attack on the United States occur**. Restructuring the U.S. nuclear arsenal would open the way to invest substantial sums the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, state and local public health agencies, and the World Health Organization, which will be on the front lines in preventing or mitigating any future mass outbreak of disease. In the long-term, over the next three decades, buying and maintaining new nuclear-armed missiles, submarines, bombers, and warheads could cost an astonishing \$1.5 to \$2 trillion. And President Donald Trump's latest budget proposal, released earlier this year, called for an increase of nearly 20% in spending on nuclear weapons while cutting funds for the CDC, WHO, and other public health agencies. Eliminating ICBMs and reducing the size of the U.S. arsenal will face strong opposition in Washington, both from strategists who maintain that the nuclear triad should be sacrosanct, and from special interests that benefit from excess spending on nuclear weapons. The Senate ICBM Coalition, composed of senators from states with ICBM bases or substantial ICBM development and maintenance work, has been particularly effective in fending any changes in ICBM policy, from reducing the size of the force to merely studying alternatives, whether those alternatives are implemented or not. Meanwhile, Northrop Grumman — currently the sole bidder for the new ICBM program — has announced that it expects to have hundreds of subcontractors spread throughout the United States for its work on the new system, known formally as the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent. The company also claims that the next phase of the work could create 10,000 jobs. That's a tiny fraction of national

employment but will pack a political punch among members of Congress whose states or districts benefit from ICBM-related employment. **Now is the time to reduce our bloated nuclear arsenal and invest in more urgent security priorities. Deterrence can be sustained at lower levels of spending, but a robust public health system needs considerably more resources. It's a trade-off that can and should be made.**

1AR Extensions

Security cooperation is a relatively small investment.

Kelly 10 [Terrence K. Kelly, principal mathematician at the RAND Corporation, former director of the RAND Homeland Security Research Division, formerly served for 20 years as a commissioned officer in the U.S. Army, positions included senior national security officer in the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, PhD mathematics, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute; Jefferson P. Marquis, Adjunct Political Scientist at RAND, PhD U.S. diplomatic and military history, Ohio State University, MA international security affairs, Columbia University; Cathryn Quantic Thurston, Political Scientist at RAND, PhD Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason University; Jennifer D. P. Moroney, senior political scientist at RAND, PhD international relations, University of Kent at Canterbury; and Charlotte Lynch, researcher at RAND; "Security Cooperation Organizations in the Country Team Options for Success," RAND Corporation, 2010, <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA517323.pdf>]

The United States conducts a wide range of security cooperation missions and initiatives that can serve as key enablers of U.S. foreign policy efforts to assist and influence other countries. For a relatively small investment, security cooperation programs can play an important role by shaping the security environment and laying the groundwork for future stability operations with allies and partners.

No tradeoff – Spending just got increased

O'Brien and Ukenye 22 Lawrence Ukenye has a journalism and political science major from Temple University, Connor O'Brien has a political science major from Anselm College and is a current senior defense reporter for Politico
<https://www.politico.com/news/2022/07/14/house-passes-ndaa-00045972>

The House approved sweeping defense policy legislation on Thursday that marks the second straight year Democrats and Republicans endorsed significant increases to President Joe Biden's Pentagon spending plan. The \$839 billion National Defense Authorization Act, approved in a 329-101 vote, is \$37 billion more than the administration sought in military spending. On top of the budget, the bill also rebukes several of Biden's national security plans. Members maintained a nuclear cruise missile the administration planned to scrap, hampered F-16 sales to Turkey and limited the number of aircraft and ships the Pentagon can retire. In a bipartisan blowout, 180 Democrats and 149 Republicans joined forces to pass legislation, which authorizes Pentagon spending levels and sets overarching military policy. "It is the definition of a bipartisan bill," said Rep. Mike Rogers of Alabama, the top Republican on the Armed Services Committee. It includes billions for more aircraft and ships than the Pentagon sought, following a bipartisan vote by the House Armed Services Committee to raise the bill's price tag by \$37 billion. Republicans and a sizable number of Democrats saw Biden's request — already a \$30 billion increase from the current year — as not enough to keep up with runaway inflation and match challenges posed by China and Russia. The final Pentagon topline will have to be hammered out by House and Senate leaders in a compromise defense bill. And lawmakers must also pass a spending bill that makes the increase a reality. Lawmakers this week slugged it out over the size of the Pentagon budget. The House rejected a push by progressive Reps. Barbara Lee (D-Calif.) and Mark Pocan (D-Wis.) to revert the bill to Biden's original \$802 billion request, though most Democrats backed the effort. House Armed Services Chair Adam Smith (D-Wash.) unsuccessfully fought against increasing the topline during a June committee markup. He backed the progressive push to slash the topline by \$37 billion, arguing Biden's budget level is sufficient to meet the military's needs. "It's not like we aren't spending money if we stick to the president's budget," Smith said. "I think that's the number we should stick to." Biden's quest to sell F-16 fighters to Turkey also suffered a setback at the hands of Democrats, as the House approved an amendment that added hurdles to the jet sale to the NATO ally amid concerns about its purchase of Russian weapons, violation of neighboring countries' territory and human rights concerns. The measure was adopted 244-179, with 184 Democrats backing the proposal. If the provision becomes law, Biden will have to certify that the sale is critical to U.S. national security. Progressives suffered another blow by the inclusion of funding to continue the development of a sea-launched nuclear cruise missile, a program the White House sought to kill. But lawmakers added guardrails on the weapon by requiring an analysis of alternatives and the declassification of the Pentagon's Nuclear Posture Review before funding can be freed up. Most contentious issues that could have broken up the bill's bipartisan coalition were kept off the floor, most notably a progressive-led effort to expand troops' access to abortions at military medical facilities. Still, Democrats muscled through some of their priorities. The House narrowly approved a provision from Del. Eleanor Holmes Norton (D-D.C.) that grants the mayor of the District of Columbia the same control over its National Guard that governors of states have, whereas the city's Guard powers are currently controlled by the president. The amendment was approved by the House after failing in the Armed Services Committee. Democrats also voted to repeal the 2002 Iraq War authorization, a post-9/11 presidential power that authorized military force with Congress' approval. Similar proposals have passed the House but haven't yet seen action in the Senate, despite Senate Majority Leader

Chuck Schumer claiming the move was a priority. Other proposals with no connection to defense were wrapped into the bill. Rep. Ed Perlmutter (D-Colo.) won inclusion of his legislation to allow cannabis businesses to access the banking system. A bipartisan proposal from Reps. Mikie Sherrill (D-N.J.), Democratic Caucus Chair Hakeem Jeffries (D-N.Y.) and others were included to eliminate the federal sentencing disparity between drug offenses for powder and crack cocaine. A heightened budget topline saw lawmakers propose purchasing more aircraft and ships, and prevent the military from retiring many older weapons as a money-saving move. The bill authorizes 13 new warships, adding five ships the Navy didn't request — an extra Arleigh Burke-class destroyer, another Constellation-class frigate, another fleet oiler and two expeditionary medical ships. It also requires the Navy to keep five of the nine littoral combat ships it sought to retire. Lawmakers turned back a push by Smith to allow the service to scrap all nine hulls. The bill also authorizes 64 F-35 fighter jets, three more than the Pentagon sought across the military services. Lawmakers approved \$354 million to procure three more F-35C carrier-based jets for the Navy.

2AC Frontline-US Unilateral CP

1. Perm do both – NATO is purely transactional to US military interests.

Thimm 2018 ("NATO: US Strategic Dominance and Unequal Burden-Sharing Are Two Sides of the Same Coin, Johannes Thimm, PhD, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, 04.09.2018, <https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/nato-us-strategic-dominance-and-unequal-burden-sharing-are-two-sides-of-the-same-coin>, VY)

The asymmetry in NATO contributions between the United States and Europa is no accident, Johannes Thimm writes. Europeans should not be too alarmed about President Trump's threats to withdraw from the alliance – and instead follow their own priorities. US President Donald Trump accuses Europe of exploiting the United States, because most NATO members, including Germany, spend less than 2 percent of their GDP on defense. He calls for a significant increase in defense budgets – most recently to 4 percent of GDP, and threatens that the US will otherwise abandon its alliance commitments. **It is true that Europe benefits from American security guarantees, and the diagnosis of European “free-riding” is not completely unfounded either. However, this does not mean that the US is being taken advantage of.** There are three important arguments here: **NATO provides practical support and legitimacy to US supremacy First, even if NATO is viewed in purely transactional terms, leaving aside values like solidarity among allies, it is a good deal for Washington.** Americans calling for more equal burden-sharing, including Trump himself, suggest that the US supports NATO mostly for altruistic reasons. In other words that America is doing Europe a favor. But this picture is incomplete. **For the US military, NATO is a force multiplier, providing legitimacy to American power.** European allies are engaged in numerous missions like Afghanistan, while **the United States mostly calls the shots.** US bases in Europe not only protect European allies, but serve as logistics hubs to project power into the Middle East. These are assets the US military would not want to give up.

2. Perm do the aff – NATO just proves legitimacy, but acts in the U.S.'s interests.

Shifrinson 2021 ("The Dominance Dilemma: The American Approach to NATO and its Future," Joshua R. Shifrinson, Non-Resident Fellow at the Quincy Institute and Assistant Professor with the Pardee School of Global Studies at Boston University, January 28, 2021, <https://quincyinst.org/report/the-dominance-dilemma-the-american-approach-to-nato-and-its-future/#5ddf6a760080>, VY)

Introduction Since its creation in the early days of the Cold War, American policymakers have been of two minds about the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). **Seeking to project American power and influence in Europe and gain legitimacy for U.S. ambitions, policy planners have seen NATO as a useful vehicle for organizing Europe in ways conducive to broader American interests.** At the same time, the United States has proven reluctant to pay or risk too much to achieve this result. For a country that is secure at home, **influence in Europe is desirable for some** but of dubious necessity. These contradictory impulses have been reflected not only in the variety of America's approaches to the alliance over time, but also in the attitudes of different policymakers. Now, having successfully helped to foster an unprecedented level of European stability and security, and facing growing pressure to reduce America's strategic burdens, **American strategists in the years ahead must be prepared to revisit the fundamentals of the U.S. presence** in Europe and devolve authority to local actors.

3. Counterplan can't solve the aff: NATO is key in human augmentation technologies because of the military applications.

NATO S&T Organization 2020 ("Science & Technology Trends 2020-2040," NATO Science & Technology Organization, March 2020, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2020/4/pdf/190422-ST_Tech_Trends_Report_2020-2040.pdf, VY)

Human augmentation, human enhancement or soldier systems are broadly understood to mean technologies used to improve human form or to function beyond what is necessary to restore or sustain health. Concerning BHET relevant to NATO, we take these to cover the range of human domains - physiological, cognitive & social, and the use of robotic exoskeletons, smart textiles, drugs, and seamless man-machine interfaces. **The development of new human augmentation technologies (physical, pharmacological, neurological or social) has the potential to change the capabilities of the individual soldier, sailor or aviator significantly** [402, 403, 404, 405, 406] **and create integrated human-machine symbiotes of unparalleled capabilities.** Examples of such augmentation across a variety of sensory modalities are [402]: • Ocular enhancements to imaging, sight, and situational awareness through implants, glasses or contact lens. These visual enhancements will support team data sharing; enhanced target identification; man-machine teaming; and, expansion of vision beyond the visible spectrum [407]: • Restoration and programmed muscular control through an optogenetic bodysuit sensor web; • Auditory enhancement for communication and protection; and, • Direct neural enhancement of the human brain for two-way data transfer. **The first three of these technologies are expected to be widely available within the next 20 years.** The last, direct neural enhancement, is potentially the most disruptive but is also unlikely to be widely available before 2050, putting it outside the scope of this study. Nevertheless, the development of direct neural-silica connections supporting bi-directional data transfer and mesh networks are a real possibility. Given recent advances in understanding the brain's neurological components and cognitive architecture, neuroelectronic components that can efficiently implement brain-like algorithms and interface directly with biological wetware offer possibilities for new technological capabilities that could significantly impact both the civilian and military domains. Very high speed, very low power neuromorphic electronic components that feature non-von Neumann architectures and analogue-like processors offer the possibility of autonomous systems and heterogeneous computer architectures that incorporate these devices. Such systems would be able to perform tasks that the brain excels at but which currently thwart classical computers, such as extensive heterogeneous data analysis and visual scene processing. Interfacing these devices with biological systems will offer new treatment methods for neurological diseases and improved interface mechanisms between the brain and electronic devices for better control of artificial limbs. In the near term, significant changes in advancing heads-up displays over the past five years will be refined to offer: • Improvements in the power efficiency of micro-displays; • Advancements in optical fabrication techniques for free-form optical surfaces; and • Integration and proliferation of smartphones and wireless data links. The broad deployment of exoskeletons in commercial sectors will probably remain quite limited for the short term, due to their high cost (more than \$25,000 per suit). Nevertheless, "it's clear that the era of the exoskeleton has begun" [408] in areas such as logistics (e.g. warehouses), construction and manufacturing (e.g. cars and aviation) to ease worker burden, improve efficiency and reduce injuries. It is predicted that by 2025 the exoskeleton market will be 1.8 billion USD, up from 68 million USD in 2014 [409]. **The US Army and others are moving forward quickly with development and exploring the operational effectiveness of exoskeletons in theatre** [410, 411]. Figure G.3: Future Gear. Other methods of human augmentation include the development of new physiological and pharmacological cognitive (PCE) enhancements, with attendant reproducibility, medical, ethical, legal and policy considerations (e.g. [412,

413]). **Direct peripheral nerve stimulation and other non-invasive methods may also be used to increase synaptic plasticity for improved cognitive performance and learning** [202], **supporting rapid and practical training of military personnel** in complex multi-faceted tasks. **Ethical, legal, and policy issues arise around the entire spectrum of human enhancement technologies, but especially with pharmacological enhancements**. As noted by [414]: “Militaries have long sought to enhance the physical and cognitive performance of warfighters directly, and indeed some human performance enhancement drugs are widely used across the US military today, such as caffeine. **Existing technologies have demonstrated the ability to improve individual physical and cognitive performance above baseline levels and in key areas central to military competition**: strength, focus, attention, learning, and resistance to fatigue. Many of these technologies are already being used in civilian settings, in licit or illicit contexts.”

<4. The counterplan links to the net benefit:

The Russia DA: Russia will still see the counterplan as NATO imperial ambitions because the US is the leader of NATO and their adversary.

The China DA: Since the US is the largest contributor to NATO, the CP will also cause a lack of focus and resources to focus on China.>

Nuclear Modernization: The US will still need to expend time, effort and resources to create and enforce the ban. It will still stall efforts to modernize the US nuclear fleet.>

2AC Topicality Frontline-Biotech

1. Counter-interpretation: Security coop is extremely broad. NATO cooperation can engage on biotech regulations and apply it to allied engagement.

Bilms 2021 (Kevin; January; career Department of Defense civilian serving in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict; War on the Rocks; "What's in a name? Reimagining irregular warfare activities for competition," <https://warontherocks.com/2021/01/whats-in-a-name-reimagining-irregular-warfare-activities-for-competition>)

Merge "Civil-Military Operations" and "Security Cooperation" Into "Security Partner Engagement" **Civil-military operations and security cooperation are similar, but each term contains ambiguity that prevents non-practitioners from fully understanding how they fit in competition.** For example, "civil-military operations" risks confusion with "civil-military relations," the study of the dynamic between the military and civil society writ large. As a term, "**security cooperation**" is broad enough to encompass virtually anything involving a partner. **Both activities specifically emphasize the use of military forces to establish, maintain, influence, and leverage security relationships** through increased defense interactions. Recent history exemplified the importance of non-standard (i.e., non-military) security partners to consolidate strategic gains, and the ability to manage complex and non-traditional security relationships could yield even greater impact in great-power competition. **Concerted security engagements before conflict help align U.S. efforts with allies and partners, provide invaluable access and placement in event of crisis, and facilitate U.S. campaign and contingency plans. Both conventional forces and special operators are capable of engaging partners and allies to not only increase interoperability, but also enhance U.S. influence, as a low-cost contribution in competition below armed conflict.** "Security partner engagement" acknowledges the importance of security partnerships and ensuring that regular engagements will secure U.S. influence and preserve the United States as the preferred partner of choice. **This terminology adapts U.S. Cyber Command's concept of "persistent engagement," where regular engagement helps to get ahead of problems and forestall opponents' abilities to gain advantage.** Applying this logic to civil-military security engagements acknowledges that the influence and advantages afforded by a deep network of security partners are neither predetermined nor indefinite, and require concerted effort to deter opponents that seek to make headway or generate fissures among partners and allies. Reshaping "security partner engagement" in this fashion could account for one way that the department operationalizes its Guidance for Development of Alliances and Partnerships, which looks to maintain and sustain this asymmetric advantage in all stages of competition.

2. We Meet: NATO is military-to-military cooperation, so the affirmative will be military-to-military cooperation on emerging technology.

3. Prefer our interpretation –

Standards:

A. Ground – regulations and cooperation are important affirmative ground. The negative's interpretation destroys affirmative ground and does not garner good negative ground either. New regulations give important stable negative links.

B. Limits – military-to-military is over-limiting. The topic areas are not generally military-to-military so new cooperation within NATO is necessary to the affirmative ground on this topic.

4. Voters:

A. Education – nearly any affirmative is going to be broad NATO cooperation. Their definition excludes important topic education like LAWS, cybersecurity, and biotech regulations.

B. Literature checks limits and ground loss – affirmatives have to have a solvency advocate based in the topic literature

C. Reasonability – The affirmative only must be reasonably close to topic to allow for educational debates. If we are close to the topic, it is not a reason to reject the affirmative.

Biotechnology NEG

AT Contention 2: Ethical Responsibility

Editing the human germline has the potential to cure many diseases like cancer and AIDS. We need to invest in this technology, not ban it.

Fernandez 2021 ("Eight Diseases CRISPR Technology Could Cure," Clara Rodríguez Fernández, 13/09/2021, <https://www.labiotech.eu/best-biotech/crispr-technology-cure-disease/>, VY, *2 page card*)

CRISPR technology offers the promise to cure any human genetic disease with gene editing; which one will be the first? CRISPR-Cas9 was first used as a gene-editing tool in 2012. In just a few years, the technology has exploded in popularity thanks to its promise of making gene editing much faster, cheaper, and easier than ever before. CRISPR is short for 'clustered regularly interspaced short palindromic repeats.' The term makes reference to a series of repetitive patterns found in the DNA of bacteria that form the basis of a primitive immune system, defending them from viral invaders by cutting their DNA. Using this natural process as a basis, scientists developed a gene-editing technology called CRISPR-Cas9 that can cut a specific DNA sequence by simply providing it with an RNA template of the target sequence. This allows to then add, delete or replace elements within the target DNA sequence. **This system represented a big leap from previous gene-editing technologies,** which required designing and making a custom DNA-cutting enzyme for each target sequence rather than simply providing an RNA guide, which is much simpler to synthesize. **CRISPR gene editing has already changed the way scientists do research,** allowing a wide range of applications across multiple fields. **But the technology could also hold great potential as a treatment for human diseases. In theory, CRISPR could let us edit any genetic mutation at will to cure any disease with a genetic origin.** In practice, however, CRISPR is still in the beginning stages of its therapeutic development. **Here is a list of some of the first diseases that scientists are tackling using CRISPR-Cas technology, testing its possibilities and limits as a medical tool.** 1. Cancer **China has been spearheading the first clinical trials using CRISPR-Cas9 as a cancer treatment.** One of these studies was testing the use of CRISPR to modify immune T cells extracted from the patient. The gene-editing technology is used to remove the gene that encodes for a protein called PD-1. This protein found on the surface of immune cells is the target of some cancer drugs such as checkpoint inhibitors. This is because some tumor cells are able to bind to the PD-1 protein to block the immune response against cancer. **The trial tested this approach in 12 patients** with non-small cell lung cancer at the West China Hospital. The results, published in April 2020, suggested **the approach was feasible and safe.** However, a later article pointed out that the study revealed some of the technology's limitations, including variable efficiency in the genome-editing process. Some experts have recommended that the long-term safety of the approach remain under review. Others have suggested using more precise gene-editing approaches such as base editing. In the US, a phase I trial run by the University of Pennsylvania tested the safety of a similar approach. The researchers used CRISPR to remove three genes that help cancer cells evade the immune system. They then added another gene to help the immune cells recognize tumors. The results

revealed that the treatment was safe in patients with advanced forms of cancer. Meanwhile, the company CRISPR Therapeutics is currently running a global phase I trial that is expected to recruit over 130 patients with blood cancer to test a CAR-T cell therapy made using CRISPR technology.

2. **Blood disorders** The blood disorders beta-thalassemia and sickle cell disease, which affect oxygen transport in the blood, are the target of a CRISPR treatment being developed by CRISPR Therapeutics and its partner Vertex Pharmaceuticals. The therapy consists of harvesting bone marrow stem cells from the patients and using CRISPR technology in vitro to make them produce fetal hemoglobin. This is a natural form of the oxygen-carrying protein that binds oxygen much better than the conventional adult form. The modified cells are then reinfused into the patient. In December, preliminary results revealed that all five patients with thalassemia haven't required any blood transfusions since receiving the treatment, and the two patients with sickle cell disease have so far not experienced any of the usual bleeding episodes caused by their condition. **Hemophilia is another blood disorder that CRISPR technology could tackle**, although development is still at the preclinical stage. CRISPR Therapeutics is working with Casebia on an in vivo CRISPR therapy where the gene-editing tool is delivered directly to the liver. Last year, Intellia Therapeutics and Regeneron Pharmaceuticals teamed up to pursue the development of hemophilia treatments based on genome editing.

3. **Blindness** Many hereditary forms of blindness are caused by a specific genetic mutation, making it easy to use CRISPR-Cas9 to treat it by targeting and modifying a single gene. In addition, the activity of the immune system is limited in the eye, which can circumvent any problems related to the body rejecting the treatment. The company Editas Medicine is working on a CRISPR therapy for Leber congenital amaurosis, the most common cause of inherited childhood blindness, for which there is currently no treatment. The treatment aims to use CRISPR to restore the function of light-sensitive cells before the children lose sight completely by fixing the most common genetic mutation behind the disease. Last year the company started a phase I/II trial, with results expected by 2024. This is the first trial to test an in vivo CRISPR treatment, in which the gene editing happens directly inside the patient's body rather than on cells extracted from their body and then returned to it.

4. **AIDS** **There are several ways CRISPR could help us in the fight against AIDS. One is using CRISPR to cut the viral DNA that the HIV virus inserts within the DNA of immune cells.** This approach could be used to attack the virus in its hidden, inactive form, which is what makes it impossible for most therapies to completely get rid of the virus. **Another approach could make us resistant to HIV infections.** Certain individuals are born with a natural resistance to HIV thanks to a mutation in a gene known as CCR5, which encodes for a protein on the surface of immune cells that HIV uses as an entry point to infect the cells. The mutation changes the structure of the protein so that the virus is no longer able to bind to it. This approach was used in a very controversial case in China two years ago in which human embryos were genetically edited to make them resistant to HIV infections. The experiment caused outrage among the scientific community, with some studies pointing out that the 'CRISPR babies' might be at a higher risk of dying younger. The general consensus seems to be that more research is needed before this approach can be used in humans, especially as recent studies have pointed out this practice can have a high risk of unintended genetic edits in embryos.

5. **Cystic fibrosis** Cystic fibrosis is a genetic disease that causes severe respiratory problems. Although there are treatments available to deal with the symptoms, the life expectancy for a person with this disease is only around 40 years. CRISPR technology could help us get to the origin of the problem by editing the mutations that cause cystic fibrosis, which are located in a gene called CFTR. Last year, researchers in the Netherlands used base editing to repair CFTR mutations in vitro in the cells of people with cystic fibrosis without creating damage elsewhere in their genetic code. In addition, companies such as Editas Medicine, CRISPR Therapeutics, and Beam Therapeutics have plans to develop treatments for cystic fibrosis using CRISPR systems. Cystic fibrosis can be caused by multiple different

mutations in the target gene, however, meaning that different therapies will have to be developed for different genetic defects. Editas Medicine has stated that it will be looking at the most common mutations, as well as some of the rare ones for which there is no treatment.

6. Muscular dystrophy Duchenne's muscular dystrophy is caused by mutations in the DMD gene, which encodes for a protein necessary for the contraction of muscles. Children born with this disease suffer progressive muscle degeneration, and existing treatments are limited to a fraction of patients with the condition. Research in mice has shown CRISPR technology could be used to fix the multiple genetic mutations behind the disease. In 2018, a group of researchers in the US used CRISPR to cut at 12 strategic 'mutation hotspots' covering the majority of the estimated 3,000 different mutations that cause this muscular disease. A company called Exonics Therapeutics was spun out to further develop this approach. Editas Medicine is also working on a CRISPR therapy for Duchenne's muscular dystrophy. The company is following a broader approach where instead of fixing specific mutations, CRISPR gene editing is used to remove whole sections of the mutated protein, which makes the protein shorter but still functional.

7. Huntington's disease Huntington's disease is a neurodegenerative condition with a strong genetic component. The disease is caused by an abnormal repetition of a certain DNA sequence within the huntingtin gene. The higher the number of copies, the earlier the disease will manifest itself. Treating Huntington's could be tricky, as any off-target effects of CRISPR in the brain could have very dangerous consequences. To reduce the risk, scientists are looking at ways to tweak the genome-editing tool to make it safer. In 2018, researchers at the Children's Hospital of Philadelphia revealed a version of CRISPR-Cas9 that includes a self-destruct button. A group of Polish researchers opted instead for pairing CRISPR-Cas9 with an enzyme called nickase to make the gene editing more precise.

8. Covid-19 In the face of the Covid-19 pandemic, CRISPR has quickly been put to the use of making fast screening tests. In the longer term, the gene-editing tool might allow us to fight Covid-19 and other viral infections. Scientists at Stanford University have developed a method to program a version of the gene-editing technology known as CRISPR/Cas13a to cut and destroy the genetic material of the virus behind Covid-19 to stop it from infecting lung cells. This approach has shown to reduce the viral load in human cells by 90% and to work against 90% of all existing and emerging coronaviruses. Another research group at the Georgia Institute of Technology has used a similar approach to destroy the virus before it enters the cell. The method was tested in live animals, improving the symptoms of hamsters infected with Covid-19. The treatment also worked on mice infected with influenza, and the researchers believe it could be effective against 99% of all existing influenza strains.

The future of CRISPR technology Considering that CRISPR-Cas9 is a relatively new development in the world of biology, research has only begun to scratch the surface of the role it could play in the future of medicine. The examples listed here are just the first attempts at using CRISPR technology as a therapy. As they progress, we can expect more and more indications to be added to the list. One of the biggest challenges to turn this research into real cures is the many unknowns regarding the potential risks of CRISPR therapy. Some scientists are concerned about possible off-target effects as well as immune reactions to the gene-editing tool. **But as research progresses, scientists are proposing and testing a wide range of approaches to tweak and improve CRISPR in order to increase its efficacy and safety. Hopes are high that CRISPR-Cas9 technology will soon provide a way to target and destroy complex diseases such as cancer and AIDS, and even target genes associated with mental illnesses.**

The benefits of Germline Engineer outweigh the risks. Weight the tangible benefits against any possible worst-case scenario.

Rubeis and Steger 2018 Rubeis, Giovanni and Steger, Florian. "Risks and Benefits of Human Germline Genome Editing: An Ethical Analysis." July 16, 2018. NIH: National Library of Medicine.
<https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7747319/>

It follows from our analysis that we can identify three types of risks: Firstly, there is a medical risk for the child that is created through GGE. Off-target effects and mosaicism are the crucial risk factors here. These risks are still prevalent despite recent refinement of GGE procedures. **We are usually willing to take certain risks when a new method can be used to treat or prevent diseases that have so far been untreatable.** As we have seen, the National Academies in the United States have suggested translational research on GGE which aims at a preventive use **in cases of severe disease or disability** where no alternative methods exist (The National Academies 2017). If we consider GGE as a possible means of disease prevention (notwithstanding the terminological difficulties outlined above), there are certain cases that fulfill these conditions, i.e. monogenic diseases like Huntington's. Since these conditions are usually severe and since there are no treatment alternatives, **translational research efforts are justified. The same holds for infertility treatment. GGE is a promising method that allows couples with a known genetic risk to create healthy offspring that is genetically related to both partners.** It can be used as an infertility treatment in cases where a genetic defect leads to infertile oocytes or sperm cells. As an assisted reproduction technology, GGE is certainly an alternative to available methods. It renders gamete donation obsolete and allows infertile partners to have a child that is genetically related to both of them. Regarding both disease prevention and infertility treatment, the main goal of the translational research will have to be the reduction of off-target effects and genetic mosaicism. However, it will be difficult to decide when an acceptable level of risk is reached. Whether the benefits outweigh the risks in this regard, however, depends on the outcome of future translational research.

Secondly, there is a medical risk for future generations. Since interventions in the germline mean that the modified genetic trait is passed on, errors in editing may have negative effects on future individuals. **It is extremely difficult to predict which consequences genetic mosaicism for example will generate in one individual. It is even harder, if not impossible to foresee the effects in two or three generations.** It is doubtful, whether further research will be useful here since effects on whole populations and in future generations are very difficult, if not impossible to model. However, **if we consider that only a few individuals will use GGE, the risks at the level of the population must be put into perspective. The number of GGE-treatments might be small enough as to have no effect on the genome of a whole population** (The National Academies 2017).

Thirdly, there are societal risks. **GGE could be used for non-medically indicated purposes, first and foremost genetic enhancement. The majority considers genetic enhancement as a societal hazard because it may compromise social justice and equality. However, this slippery-slope-argument suggests that the non-medically indicated use of GGE is a necessary consequence of its clinical implementation. This does not have to be the case since it is possible to create guidelines and regulations before GGE is implemented. This implies an intense ethical, legal, and public debate. Since the societal risks are manageable, they do not outweigh the benefits.**

Not unethical – all new technologies have unpredictable effects and we don't ban them. It's key to advancement and innovation.

Savulescu, et.al. 2015 The moral imperative to continue gene editing research on human embryos Julian Savulescu, Jonathan Pugh, Thomas Douglas, Christopher Gyngell *Protein Cell* 2015, 6(7):476–479 DOI 10.1007/s13238-015-0184-y

However, some in the scientific community are calling a moratorium on gene editing research. Yet, they fail to give a sufficient justification for such a ban. In calling for a moratorium, Lanphier et al. (2015) state: In our view, genome editing in human embryos using current technologies could have unpredictable effects on future generations. This makes it dangerous and ethically unacceptable. Such research could be exploited for non-therapeutic modifications This reasoning is, however, inconsistent with widely accepted practices. Nearly all new technologies have unpredictable effects on future generations. Information technologies like the internet and mobile phones fundamentally change the way people interact and communicate with each other. Their effect on future generations is very hard to predict, and though they could be catastrophic (for example, through cyberterrorism), this does not mean on balance they should be banned. Their expected benefits outweigh their expected harms.

Precautionary principle increases risks: diverts attention from more serious threats and ignores risk of inaction

Elizabeth Whelan 5/23/2000 ("Can Too Much Safety Be Hazardous?")

http://www.acsh.org/healthissues/newsID.589/healthissue_detail.asp

There are, however, at least two reasons why the precautionary principle itself, when applied in its extreme, is a hazard, both to our health and our high standard of living.¶ First, if we act on all the remote possibilities in identifying causes of human disease, we will have less time, less money and fewer general resources left to deal with the real public health problems which confront us. This does not mean that before we take prudent action to protect public health we have to dot every scientific "i" and cross every environmental "t". It does mean that we should not let the distraction of purely hypothetical threats cause us to lose sight of the known or highly probable ones.¶ Second, the precautionary principle assumes that no detriment to health or the environment will result from the proposed new banning or chemical regulation. For example, what are the known health risks from the current regulated use of chlorine? None. How great are the benefits? Enormous. What new health risks would we encounter if we were to ban chlorinated compounds because they "might" be harmful? Plenty.¶ Chlorine, for example, is the essential cornerstone of modern industrial chemistry. We need chlorine to disinfect our nation's water supply, make the agricultural pesticides that enable us to have a food supply rich in cancer-fighting fruits and vegetables, and to produce lifesaving pharmaceuticals.¶ When we apply the precautionary principle and focus on hypothetical risks and ponder what actions we might take "just in case", we leave the world of science and enter the realm of ideology. We allow ourselves to come under the spell of those who are motivated, for whatever reason, by a desire to return to what they perceive as a pre-industrial Garden of Eden.¶ These "what if" ideologues need to be reminded that wealth and industrial progress are associated with better, not worse health. Blanket applications of the precautionary principle ultimately would mean rejecting the modern technologies that have given us our enviable state of good health and longevity, and the freedom to enjoy it.¶ So what is to be done with those instances in which the risks are hypothetical and the costs of eliminating the technology substantial in terms of costs and lost human benefits? What should we do when confronted with the radical version of the precautionary principle? Go back to what Mom said: "When in doubt, throw it out".¶

Contention 3: Eugenics and Economics

Human gene editing is not a new form of eugenics. Labeling it as such threatens the potential benefits.

Sykora and Caplan 2017 ("The Council of Europe should not reaffirm the ban on germline genome editing in humans," Peter Sykora,

Department of Philosophy and Applied Philosophy, University of St. Cyril and Methodius in Trnava, and Arthur Caplan, Division of Medical Ethics, NYU School of Medicine, *EMBO Rep.* 2017 Nov; 18(11): 1871–1872. Published online 2017 Oct 6, <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5666594/>)

There were also concerns about misusing germline engineering for eugenic ends. However, the ethical case for developing a safe option for eliminating inheritable gene defects has gained wide consensus as shown by the widespread use of embryo biopsies in ART to select against hereditary diseases and the recent approval of mitochondrial replacement therapy in the UK. For some, **genetic engineering in fact provides a more ethical option** as it does not involve the destruction of embryos when it is done on germ cells or stem-cell precursors of germ cells. While it is true that genome editing of the germline would benefit only a small subset of patients when PGD with embryo selection is not an option (e.g. if one parent has two copies of a dominant mutation), **there is no convincing reason not to permit research in these areas. Even if eugenic applications such as gene enhancements should remain off-limits, it is unethical to hold hostage patients with severe genetic diseases to fears of a distant dystopian future.** The fear of premature and risky use of therapeutic genome editing is behind a report of the Council of Europe's Committee on Social Affairs, Health and Sustainable Development on the use of new genetic technologies in human beings 2. The forthcoming Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on October 9–13 is scheduled to debate the document [<http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-en.asp?fileid=23791&lang=en#tabs-session-35>]. The report suggests that the Assembly recommend to the Committee of Ministers a five-step plan including **fostering a broad and informed public debate on new genetic technologies, the development of clear national positions on the use of genome editing, instructing the Council of Europe Committee on Bioethics to assess ethical and legal challenges** and developing a common regulatory and legal framework.

Turn: Allowing genetic engineering of the human genome actually supports human dignity.

Beriain 2018 ("Human dignity and gene editing," Iñigo de Miguel Beriain, Chair in Law and the Human Genome RG, Department of Public Law, University of the Basque Country, EMBO Rep. 2018 Oct; Published online 2018 Sep 21, <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6172467/>, VY)

The problem with this kind of argument is that it is disrespectful to what it claims to defend: human dignity. What the argument contends is the following: although we can cure a serious pathology in an embryo or in a human being, we should refrain from doing so in order to preserve higher social values or goods. But is this kind of assertion in line with the fundamental normative principle that follows from the idea of dignity? Is this the proper way to treat an embryo, as an end in itself and not as a mere means to preserve a higher good? Or is this suggestion more like a social eugenics exercise based on the assumption that the interests of the group should prevail over those of the individual? The answer is clear: **respecting human dignity means putting the individual human and his or her interests before those of his or her possible descendants, social group or the like. This is laid down in the Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights** of 19 October 2005, whose article 3.2 reads: "The interests and welfare of the individual should have priority over the sole interest of science or society", which reproduces article 2 of the Oviedo Convention: "The interests and welfare of the human being shall prevail over the sole interest of society or science". Therefore, **respect for human dignity would actually require that we intervene in the human germline in order to preserve the interests of a particular human being, disregarding the collective interest. The overall conclusion is that there are no good reasons to justify a general ban on genetic editing of the human germline on the basis of human dignity. On the contrary, it is precisely this factor that should prompt us to use genome editing in the interests of the individual human being. Given the logical fallacies, it seems about time to give up on a notion of human dignity** and autonomy **that is closely linked to the human genome** and consider each of these separately when discussing the ethical implications of human genome and germline editing.

Yes, existential risk is that bad. It's not just us. It's all our descendants which includes over 10¹⁶ human lives over the rest of the Earth's existence. That outweighs all their claims.

Bostrom 13 (Nick Bostrom, Philosophy professor of Oxford, expert at existential risk. "Existential Risk Prevention as Global Priority" Global Policy Volume 4 . Issue 1 . February 2013. <https://www.existential-risk.org/concept.pdf>)

One gets a large number even if one confines one's consideration to the potential for biological human beings living on Earth. **If we suppose with Parfit that our planet will remain habitable for at least another billion years, and we assume that at least one billion people could live on it sustainably, then the potential exist for at least 10¹⁶ human lives of normal duration. These lives could also be considerably better than the average contemporary human life,** which is so often marred by disease, poverty, injustice, and various biological limitations that could be partly overcome through continuing technological and moral progress. **However, the relevant figure is not how many people could live on Earth but how many descendants we could have in total. One lower bound of the number of biological human life-years in the future** accessible universe (based on current cosmological estimates) **is 10³⁴ years.** Another estimate, which assumes that future minds will be mainly implemented in computational hardware instead of biological neuronal wetware, produces a lower bound of 10⁵⁴ human-brain-emulation subjective life-years (or 10⁷¹ basic computational operations) (Bostrom 2003). If we make the less conservative assumption that future civilizations could eventually press close to the absolute bounds of known physics (using some as yet unimagined technology), we get radically higher estimates of the amount of computation and memory storage that is achievable and thus of the number of years of subjective experience that could be realized. Even if we use the most conservative of these estimates, which entirely ignores the possibility of space colonization and software minds, **we find that the expected loss of an existential catastrophe is greater than the value of 10¹⁶ human lives. This implies that the expected value of reducing existential risk by a mere one millionth of one percentage point is at least a hundred times the value of a million human lives.** The more technologically comprehensive estimate of 10⁵⁴ human-brain-emulation subjective life-years (or 10⁵² lives of ordinary length) makes the same point even more starkly. **Even if we give this allegedly lower bound on the cumulative output potential of a technologically mature civilization a mere 1% chance of being correct, we find that the expected value of reducing existential risk by a mere one billionth of one billionth of one percentage point is worth a hundred billion times as much as a billion human lives.** One might consequently argue that **even the tiniest reduction of existential risk has an expected value greater than** that of the definite provision of **any "ordinary" good,** such as the direct benefit of saving 1 billion lives. And, further, that the absolute value of the indirect effect of saving 1 billion lives on the total cumulative amount of existential risk — positive or negative — is almost certainly larger than the positive value of the direct benefit of such an action.

AT Contention 4: Solvency

A ban would fail. Countries would cheat. And potential benefits outweigh the harms.

Groch 2021 (“Curing cancer, designer babies, supersoldiers: How will gene-editing change us?” Sherryn Groch, July 4, 2021, <https://www.smh.com.au/national/curing-cancer-designer-babies-supersoldiers-how-will-gene-editing-change-us-20210511-p57qqt.html>, VY)

Some have suggested an enforced ban on human germline editing along the lines of current nuclear arms bans may be in order. Metzl agrees gene-editing is as powerful, as serious, as nuclear weapons. (“Once we start [down enhancement] we could have an arms race of the human race,” he says.) **But, unlike warheads, there are real benefits to its use too - curing disease, helping feed the world. “We’re not talking about killer robots here. We don’t want to [stifle] innovation.” And how would you enforce a ban? Imagine if one nation decided to go rogue and alter the human genome. Would others then invade to stop them?** In his book *Hacking Darwin*, Metzl argues **a country looking to keep edited humans from crossing its borders would have to become almost a dictatorship itself, running intrusive genetic screening. Instead, as a guide for regulation, many point to IVF, which was also feared to some degree when it arrived some 40 years ago.** (A media storm even engulfed the British scientists who created the first “test tube baby” Louise Brown in 1978.) “If you’d called for an international ban on IVF [before Louise was born healthy], most people would have agreed because they thought it was unnatural,” Metzl says. “But how many people are alive today because of IVF? We need to go step by step like we did there.” **Doudna**, who was among scientists calling for a moratorium on human germline editing after she developed CRISPR, **agrees it’s critically important to establish “international guidelines and guardrails”. “Like any transformative technology, there is a potential for misuse but the ... benefits far outweigh the risks”.**

<Countries such as Russia and China have no incentive to follow a NATO ban and would actually have a competitive incentive to edit human genetics post the plan.>

Status quo solves. No country permits human genome editing and most countries ban it.

Qaiser 2020

(“Study: There Is No Country Where Heritable Human Genome Editing Is Permitted,” Farah Qaiser, Oct 31, 2020,

<https://www.forbes.com/sites/farahqaiser/2020/10/31/study-there-is-no-country-where-heritable-human-genome-editing-is-permitted/?sh=4f9cb3cf7617, VY>)

In this study, Baylis and her fellow co-authors reviewed policy documents, including legislation, regulations, and international treaties, from a total of 106 countries, to identify excerpts referencing, or relating to, human germline or heritable genome editing. These policy documents were then systematically organized into the following categories: permitted, prohibited, prohibited with exceptions, indeterminate and no relevant information. This categorized data is openly available, and will continue to be updated. “We have made available all of the raw data,” says Baylis. “For me, a part of this is a commitment to put the facts out there for people to engage with it, but also to do that in a way that’s opening up conversation and improving, I think, the research for the future — because it’s setting a standard. **Overall, the researchers identified a total of 125 policy documents from 96 countries.** When it comes to germline genome editing (i.e. not for reproduction), only 40 out of 96 countries have specific policies to address this, where 23 countries prohibit this research, and 11 explicitly permit it. In contrast, **78 out of 96 countries have policies to address heritable genome editing** (i.e. for reproduction), **where 70 prohibit this type of editing outright**, five prohibit it with potential exceptions (Columbia, Panama, Belgium, Italy and the UAE) and three are indeterminate (Burkina Faso, Singapore and Ukraine). **None of the 96 countries explicitly permit heritable human genome editing.**

2NC/1NR Extensions: AT Ethical Responsibility

Human germline engineering has the potential to save limits and help humanity. We should research it, not ban it.

Nicholl 2022 ("Genetic Engineering Requires Attention Not Condemnation," Cooper Nicholl, Editorial Writer, May 13, 2022, <https://altahawkeye.org/7491/opinion/genetic-engineering-requires-attention-not-condemnation/>, VY)

The bigger picture with this technology must be realized. It has the potentially to fundamentally change humanity, and if that technology is put in the wrong hands the results could be disastrous. The Health and National security implications will be huge. The US needs to stay ahead of the curve on this technology. The future uses of this technology can also be groundbreaking. We could eliminate diseases and disorders that have plagued humanity for years and years. These genetic technologies can also give humans better lives outside the realm of disease and disorder by giving them more muscle mass, intelligence, height, and other beneficial traits. However we have further reasons to research this technology: Space Exploration. If current projects by NASA, SpaceX, Blue Origin and other ventures succeed, humans will need these technologies for the brutalities of space. One day humans will be on mars and more us will work in space one day and the affects of that could be bad. When astronauts go to space despite their best efforts they lose muscle mass and have been reported to grow in space due to the lack of gravity. While short term space exploration has its consequences it is minimal compared to long term space explorations consequences. **With all what is going on in the world we must not forget about the issue of using genetic editing technologies on humans for germ line editing. This technology will impact and does impact our lives each everyday.** For example many of our foods are GMO's and ensure food security for billions of people. They bring healthy, nutritious, and safe food to billions as well. Our future and our well being depends on well regulated research for the safety and security of this technology. **I would urge our Government to legalize this research because the consequences of not doing so will impact us even more then not legalizing this technology and research at all.**

Banning germline genetic editing is naïve and amounts to ‘biological nonsense’ – their ‘ethical concerns’ are unlikely to ever occur and mystify legitimate implementation benefits

Pinker 15 Pinker, Steven. Steven Pinker is professor of psychology at Harvard University and the author of 10 books, most recently "The Sense of Style: The Thinking Person's Guide to Writing in the 21st Century." "Experts Debate: Are We Playing with Fire When We Edit Human Genes?" STAT, 17 Nov. 2015, www.statnews.com/2015/11/17/gene-editing-embryo-crispr/#Mathews. Accessed 30 June 2022. //DRE

Germline editing should be treated like any other medical procedure, weighing benefits against harms. It should not be banned out of a nebulous terror about tampering with a sacrosanct entity called "the human germline" - a concept which is biological nonsense. We affect the genetic makeup of our offspring, and the species, every time we choose one sex partner over another. And each of us introduces dozens of mutations into our own germlines by exposing ourselves to everyday radiation and chemical mutagens. Genetic editing would be a droplet in the maelstrom of naturally churning genomes. What are the potential benefits? There are several scenarios in which germline editing could benefit parents who carry disease genes. It could be used when both parents are homozygous for the disease, when in vitro fertilization doesn't produce enough viable and unaffected embryos for preimplantation genetic diagnosis, or if future data shows that babies who undergo the procedure have compromised longevity or health. The principal harm of germline editing is the risk of producing a sick or deformed child. Frankly, I suspect that this risk will always be unacceptable, so most of this discussion is moot. But suppose safety could be ensured. Should we fear the prospect of parents genetically enhancing their babies, the outcome the prohibitionists dread? This is highly unlikely - a relic of the early 1990s, when people thought there was "a gene for" this or that talent. We now know that heritable psychological traits, such as intelligence and personality, are the product of hundreds or thousands of genes, each with a tiny effect. And many genes have multiple effects, some of them harmful, such as an increased risk of neurological disease or cancer. With each enhancement providing a trifling benefit and a non-negligible risk, and with the editing process itself imposing risks, it's unlikely that today's morbidly risk-averse helicopter parents will take a chance at enhancing a child. They won't even feed their babies genetically modified applesauce! Add these risks to the expense and tribulation of IVF compared to good old-fashioned sex, and one can conclude that **widespread genetic enhancement is too unlikely a possibility to worry about.**

Precautionary principle increases risks: diverts attention from more serious threats and ignores risk of inaction

Elizabeth Whelan 5/23/2000 ("Can Too Much Safety Be Hazardous?")

http://www.acsh.org/healthissues/newsID.589/healthissue_detail.asp

There are, however, at least two reasons why the precautionary principle itself, when applied in its extreme, is a hazard, both to our health and our high standard of living.¶ First, if we act on all the remote possibilities in identifying causes of human disease, we will have less time, less money and fewer general resources left to deal with the real public health problems which confront us. This does not mean that before we take prudent action to protect public health we have to dot every scientific "i" and cross every environmental "t". It does mean that we should not let the distraction of purely hypothetical threats cause us to lose sight of the known or highly probable ones.¶ Second, the precautionary principle assumes that no detriment to health or the environment will result from the proposed new banning or chemical regulation. For example, what are the known health risks from the current regulated use of chlorine? None. How great are the benefits? Enormous. What new health risks would we encounter if we were to ban chlorinated compounds because they "might" be harmful? Plenty.¶ Chlorine, for example, is the essential cornerstone of modern industrial chemistry. We need chlorine to disinfect our nation's water supply, make the agricultural pesticides that enable us to have a food supply rich in cancer-fighting fruits and vegetables, and to produce lifesaving pharmaceuticals.¶ When we apply the precautionary principle and focus on hypothetical risks and ponder what actions we might take "just in case", we leave the world of science and enter the realm of ideology. We allow ourselves to come under the spell of those who are motivated, for whatever reason, by a desire to return to what they perceive as a pre-industrial Garden of Eden.¶ These "what if" ideologues need to be reminded that wealth and industrial progress are associated with better, not worse health. Blanket applications of the precautionary principle ultimately would mean rejecting the modern technologies that have given us our enviable state of good health and longevity, and the freedom to enjoy it.¶ So what is to be done with those instances in which the risks are hypothetical and the costs of eliminating the technology substantial in terms of costs and lost human benefits? What should we do when confronted with the radical version of the precautionary principle? Go back to what Mom said: "When in doubt, throw it out".¶

Viewing Gene Editing as only leading to inequality and prejudice is incorrect. Negative eugenics is not the only outcome.

Gebelhoff 2016 Gebelhoff, Robert. "What's the Difference between Genetic Engineering and Eugenics." February 22, 2022. Washington Post.

<https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/in-theory/wp/2016/02/22/whats-the-difference-between-genetic-engineering-and-eugenics/>

The field of genetics has always had an uncomfortable link to eugenics: the science of improving people through controlled breeding. Centuries ago, people realized that desirable traits in farm animals could be passed down to their offspring. In the late 19th century, "social Darwinists" began to advocate for artificial selection among humans as well, often along racial terms. Such policies were enacted under fascist regimes during World War II, with the expressed goal of eliminating what were seen as negative traits from the human gene pool through genocide or sexual sterilization. The United States even had versions of these involuntary sterilization policies, implemented to protect the country's "racial hygiene."

Today, the scientific community soundly condemns such atrocities, yet prominent biologists have long advocated for genetic engineering as a means of perfecting the human species. During the 1950s and '60s, as postwar thinkers began uncoiling the mysteries of DNA, **scientists began to suggest that people may one day be able to guide human evolution by altering the microscopic blueprints government laid out in our cells.**

Nobel Prize-winning biologist Joshua Lederberg conceded that **altering human DNA could possibly lead to eugenics of a sort, but he argued that it was substantially different from the genocidal eugenics committed by the Nazis. No living person would be eliminated from the gene pool – as eugenics often implies. Instead, society could guide human development by eliminating negative traits and encouraging desirable ones through genetic engineering. Evolutionary biologist J.B.S. Haldane called this "positive eugenics."**

At the time, though, there was no technology available to edit human DNA, so **Lederberg viewed talking about guiding human evolution as "diversionary" to the true potential of genetics: research that could lead to medical gains.** The question of eugenics remained largely marginal.

Over the next few decades, genetic research would, in fact, produce milestone advancements in the medical field. DNA research has produced treatments for diabetes and potentially for Parkinson's disease. CRISPR was, in fact, discovered not by scientists who wanted to edit the genome but by researchers studying genetic immunity among bacteria. Unexpectedly, CRISPR technology has led to a vast range of medical possibilities, from "three parent" children to the prevention of mitochondrial diseases.

Today, CRISPR has captured the fantasies of those who emphasize the high-flying possibilities of human-led evolution. Some look forward to "designer babies," suggesting that altering children to have higher intelligence is inevitable for human progress. Others argue that we should engineer humans so they have a reduced impact on the environment.

Of course, these proposals are still wildly unrealistic. But we're no longer in an era where scientists can shrug off eugenicist rhetoric as too distant to worry about. This month, Britain became the first country to approve public funding for projects that edit the human genome. At the pace that CRISPR technology is advancing, it's likely that the United States and other governments will want to follow suit. While **83 percent of the American public is solidly against editing genes for frivolous purposes such as increasing intelligence, about half**

of those asked were fine with the idea of doing so to treat diseases. The time to distinguish between negative eugenics and positive genetic intervention is now.

But how far are we willing to go? Ending truly debilitating diseases may be one thing, but what about conditions such as dwarfism? Current CRISPR research might lead to genetic treatments for autism. Given that the possibilities truly are endless, should we edit out traits that many people have come to accept and celebrate? Isn't there a moral, social and physical advantage in allowing diversity to flourish within the human gene pool?

In the end, where we draw the line will be a political question. The scientific community has already begun this discussion, but it's not unreasonable to expect a more involved debate in the near future — one in which the general public will have a greater say in how science will proceed.

2NC/1NR Extensions: AT Eugenics and Economics

Genetic engineering does not take away humanness

POWELL 2015 Boston University, Boston, Massachusetts 2015 In Genes We Trust: Germline Engineering, Eugenics, and the Future of the Human Genome, USA Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 40 (6):669-695 (2015) <https://philpapers.org/rec/POWIGW>

I will not take a stand here as to whether our given biological nature has intrinsic value or, if it does, how weighty that value might be. Indeed, there are serious problems with drawing any substantive bioethical conclusions from a conception of human nature (see Buchanan, 2009). Furthermore, authors will disagree over just how much of a departure from human biological nature is necessary to bring about the loss of intrinsic value associated with remaining “fundamentally human.” One might contend, for example, that much of human biological nature (as defined earlier) can be altered without altering fundamentally human characteristics. Attempting to distinguish putatively fundamental human characteristics from less fundamental ones raises a spate of philosophical difficulties that I will not address here. I will simply argue that if there is intrinsic value in retaining human biological nature or central features of “humanness,” then this gives us further reasons—conservative reasons—to actively promote human germline modification technologies, or at the very least to oppose prohibitions of germline intervention that are insensitive to risk-benefit analyses and which block the gathering of information necessary to make proper risk-benefit assessments.

Germline editing is ethically justifiable – can solve economic equality concerns with enhanced access.

MALKIN 2021 attorney practicing in intellectual property law. GERMLINE EDITING USING CRISPR: WHY A MORATORIUM IS NOT THE SOLUTION, 55 Fam. L.Q. 69

Using CRISPR to repair germline mutations that cause serious congenital single-gene diseases is ethically justifiable. Such a use poses even fewer ethical barriers than does IVF generally, which is minimally regulated. Therefore, the COA erred in forbidding the FDA to even consider clinical germline editing applications.

For certain applications, modifying severe single-gene diseases in the germline using CRISPR would satisfy the FDA's benefit-risk analysis. For example, where both parents will pass on the Huntington's disease mutation to their children, CRISPR may be the only potential treatment to eliminate the mutation. Evidence also shows that public opinion strongly supports such use for CRISPR to address serious medical conditions or diseases. While equal access to the therapy poses an ethical concern, the answer is to enhance access, rather than to reject treatments that could eliminate serious physical or mental impairments that would substantially limit a child's major life activities. Finally, fears of a new eugenics movement should be allayed if the FDA authorizes germline editing licenses only for therapies targeting severe single-gene diseases.

No risk from economic inequality – effects are exaggerated and it’s declining.

Gramm and Early 2021 Wall Street Journal, “Incredible Shrinking Income Inequality,”
<https://www.wsj.com/articles/incredible-shrinking-income-inequality-11616517284>

Twice over the past 50 years, the Census Bureau has significantly changed how it collects and records income statistics. In 1993 and 2013 the Census Bureau changed its methods in an effort to collect better information from high-income households. These changes created two major discontinuities and distorted the time-series so that the change in measured income inequality in those years was as much as 15 times the average annual change found for the entire 50-year period. At the time, the Census Bureau explained in detail what it had done. It also explained the limitations the changes imposed on the use of its income-inequality measure to look at changes over extended periods. In subsequent use of the data by the Census Bureau and others, however, those warnings have been neglected. The simple solution would have been to isolate the distortions caused solely by the changes in data-collection techniques and adjusted the previous years’ measures to reflect the effect of the changes. We made these adjustments and they are shown in the nearby figure. The blue line is the actual reported Census Bureau measurement of income inequality. The yellow line eliminates the effects of the 1993 and 2013 discontinuities caused solely by changes in measurement technique. The black line shows income inequality when the value of all transfer payments received is counted as income, income is reduced by taxes paid, and the two technical corrections are made. Lo and behold—income inequality is lower than it was 50 years ago. The raging debate over income inequality in America calls to mind the old Will Rogers adage: “It ain’t what you don’t know that gets you into trouble. It is what you do know that ain’t so.” We are debating the alleged injustice of a supposedly growing social problem when—for all the reasons outlined above—that problem isn’t growing, it’s shrinking. Those who want to transform the greatest economic system in the history of the world ought to get their facts straight first.

2NC/1NR: Solvency Extensions

A ban would fail. Rogue scientists would bypass the ban – He Jiankui proves.

Blanchard 2019 ("Group of scientists demand a global BAN on human gene-editing after illegal Chinese experiment – but experts slam their calls as 'neither necessary nor useful,'" Sam Blanchard, 13 March 2019, <https://www.dailymail.co.uk/health/article-6804549/Scientists-demand-BAN-human-gene-editing-illegal-Chinese-experiment.html>, VY)

In November, **Chinese scientist He Jiankui announced that, in a world first, twin girls had been born after he changed their DNA** to make them immune to HIV. **The announcement caused uproar because Professor Jiankui had done the experiment in secret and in spite of laws in China banning germline editing in embryos.** And the researchers warned in their Nature article the gene change he had made could make the girls more likely to die of West Nile virus or flu. Professor Jiankui was last month placed under police investigation, the Chinese government ordered a halt to his research work and he was fired by his university. Writing in Nature today, researchers want the moratorium – temporary ban – to avoid the same thing happening again. 'There is no doubt that genome editing technologies hold huge potential for the future health of patients,' said Professor Sir Robert Lechler, president of the Academy of Medical Sciences. 'But I agree that the clinical use of germline genome editing should remain prohibited. 'There are currently just too many unanswered safety, ethical and scientific questions.' **Around 30 countries already have specific laws preventing germline editing in live human offspring, leading some experts to be sceptical about what a ban would change.** University College London's Dr Helen O'Neill said: **'This letter serves to ignore rather than reiterate that a global ban is already in existence and only attempts to address what would happen in the case of another extreme scientist.** 'Currently, there are (as there was in China) legal and ethical measures in place globally which regulate the use of gametes and embryos. **'Let's not forget that He Jiankui broke many rules, and was aware of this** by choosing to do his work outside of the auspices of the university (and taking unpaid leave). 'It was not that he did this because the law allowed it.' And Dr O'Neill added putting a ban in place could make it more difficult for scientists to get funding for research. She said: 'Naming a "moratorium" sheds a negative light on the potential for germline genome editing. 'This will have huge consequences for research funding, many of the bodies requiring the proposal to be "clinically translatable".' The Progress Educational Trust, a charity encouraging debate on assisted conception and genetic science, agreed that a ban would not avoid another case like Professor Jiankui's. 'A moratorium on the clinical use of germline genome editing is neither necessary nor useful,' said PET director Sarah Norcross. **'We do not think a moratorium would have deterred He Jiankui, who acted secretly and in breach of a clear scientific consensus that germline genome editing should not be used in the clinic at this time.**

DA's vs Biotechnology

Russian Aggression vs Biotechnology

A. Uniqueness: Putin is pushing back against increasing NATO's imperial ambitions now. He will respond to increases in NATO's power and control by force.

Al Jazeera on June 29, 2022 ("Putin condemns NATO's 'imperial ambitions', warns Finland, Sweden," Al Jazeera, 29 Jun 2022, [Putin condemns NATO's 'imperial ambitions', warns Finland, Sweden | News | Al Jazeera](#), VY)

Russian President Vladimir Putin has condemned NATO's "imperial ambitions", accusing the military alliance of seeking to assert its "supremacy" through the Ukraine conflict. The Russian leader also said on Wednesday that he would respond in kind if NATO deployed troops and infrastructure in Finland and Sweden after the two Nordic countries join the military alliance. Putin made his comment a day after NATO member Turkey lifted its veto over the bid by Finland and Sweden to join the alliance when the three nations agreed to protect each other's security. Helsinki and Stockholm joining NATO marks one of the biggest shifts in European security in decades. "With Sweden and Finland, we don't have the problems that we have with Ukraine. They want to join NATO, go ahead," Putin told Russian state television after talks with regional leaders in the central Asian ex-Soviet state of Turkmenistan. "But they must understand there was no threat before, while now, if military contingents and infrastructure are deployed there, we will have to respond in kind and create the same threats for the territories from which threats towards us are created," he said. Moscow's relations with Helsinki and Stockholm would inevitably sour over their NATO membership, he added. **"Everything was fine between us, but now there might be some tensions, there certainly will,"** Putin said. "It's inevitable if there is a threat to us." 'Shattered peace in Europe' Putin also denied that Moscow's forces were responsible for a missile raid on a crowded shopping centre in the Ukrainian town of Kremenchuk earlier this week, in which at least 18 people were killed and many remain missing in the rubble. "Our army does not attack any civilian infrastructure sites. We have every capability of knowing what is situated where," Putin told a news conference in the Turkmenistan capital of Ashgabat. "I am convinced that this time, everything was done in this exact manner," Putin said. Ukraine accuses Russia of targeting the shopping centre and civilian shoppers. **Putin made his comment as NATO on Wednesday branded Russia the biggest "direct threat" to Western security after its invasion of Ukraine.** The military alliance also agreed on plans to modernise Kyiv's beleaguered armed forces, saying it stood fully behind Ukrainians' "heroic defence of their country". "President Putin's war against Ukraine has shattered peace in Europe and has created the biggest security crisis in Europe since the Second World War," NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg told a news conference. **"NATO has responded with strength and unity,"** he said.

B. Link: Vladimir Putin Believes in Genetic Engineering and will continue to work with them.

Tass 2021 TASS New Agency. "Russia to Support Genetic Engineering, Putin Says." TASS-Russian News Agency. September 21st, 2021.

<https://tass.com/society/1332539>

Creating artificial barriers to the development of genetic engineering is pointless, so Russia will support research in this sphere, Russian President Vladimir Putin said at a back-to-school gathering on Wednesday to mark the occasion of the Day of Knowledge during his visit to Russia's Far East.

"With the help of genetic engineering, it is possible, actually, to shape the quality of future biological objects. This is a very demanding task. The outcome, if humankind goes down this path, is hard to predict, so we have to bear this in mind. There are scientific and moral considerations. [This is] a very important issue," the head of state emphasized.

"However, **it is fully obvious that its development will continue one way or another. And it makes no sense to put up artificial barriers,**" he asserted.

The president cited as examples the invention of gunpowder and nuclear energy that ended up belonging to all of humanity. "Mankind should formulate shared criteria for work in this direction, make a decision and ensure that these decisions are well-considered, scientifically valid and will be implemented," Putin said.

"Nowadays, there is probably nothing more interesting than this. So, we will support this research without any doubt," he concluded.

Putin's meeting with schoolchildren was held within the framework of the New Knowledge educational marathon.

C. Internal Link and Impact: Fears of increasing NATO's pushback on any front will escalate the Ukrainian conflict. Russian nuclear weapons are already on high-alert. Brinkmanship ends in disaster.

Hill 2022 ("Is Russia increasingly likely to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine?," Alexander Hill, Professor of Military History, University of Calgary, May 9, 2022, [Is Russia increasingly likely to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine?](#), VY)

At the beginning of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Vladimir Putin reminded the West that Russia had nuclear weapons by putting them on "special combat readiness." Putin's actions suggested that Russia was considering their use, even though actually launching them was a remote possibility. In precisely what circumstances Russia might use nuclear weapons was left vague — Putin's intent was presumably to frighten NATO and discourage its intervention on behalf of Ukraine. Since then, much has changed — and not for the better in terms of the risk of nuclear war. Although NATO hasn't sent troops to fight in Ukraine, the West has implemented increasingly tough economic sanctions against Russia and provided Ukraine with military equipment like tanks. **NATO is now involved in what is, in essence, a full-fledged proxy war against Russia.** Not only have NATO nations — particularly the United States — provided Ukraine with an array of different weapons, but they are clearly helping Ukraine with other elements of its war effort, including intelligence — some of which has been used to target Russian generals. Ukraine emboldened From the failure to take Kyiv to the plodding pace of Soviet gains in the Donbas region in eastern Ukraine, the war has not gone according to plan. Russia has taken heavy losses due to the intense Ukrainian resistance. Russian troops will likely dig in and seek to consolidate their gains in the east. Reasserting independence from Ukraine for the separatist regions — backed up by troops on the ground — could be presented by Putin as a Russian win. He could then declare his "special military operation" over. Ukraine could subsequently reach some sort of peace agreement with Russia involving loss of territory — one that probably wouldn't be much different from the sort of agreement that could be negotiated today. Currently there is no sign of Ukrainian inclination to negotiate over the Donbas region. Nor is Ukraine willing to formally give up Crimea, seized by Russia in 2014 after the pro-western and anti-Russian Euromaidan revolution in Ukraine. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has made clear his war aim is to liberate all Ukrainian territory in Russian hands, including Crimea. His NATO backers — most vocally the U.S., the U.K. and Canada — are willing to provide Ukraine with the means to do so. These countries hope to see Russia come out of this war significantly weakened as a regional power. The Russian nuclear threat While committing NATO forces directly to Ukraine is unlikely, some hawkish western commentators have suggested NATO could do so without Russia retaliating with nuclear weapons. Even though Russia raised the spectre of nuclear weapons at the beginning of the war, as it progressed, Russian sources suggested that nuclear weapons would only be used in the event of an existential threat to Russia. Recent Russian nuclear sabre-rattling — such as the testing and deployment of more advanced missiles or Russian TV segments showing the impact of a nuclear attack on the U.K. — is undoubtedly cause for concern, but it doesn't make the use of nuclear weapons significantly more likely in the short term. What would? If the war was to turn in Ukraine's favour and Ukrainian forces started not only to recapture swaths of territory in the east, but to threaten the separatist regions — or Crimea. **Some western observers have suggested that Russia might employ an "escalate to de-escalate" strategy in such circumstances, using tactical nuclear weapons.** Launching them in territory likely to be held by the enemy, instead of where Russia hopes to retain control, makes a lot more sense. **If the war escalates to the point where a western-backed Ukraine threatens territory Putin considers to be Russian, then the chances of nuclear weapons being employed**

would increase dramatically. The problem of Crimea Zelenskyy has suggested that Ukraine will not stop fighting until Crimea is in Ukrainian hands. But for Putin and many Russians, Crimea is Russian. Crimea's incorporation into Ukraine in 1954 is often seen as a historical accident, rather than an expression of Crimea being ethnically Ukrainian. Crimea's Tatar population was largely displaced by ethnic Russians — not Ukrainians — and it has a long history as Russian. From Leo Tolstoy's Sevastopol Sketches, for example, to Vasily Aksyonov's 1970s novel The Island of Crimea, Crimea is widely represented in Russian literature. A credible western-backed threat to Crimea would undoubtedly constitute the sort of existential threat to Russian territory that would dramatically increase the risk of nuclear weapons being used. A distant but increased nuclear threat **Putin's frustration over Ukrainian resilience and western support is clearly increasing — recent nuclear posturing is evidence of that. The nuclear threat has been increasing** since February, even if the use of nuclear weapons probably isn't imminent. **Even the use of low-yield tactical nuclear weapons by Russia would likely provoke some sort of western response. Such a response would then increase the likelihood of further escalation. Informed estimates suggest Russia has more than 1,900 non-strategic or tactical nuclear weapons. The threshold for their use is lower than for larger nuclear weapons. The sort of scenarios that might lead to the use of nuclear weapons are outside the immediate confines Putin's war in Ukraine.** It would require a significant deterioration in Russian fortunes — and greater western involvement in the conflict. Nonetheless, **not since the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 or nuclear tensions in the early 1980s has the spectre of potential nuclear war loomed so large in the future.** Back in 1962, politicians on all sides ultimately showed their statesman-like qualities and stepped back from their threat to employ nuclear weapons. We can only hope that their successors will do the same over Ukraine.

2NC/1NR Link Extensions

Use the extensions in the Core Files, plus those below

Russia sees political actions on the same level as military actions

Frederick, et al 2017 “Assessing Russian Reactions to US and NATO Posture Enhancements.” Frederick, Bryan, et al. 2017. Rand Corporation/

https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1800/RR1879/RAND_RR1879.pdf

Russian leaders have seen Western political activities in these states **as a threat** to Russia’s integration project—and **to Russian security more broadly. Russia does not see a clear line between some political activities (such as democracy promotion) and broader strategic issues, and Russia views the United States and NATO as using such activities to threaten Russia. The 2014 Russian Military Doctrine discusses NATO aggression that blends traditional capabilities with nonmilitary means to achieve political objectives and identifies this as a key threat to Russian security. Media manipulation, propaganda, and information operations are examples of such means and can be leveraged to destabilize a government and bring about regime change. The 2014 doctrine also identifies the danger posed by the “use of information and communications technology for political-military objectives,” including the subversion of state sovereignty and the degradation of political independence and territorial integrity.** A closely linked danger is that of “the establishment of regimes—such as through the overthrow of legitimate organs of state power—in states bordering Russia whose policies threaten the interests of the Russian Federation.”²³ Uprisings such as the color revolutions (e.g., in Ukraine) and the Arab Spring (e.g., in Tunisia and Egypt) are, in the Russian view, examples of such actions conducted by Western governments.²⁴ However, Russia’s actions over the past two decades suggest that it values its influence over some former Soviet states more than others. For example, while Russia was concerned about plans for Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania to accede to NATO during 2002–2004, it largely acquiesced in the end, yet it has defended its interests in other post-Soviet states with much greater vigor. As one analyst put it, “Moscow was ready to renounce its claim on a role in its old sphere of interest: Central and Southeastern Europe, and the Baltics. But it resolved not to allow further Western encroachments into the territory it felt was its ‘historical space.’

An increase in NATO cooperation is what causes escalation in Ukraine.

O'Connor and Jamali 2022 ("Russia Could Launch Cyber Attacks Against U.S. if Biden Sends Wrong Signals, Intel Warns," Tom O'Connor And Naveed Jamali, 1/24/22, [Russia Could Launch Cyber Attacks Against U.S. if Biden Sends Wrong Signals, Intel Warns](#), VY, *2 page card*)

In a new memo obtained by Newsweek, **the Department of Homeland Security has warned of Russia's potential to launch cyberattacks against the United States in response to a possible escalation of the crisis unfolding at the border with Ukraine. "We assess that Russia would consider initiating a cyber attack against the Homeland if it perceived a US or NATO response to a possible Russian invasion of Ukraine threatened its long-term national security."** the memo, dated January 23 and attributed to the Office of Intelligence and Analysis, reads in bold text. The warning came as President Joe Biden sent additional weapons to Ukrainian forces and reportedly weighed the option of sending thousands of U.S. troops to the Baltic states bordering Russia over concerns that Moscow was planning imminent military action against Ukraine. Kyiv has defied the Kremlin's protests by seeking membership in the NATO Western military alliance, something that Russian officials have said threatened their country's national security. The bloc has expanded eastward since the fall of the Soviet Union three decades ago and has refused to rule out including Ukraine as well. **The memo detailed a range of ways in which Russia may choose to unleash its cyber arsenal in the event of a flare-up** while noting such an action would be unprecedented. "Russia maintains a range of offensive cyber tools that it could employ against US networks — from low-level denials-of-service to destructive attacks targeting critical infrastructure," the memo read. "However, we assess that Russia's threshold for conducting disruptive or destructive cyber attacks in the Homeland probably remains very high and we have not observed Moscow directly employ these types of cyber attacks against US critical infrastructure — notwithstanding cyber espionage and potential prepositioning operations in the past." Reached for comment, a spokesperson for the Department of Homeland Security told Newsweek said it "regularly shares information with federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial officials and the private sector to ensure the safety and security of all communities across the country." "We have increased operational partnerships between private sector companies and the federal government to strengthen our nation's cyber defenses, including through CISA's newly established Joint Cyber Defense Collaborative (JCDC)," the spokesperson said. "The JCDC brings these partners together to help us understand the full threat landscape and enable real-time collaboration to empower our private sector partners to gain information and take action against the most significant threats to the nation." The memo, which was first reported on by CNN, has already generated reactions from experts and former officials, some of whom expressed concern that a wider conflagration could erupt. Alexander Vindman, a retired U.S. Army lieutenant colonel who served as director for European Affairs at the National Security Council under former President Donald Trump, said the Biden administration has tried to "keep the U.S. out of bilateral confrontation" with Russia, and "that's why they kind of took this approach limited to diplomacy" as the U.S. leader ruled out the deployment of U.S. soldiers to Ukraine itself. "Already we see that's eroding," Vindman, who was reassigned from his position in early 2020 following his testimony to lawmakers regarding a controversial call between Trump and Ukrainian counterpart Volodymyr Zelensky, told Newsweek. "Already we see the risks in a full-spectrum type of scenario, starting out kind of low-end with regards to cyber operations, those risks are increasing." **And if these risks turn kinetic, he warned such an escalation could pass the point of no return.** "Once the shots are fired, there is no putting the genie back in the bottle," Vindman said. One former U.S. intelligence analyst said Russian President Vladimir Putin was likely calculating these risks as he planned his next moves vis-à-vis the situation in Ukraine

and deterring U.S. actions. "Russia certainly has the ability to carry out cyber attacks against U.S. systems, but also very much wants to avoid direct confrontation with the United States through deliberate acts that might result in their loss of 'escalation control,'" the former intelligence analyst told Newsweek. "Attacks targeting U.S. critical infrastructure systems would almost certainly prompt more serious reprisals from the Biden administration, something Putin wants to avoid, as he'll likely seek to keep conflict confined to Ukraine." Given past cyber attacks Washington has attributed to Moscow and the current level of escalation, however, others emphasized a need to reinforce digital defenses. "Russia has telegraphed that they are willing to attack critical infrastructure here in the U.S.," Brian Harrell, who served as former Department of Homeland Security Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection before his resignation in August 2020, told Newsweek. "The private sector should work to understand enemy tactics, including spear-phishing and brute force attacks while conducting proactive threat hunting efforts," he added. "We have absolutely entered a heightened period of awareness given the threats that have been made and the demonstrated attacks we've seen from the Russian GRU and Foreign Intelligence Service." Mike McNerney, who serves as senior vice president of security at Resilience Insurance, a San Francisco-based firm that offers cybersecurity and insurance services, commended the Department of Homeland Security's Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency for having set out to prepare the private sector for such attacks, regardless of their origin. "CISA is absolutely doing the right thing by telling US companies to be prepared against cyber threats," McNerney told Newsweek. "While Russia is unlikely to escalate tensions with the U.S. right now by launching cyber attacks here, there is also the possibility of opportunistic attacks from criminal groups." Kyiv has already accused Moscow of employing covert cyber tactics throughout the course of the current dispute, which first began to grab global attention in March of last year and then again in November as up to 100,000 Russian troops amassed near the country's restive border with Ukraine, where Russia-aligned separatists have been active since 2014. An apparent cyber attack gripped the post-Soviet Eastern European state earlier this month, but Russian officials have dismissed any allegations their government was behind the incident. "We are nearly accustomed to the fact that Ukrainians are blaming everything on Russia, even their bad weather," Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov told reporters last week, according to the state-run Tass Russian News Agency. As Washington and Moscow struggle to find common ground in talks, the Biden administration has also publicly the likelihood of Russia waging cyberwarfare, though often in the context of actions that would target Ukraine itself. In an interview with NBC News on Sunday, Secretary of State Antony Blinken warned that "in the event that there is a renewed Russian incursion, Russian forces going into Ukraine, there is going to be a swift, a severe, and united response" and also threatened such a reaction in response to other things "Russia could do short of sending forces into Ukraine again to try to destabilize or topple the government – cyber attacks, hybrid means, et cetera." In Ukraine, officials have sought to downplay the threat of any major escalation on the horizon, even as three embassies in Kyiv, those of Australia, the United Kingdom and the U.S., sent diplomats out of the country. On Monday, Ukrainian National Security Council Secretary Alexey Danilov called on those in the media "to turn down the heat." That same day, Peskov too criticized what he called "information hysteria" when it came to the situation between Russia and Ukraine. **He placed the blame on the U.S. and NATO, however, and said Western powers were also responsible for real-world provocations as well. "As for concrete actions, we see the statements published by NATO about the increase of the contingent and relocations of forces and means to the eastern flank,"** Peskov said. **"All this leads to an escalation of tensions."**

China Focus DA vs Biotechnology

The Shell in the Core Files works for all AFF's

2NC/1NR Extensions:

Use the extensions in the Core Files, plus those below

NATO is Failing to even complete its main purpose. More action items fail.

Berry 2019. "Empty Meetings and Broken Promises: How NATO is Failing to do its Job." Berry, Oscar. November 6, 2019. Harvard International Review. [Empty Meetings and Broken Promises: How NATO is Failing to do its Job](#)

Ever since its foundation in 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has had a straightforward strategy to maintain peace in Europe: "keep the Soviet Union out, the United States in, and the Germans down,". **For the past 70 years, this strategy has been incredibly successful, preventing interstate wars between its member nations,** forcing the United States to maintain a large military presence in Europe, **and keeping the Soviet Union isolated,** eventually leading to their total collapse. **However, in recent years, NATO has been suffering from a crisis of purpose, and many of its members are no longer convinced of the value of being in the alliance.** While the most inflammatory example of this has been President Donald Trump's position that NATO has become "obsolete", **the truth is that the organization is facing serious structural problems that are inhibiting its ability to ensure European security.**

In 2014, the pro-Russian Ukrainian government was toppled by a massive protest movement. In the chaotic aftermath, Russian special forces seized the strategically significant state of Crimea and helped two eastern states break off and form an independent pro-Russian nation. Ever since, Ukraine has been engaged in a protracted "soft war" against militias and secret military units, supplied and armed by Russia, that has led to the deaths of tens of thousands and been a constant source of instability in [Kiev](#). While Ukraine is not a member of NATO and is therefore not subject to its protections, **Russia's aggressive actions have made neighboring nations fearful of being next on the target list, consequently dividing the military alliance on how to secure it's eastern front from its old enemy.**

Case in point, Germany was once the frontline against the Soviet Union during the Cold War. However, with the dissolution of the USSR, it is now separated from its successor state Russia by nations such as Poland, Ukraine, and the Baltic States, and it no longer faces a direct physical threat from the Red Army. As a result, Germany has slashed its spending on defense, disbanded dozens of brigades, and resisted calls by the US and those same former-Soviet nations to provide concrete military support to shore up NATO's new front line in the east from recent Russian aggression. Although the two are not consistently cooperative allies, **Germany's economic growth and subsequent need for more markets have driven it to engage in more long-term**

cooperation with Russia. For example, while it has sanctioned Russia over its invasion of eastern Ukraine, it has also partnered with Moscow to build a massive new pipeline in Nord Stream 2, which would compound Europe's energy dependence on the east, **and has continually tried to negotiate to remove those same sanctions on Russia.** NATO members **France, Italy, Hungary and Turkey, just to name a few, have also shown themselves to be hesitant to categorize Russia as an enemy and blocked moves within the organization to mobilize more resources and forces to counter the perceived threat from the east.**

On the other hand, ever since Russia's 2014 invasion of eastern Ukraine, NATO members Poland and Romania have been front and center in trying to resist Russian pressure imposed on former Soviet nations. **While NATO nations have joined together to condemn and sanction Russia for its actions as well as rotate more troops into Poland and the Baltic countries for training exercises, these eastern nations have long been demanding something more concrete: permanently stationed armed brigades. These nations believe that current NATO actions are wildly insufficient to counter the growing Russian threat, and have become increasingly exasperated at the lack of concerted action taken by the alliance.** The **United States is also in agreement and has continually been frustrated by NATO members' lack of military preparedness and investment in their own defense.** Even though the old days of the Cold War are long gone, US foreign policy still identifies Russia as an enemy to be contained, and has been eager to support former-Soviet nations defending themselves against Putin's ambitions. **However, as all matters of policy and military deployment have to be made by consensus from NATO's 29 members, and with wildly divergent priorities from all sides, members have increasingly taken to simply bypassing the NATO decision-making**

In the face of increasing Russian pressure and a lack of concerted action by NATO, Poland has reached out to the United States directly for protection. After a relatively short negotiation period, the US has deployed two new infantry brigades to Polish bases, strengthened its armored contingent in the region, and agreed on a plan to build a new forward-deployment base in Poland which would house an additional 1,000 US troops. With the speed at which these decisions were taken, other nations have fallen into a similar pattern of negotiations.

Just last month, Romania announced that it was going to build a new military base close to the Black Sea Coast to serve as a forward deployment point for US troops stationed nearby. Like Poland, it fears Russian attempts to restore its prior control over the region, such as its covert invasion of eastern Ukraine in 2014. Bulgaria too is building up its military forces, partnering with the US to invest in expanding one of its major bases and purchasing a large number of tanks and missile systems from the United States. Lithuania has agreed to host a rotating US motorized brigade and purchased new US military equipment to train with. Yet it is significant that these decisions were made between Romanian and Bulgarian and US defense officials. **Just like so many other security decisions these days, they were made outside, not inside, the NATO framework, further demonstrating its debilitating ability to galvanize concerted action.**

All of this is not to say that NATO is or is not obsolete, merely that, in its current structure, the alliance is failing to provide on its guarantee of security and protection. While the current discussion over the purpose of the alliance may have been inflamed by Washington, the source of NATO's problems run far deeper and are rooted in its failure to adequately defend against the threat of a seemingly resurgent Russia. It is therefore no wonder that many are increasingly questioning the purpose of the alliance to their respective nations, and it is a question that must be addressed seriously if NATO wants to survive.

Nuclear Modernization DA vs Biotechnology

The shell in the Core Files already includes biotechnology

2NC/1NR Extensions

USe Berry 2019 above

CP vs. Biotechnology

1NC Shell-Unilateral Counterplan

Text: The United States federal government should restrict the development and use of germline genetic engineering.

B. The counterplan solves – US action alone is sufficient to solve the case

Morrison and Bliss 2021 (J. Stephen Morrison and Katherine E. Bliss, Senior Vice President and Director, Global Health Policy Center, Katherine is Senior Fellow and Director, Immunizations and Health Systems Resilience, Global Health Policy Center 4-14-2021, Center for Strategic & International Studies, The Time Is Now for U.S. Global Leadership on Covid-19 Vaccines, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/time-now-us-global-leadership-covid-19-vaccines>, 6-24-2022) SCade

A Pivot Point of U.S. Confidence

The United States should launch a signature global initiative on Covid-19 vaccine supply, delivery, and demand, propelled by high-level U.S. diplomacy and combined with a robust strategy with concrete, quantifiable goals. The **Biden** administration **is on track to reach a pivot point** of confidence in managing the domestic epidemic over the course of the summer, and **it should seize that opportunity to escalate its international engagement** while attending to the ongoing domestic challenges and **making the case for U.S. global engagement** to the American people. The **Biden** administration **has already taken important steps to support the global vaccination effort** but should do more, quickly, to lay the diplomatic and operational groundwork, leveraging the global leadership role of the Office of the President and President Biden's personal commitment. **The administration should signal its intent to begin to scale up the sharing of vaccine doses with lower- and middle-income countries,** beginning at the earliest possible moment and accelerating through the fall. It should work with international partners to develop an international coalitional effort to bring greater transparency and accountability to the global vaccine marketplace and to create voluntary incentives for technology transfer to increase regional manufacturing capacity. It should **prioritize improving production, quality control, and pricing to ensure equitable access to vaccines.** And it should spearhead innovations that will strengthen partner country readiness and increase public trust and confidence in vaccines and vaccine demand. These are fundamentally ethical, economic, and national security matters. **Concerted U.S. action** internationally **will** strengthen the protection of Americans at home but also **lift the threat posed by the pandemic** to the world's most vulnerable populations, **expedite the reopening of the global economy, and enhance U.S. influence** in shaping solutions that align with U.S. values and interests. These goals can be advanced while epidemic controls are consolidated at home. And even in the setting of a successful domestic vaccination campaign, failure to adequately address critical vaccine shortages abroad means extended time periods for Covid-19 transmission globally. This longer pandemic window will accentuate human suffering, hamper global economic development, continue to limit international travel for at least the next one to two years, and increase the risk of vaccine-escape variants that can undermine control in the United States and globally.

C. Net Benefit: The net benefit is the...

Russia DA - The Counterplan does not provoke Russian Aggression because the US is the sole actor on the Plan. Russia would not fear NATO expansion.

China DA - The Counterplan has no tradeoff with NATO's focus on China because NATO is not involved in the Plan. NATO can focus on China with the US simultaneously does the Plan

Nuclear Modernization DA - The Counterplan has no security cooperation, so there would be no tradeoff with the DOD budget.

D. The Counterplan is distinct from the affirmative because it does NOT include security cooperation with NATO. The counterplan has the U.S. government restrict the use of LAWS without NATO's involvement. Countries look to the U.S. for military technology, so other countries will follow.

2NC/1NR Extensions

US Global Leadership has Returned

Wike, Et all 2021 Wike, Richard, et al. "America's Image Abroad Rebounds with Transition from Trump to Biden." June 10, 2021. Pew Research Center.
[America's Image Abroad Rebounds With Transition From Trump to Biden | Pew Research Center](#)

The election of Joe Biden as president has led to a dramatic shift in America's international image.

Throughout Donald Trump's presidency, publics around the world held the United States in low regard, with most opposed to his foreign policies. This was especially true among key American allies and partners. **Now, a new Pew Research Center survey of 16 publics finds a significant uptick in ratings for the U.S., with strong support for Biden and several of his major policy initiatives.**

In each of the 16 publics surveyed, **more than six-in-ten say they have confidence in Biden to do the right thing in world affairs. Looking at 12 nations surveyed both this year and in 2020, a median of 75% express confidence in Biden,** compared with 17% for Trump last year.

During the past two decades, presidential transitions have had a major impact on overall attitudes toward the U.S. When Barack Obama took office in 2009, ratings improved in many nations compared with where they had been during George W. Bush's administration, and when Trump entered the White House in 2017, ratings declined sharply. **This year, U.S. favorability is up again: Whereas a median of just 34% across 12 nations had a favorable overall opinion of the U.S. last year, a median of 62% now hold this view.**

In France, for example, just 31% expressed a positive opinion of the U.S. last year, matching the poor ratings from March 2003, at the height of U.S.-France tensions over the Iraq War. This year, 65% see the U.S. positively, approaching the high ratings that characterized the Obama era. **Improvements of 25 percentage points or more are also found in Germany, Japan, Italy, the Netherlands and Canada.**

Still, attitudes toward the U.S. vary considerably across the publics surveyed. For instance, only about half in Singapore and Australia have a favorable opinion of the U.S., and just 42% of New Zealanders hold this view. And while 61% see the U.S. favorably in Taiwan, this is actually down slightly from 68% in a 2019 poll.